Leticia Castillo v. Natalie Aguirre, et al

Case Number

24CV01098      

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 04/15/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Demurrer To Plaintiff’s Complaint

Tentative Ruling

Leticia Castillo v. Natalie Aguirre, et al.

Case No. 24CV01098      

Hearing Date: April 15, 2024                                      

HEARING:              Demurrer To Plaintiff’s Complaint

                                                           

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff Leticia Castillo: Self Represented

                             For Defendants Natalie Aguirre and Deven Lopez: Mark Cardona, Legal Aid Foundation of Santa Barbara County

TENTATIVE RULING:

The demurrer of defendants to plaintiff’s complaint is sustained with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall file and serve any first amended complaint on or before April 22, 2024.

Background:

On January 19, 2024, plaintiff Leticia Castillo filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against defendants Natalie Aguirre and Deven Lopez (collectively, defendants). As alleged in the complaint:

Plaintiff is the master tenant of premises located at 605 Kentia Avenue, Apartment 1 (the premises), which is within the city limits of Santa Barbara, California. (Compl., ¶¶ 3(a) & (b)(1), 4.) Under an oral agreement made with plaintiff on June 22, 2022, defendants were going to stay at the premises for a few days but have not left. (Compl., ¶¶ 6(a)(1) [handwritten allegation]; 6(b).) The tenancy is subject to Civil Code section 1946.2 (the Tenant Protection Act of 2019 or the Act). (Compl., ¶¶ 7(b).)

The lease was later changed when plaintiff asked defendant for monthly rent in the amount of $800 but defendants did not accept plaintiff’s offer. (Compl., ¶ 6(d).) There exists no agreement for defendants to stay at the premises. (Compl., ¶ 6(d).)

On February 22, 2024, plaintiff posted on the premises, gave to a person found residing at the premises, and mailed to defendants a copy of a 3-day notice to quit (the 3-day notice). (Compl., ¶¶ 9(a)(4), 9(e), 10(a)(3), & Exhs. 2 & 3.) The 3-day notice included an election of forfeiture. (Compl., ¶ 9(d).) The period stated in the 3-day notice expired at the end of the day on February 27, 2024, and defendants failed to comply with its requirements by that date. (Compl., ¶ 9(b)(1) & (2).) The tenancy was terminated for at-fault just cause pursuant to Civil Code section 1946.2, subdivision (b)(1). (Compl., ¶ 8(a).)

Defendants have filed a demurrer to plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that plaintiff has failed to plead compliance with, or an exemption from compliance with, Santa Barbara Municipal Code section 26.50 or the Act’s just cause provisions and failed to provide defendants an opportunity to cure the violation stated in the 3-day notice. Plaintiff opposes the demurrer. 

Analysis:

On demurrer, the court determines whether the complaint “alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action ….” (T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 162.) The court treats a demurrer “as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, it does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.” (Travelers Indem. Co. of Connecticut v. Navigators Specialty Ins. Co. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 341, 358, citing Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) The court also accepts as true facts that may be inferred from those expressly alleged and facts appearing in exhibits attached to the complaint. (McMahon v. Craig (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1509; Mead v. Sanwa Bank California (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 561, 567.) If the complaint states a cause of action, it is good against a demurrer. (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38.)

An action for unlawful detainer is a summary proceeding authorized and governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 1161 et seq. (Underwood v. Corsino (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 132, 135.) The statutory scheme is “intended and designed to provide an expeditious remedy for the recovery of possession of real property.” (Larson v. City and County of San Francisco (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1297.) The party asserting a right to possession of real property must strictly comply with statutory requirements and relief not statutorily authorized may not be granted. (Dr. Leevil, LLC v. Westlake Health Care Center (2018) 6 Cal.5th 474, 480.)

Defendants contend that the 3-day notice fails to state in full the facts and circumstances constituting just cause for terminating the subject tenancy. Therefore, defendants argue, plaintiff has failed to allege compliance with Santa Barbara Municipal Code (the Municipal Code) sections 26.50.010, subdivision (A), which prohibits an owner of a rental unit from terminating the tenancy of a tenant who has continuously and lawfully occupied a rental unit for 12 months “without just cause stated in full in the termination notice”, and section 26.50.040, subdivision (A), which requires a written notice to terminate a tenancy to “state in full the facts and circumstances constituting the at-fault just cause or no-fault just cause for termination.” Defendants also assert that plaintiff has failed to allege an excuse from compliance with the provisions of the Municipal Code.

Defendants also contend that plaintiff has failed to allege service of a 3-day notice to cure any violation with respect to the keeping of a dog at the premises by defendants, which defendants argue is a curable lease violation, before serving the 3-day notice. Therefore, defendants argue, plaintiff has failed to allege compliance with subdivision (c) of Civil Code section 1946.2 which requires an owner to “first give notice of the violation to the tenant with an opportunity to cure the violation pursuant to paragraph (3) of Section 1161 of the Code of Civil Procedure” before issuing a notice to terminate a tenancy for just cause that is a “curable lease violation[.]” (Civ. Code, § 1946.2, subd. (c).)

In the 3-day notice, plaintiff alleges that defendants “have not entered in any rental agreement” with plaintiff, that plaintiff has “repeatedly told [defendants] to find other housing”, and that defendants “have a dog that is not allowed on the property.” (Compl., Exh. 2 & 3.)

As a preliminary matter, the court notes that plaintiff does not allege the existence of an agreement between the parties to this action, whether oral or written, which relates to whether defendants may keep a dog at the premises. Because there exist no allegations from which the court may infer an agreement regarding the maintaining of a dog at the premises, defendants’ contentions regarding the existence of such an agreement or whether plaintiff waived any such agreement constitute extrinsic matters that the court may not consider on demurrer. (Executive Landscape Corp. v. San Vicente Country Villas IV Assn. (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 496, 499-500 [also noting that the court is precluded from weighing disputed facts on demurrer].)

Unlawful detainer actions deal solely with the issue of the right to possession of real property. (Coyne v. De Leo (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 801, 805.) Accordingly, the remedy of unlawful detainer “is available in only three situations: to a lessor against a lessee for unlawfully holding over or for breach of a lease; to an owner against an employee, agent, or licensee whose relationship has terminated; and to a purchaser at an execution sale, a sale by foreclosure, or a sale under a power of sale in a mortgage or deed of trust against the former owner and possessor.” (Greene v. Municipal Court (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 446, 450; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 1161.)

Subject to exceptions, the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship is an essential prerequisite to the maintenance of an action for unlawful detainer. (Castaic Studios, LLC v. Wonderland Studios LLC (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 209, 217; see also Taylor v. Nu Digital Marketing, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 283, 289 [the court must determine whether the agreement between the parties “created a landlord-tenant relationship”].) “The distinguishing characteristics of a leasehold estate are that the lease gives the lessee the exclusive possession of the premises against all the world, including the owner….” (Howard v. County of Amador (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 962, 972.) If the agreement between the parties does not grant exclusive possession of the premises, the interest created by the agreement is not a leasehold estate or tenancy. (See, e.g., San Jose Parking, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1321, 1328 [no exclusive possession where contracting party was required to provide access for customers of adjacent owners].)

“ ‘All landlord-tenant relationships share in common the basic conveyance and contract elements. But each type of tenancy is distinguishable by certain unique characteristics.’ [Citation.]” (Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1032 (Spinks).) Relevant here, “ ‘ “[a] tenancy at will is an estate which simply confers a right to the possession of premises leased for such indefinite period as both parties shall determine such possession shall continue.... The tenant at will is in possession by right with the consent of the landlord either express or implied…. His estate is a leasehold and he holds in subordination to the title of the landlord.” [Citation.] And “A permissive occupation of real estate, where no rent is reserved or paid and no time agreed on to limit the occupation, is a tenancy at will.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Borden v. Stiles (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 337, 347-348 (Borden); see also Miller v. Elite Ins. Co. (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 739, 750 [“a tenancy … may be created by occupancy by consent”]; Miller v. Smith (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 114, 117 [entry onto premises with owner’s permission while lease negotiations are ongoing creates a tenancy at will].)

The allegations of the complaint demonstrate that plaintiff gave consent for defendants to reside at the premises for an effectively uncertain term (i.e., “a few days”), notwithstanding the alleged absence of an agreement for the payment of rent by defendants. Based on plaintiff’s allegation that she is the master tenant at the premises, it can be reasonably inferred that plaintiff conveyed to defendants a possessory interest in the premises. (See, e.g., Vallely Investments, L.P. v. BancAmerica Commercial Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 816, 823.) In addition, defendants’ occupancy of the premises with plaintiff’s consent is sufficient to create a tenancy at will notwithstanding whether there is a valid lease between the parties. (Ellingson v. Walsh, O'Connor & Barneson (1940) 15 Cal.2d 673, 675.) For these reasons, a reasonable interpretation of the complaint shows that there exists a landlord-tenant relationship between the parties which may be characterized as a tenancy at will.

Though a tenancy at will is terminable at the will of either party, a tenant does not begin to hold unlawfully until the tenancy is terminated. (Borden, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at pp. 347-348.) To terminate a tenancy at will, a landlord must give “notice in writing to the tenant, in the manner prescribed by Section 1162 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to remove from the premises within a period of not less than 30 days, to be specified in the notice.” (Civ. Code, § 789; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 1161, subd. (1); Tracy v. Donovan (1918) 37 Cal.App. 350, 351.)

The Act “added sections 1946.2, 1947.12, and 1947.13 to the Civil Code, effective January 1, 2020.” (Borden, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 346.) (Note: Undesignated code references shall be to the Civil Code unless otherwise indicated.) Under section 1946.2, “after a tenant has continuously and lawfully occupied a residential real property for 12 months, the owner of the residential real property shall not terminate the tenancy without just cause, which shall be stated in the written notice to terminate tenancy.” (Civ. Code, § 1946.2, subd. (a).) Relevant here, subdivision (a) of section 1946.2 applies only if “[a]ll of the tenants have continuously and lawfully occupied the residential real property for 12 months or more.” (Civ. Code, § 1946.2, subd. (a)(1).)

“The Legislature placed section 1946.2 within Chapter 2 (§§ 1940-1954.1) of Title 5 of the Civil Code.” (Borden, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 348.) Under section 1940, Chapter 2 applies to “all persons who hire dwelling units….” (Civ. Code, § 1940, subd. (a); Borden, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 348.) The term “dwelling unit” means “a structure or the part of a structure that is used as a home, residence, or sleeping place by one person who maintains a household or by two or more persons who maintain a common household.” (Civ. Code, § 1940, subd. (c).)

Title 5 of the Civil Code begins with section 1925 which provides that a “[h]iring is a contract by which one gives to another the temporary possession and use of property, other than money, for reward, and the latter agrees to return the same to the former at a future time.” (Civ. Code, § 1925; Borden, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 348.) The terms “hire” and “hiring” as used in sections 1925 and 1940 require the giving of a “reward” in exchange for the transfer of temporary possession and use of the subject property. (Id. at p. 349 [a “hiring” of real property can also include circumstances in which temporary possession and use of the property is given in exchange for something other than rent such as work to be performed for the owner]; Spinks, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1035 [disputed factual issue existed as to whether plaintiff was a “hirer” of an apartment purportedly received as part of plaintiff’s compensation].) Moreover, occupancy of a premises with the consent of its owner “implies an agreement on the part of the tenant to pay a reasonable rent for such occupation.” (Ross v. City of Long Beach (1944) 24 Cal.2d 258, 263.)

It can be reasonably inferred from the express allegations of the complaint that the premises is a “dwelling unit” as that term is defined in section 1940, subdivision (c). However, the express allegations of the complaint also show that defendants did not pay rent for the premises. Furthermore, there are no allegations to suggest that plaintiff gave defendants temporary possession and use of the premises in exchange for a “reward” other than the payment of rent (such as compensation for work to be performed by defendants on behalf of plaintiff). For these reasons, the allegations of the complaint show that defendants did not “hire” the premises for purposes of section 1940, subdivision (c). Therefore, because section 1946.2 applies only to persons to “hire” dwelling units, its provisions do not apply to the premises under the circumstances alleged in the complaint.

Section 1946.2, subdivision (e), also includes express exemptions applicable to enumerated types of “residential circumstances”. (See Civ. Code, § 1946.2, subd. (e)(1)-(9).) Included among these exemptions are “[h]ousing accommodations in which the tenant shares bathroom or kitchen facilities with the owner who maintains their principal residence at the residential real property.” (Civ. Code, § 1946.2, subd. (e)(2).) Based on plaintiff’s express allegation that she is the master tenant at the premises, it can be reasonably inferred that plaintiff maintains her principal residence at the premises. Though plaintiff does not expressly allege that the parties shared bathroom or kitchen facilities, to the extent it can be reasonably inferred or plaintiff intends to allege that bathroom or kitchen facilities at the premises were shared by the parties, it would appear that the premises is also exempt from the Act’s just cause provisions under section 1946.2, subdivision (e).

Furthermore, section 1946.2 does not apply to “[r]esidential real property subject to a local ordinance requiring just cause for termination of a residential tenancy adopted or amended after September 1, 2019, that is more protective than this section[.]” (Civ. Code, § 1946.2, subd. (g)(1)(B).) In such cases, “the local ordinance shall apply.” (Ibid.)

A local ordinance is “more protective” if the just cause for terminating the tenancy is consistent with section 1946.2, “further limits the reasons for termination of a residential tenancy, provides for higher relocation assistance amounts, or provides additional tenant protections that are not prohibited by any other provision of law”, or if “[t]he local government has made a binding finding within their local ordinance that the ordinance is more protective than the provisions of this section.” (Civ. Code, § 1946.2, subd. (g)(1)(B)(i)-(iii).) “A residential real property shall not be subject to both a local ordinance requiring just cause for termination of a residential tenancy and [section 1946.2].” (Civ. Code, § 1946.2, subd. (g)(2).)

Santa Barbara Ordinance No. 5979 (the ordinance), which amended Title 26 of the Santa Barbara Municipal Code (the Municipal Code) by adding chapter 26.50 to require just cause for termination of a residential tenancy as provided in Municipal Code section 26,50.010 et seq., was adopted by the Santa Barbara City Council on December 8, 2020. (Santa Barbara Ord. No. 5979, adding ch. 26.50, § 26.50.010 et seq. to Santa Barbara Mun. Code.) In the ordinance, the Santa Barbara City Council made a binding finding that the ordinance is more protective than the provisions of Civil Code section 1946.2 because the ordinance “provides higher relocation assistance amounts than state law” and “provides additional tenant protections by making permanent the temporary protections provided under AB 1482, which would otherwise sunset in 2030.” (Id., Section 1, ¶ D.) As the complaint alleges that the premises is within the City of Santa Barbara, and provided that the premises is not exempt under any provision of the Municipal Code, the provisions of Municipal Code Chapter 26.50 apply to the premises. For this additional reason, section 1946.2 does not apply to the premises.

Under Municipal Code section 26.50.010, subdivision (A), an “owner of a rental unit” is prohibited from terminating the tenancy of a tenant who has continuously and lawfully occupied a rental unit for 12 months “without just cause stated in full in the termination notice.” (Santa Barbara Mun. Code, § 26.50.010, subd. (A).) The term “rental unit” means “[a]ny unit in any real property … that is rented or available for rent for residential use or occupancy….” (Santa Barbara Mun. Code, § 26.50.070.) The term “owner” includes “any person, acting as principal or through an agent, having the right to offer residential real property for rent, and includes a predecessor in interest to the owner….” (Ibid.; Civ. Code, § 1954.51, subd. (b).)

Municipal Code section 26.50.070 includes in its definition of “rent” the “consideration charged or received” for the rental unit. (Santa Barbara Mun. Code, § 26.50.070.) In addition, a “rental unit” is defined as a unit that is rented or available for rent. (Santa Barbara Mun. Code, § 26.50.070.) Under Municipal Code section 26.50.050, subdivision (A), the owner of a rental unit must make a relocation assistant payment if a termination notice is based upon no-fault just cause. The relocation assistance payment required to be made under the Municipal Code is based on the rent charged for the rental unit. (Santa Barbara Mun. Code, § 26.50.020, subd. (A).)

Considering the just cause provisions of Chapter 26.50 of the Municipal Code as a whole, including the definitions of rent and rental unit, together with the requirements relating to the making of relocation assistance payments by an owner of a rental unit, the plain language of the just cause provisions of the Municipal Code indicate that these provisions apply only to rental units for which rent is charged and received by the landlord. (See Almond Alliance of California v. Fish and Game Commission (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 337, 364 [general discussion of the doctrine of noscitur a sociis].) For the same reasons further discussed above, there are no allegations in the complaint establishing that defendants paid “rent” for the premises or that the premises is a “rental unit” to which Municipal Code section 26.50.010, subdivision (A), applies.

In addition, because it can be reasonably inferred from the express allegations of the complaint that plaintiff resides at the premises with defendants, to the extent plaintiff intends to allege expressly or by inference that the parties shared bathroom or kitchen facilities at the premises as described in Municipal Code section 26.50.030, subdivision (D), the premises would be exempt from the just cause provisions of Municipal Code Chapter 26.50. (See Santa Barbara Mun. Code, § 26.50.030 [describing rental units to which Chapter 26.50 does not apply].)

Subject to exceptions, if a property is not subject to the Act or a local ordinance, a landlord generally need not state a reason for serving a notice to terminate a tenancy. (See, e.g., S.P. Growers Assn. v. Rodriguez (1976) 17 Cal.3d 719, 730 [“[a] landlord may normally evict a tenant for any reason or for no reason at all, but he may not evict for an improper reason”]; accord, Barela v. Superior Court (1981) 30 Cal.3d 244, 249.) For all reasons further discussed above, as the just cause provisions of the Act and of Chapter 26.50 of the Municipal Code do not apply to the premises based on the allegations of the complaint, the 3-day notice is not defective for failure to state in full all facts and circumstances constituting just cause for terminating the tenancy of defendants. Therefore, the grounds for defendants’ demurrer based on the just cause provisions of the Municipal Code are without merit.

Notwithstanding that the 3-day notice attached to the complaint is not invalid or deficient for failure to comply with section 1946.2 or with the just cause provisions of the Municipal Code as argued by defendants, plaintiff must allege proper service of the requisite notice before a judgment for possession of the premises may be obtained. (See Borsuk v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 607, 616-617 [proper service of  written notice is an element of a cause of action for unlawful detainer under Code of Civil Procedure section 1161]; Levitz Furniture Co. v. Wingtip Communications, Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1038 [a written notice terminating a tenancy is valid “only if the landlord strictly complies with the provisions of section 1161”].)

In the complaint, plaintiff has failed to allege service of the minimum 30-day notice required under Code of Civil Procedure section 1161, subdivision (1), and Civil Code section 789. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to allege strict compliance with statutory requirements. For this reason, the court will sustain the demurrer of defendants.

In her opposition to the demurrer, plaintiff states that she served defendants with a 30-day notice after defendants refused to agree to a month-to-month lease. (Opp. at pp. 1, l. 27-p. 2, l. 8.) As it appears that the complaint can be amended by alleging and including a copy of the 30-day notice purportedly served by plaintiff on defendants, the court will grant plaintiff leave to amend. (See Cooper v. Leslie Salt Co. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 627, 636; Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) Plaintiff may amend the complaint to allege service of the notice and any additional facts that may be necessary to more clearly demonstrate an exemption from the just cause provisions of the Municipal Code as further discussed herein. (See Harris v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023 [plaintiff may amend the complaint “only as authorized by the court’s order].)