Dallas Dalton, et al. vs. Punta Gorda Apartments

Case Number

24CV00914

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 05/28/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

1) Defendant Willbridge of Santa Barbara, Inc.’s, Demurrer To Plaintiffs’ Complaint; 2) Defendant Willbridge of Santa Barbara, Inc.’s, Motion To Strike Portions Of Plaintiffs’ Complaint

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiffs Dallas Dalton, Ted Munoz, and Keith De Costa: Ilan N. Rosen Janfaza, Law Offices of Ilan N. Rosen Janfaza, A.P.C.

                                   

For Defendant Willbridge of Santa Barbara, Inc.: Scott S. Mizen, Serena L. Nervez, Veatch Carlson, LLP

RULING

(1) For all reasons discussed herein, the demurrer of defendant Willbridge of Santa Barbara, Inc., is sustained, in part as to the first and thirteenth causes of action alleged in plaintiffs’ complaint, with leave to amend. Except as otherwise herein granted, the demurrer is overruled.

(2) For all reasons discussed herein, the motion of defendant Willbridge of Santa Barbara, Inc., to strike portions of plaintiffs’ complaint is granted in part, with leave to amend. To the extent the following allegations are directed or effective as to defendant Willbridge of Santa Barbara, Inc., only, these allegations are stricken from plaintiffs’ complaint: (1) page 15, ll. 3-4 [“entitling Plaintiffs to punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish and set an example of Defendants, and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive”]; (2) page 19, ll. 17-18 [“entitling Plaintiffs to punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish and set an example of Defendants, and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive”]; (3) page 22, ll. 6-7 [“entitling Plaintiffs to punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish and set an example of Defendants, and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive”]; (4) page 25, ll. 25-26 [“entitling Plaintiffs to punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish and set an example of Defendants, and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive”]; (5) page 26, ll. 2-3 [“thereby entitling Plaintiffs to punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial”; (6) page 29, ll. 5-6 [“entitling Plaintiffs to punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish and set an example of Defendants, and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive”]; (7) page 29, ll. 10-11 [“thereby entitling Plaintiffs to punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial”]; (8) page 33, ll. 8-10 [“entitling Plaintiffs to punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish and set an example of Defendants, and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive”]; and (9) prayer for relief, paragraph 9 [“For punitive and exemplary damages according to proof at trial based on Defendants’, and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, willful, malicious, wanton and fraudulent misconduct”].

(3) Plaintiffs shall file and serve a first amended complaint, if any, on or before June 11, 2025.

Background

On February 15, 2024, plaintiffs Dallas Dalton (Dalton), Ted Munoz (Munoz), and Keith De Costa (De Costa) (collectively, plaintiffs) filed a complaint against defendants Punta Gorda Apartments (Punta Gorda), Lyon John Family Trust (the Trust), Willbridge of Santa Barbara (Willbridge), John H. Lyon (Lyon), Lynnelle Williams (Williams), Cynthia Rubio (Rubio), and Louie Perez (Perez) (collectively, defendants), alleging thirteen causes of action: (1) battery; (2) negligence; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (4) statutory breach of the warranty of habitability (Civ. Code, §§ 1941 & 1941.1); (5) tortious breach of implied warranty of habitability; (6) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.; (7) breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment; (8) violation of Civil Code section 1942.3; (9) violation of Civil Code section 1942.4; (10) negligent violation of statutory duty to maintain habitable conditions; (11) breach of contract; (12) private nuisance; and (13) public nuisance.

As alleged in the complaint:

The Trust, Willbridge, Lyon, Williams, and Rubio own, operate, and manage Punta Gorda, which is located at 1119 Punta Gorda Street in Santa Barbara, California. (Compl., ¶¶ 5-9.) Perez is the Program Coordinator and Case Manager of Willbridge who operates and manages Punta Gorda. (Compl., ¶¶ 10 & 21.) Plaintiffs and defendants are in a landlord-tenant relationship which was created by a written lease agreement. (Compl., ¶¶ 103 & 126.)

On April 1, 2019, Dalton moved into room 5 of “Unit B” of Punta Gorda. (Compl., ¶ 18.) On May 24, 2021, Dalton discovered a bedbug infestation within his room including at the head of a mattress which was provided by Willbridge, and which Dalton immediately threw away. (Compl., ¶ 20.) Dalton notified Perez of the bedbug infestation and requested a new mattress. (Compl., ¶ 21.)

Due to Perez’s lack of response, Dalton bought a new mattress on May 31, 2021. (Compl., ¶ 23.) Assuming the bedbug infestation had been resolved, Dalton informed Perez that no further action was needed. (Compl., ¶ 24.) Dalton thereafter discovered that the bedbug infestation had not resolved and, throughout 2021 and 2022, contacted Perez regarding the infestation. (Compl., ¶ 25.)

On June 10, 2022, a neighbor in room 6 discovered that his room was infested with bedbugs, which the neighbor immediately reported to Punta Gorda’s management who did nothing to remedy the infestation. (Compl., ¶¶ 26-27.)

On October 10, 2022, Dalton inspected a dryer in the laundry room of Unit B and discovered approximately 100 bedbugs inside the lint catch. (Compl., ¶ 27.) Dalton informed Perez that the infestation was widespread beyond Dalton’s room. (Compl., ¶ 28.)

In October 2022, Dalton learned that Willbridge had discovered an infestation in and was inspecting room 3 of Unit B. (Compl., ¶ 29.) During this time, Perez made several unsuccessful attempts to rid the infestation by using a heat gun. (Compl., ¶ 30.) Willbridge did not refer an exterminator to Unit B. (Compl., ¶ 29.)

On December 1, 2022, Munoz moved into room 1 of Unit B, and began experiencing bites on his body. (Compl., ¶ 32.) Dalton informed Munoz of the bedbug infestation and inquired as to whether Willbridge had notified Munoz of the infestation, in response to which Munoz stated that he had not heard of a bedbug infestation. (Compl., ¶ 33.)

Munoz discovered bedbugs in his room on January 30, 2023, and contacted Perez on February 1, 2023, to request an exterminator. (Compl., ¶¶ 35-36.) Perez continued to use “bug bombs”, an automotive heat gun, and other unsuccessful measures to try to rid the infestation. (Compl., ¶ 36.)

On January 1, 2023, de Costa moved into room 2 of Unit B, and began receiving bedbug bites on February 15, 2023, which da Costa reported to Punta Gorda’s management. (Compl., ¶¶ 34 & 37.) On March 25, 2023, de Costa sought medical treatment, was diagnosed with bedbug bites, and prescribed medication. (Compl., ¶ 38.)

On March 28, 2023, a pest control company conducted a heat treatment throughout Unit B. (Compl., ¶ 39.) During the second week of April 2023, plaintiffs informed Perez that the infestation remained. (Compl., ¶ 40.)

On April 17, 2023, Munoz presented to the emergency room of Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital with a bedbug in his ear, and sought further treatment the following day. (Compl., ¶ 41.) Munoz also contacted his case managers at the organization that was providing Munoz with subsidized rent. (Compl., ¶ 42.) These case managers inspected Unit B and discovered the bedbugs. (Ibid.)

In May 2023, a professional exterminator was sent to Unit B for a second time, conducted an inspection, and scheduled a second treatment for the bedbugs. (Compl., ¶ 43.) That exterminator informed Munoz and Dalton that the previous treatment was not complete or proper, and that the pest control company had done what Willbridge directed them to do. (Compl., ¶ 44.)

Munoz contacted the health department in Santa Barbara due to the bedbug infestation and other habitability issues present in Unit B. (Compl., ¶ 45.) The health department inspected unit B which had issues relating to vermin that Willbridge failed to address. (Ibid.)

Munoz began sleeping in his car in May 2023, and in August 2023, moved out of Punta Gorda. (Compl., ¶¶ 46-47.) Dalton and de Costa continue to suffer from an ongoing bedbug infestation. (Compl., ¶ 48.)

On March 28, 2025, Willbridge filed a demurrer to the first, second, eighth, ninth, tenth, and thirteenth causes of action alleged in the complaint, on the grounds that the complaint is uncertain and fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Willbridge, and separately filed a motion to strike all allegations which give rise to plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages against Willbridge.

The demurrer and motion to strike are opposed by plaintiffs.

Court records also reflect that, on May 14, 2025, plaintiffs filed a request for dismissal of the causes of action for violations of Civil Code section 1942.3 and 1942.4, without prejudice.

Analysis

(1) The Demurrer

On demurrer, the court determines whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125.) “ ‘The rules by which the sufficiency of a complaint is tested against a general demurrer are well settled. We not only treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also ‘give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.’ ” (Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 370, internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) “If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer.” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38 (Quelimane).)

Demurrer to the eighth and ninth causes of action:

Noted above, the eighth and ninth causes of action alleged in the complaint assert claims for violations of, respectively, Civil Code sections 1942.3 and 1942.4, which have been dismissed, without prejudice, pursuant to the request for dismissal filed by plaintiffs on May 14, 2025, concurrently with plaintiffs’ opposition to the demurrer as further described above.

“[A] demurrer challenges only the sufficiency of the allegations in the cause of action.” (Committee for Sound Water & Land Development v. City of Seaside (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 389, 397.) As the eighth and ninth causes of action have been dismissed, the present demurrer as to these causes of action is moot. The court does not “give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” (Consolidated Vultee Air. Corp. v. United Automobile (1946) 27 Cal.2d 859, 863.)

Demurrer to the first cause of action:

As grounds for its demurrer to the first cause of action for battery alleged in the complaint, Willbridge asserts that the allegations of the complaint show only that Willbridge failed to respond to complaints of bedbugs, and to remedy a bedbug infestation. Because plaintiffs have failed to allege facts showing that Willbridge engaged in an affirmative act with the intent to harm plaintiffs, Willbridge argues, plaintiffs have failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for battery.

Plaintiffs contend that the allegations of the complaint show that Willbridge intentionally failed to inspect for, to warn plaintiffs of, and to eradicate the bedbug infestation. Plaintiffs argue that these allegations are sufficient to show that Willbridge’s inaction resulted in plaintiffs being bitten by bedbugs, to which plaintiffs did not consent.

“The elements of civil battery are: (1) defendant intentionally performed an act that resulted in a harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff’s person; (2) plaintiff did not consent to the contact; and (3) the harmful or offensive contact caused injury, damage, loss or harm to plaintiff.” (Brown v. Ransweiler (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 516, 526-527.) Though “it is well-established that battery can be committed indirectly, i.e., that the crime does not require a direct touching of the victim’s person by the defendant’s person[,]” plaintiffs fail to cite, and the court is unaware of, any legal authority showing that the first element of civil battery can, under the circumstances present here, be met or satisfied by alleging an omission or failure to act. (See, e.g., People v. Dealba (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1151.)

Further, wholly absent from the complaint are any allegations which show that, apart from a purported failure to inspect for or remedy a bedbug infestation, Willbridge engaged in any act or conduct that was intended to create or cause the bedbug infestation, or that any such act or conduct was undertaken by Willbridge with a willful disregard of plaintiffs’ rights. (Ashcraft v. King (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 604, 613; see also So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 669 [the defendant must be the cause of the touching]; Barouh v. Haberman (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 40, 44, fn. 1 [defendant must intend to “do the act” that causes the harm].) Instead, the allegations of the complaint suggest that defendants did not intentionally perform an act which resulted in plaintiffs coming into harmful contact with bedbugs. (See, e.g., Compl., ¶ 29 [alleging that Willbridge “discovered” an infestation in another room within Unit B].)

In addition, to the extent the complaint alleges that Willbridge failed to warn plaintiffs of the existence of bedbugs in Unit 2, or to eradicate the bedbugs, these allegations show, at most, that Willbridge’s conduct placed plaintiffs’ at risk of bites from the bedbugs. These allegations, alone, are insufficient to show that Willbridge performed an intentional act which caused or created the bedbug infestation to which plaintiffs were exposed.

For all reasons further discussed above, the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for battery. Therefore, the court will sustain the demurrer to the first cause of action alleged in the complaint.

Demurrer to the third cause of action:

As grounds for its demurrer to the third cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress alleged in the complaint, Willbridge contends that plaintiffs have failed to allege facts showing that its conduct was outrageous, or that plaintiffs suffered severe emotional distress.

“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.’ [Citations.] A defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ [Citation.] And the defendant’s conduct must be ‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’ [Citation.]” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051, internal quotation marks omitted.)

Giving the complaint a reasonable interpretation, plaintiffs tie the following allegations to the element of extreme and outrageous conduct by Willbridge: failing to conduct reasonable inspections of Unit B prior to the commencement of plaintiffs’ tenancy; disregarding uninhabitable, unhealthy, and unsanitary conditions that were known to Willbridge, or could have been discovered by a reasonable inspection, prior to the commencement of plaintiffs’ tenancy in Unit B; failing to address plaintiffs’ complaints about, and failing to remedy, the bedbug infestation in Unit B; failing to maintain adequate policies to protect tenants from exposure to bedbugs and other uninhabitable conditions; failing to implement any new policies and procedures after plaintiffs’ injuries to prevent any further uninhabitable conditions in Unit B; failing to educate and train employees on inspection, sanitation, cleanliness, and repair; and failing to terminate or replace employees or management who failed to inspect for uninhabitable, unsanitary, unhealthy, or dangerous conditions. (Compl., ¶¶ 98 & 96.)

The allegations of the complaint, which the court for present purposes accepts as true, are sufficient to show the existence of a bedbug infestation throughout Unit B which persisted over the course of several years, which was known to Willbridge, which impacted the habitability of rooms within Unit B, which caused plaintiffs to suffer the injuries further detailed above as well as annoyance or discomfort, and which was not remedied, or ignored, by Willbridge. Under the circumstances alleged in the complaint, the court cannot say as a matter of law that these allegations are insufficient to show extreme or outrageous conduct by Willbridge with respect to the persistent and ostensibly widespread bedbug infestation that allegedly occurred, and continues to occur, at Punta Gorda, and which exceeds the bounds of that which is usually tolerated in a civilized community. (See Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 922 (Stoiber); Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298-1299 (Erlach) [landlord’s acts presented a factual issue which could not be resolved on demurrer].)

Furthermore, considering the nature of the alleged landlord-tenant relationship between plaintiffs and Willbridge, “the [n]egligent infliction of emotional distress anxiety, worry, discomfort is compensable without physical injury in cases involving the tortious interference with [p]roperty rights [Citations.] Thus, if defendants’ failure to repair the premises constitutes a tort grounded on negligence, [the plaintiff] is entitled to prove her damages for emotional distress because the failure to repair not only allegedly caused … damage …, it also must be deemed to constitute an injury to her tenancy interest (right to habitable premises) which is a species of property [citation].” (Stoiber, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at pp. 922-923.)

For all reasons discussed above, the complaint alleges a failure by Willbridge to inspect and remedy a bedbug infestation in Unit B, which caused plaintiffs to sustain physical injury and discomfort. Plaintiffs are entitled to prove any damages for emotional distress which arise from any injury to plaintiffs’ right to a habitable premises, notwithstanding the title under which the basis for that relief is stated in the complaint. (Erlach, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1299; Quelimane, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 38.) For these and all reasons further discussed above, the court will overrule the demurrer to the third cause of action alleged in the complaint.

Demurrer to the tenth cause of action:

As grounds for its demurrer to the tenth cause of action for negligent violation of a statutory duty to maintain habitable conditions alleged in the complaint, Willbridge contends that this cause of action duplicates or is identical to the second cause of action for negligence, and the fourth and fifth causes of action for, respectively, statutory and tortious breaches of the warranty of habitability, and adds no new facts or theories to plaintiffs’ complaint.  

The grounds for a demurrer to a complaint are set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, and do not include that a complaint includes duplicative causes of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (a)-(h); see also McDonell v. American Trust Co. (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 296, 303 [“‘redundancy’ is not a ground for demurrer].) For these reasons, a demurrer which is made on the grounds that a cause of action is duplicative or redundant may not be sustained. (Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 858, 889-890 [general discussion].) Therefore, the court will overrule the demurrer to the tenth cause of action alleged in the complaint.

Demurrer to the thirteenth cause of action:

As grounds for its demurrer to the thirteenth cause of action for public nuisance alleged in the complaint, Willbridge contends that the allegations of the complaint are conclusory and insufficient to support a claim for public nuisance.

“Anything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to[] . . . an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, . . . is a nuisance.” (Civ. Code, § 3479.) “A public nuisance is one which affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may be unequal.” (Civ. Code, § 3480.)

The allegations of the complaint are insufficient to show that any alleged conduct of Willbridge with respect to the bedbug infestation at issue caused, or was calculated, threatened, or likely to cause, a substantial or unreasonable interference, harm, or loss to any persons apart from those residing in Unit B of Punta Gorda, or to any rights or interests other than private interests in a residential tenancy which is free from bedbugs. (See In re Firearm Cases (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 959, 988-989 [elements of a public nuisance]; County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 305-306.) For these and all reasons discussed above, the court will sustain the demurrer to the thirteenth cause of action alleged in the complaint.

Special demurrer on the grounds of uncertainty:

Willbridge specially demurs to the first, second, tenth, and thirteenth causes of action alleged in the complaint and described above, on the grounds that the complaint is uncertain.

A party may object by special demurrer on the grounds that the subject pleading is uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) “ ‘[U]ncertain’ includes ambiguous and unintelligible.” (Smith v. Kern County Land Co. (1958) 51 Cal.2d 205, 209.) “A special demurrer on the ground that [a pleading] is (a) ambiguous, (b) unintelligible, or (c) uncertain is insufficient unless the demurrer points out specifically wherein the pleading is ambiguous, uncertain or unintelligible.” (Coons v. Thompson (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 687, 690.)

In its demurrer, Willbridge fails to point out specifically where plaintiffs’ complaint is uncertain. Furthermore, the allegations of the complaint described herein, including those appearing in the first, second, tenth, and thirteenth causes of action, are not so incomprehensible that Willbridge cannot reasonably respond. (Morris v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 279, 292.)

In addition, Willbridge includes in its demurrer a general description of the allegations of the complaint, including those which give rise to the causes of action to which Willbridge asserts objections. The recitation of these allegations by Willbridge indicates that the complaint is not so unintelligible or ambiguous that Willbridge cannot understand the issues or the nature of the claims alleged by plaintiffs. (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245 [“a plaintiff is required only to set forth the essential facts of his case with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action”].) For these and all reasons discussed above, the court will overrule the special demurrer of Willbridge to the first, second, tenth, and thirteenth causes of action alleged in the complaint.

Leave to Amend:

Plaintiffs request leave to amend to permit them to conduct sufficient discovery. Apart from these assertions, plaintiffs offer no reasoned argument showing the manner in which the defects in each cause of action addressed above and in the demurrer may be cured by an amendment to the complaint. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.)

Though plaintiffs have failed to show the manner in which the deficiencies discussed herein may be cured by an amendment, and notwithstanding that the first cause of action for battery suggests on its face that it is incapable of amendment, the court will grant plaintiffs an opportunity to amend the complaint to cure the deficiencies discussed herein. (Eghtesad v. State Farm General Insurance Company (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 406, 411 (Eghtesad).)

(2) The Motion To Strike

“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) Upon a motion to strike made under Code of Civil Procedure section 435, the court may “strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading” or “strike all or part of any pleading not filed in conformity with applicable law, court rules, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., §436(a) & (b).) The grounds for a motion to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or from matters of which the court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)

In the motion to strike, Willbridge asserts that the allegations of the complaint do not show that Perez is a corporate official with authority to bind Willbridge, or that Perez ratified any wrongful conduct by an employee of Willbridge. Willbridge further asserts that plaintiffs have failed to allege facts showing that any acts giving rise to plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages were done with the knowledge or under the direction of corporate officials of Willbridge or that an officer, director, or managing agent of Willbridge ratified or directed any such acts. For these reasons, Willbridge argues, the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to support plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages as against Willbridge.

A reasonable interpretation of the complaint shows, and plaintiffs do not dispute, that plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages against Willbridge is ostensibly based on a purported failure by Willbridge, its management and employees, and Perez, to, among other things, inspect or remedy the bedbug infestation in Unit B, and to terminate employees or managers who failed to conduct inspections or to remedy the bedbug infestation at issue, among other things. As also noted above, plaintiffs allege that Perez is Willbridge’s Program Coordinator and Case Manager.

“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)

Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b), provides that “[a]n employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)

Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b), “does not purport to exclude any particular type of employer … from its coverage.” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.)

The complaint does not allege facts which are sufficient show advance knowledge by Willbridge of any unfitness of Perez or any other employee of Willbridge, that Willbridge employed Perez or any other person with a conscious disregard of plaintiffs’ rights or safety, or that any officer, director, or managing agent of Willbridge had the advance knowledge or conscious disregard required to support a claim for punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294. Further, the complaint fails to allege facts showing that any officer, director, or managing agent of Willbridge authorized or ratified any act of oppression, fraud, or malice, sufficient to support an award of punitive damages.

Moreover, the general and conclusory allegations relied on by plaintiffs in their opposition to the demurrer, which refer only to purported acts of authorization and ratification by unspecified “defendants”, are themselves insufficient to show that plaintiffs are entitled to an award of punitive damages. (See, e.g., Compl., ¶¶ 74, 90, 98, 120, 136, & 156 [conclusory allegations that “defendants” authorized and ratified the conduct of unspecified “corporate” employees and management].)

For all reasons discussed above, the complaint fails to plead facts sufficient to show that plaintiffs’ are entitled to punitive damages, even if plaintiffs were to prove the allegations at trial. Therefore, the court will grant the motion to strike, in part.

The court will order that the following allegations be stricken from the complaint, to the extent these allegations allege a claim for punitive damages against Willbridge only, and not as to any other defendant named in the complaint: (1) page 15, ll. 3-4 [“entitling Plaintiffs to punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish and set an example of Defendants, and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive”]; (2) page 19, ll. 17-18 [“entitling Plaintiffs to punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish and set an example of Defendants, and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive”]; (3) page 22, ll. 6-7 [“entitling Plaintiffs to punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish and set an example of Defendants, and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive”]; (4) page 25, ll. 25-26 [“entitling Plaintiffs to punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish and set an example of Defendants, and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive”]; (5) page 26, ll. 2-3 [“thereby entitling Plaintiffs to punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial”; (6) page 29, ll. 5-6 [“entitling Plaintiffs to punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish and set an example of Defendants, and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive”]; (7) page 29, ll. 10-11 [“thereby entitling Plaintiffs to punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial”]; (8) page 33, ll. 8-10 [“entitling Plaintiffs to punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish and set an example of Defendants, and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive”]; and (9) prayer for relief, paragraph 9 [“For punitive and exemplary damages according to proof at trial based on Defendants’, and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, willful, malicious, wanton and fraudulent misconduct”].

As to the remaining allegations identified in the notice of and motion to strike, these allegations are or appear to be essential to other claims or matters alleged in the complaint apart from the claims for punitive damages alleged against Willbridge. Therefore, the court will deny the motion as to these allegations. (Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1281.)

Leave to amend:

The considerations for granting a leave to amend when a motion to strike is granted are “analogous to an order sustaining a demurrer.” (Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.) Though plaintiffs have not demonstrated the manner in which the defects discussed herein can be cured by amendment, as the complaint does not necessarily show on its face that there exists no reasonable possibility that plaintiffs can allege facts sufficient to support an award of punitive damages against Willbridge, the court will grant plaintiffs leave to amend to cure the deficiencies further discussed herein. (Eghtesad, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 411.)