Lindsay Marks Orsini et al vs Scott Woollard et al

Case Number

24CV00596

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 06/09/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion: Compel Neuropsychological Evaluation of Plaintiff Lindsay Marks Orsini

Tentative Ruling

Lindsay Marks Orsini, et al. v. Scott Woollard, et al.           

Case No. 24CV00596

Hearing Date: June 9, 2025                                                    

HEARING:              Motion To Compel Neuropsychological Evaluation Of Plaintiff Lindsay Marks Orsini

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiffs Lindsay Marks Orsini and Christian Orsini: Ramin Kermani-Nejad, Mohamad Ahmad, Hani Ganji, Kermani LLP

                                    For Defendants Brooke Woollard and Scott Woollard: Wilma J. Gray, Caitlyn M. Harris, McNamara, Ambacher, Wheeler, Hirsig & Gray LLP

                                   

TENTATIVE RULING:

(1) The motion of defendants to compel the neuropsychological evaluation of plaintiff Lindsay Marks Orsini is granted, in part and in accordance with this ruling.

(2) Plaintiff Lindsay Marks Orsini shall, subject to each of the conditions and restrictions set forth in this ruling, appear for a neuropsychological examination to be conducted by defendants’ neuropsychologist, Rebecca Goodman, Ph.D., ABPP-CN, on a date and at a time mutually agreed to by the parties.

(3) No later than 30 days after the conclusion of the neuropsychological examination ordered herein, defendants and their neuropsychologist identified above shall produce to plaintiffs’ counsel, all raw testing data as further described in this ruling, including without limitation: audio recordings; history; all raw test data forms and procedures; instructions, tests, questions, answers, and score summaries; findings, narrative reports, any additional summaries, and results of all tests made; and the diagnoses, prognoses, and conclusions of the examiner. The raw testing data to be produced by defendants’ neuropsychologist as described herein shall be maintained as confidential and used by the parties to this proceeding solely for the purposes of this case, and shall not be discussed with, revealed, or disclosed to any other person outside this litigation other than the parties, their counsel and neuropsychological experts, and the court. All provisions of this ruling restricting the communication or use of the raw testing data shall continue to be binding after the conclusion of this action unless the parties agree otherwise. No later than thirty days after the conclusion of this action, any party in possession of raw testing data that is not contained in the public file, shall either destroy the raw testing data and certify in writing that the data has been destroyed, or return the raw testing data to counsel or the nonparty who provided that data.

(4) The neuropsychological examination of plaintiff ordered herein shall not include any tests which are not identified in exhibit A to “Defendants’ Demand For Neuropsychological Evaluation Of Plaintiff”, a copy of which is attached as exhibit I to the Index of Evidence filed by defendants on April 15, 2025, in support of the present motion.

(5) Plaintiffs and their counsel may record the neuropsychological evaluation of plaintiff by audio technology.

(6) Defendants shall submit for the court’s approval, a corrected proposed order that conforms to the court’s ruling herein, in compliance with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.

Background:

The second amended complaint (SAC) filed on August 22, 2024, by plaintiffs Lindsay Marks Orsini (Lindsay) and Christian Orsini (Christian) (collectively, plaintiffs) is the operative pleading. In the SAC, plaintiffs allege three causes of action against defendants Brooke Woollard (Brooke) and Scott Woollard (Scott) (collectively, the Woollards): (1) negligence; (2) negligent entrustment; and (3) loss of consortium. (Note: To avoid confusion due to common familial surnames, the court will refer to the parties by their first names. No disrespect is intended.)

Briefly, plaintiffs allege in the SAC that on March 7, 2022, while speeding in an SUV owned by Scott and talking on a cell phone, Brooke rear-ended a vehicle driven by Lindsay, causing Lindsay to suffer serious injuries from which she will never fully recuperate.

The Woollards answered the SAC on September 24, 2024, generally denying its allegations and asserting six affirmative defenses.

On September 26, 2024, the Woollards filed a motion for an order striking the claim for punitive damages alleged by plaintiffs in the SAC, which plaintiffs opposed. On December 2, 2024, the court entered a Minute Order granting that motion, without leave to amend, and striking paragraph 26 and prayer paragraph 3 from the SAC.

On April 15, 2025, the Woollards filed a motion for an order compelling Lindsay to appear for a neuropsychological evaluation by a defense neuropsychologist.

In support of the present motion, the Woollards submit a declaration of their counsel, Wilma J. Gray (Gray), and an Index of Exhibits (the Index). Gray states that Lindsay’s responses to written discovery set forth Lindsay’s claim of injuries and referred to medical records for details. (Gray Decl., ¶ 4; Index, Exh. G.) Gray’s office issued subpoenas to all known treatment facilities for treatment, therapy, evaluations and medication management records. (Gray Decl., ¶ 5.)

Gray also refers to excerpts of Lindsay’s deposition transcript which are  attached to the Index as exhibit H and which, according to Gray, set forth Lindsay’s testimony as to the physical and mental injuries resulting from the accident that are the subject of this litigation. (Gray Decl., ¶ 6; Index, Exh. H.) Gray contends that Lindsay has placed her mental status in controversy, justifying a defense neuropsychological evaluation. (Gray Decl., ¶ 5.)

Gray asserts that, given the nature of the injuries claimed by Lindsay, the Woollards retained Rebecca Goodman, Ph.D. (Dr. Goodman) to conduct a neuropsychological evaluation (the evaluation) of Lindsay. (Gray Decl., ¶ 7.) On February 27, 2025, the Woollards served a demand (the demand) for the evaluation by Dr. Goodman, which includes a list of neuropsychological tests to be administered to Lindsay. (Gray Decl., ¶ 8; Index, Exh. I.) Plaintiffs served objections to the demand on February 12, 2025. (Gray Decl., ¶ 9; Index, Exh. J.)

Gray contends that she attempted to meet and confer with attorney Hani Ganji (Ganji) regarding the objections and to resolve the dispute. (Gray Decl., ¶ 10; Index, Exh. K.) Though Gray asked Ganji to confirm that Lindsay would appear, Lindsay did not appear for the evaluation on February 27, 2025. (Gray Decl., ¶ 11.) Gray further met and conferred with Ganji on March 10, 2025, in an attempt to resolve the dispute, but the parties have reached an impasse. (Gray Decl., ¶ 12.)

Gray contends that the key dispute is plaintiffs’ demand that Dr. Goodman turn over raw data directly to an attorney, which Gray contends would not be permitted by any licensed psychologist following “the guidelines.” (Gray Decl., ¶ 13.) Gray further contends that, without a current and accurate assessment of Lindsay, the Woollards will be prejudiced in preparing for trial. (Gray Decl., ¶ 14.)

Though the notice of the present motion states that it is based on a memorandum and the Gray declaration and does not identify a declaration of Dr. Goodman, the memorandum submitted in support of the motion includes references a declaration of Dr. Goodman, a copy of which is attached to the Index. In that declaration, Dr. Goodman states that, as part of a neuropsychological evaluation of an individual, she administers a battery of tests to help assess various aspects of that individual’s cognition, and that for each patient, Dr. Goodman determines which tests would be best suited given the examinee’s specific circumstances. (Goodman Decl., ¶ 7.)

Dr. Goodman explains that, though she uses a “standard practice fixed flexible assessment” approach under which Dr. Goodman provides the complete battery of tests that may be administered, Dr. Goodman reserves the right to use her clinical judgment to remove or incorporate a test based on the examinee’s performance. (Goodman Decl., ¶ 7.) Dr. Goodman contends that this flexibility is necessary because the interview or test results may indicate that the administration of some tests may be inappropriate. (Ibid.) For these reasons, Dr. Goodman contends, the specific tests to be administered cannot be anticipated, but that Dr. Goodman will not administer any test that has not been identified. (Ibid.)

Dr. Goodman further explains that, during a neuropsychological examination, neuropsychologists obtain “raw test data” (the Raw Data) which includes actual test forms recording the examinee’s responses and any audio recordings of test procedures. (Goodman Decl., ¶ 8.) The recorded test forms and audio recordings contain what Dr. Goodman describes as protected psychological test information provided by test publishers, including questions, answers, instructions, scoring procedures and summaries, and narrative reports. (Ibid.) Dr. Goodman asserts that neuropsychologists do not release the Raw Data to non-psychologists because these materials contain protected information and material. (Goodman Decl., ¶ 9.)

Dr. Goodman further asserts that, due to ethical and professional obligations to preserve test security and because examinations use sensitive or copyrighted materials, Dr. Goodman does not permit third party audio recordings of test procedures unless she retains custody of the original recording, and that she will agree to transmit copies of any audio recordings only to retained neuropsychologist experts who are bound by the same ethical and legal duties. (Goodman Decl., ¶ 9.)

Dr. Goodman also contends that the California Board of Psychology has imposed a rule that limits distribution of test materials and requires psychologists to refrain from compromising the security of test instruments. (Goodman Decl., ¶ 10.) Dr. Goodman states that, to ensure her compliance with this rule, she only provides test materials and audio recordings to other licensed psychologists who are trained and qualified to review the data. (Goodman Decl., ¶¶ 11-12.) According to Dr. Goodman, the neuropsychologist in receipt of the audio recording can meet and confer with attorneys to discuss the methodology including whether standard procedures were followed. (Goodman Decl., ¶ 11.)

Dr. Goodman states that the maintenance of “test security” is critical to the value and the usefulness of these specialized measures which require that an examinee cannot have had previous access to, knowledge of, or familiarity with the specific test material and content or the actual instructions given for each measure that is administered. (Goodman Decl., ¶ 12.) Dr. Goodman contends that if examinees have the opportunity, through the dissemination of audio recording files, to learn about the details of these specialized, proprietary tools, this will compromise test security and the integrity of the specific measures. (Ibid.) Dr. Goodman contends that this would lead to situations where examinees are incompletely assessed or potentially misunderstood, would negatively affect the value of neuropsychological examinations, and negatively impact the public in general. (Goodman Decl., ¶¶ 13-15.)

Dr. Goodman states that various professional organizations within the field of psychology and neuropsychology have issued practice guidelines and official statements regarding the importance of maintaining testing security and integrity, including the American Academy of Clinical Neuropsychology and the California Psychological Association, and that a protective order is not suitable to address concerns that may arise from the disclosure of Raw Data to attorneys who may use the Raw Data to coach current and future clients. (Goodman Decl., ¶¶ 16-20; Exh. E.)

Dr. Goodman states that, should the court order the evaluation of Lindsay to proceed with the condition that the Raw Data and any audio recordings be transmitted to Lindsay’s attorney, she will be required to recuse herself from this case. (Goodman Decl., ¶ 27.)

The motion is opposed plaintiffs. In their opposition, plaintiffs state that they agree that the Woollards are entitled to conduct a neuropsychological examination of Lindsay, provided that the Woollards’ expert identifies the specific tests to be administered, produces the examination’s raw data to their counsel, and allow plaintiffs to audio record the examination pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.530, subdivision (a). (Opp. at p. 2, ll. 2-8.)

In support of their opposition, plaintiffs submit the declaration of their counsel, Ganji, who states that though the parties met and conferred extensively regarding Lindsay’s agreement to sit for the evaluation provided the Raw Data at issue is sent to Ganji’s office pursuant to a protective order in accordance with the decision in Randy’s Trucking, Inc. v. Superior Court (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 818 (Randy’s Trucking), defense counsel refused, which Ganji further contends violates the decision in Carpenter v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 249. (Ganji Decl., ¶ 2.)

Ganji further asserts that the Woollards’ counsel also refused to list the tests that would be performed, and that the present motion also shows that the Woollards seek to deny Lindsay her statutory right under Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.530, subdivision (a), to audio record the examination, and will not produce their own audio recording. (Ganji Decl., ¶ 3.) Ganji contends that the Woollards never met and conferred on these issues. (Ibid.)

Ganji contends that if Ganji is not permitted to obtain and review Dr. Goodman’s entire file, including actual tests, test answers, interpretative materials used, literature, reports of tests, scoring, audio recordings, and test results associated with Dr. Goodman’s evaluation of Lindsay, the Woollards will be prejudiced at trial because Ganji will not be able to properly cross-examine Dr. Goodman as to the bases for her opinions. (Ganji Decl., ¶ 4.)

Ganji also submits copies of the American Academy of Forensic Psychology’s official position on the disclosure of such “raw data”, and the American Psychological Association’s Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, and the National Academy of Neuropsychology’s “Test Security Appendix”. (Ganji Decl., ¶¶ 5-7 & Exhs. A-C.)

Ganji asserts that in the “highly unlikely” event that the Woollards’ expert recuses herself, and the Woollards are unable to choose among other doctors or psychologists that can administer the tests, Ganji is “happy to offer defense counsel a few names of other defense doctors who have adhered to their ethical and legal obligations and forwarded the raw data to Plaintiff’s counsel pursuant to a protective order.” (Ganji Decl., ¶ 8.)

Analysis:

Subject to court-imposed restrictions set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 2019.010 et seq., “[a]ny party may obtain discovery ... by means of a ... mental examination of ... a party to the action....” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.020, subd. (a).) (Note: Undesignated code references herein shall be to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise stated.) If a party wishes to obtain discovery by a mental examination, “the party shall obtain leave of court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.310, subd. (a).) A motion for a mental examination must include the matters set forth in subdivision (b) of section 2032.310, and the notice of the motion must be served “on the person to be examined and on all parties who have appeared in the action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.310, subd. (b) & (c).) “The court shall grant a motion for a ... mental examination under Section 2032.310 only for good cause shown.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.320, subd. (a).)

Plaintiffs do not contend, and appear to concede, that the present motion is procedurally appropriate and statutorily compliant. Further, the parties do not dispute that Lindsay has placed her mental condition in controversy, or that the Woollards are authorized, and have demonstrated good cause, to obtain discovery of Lindsay’s condition by means of the evaluation to be conducted by Dr. Goodman. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.020, subd. (a); Doyle v. Superior Court (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1878, 1887.)

Based on the points advanced by the parties and further detailed above, it is the court’s understanding that the present dispute centers on whether or not Dr. Goodman must produce her entire file pertaining to the evaluation of Lindsay, including the Raw Data, directly to Lindsay’s counsel, whether Lindsay may audio record the examination and obtain any audio recording made by the Woollards or Dr. Goodman, and whether the tests that will be administered by Dr. Goodman must be disclosed prior to the evaluation.

Section 2032.610 provides that “[i]f a party submits to, or produces another for, a ... mental examination in compliance with a demand under Article 2 (commencing with Section 2032.210), an order of court under Article 3 (commencing with Section 2032.310), or an agreement under Section 2016.030, that party has the option of making a written demand that the party at whose instance the examination was made deliver both of the following to the demanding party:

“(1) A copy of a detailed written report setting out the history, examinations, findings, including the results of all tests made, diagnoses, prognoses, and conclusions of the examiner.

(2) A copy of reports of all earlier examinations of the same condition of the examinee made by that or any other examiner.

(b) If the option under subdivision (a) is exercised, a copy of the requested reports shall be delivered within 30 days after service of the demand, or within 15 days of trial, whichever is earlier.

(c) In the circumstances described in subdivision (a), the protection for work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010) is waived, both for the examiner's writings and reports and to the taking of the examiner's testimony.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.610, subds. (a)-(c).)

In determining whether raw data and audio recording of an examination by a defendants’ neuropsychologist must be produced to plaintiff’s counsel, the Fifth District Court of Appeal addressed a substantively similar if not identical dispute in Randy’s Trucking. Though the Woollards contend that plaintiffs’ reliance on this decision is misplaced, the court finds Randy’s Trucking instructive under the circumstances present here.

Randy’s Trucking involved a suit filed by, among others, a school bus driver against the driver of a tractor-trailer that rear-ended a school bus, and that driver’s employer. (Randy’s Trucking, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 824.) The plaintiff school bus driver claimed that she suffered a traumatic brain injury as a result of the collision. (Ibid.) Defendants in Randy’s Trucking sought to compel the plaintiff school bus driver to submit to a mental examination by a defense neuropsychologist. (Id. at p. 825.)

The parties in Randy’s Trucking could not agree to the “ground rules” for the mental examination at issue in that case. (Randy’s Trucking, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 825.) Specifically, plaintiff would not agree to the examination “unless the examining neuropsychologist provided ... all testing materials [and] raw test data”, while defendants maintained that their expert neuropsychologist “was unwilling to transfer those items to plaintiffs’ counsel, although she would provide them to a similarly situated expert who was subject to the same professional and ethical duties to which she was subject.” (Ibid.) The dispute resulted in the filing of a motion by defendants for an order granting leave to conduct the neuropsychological examination of the school bus driver plaintiff “without having to provide raw data and copyrighted examination questions to plaintiffs’ counsel.” (Ibid.)

To support their motion, defendants in Randy’s Trucking submitted a declaration of their examining neuropsychologist, which advanced the same if not a substantively similar points as those advanced by Dr. Goodman here, including that disclosure of raw testing data would sacrifice test security and integrity, that there exists no authority requiring disclosure of raw testing data to non-psychologists attorneys, that psychologists are subject to ethical and professional obligations to preserve test security, and that protective orders are insufficient because attorneys coach clients on how to “prepare” for neuropsychological testing, among other things. (See Motion at pp. 6-11; Randy’s Trucking, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 826.)

For example, defendants in Randy’s Trucking also argued that the disclosure of raw data and other materials relating to the examination of the plaintiff in that case would cause defendants’ neuropsychologist “to violate her ethical and professional duties”, and that “the raw data and examination questions were of no use to plaintiffs’ counsel ‘other than to utilize it improperly to corrupt the process by preparing future clients using the copyrighted questions.’ ” (Randy’s Trucking, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 825-826.) Similar to the Woollards, defendants in Randy’s Trucking requested that the court instead “order the transfer of data to plaintiffs’ retained neuropsychologist. (Id. at p. 826; see also Motion at p. 13 [requesting that the court order that raw test data be confidentially produced to Lindsay’s treating psychologist].)

Similar to the points advanced by plaintiffs here, plaintiffs in Randy’s Trucking “asserted they only were seeking to have the raw data from the examination provided to their counsel in addition to plaintiffs’ expert”, and offered to sign a protective order “making the data available for use only in this case and only for review by counsel’s team and experts, with the data to be destroyed at the conclusion of the case ….” (Randy’s Trucking, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 826.) Plaintiff in Randy’s Trucking relied on Carpenter v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 249 (Carpenter), in which the court concluded, among other things, that copyright law did not preclude a plaintiff from obtaining a copy of written test materials. (Randy’s Trucking, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 826; Carpenter, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 253.)

The trial court in Randy’s Trucking granted the defendants’ motion and directed, among other things, that “’all raw data’ be provided to [plaintiffs’] counsel … subject to a protective order.” (Randy’s Trucking, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 828.) Defendants sought review of the trial court’s order, based on the contention that the trial court erred by ordering the transmission of the raw data to anyone other than a licensed psychologist or neuropsychologist. (Id. at p. 834.)

In conducting its review of the trial court’s order, the appellate court noted the absence of “statutory authority … precluding a trial court from ordering the disclosure of test materials or test data when ordering a mental examination.” (Randy’s Trucking, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 834.) The appellate court also recognized “the trial court’s broad discretion in discovery matters” and its “power to order disclosure of test materials and data to the plaintiff’s attorney.” (Id. at p. 835.)

The court further noted that the only evidence submitted by defendants in that case was a declaration of their neuropsychologist. (Randy’s Trucking, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 837.) Based on information provided by that neuropsychologist, the appellate court acknowledged the “dangers” which may result from the exposure of test materials and raw data, which include “compromising the validity of future neuropsychological test results”, the potential for “misuse and misinterpretation of tests” by untrained persons, “potential conflicts with the APA Ethical Standards” including “ ‘several key principles in the Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychology of the American Psychological Association (2013)’ ”, “an increased likelihood test content and instructions would be disseminated which ‘raises the risk that motivated parties will coach and prepare examinees for testing in advance, specifically to influence test results’ ”, and that “ ‘ “[l]awyers involved in brain injury litigation routinely coach their clients how to approach neuropsychological testing to their advantage.” ’ ” (Ibid.)

 

Notwithstanding the “dangers” noted by the court in Randy’s Trucking, which are effectively the same dangers cited by Dr. Goodman and the Woollards in the present motion, the court found that defendants failed to show why a protective order would not ameliorate these dangers, or any risk of violating the neuropsychologist’s ethical obligations. (Randy’s Trucking, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 837-838.) The court further noted that, while defendants’ neuropsychologist had identified various standards which the neuropsychologist claimed could be violated by the disclosure of raw examination data, the neuropsychologist had failed to explain these potential violations or submit copies of the applicable standards to the trial court. (Id. at p. 838.)

When weighing the evidence submitted by defendants against “plaintiffs’ right to take discovery and cross-examine defendants’ expert witnesses, which includes being able to examine the expert on the matter upon which the expert’s opinion is based and the reasons for that opinion …”, the court in Randy’s Trucking determined that “[w]ithout the raw data …, plaintiffs cannot effectively scrutinize the way the data was collected, determine if there are discrepancies, and cross-examine the neuropsychologist on the basis and reasons for the neuropsychologist’s opinion.” (Randy’s Trucking, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 838.) The court concluded that “[b]ased on the record before it, the trial court reasonably could find plaintiffs had a legitimate need for the raw data … and the concerns about maintaining test security would be satisfied with a protective order.” (Ibid.) For these, and other reasons more fully discussed in Randy’s Trucking, the court found that relief from the trial court’s order was not warranted. (Id. at p. 848.)

As the dispute at issue in Randy’s Trucking is substantively similar if not identical to the parties’ present dispute, that decision is persuasive and on point.

Noted above, Dr. Goodman describes a rule imposed by the California Board of Psychology. Dr. Goodman does not explain where a copy of this rule appears in the Index. Instead, Dr. Goodman quotes select portions of this rule, which Dr. Goodman appears to contend could be violated if the Raw Data is transmitted to Lindsay’s counsel. (See Goodman Decl., ¶¶ 10-11.)  

Further, the conclusory contentions offered by Dr. Goodman regarding potential violations of practice guidelines issued by “professional organizations” within the field of neuropsychology which purportedly could occur if the Raw Data is provided to Lindsay’s counsel, are themselves insufficient to explain any purported violations.

For example, though Dr. Goodman asserts that the guidelines or official statements referenced in the Goodman declaration are based on the premise that disclosure of test questions to non-psychologists would undermine the effectiveness or validity of the neuropsychological tests, Dr. Goodman fails to explain where the guidelines or statements provide that disclosure would violate practice guidelines. (Goodman Decl., ¶ 16.) Dr. Goodman also fails to explain why the publication by the American Academy of Clinical Neuropsychology referenced in the Goodman declaration and attached as exhibit D to the Index shows that disclosure of the Raw Data to Lindsay’s counsel would violate any practice guidelines, or that a protective order would not be sufficient to ameliorate any risk of violating such guidelines. (Ibid.)

Further, the language of the “rule” imposed by the California Board of Psychology set forth in Dr. Goodman’s declaration does not on its face show that Dr. Goodman is prohibited from releasing the Raw Data under the circumstances present here.

The “rule” set forth in the Goodman declaration states that a “psychologist shall not reproduce or describe in public or in publications subject to general public distribution any psychological test or other assessment devices....” (Goodman Decl., ¶ 10.) This language, which was selected by Dr. Goodman to show why the Raw Data or audio recordings may not be disclosed to Lindsay’s counsel, suggests to the court that, to the extent an appropriate protective order includes language sufficient to maintain the integrity and security of the Raw Data or any audio recordings, including by prohibiting their use or dissemination outside of this litigation, Dr. Goodman would not be prohibited from releasing the Raw Data or any audio recordings to Lindsay’s counsel. For these reasons, Dr. Goodman fails to sufficiently explain why an appropriate protective order could not satisfy any requirements imposed under this rule, which appears on its face to pertain only to the disclosure of test data or devices to the general public.

As to Dr. Goodman’s concerns regarding counsel’s qualifications to interpret the Raw Data, counsel “would not necessarily be required to do so to use the materials for purposes of cross-examination, since disclosure of these materials may help to protect against abuse and disputes over what transpired during the examination ….” (Randy’s Trucking, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 838.) Moreover, Lindsay “should not be forced to retain an expert to gain access to these materials and even if [she does] retain one, that expert can only assist [Lindsay’s counsel] in preparing for cross-examination; to prepare and conduct an effective cross-examination, ‘the attorney must themselves possess more than a secondhand understanding of the information being scrutinized.’ ” (Ibid.) For these reasons, any purported inability of counsel to interpret the Raw Data does not, alone, justify Dr. Goodman’s refusal to produce the Raw Data to counsel.

In addition, though Dr. Goodman also asserts, generally, that attorneys may use test information and devices to coach future clients, “that risk is not unique to psychological testing.” (Randy’s Trucking, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 841.) Further, Dr. Goodman and the Woollards have failed to “show testing integrity is meaningfully compromised by the potential for some attorney recall.” (Ibid.)

The remaining arguments advanced by the Woollards and Dr. Goodman are themselves insufficient to show that “attorneys regularly violate protective orders, including those concerning psychological or neuropsychological testing materials” or that there exists “a substantial risk of abusive intentional dissemination or an unacceptable risk of inadvertent disclosure” such that no protective order would be adequate to address Dr. Goodman’s concerns about the integrity or security of the Raw Data, including audio recordings, or the potential for their disclosure outside of this litigation. (Randy’s Trucking, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 842.)

For all reasons further discussed above, though the Woollards have made a sufficient showing of good cause for the evaluation, Lindsay has made a sufficient showing of the need for her counsel to obtain the Raw Data, including audio recordings of the evaluation, in order to enable counsel to understand the information at issue with respect to the evaluation. There is nothing to suggest, or which would allow the court to conclude, that a protective order could not sufficiently address any concerns regarding the security, integrity, or potential for misuse of the Raw Data or audio recordings, or to prevent their disclosure or release to persons not a party to or otherwise involved in this litigation.

Moreover, section 2032.530 grants Lindsay “the right to record [the evaluation] by audio technology.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.530, subd. (a).) Under section 2032.310, a motion for a mental examination must also specify the “manner, conditions, scope, and nature of the examination....” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.310, subd. (b).)

For all of the foregoing reasons, the court will grant the present motion, in part, and order Lindsay to appear for the evaluation on a date and at a time to be mutually agreed to by the parties, subject to the following conditions and restrictions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2019.030.) No later than 30 days after the conclusion of the evaluation, Dr. Goodman shall produce to plaintiffs’ counsel all raw data and audio recording of the evaluation, including the Raw Data described herein, which shall be maintained as confidential and used by the parties solely for the purposes of this case. The Raw Data, including any audio recordings of the evaluation, shall not be revealed, discussed with, or disclosed to any other person outside this litigation other than the parties, their counsel and neuropsychological experts, and the court. In addition, plaintiffs shall, within thirty days after the conclusion of this litigation, either destroy the Raw Data and provide a certification in writing that the data has been destroyed, or return the Raw Data to defendants’ counsel or Dr. Goodman.

Furthermore, the evaluation will not include any tests not identified in exhibit A to “Defendants’ Demand For Neuropsychological Evaluation Of Plaintiff”, a copy of which is attached to the Index as exhibit I. Plaintiffs and their counsel are authorized to record the evaluation by audio technology.

The court has reviewed the proposed order submitted by the Woollards and does not intend to sign it. The court will direct counsel for the Woollards to submit a corrected proposed order for the court’s approval that conforms to the court’s ruling herein, in compliance with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.