Carpinteria Unified School Dist vs The Commission on Professional Competence
Carpinteria Unified School Dist vs The Commission on Professional Competence
Case Number
24CV01068
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Fri, 11/07/2025 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Motion: Attorney Fees
Tentative Ruling
For the reasons set forth below:
The motion of John Hotchner for attorneys’ fees is granted in the reduced amount of $535,425.00, to be paid by Carpinteria Unified School District to John Hotchner’s attorneys of record, Bush Gottlieb.
The court declines to rule on the request for additional costs, pending the timely service of a memorandum of costs and any challenge to claimed costs contained therein.
Background:
This action commenced on February 26, 2024, by the filing of the petition for Writ of Administrative Mandate by petitioner Carpinteria Unified School District (the “District”) against respondent The Commission on Professional Competence (“Commission” or “CPC”). John Hotchner (“Hotchner”) is the real party in interest.
As alleged in the petition:
On March 18, 2022, the District issued a Notice of Unprofessional Conduct and Unsatisfactory Performance (“Notice”) for inappropriate and unprofessional conduct. (Pet., ¶ 8.) The Notice directed Hotchner “to, among other things, maintain professional boundaries with students; refrain from stating or implying that students are interested in anything other than a professional teacher-student relationship with him; refrain from stating or implying that he is interested in anything other than a professional teacher-student relationship; refrain from making comments about students interacting with others sexually or romantically or being sexually or romantically interested in others; refrain from making comments about or discussing spending time with students outside of school; refrain from touching students or their belongings; refrain from administering student dress code, ‘coding’ students, or speaking or communicating with students about their dress in any manner; refrain from teasing and picking on students; refrain from arguing with students and/or engaging in a power struggle with them; and refrain from removing students from another teacher’s class or reprimanding students in another teacher’s class or on campus.” (Ibid.)
On September 13, 2022, the Director of Human Resources signed and filed a verified Statement of Charges (“SOC”) with the District’s Board of Education (“Board”) charging that cause exists to immediately suspend Hotchner without pay and dismiss him from employment. (Pet., ¶ 9.) The Board approved the SOC and found that there was cause to dismiss Hotchner for immoral conduct, dishonesty, unprofessional conduct, and persistent violation of or refusal to obey regulations prescribed by the Board or the State. (Ibid.)
On September 14, 2022, the District served Hotchner with notice that the Board was suspending him without pay, effective immediately, and intended to dismiss him from employment at the expiration of 30 days from the date of service of the notice, unless Hotchner demanded a hearing. (Pet., ¶ 10.)
On October 14, 2022, Hotchner filed a Notice of Defense and Request for Hearing with Board and a Motion for Immediate Reversal of Suspension, alleging that the SOC failed to allege willful refusal to perform or immoral conduct sufficient to support an immediate unpaid suspension. (Pet., ¶ 11.) On November 16, 2022, the Motion was denied, finding that the District “alleged sufficient facts in the Statement of Charges that, if true, would constitute immoral conduct and support immediate suspension . . .” (Pet., ¶ 12 & Exh. 1.)
Over several days, from March 13, 2023, until September 1, 2023, the Commission conducted a hearing via videoconference. (Pet., ¶ 13.)
On December 26, 2023, the Commission issued its decision finding that Hotchner had engaged in conduct that was inappropriate, unprofessional, had no legitimate educational purpose, had the effect of making students uncomfortable or embarrassing them, and which negatively impacted students. (Pet., ¶ 15.) Despite these findings, the Commission concluded that dismissal was not warranted because the District failed to establish Hotchner was unfit to teach, and that the District failed to establish Hotchner’s actions were immoral, that he engaged in acts of dishonesty, that he engaged in persistent violation of or refusal to obey school laws, or that he was unfit for service. (Ibid.) As a result, the Commission dismissed the SOC against Hotchner and ordered that the District continue to employ Hotchner. (Ibid. & Exh. 2.)
The District alleges that the Commission’s dismissal was an abuse of discretion, not supported by the Commission’s own findings, conclusions, or the weight of the evidence in the record. (Pet., ¶ 17.)
On April 4, 2024, Hotchner filed his original answer to the petition. On April 24, 2024, Hotchner filed an amended answer to the petition, admitting some allegations, denying some allegations, and asserting six affirmative defenses.
On March 21, 2025, the court denied the District’s writ of mandate.
Hotchner now moves for attorneys’ fees and costs in the total amount of $1,048,063.75 in fees (which includes a lodestar multiplier of 1.75), and $9,569.38 in costs.
The District opposes the motion, arguing that Hotchner fails to prove entitlement to a lodestar multiplier, that Hotchner is not entitled to fees incurred outside of the CPC hearing, that Hotchner incurred fees in a non-CPC proceeding which are not recoverable, and that several of the requested lodestar fees are unreasonable and unnecessary. The District also argues that attorney Dana Martinez’ billing rate of $800 per hour is unreasonable, that the requested fees incurred for preparing the present motion were unreasonable and unnecessary, and that some claimed costs were unnecessarily incurred.
Analysis:
“California follows the ‘American rule,’ under which each party to a lawsuit ordinarily must pay his or her own attorney fees.” (Musaelian v. Adams (2009) 45 Cal.4th 512, 516.) “[A] court has no discretion to award costs not statutorily authorized.” (Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774.)
However, attorneys’ fees are allowable as costs if authorized by “contract,” “statute,” or “law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(A)-(C).)
It appears to be undisputed that Hotchner is entitled to some amount of attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to Education Code section 44944, subdivision (f)(2), which provides:
“If the Commission on Professional Competence determines that the employee should not be dismissed or suspended, the governing board of the school district shall pay the expenses of the hearing, including the cost of the administrative law judge, any costs incurred under paragraphs (2) and (3) of subdivision (e), the reasonable expenses, as determined by the administrative law judge, of the member selected by the governing board of the school district and the member selected by the employee, including, but not limited to, payments or obligations incurred for travel, meals, and lodging, the cost of the substitute or substitutes, if any, for the member selected by the governing board of the school district and the member selected by the employee, and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by the employee.”
When determining prevailing party attorney fees awards: “ ‘A typical formulation is that ‘ “plaintiffs may be considered “ ‘prevailing parties’ ” for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” ’ [Citation.]” (Quiles v. Parent (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1015.)
The CPC and this court determined that Hotchner should not be dismissed from his position. He is therefore the prevailing party.
“[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.)
“[T]rial courts must carefully review attorney documentation of hours expended” in assessing reasonable and necessary attorney fees. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4h 1122, 1132.)
Lodestar Enhancement
The District’s first argument is that Hotchner fails to prove entitlement to a lodestar enhancement. As noted above, Hotchner seeks a lodestar enhancement of 1.75, or $444,243.75 added to the lodestar amount.
“The lodestar adjustment method requires the trial court first to determine a touchstone or lodestar figure based on actual time spent and reasonable hourly compensation for each attorney. [Citations.] “ ‘The touchstone figure may then be augmented or diminished by taking various relevant factors into account, including (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; and (3) the contingent nature of the fee award, based on the uncertainty of prevailing on the merits and of establishing eligibility for the award.’ ” [Citation.]” (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 998.)
Hotchner argues that the three factors support a lodestar enhancement. The court disagrees. This matter was not novel, nor were the questions involved difficult. Hotchner has failed to persuade the court that the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, or that there was a risk due to a contingent fee agreement.
“[T]he trial court is not required to include a fee enhancement to the basic lodestar figure for contingent risk, exceptional skill, or other factors, although it retains discretion to do so in the appropriate case; moreover, the party seeking a fee enhancement bears the burden of proof.” (Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1138.)
The court declines to include any lodestar enhancement.
Fees Incurred Outside the CPC Hearing
The District next argues that Hotchner is not entitled to fees incurred outside the CPC hearing. Specifically, the District seeks to exclude fees incurred: (1) prior to the District’s December 2, 2022, request to set hearing, and (2) incurred in pursuing Hotchner’s separate state court writ proceeding seeking reinstatement and back pay.
“We construe section 44944, subdivision (e) to allow for recovery by [teacher] of expenses, including attorney fees, at all stages of the litigation process if she ultimately prevails. [Citation.]” (Bassett Unified School Dist. v. Commission On Professional Competence (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 1444, 1456.)
While Hotchner is entitled to fees at all stages of the litigation process, the fees must be reasonable and necessary. The District claims that Hotchner should not be able to recover fees incurred prior to December 2, 2022, which consists of: (1) pre-disciplinary related tasks that were performed before the governing Board approved and issued charges, and (2) Hotchner’s unsuccessful motion for immediate reversal and suspension that was heard by a non-CPC administrative law judge.
The court has reviewed the time entries, and considered the arguments of counsel, related to the fees occurring prior to December 2, 2022, and finds the tasks reasonable and necessary. As such, the District’s argument in this regard fails.
Reasonableness of Lodestar Fee Requests
“[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. ‘California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.’ [citation] The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work. [citation] The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. [citation] Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. [citation].” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)
“[T]he [party] . . . seeking fees and costs ‘bear[s] the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.’ [Citation.]’” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320.) “To that end, the court may require [a] defendant . . . to produce records sufficient to provide ‘a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expended. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
- Administrative Tasks Billed by Attorneys and Paralegals
The District argues that Hotchner should not recover multiple items that constitute clerical tasks, in the total amount of $3,980.00. While the court certainly can disallow attorney fees for purely clerical work, the entries cited by the District do not strictly fall into the category of purely clerical work, and the District does not adequately explain why it believes they do. As such, the District’s argument in this regard fails.
- Excessive Time Spent
The District next argues that the claimed attorney’s fees should be reduced due to excessive time spent on tasks including: (1) $12,240.00 of duplicate work performed by attorney Martinez, (2) $7,092.50 for “explaining, researching, and drafting three substantially similar reinstatement letters,” (3) $46,077.50 for reviewing and preparing exhibits, (4) $130,731.00 spent attempting to contact witnesses and witness preparation, (5) $53,730.00 preparing Hotchner for direct testimony, and (6) $15,645.00 preparing a closing argument.
The court has reviewed the billing entries, the District’s exhibit identifying the challenged entries, and the arguments of the parties regarding the District’s claims that Martinez performed duplicate work. The entries for Martinez do not appear to be duplicative of work performed by others. The time for these tasks will be allowed.
The court has reviewed the billing entries, the District’s exhibit identifying the challenged entries, and the arguments of the parties regarding the District’s claims that an excessive amount of time was spent on the three reinstatement letters. In total, Hotchner claims 13.2 hours, at hourly rates ranging from $425 to $800. The letters are attached as Exhibits P, Q, and R. They are very short and basic letters that consist of little in the way of legal authorities or detailed factual information. The court agrees with the District that 13.2 hours is excessive for “explaining, researching, and drafting” the letters. The District argues that this time should be reduced to 2 hours at $425 per hour. What the District fails to appreciate is that some of the entries are more than just researching and drafting the letters. For example, on January 4, 2024, there are entries for attorneys Wojciechowski and Martinez meeting with Hotchner to discuss the next steps in his reinstatement and appeal. After reviewing the entries for the challenged times, the court determines that the challenged amount should be reduced to 5.3 hours at $425.00 per hour (Villalpando time), and 2.5 hours at $650 per hour (Wojciechowski time), for a total of $3,877.50. This results in a reduction of Hotchner’s attorney fees in the amount of $3,215.00.
The court has reviewed the billing entries, the District’s exhibit identifying the challenged entries, and the arguments of the parties regarding the District’s claims that an excessive amount of time was spent reviewing and preparing exhibits. The court agrees with the District that some of the entries appear excessive. For example, the entries of Villalpando indicate that she reviewed the statement of charges on at least 10 occasions. Although the court does understand and appreciate that there was a great deal of documentary discovery and evidence exchanged in this case, it also appears that an inordinate amount of time was spent on reviewing and discussing those documents. The court determines that, after removing the unnecessary and unreasonable amounts, the requested attorney fees for these challenged entries will be reduced by $13,155.00.
The court has reviewed the billing entries, the District’s exhibit identifying the challenged entries, and the arguments of the parties regarding the District’s claims that Hotchner spent excessive time attempting to contact witnesses. As noted above, Hotchner claims attorney fees in the amount of $130,731.00 related to these tasks. While some of the challenged entries appear to have nothing to do with witnesses (for example: “Edit draft of opposition to MIL”), most of the challenged entries are directly related to witness, or potential witness, conversations with those potential witnesses, taking notes regarding the conversations, or preparing witnesses for testimony. While the requested fees do appear large, and a great deal of time is claimed for the tasks, the District has failed to specifically identify any of the claimed time as unreasonable or unnecessary. The time challenged for these tasks will not be reduced.
The court has reviewed the billing entries, the District’s exhibit identifying the challenged entries, and the arguments of the parties regarding the District’s claims that Hotchner’s seeking $53,730.00 (123.3 hours) for testimony preparation is excessive. The court agrees. The entries show multiple entries for drafting direct examination for Hotchner. While the court does understand that many factors influence the modification of examination questions both before and during hearings, those modifications typically only consist of minor amounts of time. Here, attorney Villalpando would typically spend 5.5 hours or more a day, sometimes on consecutive days, drafting the direct exam questions. It is facially unreasonable. After deducting the time that the court deems unnecessary and unreasonable, the time claimed will be reduced by $21,430.00.
The court has reviewed the billing entries, the District’s exhibit identifying the challenged entries, and the arguments of the parties regarding the District’s claims that Hotchner is seeking unreasonable fees for his closing argument. The entries identified by the District total 32.1 hours for a total amount of $15,645.00. This was a case that involved 20 days of hearing testimony and thousands of pages of exhibits. The case involved numerous allegations of improper conduct by Hotchner. The court does not find the time claimed unreasonable or unnecessary. The time challenged for these tasks will not be reduced.
Unnecessary Time Billed
- Motion to Compel
The District argues that the amount claimed should be reduced by disallowing $5,762.50 related to work spent preparing an unnecessary motion to compel, because the District offered to provide student and parent contact information pursuant to a protective order. The District argues that the motion was never filed because Hotchner signed the protective order the day before his deposition. The entries identified by the District include research and attempts to meet and confer regarding concerns of the privacy rights of the students and parents. That is not unreasonable or unnecessary. Likewise, drafting a motion to compel in the event the parties were not able to reach a resolution of those concerns was not unreasonable or unnecessary. The time challenged for those tasks will not be reduced.
- Un-Prosecuted Writ Proceeding
The District’s argument regarding the writ proceeding is addressed above under the heading “Fees Incurred Outside the CPC Hearing.” As noted above, the time claimed will not be reduced.
Time Billed for Unsuccessful Motion for Immediate Reversal of Suspension
The District’s argument in regarding the unsuccessful motion for immediate reversal of suspension is simply that Hotchner should not recover attorneys’ fees because the motion was denied by the Administrative Law Judge.
“ ‘Compensation is ordinarily warranted,’ ” even for unsuccessful litigation forays, “ ‘unless the unsuccessful forays address discrete unrelated claims, are pursued in bad faith, or are pursued incompetently, i.e., are such that a reasonably competent lawyer would not have pursued them. . . . [Citation.]” (Simers v. Los Angeles Times Communications LLC (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 940, 947.)
The court does not find that the unsuccessful MIRS motion was unrelated, pursued in bad faith, or pursued incompetently. The claimed time will not be reduced.
Block Billing
The District argues that fees should be discounted due to block billing.
“Block billing occurs when “ ‘a block of time [is assigned] to multiple tasks rather than itemizing the time spent on each task.’ ” (Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 279.)
“Trial courts retain discretion to penalize block billing when the practice prevents them from discerning which tasks are compensable and which are not.” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1010.)
The court has reviewed the challenged entries and finds that some of the entries are not block billing (such as “prepare for hearing”), but that some of them contain block billing to the point where it is not possible to discern if Hotchner spent an unreasonable amount of time on some of the individual tasks. For example: For November 23, 2022, attorney Villalpando indicates 8.2 hours of time for: “Review documents provided by Hotchner for initial disclosures; determine which documents to produce; email Hotchner re questions re disclosures; email SDM and JW about production of documents.”
After removing the most egregiously block billed entries, the $65,525.00 of challenged entries will be reduced by $27,275.00.
Hourly Rate for Attorney Martinez
The district argues that the $800.00 hourly rate of Martinez is unreasonable. Martinez was not the lead attorney in this case and billed a total of 16.1 hours. She has 25 years of legal experience. In support of her request, Martinez provides declarations from three other attorneys, not involved in this action, testifying as to their hourly rates. The court does not find the attorney declarations helpful as they are based on amounts those attorneys obtained in other non-related cases, mostly in Los Angeles County. The court will base its decision on the reasonable rate for similarly skilled attorneys, providing similar legal services, in Santa Barbara County.
“ ‘In making its calculation [of a reasonable hourly rate], the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees [citation], the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied [citations], and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases.’ ” [Citations.]” (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 41.)
Based on the courts knowledge and familiarity with the Santa Barbara legal market, Martinez’ experience and skill, and the nature of this employment law case, the court finds that, while at the high end of reasonable, Martinez’ hourly rate does fall into the reasonable range. Her hourly rate will not be reduced.
Fees for Preparing the Present Motion
The District argues that the $15,330.00 for preparation of the present motion is unreasonable and should be reduced to reflect 15 to 20 hours of work rather than the 30.3 hours claimed by Hotchner. The court has reviewed the entries and compared it with the motion itself. Facially, the motion should not have taken nearly as much time to prepare as Hotchner’s attorneys claim. The result of removing unreasonable and unnecessary time from the fee request, in this regard, is a reduction of $9,750.00.
Total Recoverable Fees
The breakdown of the fees sought are as follows:
Martinez: 16.1 hours, at $800 per hour, for a total of $12,880.00
Wojciechowski: 231.0 hours, at $650 per hour, for a total of $150,605.00
Surapruik: 144.3 hours, at $500 per hour, for a total of $72,150.00
Villalpando: 851.5 hours, at $425 per hour, for a total of $361,887.50
Wright: 3.1 hours, at $425 per hour, for a total of $1,317.50
Paralegal and LC Work: 24.9 hours, at $200 per hour, for a total of $4,980.00
Total for all claimed work performed: $603,820.00
As noted above, reductions are being applied in the following amounts:
-$3,215.00 related to reinstatement letters;
-$13,155.00 related to reviewing and preparing exhibits;
-$21,430.00 related to Hotchner testimony preparation;
-$27,275.00 for block billing entries; and
-$9,750.00 related to fees for the present motion.
Total reductions: $68,395.00
Total recoverable fees: $603,820.00 – 68,395.00 = $535,425.00
Costs
Hotchner seeks costs in the amount of $9,569.38 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (b), which provides: “Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.”
“A prevailing party who claims costs must serve and file a memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of service of the notice of entry of judgment or dismissal by the clerk under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.5 or the date of service of written notice of entry of judgment or dismissal, or within 180 days after entry of judgment, whichever is first. The memorandum of costs must be verified by a statement of the party, attorney, or agent that to the best of his or her knowledge the items of cost are correct and were necessarily incurred in the case.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(a)(1).)
As Hotchner is the prevailing party, he is entitled to costs. However, to the extent he wishes to obtain costs, as allowable under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, a timely memorandum of costs must be filed and served, which is subject to a motion to tax costs. Therefore, the court will not address claimed costs, other than the attorneys’ fees, at this time.
Hotchner’s Request for Additional Fees
By way of his reply brief, Hotchner requests $8,895.00 in additional attorney fees for attempts at settling the fee issue and drafting the reply. A new request such as that is improper and would deprive the District of its due process rights to oppose the request. As such, it will be denied.