JPMorgan Chase Bank NA vs Logan Schubert

Case Number

24CV00886

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 08/07/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion: Order; Motion to Acknowledge Title 48 CFR International Commercial Affidavit etc.

Tentative Ruling

CIVIL LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR

August 7, 2024

10:00 am

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Logan Schubert # 24CV00886

HEARING

1. Motion For Order That Matters In Request For Admission Of Truth Of Facts Be Deemed Admitted.

2. Motion To Acknowledge Title 48 CFR International Commercial Affidavit

      Presented As Letter Of Rogatory.

ATTORNEYS

For Plaintiff JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.: Donald Sherrill, Alexander Balzer Carr,

                            

For Defendant Logan Schubert: Self Represented

Emails:

RULING

(1) For all reasons discussed herein, unless defendant Logan Schubert serves, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the set one requests for admission of plaintiff JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., which substantially complies with Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.220, the Court will grant the motion of plaintiff for an order that the truth of the matters specified in the requests for admission be deemed admitted. (There is a [Proposed] Order submitted.)

(2) For all reasons discussed herein the motion of defendant Logan Schubert to acknowledge “Title 48 CFR International Commercial Affidavit Presented As Letter Of Rogatory” is denied without prejudice.

(3) Plaintiff shall serve notice and file a proof of service of notice of the Court’s ruling herein.

(4) The trial date of 9/11/24 at 1:30pm is confirmed. [Plaintiff seeks damages of $23,755.29 in the Complaint; Defendant has filed an Answer requesting that the Court deny relief.]

Background

On February 20, 2024, plaintiff JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase Bank), filed this limited civil action against defendant Logan Schubert (Schubert) alleging causes of action for common counts based on an open book account for money due and an account stated in writing. (See Compl., ¶ CC-1(a)(1) & (2).) As alleged in the complaint:

Within the last four years, Schubert became indebted to Chase Bank on an open book account for money due and because an account was stated in writing between Chase Bank and Schubert in which it was agreed that Schubert was indebted to Chase Bank. (Compl., ¶ CC-1(a)(1) & (2).) The reasonable value due from and unpaid by Schubert despite the demand of Chase Bank is $23,755.29. (Id. at ¶ CC-2.)

In response to the complaint, Schubert filed on March 27, 2024, five documents: (1) a “Motion To Dismiss” (the motion to dismiss); (2) an “Answer … and Memorandum Of Law In Support” (the answer); (3) a “List Of Exhibits In Support Of Answer, Motion To Dismiss, and Memorandum Of Law In Support”; (4) an “Affidavit In Support Of Answer, Motion To Dismiss, And Memorandum Of Law In Support”; and (5) an “Affidavit Of Notice [of Discharge]”.

Notwithstanding the title of the documents filed by Schubert as further described above, in the answer and the motion to dismiss, Schubert requested that the Court issue an order under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dismissing the complaint of Chase Bank on the grounds that “payment was already tendered, in accord with Title 48 C.F.R. Ch. l, §53.228, UCC 3—307 and CISG.” (See Motion To Dismiss at p. 1, ll. 18-25; Answer at p. 5, ll. 16-21.) The motion to dismiss was opposed by Chase Bank.

On May 8, 2024, the Court issued its Minute Order (the Minute Order) in which the Court construed the answer and motion to dismiss filed by Schubert, collectively, as a general demurrer filed for the purpose of obtaining a ruling as to whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (See May 8, 2024, Minute Order.) The Court denied the request asserted in the answer and motion to dismiss and ordered Schubert to file and serve an answer to the complaint on or before May 20, 2024. (Ibid.)

On May 10, 2024, Schubert filed a document labeled a “Response by Negative Averment Affidavit to Request for Discovery by Plaintiff”, in which Schubert purported to answer the complaint of Chase Bank.

On June 11, 2024, Chase Bank filed a motion (the Chase Bank motion) for an order that the truth of all facts stated in a set one request for admissions (the RFA) served by Chase Bank on Schubert be deemed admitted. The Chase Bank motion is brought on the grounds that Schubert failed to serve timely responses to the RFA.

On July 5, 2024, Schubert filed a “Motion to Acknowledge Title 48 CFR International Commercial Affidavit Presented As Letter Of Rogatory” (the Schubert motion), which appears to have been served by certified mail on counsel for Chase Bank on the same date. (Schubert Motion at PDF p. 18 [certificate of service].)

Also on July 5, 2024, Schubert filed a “Notice to Appoint Trustee with Form 56” in support of the Schubert motion.

Court records reflect that Schubert has not filed an opposition to the Chase Bank motion, and that Chase Bank has not filed an opposition to the Schubert motion.

Analysis

(1) The Chase Bank Motion

A party to whom requests for admission are directed must serve a response to the requests within 30 days after service unless, on motion of the requesting or responding party, the court has either shortened or extended the time for a response. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.250, subds. (a) & (b).) Subject to conditions, if a party fails to serve a timely response to requests for admission, the party “waives any objection to the requests, including one based on privilege or on the protection for work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010).” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (a).) In addition, the requesting party “may move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted, as well as for a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010).” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (b).) “The court shall make this order, unless it finds that the party to whom the requests for admission have been directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (c).)

In support of the Chase Bank motion, Chase Bank submits the declaration of its counsel, Alexander Balzer Carr (Carr), who states that on April 10, 2024, Chase Bank served the RFA by mail on Schubert. (Carr Decl., ¶ 2.) A redacted copy of the RFA served on Schubert by Chase Bank, which are numbered 1 through 5, is attached to the Carr declaration as Exhibit 1. Chase Bank received no response to the RFA from Schubert. (Id. at ¶ 3.)

Available information and evidence shows that although Chase Bank served the RFA on Schubert on April 10, 2024, Schubert failed to serve any response. Schubert has not filed any opposition or other response to the Chase Bank motion demonstrating that Schubert has subsequently served a response to the RFA which substantially complies with Code of Civil Procedure sections 2033.210, 2033.220, and 2033.230, or that Schubert’s failure to timely serve a response to the RFA resulted from “mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (a)(1) & (2).) Accordingly, Schubert has waived any objection to the RFA.

Under the circumstances present here, unless Schubert serves, before the hearing on the Chase Bank motion, a proposed response to the RFA which substantially complies with Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.220, the Court will grant the Chase Bank motion and order that the truth of the matters specified in the RFA be deemed admitted.

(2) The Schubert Motion

A motion is an application for an order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1003.) “In general, the moving party must carry the initial burden of informing its opponent and the court of the specific basis for its motion.” (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 129.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, subdivision (a), sets forth the motions that require written notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (a)(1)-(13).) To the extent a motion requires written notice, the notice “must be in writing, and the notice of a motion, other than for a new trial, must state when, and the grounds upon which it will be made, and the papers, if any, upon which it is to be based.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1110(a) [“[a] notice of motion must state in the opening paragraph the nature of the order being sought and the grounds for issuance of the order”].) In addition, the motion must “briefly state the basis for the motion and the relief sought[.]” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1112(d)(3).)

“The purpose of the notice requirements ‘is to cause the moving party to “sufficiently define the issues for the information and attention of the adverse party and the court.” ’ [Citations.]” (Kinda v. Carpenter (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1277.) Therefore, “[a]s a general rule, the trial court may consider only the grounds stated in the notice of motion.” (Luri v. Greenwald (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1125 [also noting that a trial court is not required to consider grounds for relief not raised or sought by the moving party].)

In addition, a memorandum filed in support of a motion must include “a concise statement of the law, evidence and arguments relied on, and a discussion of the statutes, cases, and textbooks cited in support of the position advanced.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113(b).) The court may construe the absence of a proper memorandum as an admission that the motion is not meritorious and deny the motion on that basis. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113(a).)

Though the Schubert motion includes a supporting memorandum, the memorandum does not contain a statement of facts or a concise statement of the law. In addition, Schubert appears to rely primarily on federal statutes and decisional authority that do not appear to be binding on this Court or to have persuasive value based on the subject matter of the present action. (See, e.g., McCann v. Lucky Money, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1382, 1396.) Moreover, though it is not clear what, if any, relief Schubert seeks in the Schubert motion, to the extent the motion is governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, Schubert has failed to give written notice.

 Notwithstanding the procedural deficiencies further discussed above which justify a denial of the Schubert motion on procedural grounds, Schubert asserts that he “moves the court to acknowledge that Title 48 CFR, and specifically, Title 48 CFR Ch. l § 53.228 Bonds and Insurance, is valid law, has not been repealed, and applies to the discharge process in this case at bar in accord with Title 31 CFR 363.6, ‘minor’ defined, Title 27 CFR 72.11, ‘commercial crimes’ defined, and Title 48 CFR Ch. 1 §53.2 Bonds and Insurance for discharge of the penalty sum of this case 24CV00886 (a security) at Bar.” (Schubert Motion at p. 2, ll. 20-25.) Schubert further “moves Judge [sic] to recuse Himself/Herself on the grounds that s/he is continuing an action that has been discharged and settled, ‘Affidavit of Notice [of Discharge]” ….” (Id. at at p. 3, ll. 13-16.) Schubert also appears to contend that the Court was without jurisdiction to issue the Minute Order. (Id. at p. 10, ll. 11-25.)

Schubert also requests that the Court issue an order that “Donald Sherrill, Esq. and/or successor(s) must prove and provide on the record that he/she had neither any jurisdiction nor any Law that can supersede the Holder-In-Due-Course Priority Claim”; a hearing “to appoint, and/or Donald Sherrill, Esq. successor(s) as Trustee of [Schubert] and released/discharged from any and all alleged obligation(s) to STATE OF CALIFORNIA; et al.”, that a “judgment of conviction” purportedly entered in this action be vacated for want of subject matter jurisdiction, that the “indictment or other accusatory instrument” in this action be dismissed by prejudice, that the State of California return secured private property “as secured under Colorado, Secretary of State, which was referenced in Cause/Case/Res Number 24CV00886 and any/all derivatives or justly compensate for the value taken unjustly”, and that Schubert “be set at liberty immediately”. (Schubert Motion at pp. 15-16, ¶¶ 1-7.)

Regarding Schubert’s apparent contention that this Court lacks either personal jurisdiction over Schubert, or subject matter jurisdiction over the present controversy, the Court has no record of Schubert having filed a procedurally appropriate motion to quash service of the summons at the time Schubert filed the answer and motion to dismiss further discussed above. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (e)(3) [failure to make a motion to quash service of a summons for lack of jurisdiction “at the time of filing a demurrer or motion to strike constitutes a waiver of the issues of lack of personal jurisdiction, inadequacy of process, inadequacy of service of process, inconvenient forum, and delay in prosecution”].) In addition, as Schubert has generally appeared in this action, Schubert has waived any objections to any purported lack of personal jurisdiction. (Brue v. Shabaab (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 578, 586.) Schubert also fails to explain, with reasoned legal argument, why this Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the Minute Order or lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the present controversy or dispute. (See In re Marriage of Jensen (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 587, 593 [general discussion of subject matter jurisdiction].)

Moreover, the federal statute cited by Schubert in the Schubert motion as further described above “sets forth basic policies and general information about the Federal Acquisition Regulations System including purpose, authority, applicability, issuance, arrangement, numbering, dissemination, implementation, supplementation, maintenance, administration, and deviation. Subparts 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 prescribe administrative procedures for maintaining the FAR System.” (48 C.F.R. § 1.000.) “The Federal Acquisition Regulations System is established for the codification and publication of uniform policies and procedures for acquisition by all executive agencies. The Federal Acquisition Regulations System consists of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which is the primary document, and agency acquisition regulations that implement or supplement the FAR. The FAR System does not include internal agency guidance of the type described in 1.301(a)(2).” (48 C.F.R. § 1.101.) As the complaint filed by Chase Bank does not on its face implicate the Federal Acquisition Regulations System, it is unclear on what basis Schubert brings his apparent request for an order acknowledging the validity of Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations.

Regarding Schubert’s apparent contention that a purported discharge or settlement requires recusal under 28 U.S.C. section 455, this federal statute applies on its face to justices, judges, or magistrate judges of the United States. (28 U.S.C.A. § 455.) Schubert offers no clear grounds for recusal or disqualification under Code of Civil Procedure section 170 et seq., or any other applicable statute. Schubert also has not duly presented an appropriate motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6, including the declaration required under subdivision (a)(2) of that section.

As Schubert presents no clear grounds for any relief that may be sought in the Schubert motion, including the request of Schubert for an order appointing counsel for Chase Bank as a successor trustee of a purported trust of Schubert, the Court is unable to enter any order to the extent there may exist sufficient factual or legal grounds for any relief. Therefore, and for all reasons discussed above, the Court will deny the Schubert motion without prejudice to any procedurally and substantively appropriate motion that may be filed and served by Schubert in this action and in which Schubert seeks the same, or effectively the same, relief.