Lindsay Marks Orsini, et al. v. Scott Woollard, et al.

Case Number

24CV00596

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 12/02/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion to Strike Prayer For Punitive And Exemplary Damages From Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint

Tentative Ruling

Lindsay Marks Orsini, et al. v. Scott Woollard, et al.    

Case No. 24CV00596

           

Hearing Date: December 2, 2024                               

HEARING:              Motion to Strike Prayer For Punitive And Exemplary Damages From Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiffs Lindsay Marks Orsini and Christian Orsini: Ramin Kermani-Nejad, Mohamad Ahmad, Hani Ganji, Kermani LLP

                                    For Defendants Brooke Woollard and Scott Woollard: Nolan S. Armstrong, Caitlyn M. Harris, McNamara, Ambacher, Wheeler, Hirsig &Gray LLP

                                   

TENTATIVE RULING:

The motion of defendants to strike the prayer for punitive and exemplary damages from plaintiffs’ first amended complaint is granted without leave to amend. Paragraph 26 and Prayer paragraph 3 are each stricken from plaintiffs’ second amended complaint.

Background:

Plaintiffs Lindsay Marks Orsini (Lindsay) and Christian Orsini (Christian) (collectively, Orsini) filed their original complaint in this matter on February 2, 2024, alleging three causes of action against defendants Brooke Woollard (Brooke) and Scott Woollard (Scott) (collectively, Woollard): (1) negligence; (2) negligent entrustment; and (3) loss of consortium. (Note: Due to common familial surnames, the court will refer to the parties by their first names. No disrespect is intended.) As alleged in the complaint, on March 7, 2022, while speeding in an SUV owned by Scott and talking on a cell phone, Brooke rear-ended a vehicle driven by Lindsay, causing Lindsay to suffer serious injuries from which she will never fully recuperate.

Woollard filed an answer to the complaint on March 12, 2024, generally denying its allegations and asserting six affirmative defenses, and a motion to strike the prayer for punitive and exemplary damages asserted in the complaint on the grounds that Orsini failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate malice or oppression. The motion was opposed by Orsini.

On April 29, 2024, the Court issued its Minute Order (the First Minute Order) granting the motion to strike filed by Woollard on March 12, 2024, and ordering Orsini to file and serve a first amended complaint on or before May 10, 2024.

On May 10, 2024, Orsini filed a first amended complaint (the FAC) alleging the same three causes of action described above against Woollard. The FAC includes identical or substantively similar allegations and adds that, at the time of the incident, Brooke was travelling in a large and heavy SUV at nearly double the speed limit in a 25 mile per hour residential neighborhood near a park where children play, that Brooke had driven through this residential neighborhood countless times and knew that it was adjacent to the park, that Brooke knew it was illegal to use a cell phone while driving, and that Brooke routinely uses her cell phone while driving and routinely speeds through the neighborhood. (FAC, ¶¶ 10-13.) Orsini further alleged that, despite her knowledge of these matters, Brooke was looking down at and distracted by her cell phone when the incident occurred. (Id. at ¶¶ 10-12.)

On June 10, 2024, Woollard filed an answer to the FAC generally denying its allegations and asserting six affirmative defenses, and a motion for an order striking the prayer for punitive and exemplary damages from the FAC. (See FAC at p. 7.) That motion was also opposed by Orsini.

On August 12, 2024, the Court issued a Minute Order (the Second Minute Order) granting the June 10, 2024, motion to strike of Woollard without leave to amend as to the claim alleged against Scott, and with leave to amend as to the claim alleged against Brooke. The Court further ordered Orsini to file and serve a second amended complaint on or before August 22, 2024.

On August 22, 2024, Orsini filed a second amended complaint (the SAC), alleging the same three causes of action against Woollard. The SAC includes substantively identical or similar allegations as those asserted in the FAC further described above, and adds that at the time of the incident, Brooke also was not wearing her prescription sunglasses and not looking in front of her due to being distracted by her cell phone. (SAC, ¶¶ 10, 12(d), 13.) Orsini also alleges that, taken together, the repeated conduct of Brooke described in the SAC, which Orsini also asserts is illegal, demonstrates a conscious and deliberate disregard for the interests and safety of others. (Id. at ¶ 14.)

On September 24, 2024, Woollard answered the SAC generally denying its allegations and asserting six causes of action.

On September 26, 2024, Woollard filed a motion for an order striking from the SAC allegations that Brooke acted with malice and the demand of Orsini for punitive damages. The motion is opposed by Orsini.

Analysis:

“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) In ruling on a motion to strike, a court may “strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading” or “strike  all or part of any pleading not filed in conformity with applicable law, court rules, or an order of the court” (Code Civ. Proc., §436.) The grounds for a motion to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or from matters which the court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)

Woollard contends that, notwithstanding that their motion to strike punitive damages from the FAC was granted by the Court without leave to amend as to Scott, the SAC appears to seek punitive damages against Scott. To the extent Orsini intends in the SAC to allege a claim for punitive damages against Scott, and considering the Court’s prior ruling with respect to this issue as reflected in the Second Minute Order, the Court will grant the present motion as to Scott, without leave to amend.

Under Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a), punitive damages are recoverable where it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with malice, oppression, or fraud. “Malice” means “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “Oppression” means “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) To survive a motion to strike allegations of punitive damages, ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pleaded. (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)

Orsini does not appear to dispute that the claim for punitive damages alleged in the SAC does not arise from any fraudulent conduct by Brooke. Therefore, Orsini must allege facts which, if proven, would be sufficient to show that Brooke’s conduct was despicable. (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725 (College Hospital) [noting that “malice” requires more than a willful or conscious disregard of other’s rights].)“Despicable conduct” for purposes of an award of punitive damages means “conduct that is ‘ “so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.” ’ … [Citation.] ” (McNeal v. Whittaker, Clark & Daniels, Inc. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 853, 872 [also noting that such conduct has the character of outrage associated with a crime].) “ ‘The wrongdoer “must act with the intent to vex, injure, or annoy, or with a conscious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights [citations].” Punitive damages are appropriate if the defendant’s acts are reprehensible, fraudulent or in blatant violation of law or policy. The mere carelessness or ignorance of the defendant does not justify the imposition of punitive damages.... Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff’s rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.’ ” (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287, citations omitted.)

Even if the Court were to assume the truth of new allegations appearing in the SAC which assert that, in addition to engaging in conduct previously alleged in the FAC and addressed in the Second Minute Order, Brooke was also not wearing her prescription glasses at the time of the incident, these allegations do not materially change the Court’s analysis or reasoning as set forth in the First Minute Order or the Second Minute Order.

For example, as the Court stated in the Second Minute Order, motor vehicle accidents typically involve some level of inattention, distraction, or negligence of one or more involved parties. In addition, while speeding, looking at or using a cell phone, and failing to wear necessary prescription eyewear while driving may create some foreseeable risk of injury to others, it is not necessarily probable that a risk of injury arises under all circumstances. (Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 89 (Dawes).) Even if the Court were to assume that the allegations of the SAC are sufficient to show that Brooke acted with a conscious disregard for the probable consequences of her conduct, the additional allegations remain insufficient as a matter of law to show that Brooke’s conduct was despicable, that Brooke intended to hit Lindsay’s vehicle, or that Brooke acted with any evil intent notwithstanding whether Brooke knew that her conduct could create a risk of injury to others including Lindsay.

For all reasons further discussed above, even if Orsini proved the factual allegations of the SAC at trial, they do not show, as a matter of law, that Brooke acted in a manner that would justify the imposition of punitive damages. Instead, as the Court also noted in the Second Minute Order, these allegations demonstrate, at most, a negligent or reckless decision by Brooke to speed while driving a large vehicle, not wearing her glasses, and using a cell phone. Though these allegations may be sufficient to show gross negligence by Brooke, “proof of … even gross negligence ... is insufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.” (Dawes, supra, 111 Cal.App.3d at p. 87.)

The Court also previously noted that the allegations addressed above are not analogous to those examined in Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890. For example, there are no additional facts alleged in the SAC which show that Brooke’s allegedly repeated conduct caused other serious accidents or that Brooke was previously arrested, subject to criminal prosecution, or convicted for the same conduct. Instead, the allegations of the SAC also describe “routine negligent or even reckless disobedience of traffic laws” which “would not justify an award of punitive damages.” (Id. at p. 900.) As further noted in the Second Minute Order, “despicable conduct was not a requirement when Taylor was decided.” (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1212.) For these same reasons, Orsini’s reliance on the decision SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902 is also misplaced. (See College Hospital, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725 [noting that the addition of the word “willful” and reference to “despicable” conduct by the Legislature under the 1987 Reform Act was not surplusage but “seems to represent a new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards”].)
 

For all reasons discussed above, the allegations of the SAC remain insufficient to demonstrate the existence of sufficiently despicable or willful conduct by Brooke which would support or justify an award of punitive damages even if Orsini were to prove these allegations at trial. Therefore, the Court will grant the motion as to the claim for punitive damages claim alleged against Brooke.

Orsini bears the burden to show a reasonable possibility that the deficiencies in the SAC can be cured by amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) Orsini contends that they recently discovered that Brooke also ignored Lindsay’s lengthy honking to alert Brooke to slow down and stop. Orsini offers no reasoned legal argument demonstrating why these allegations will change the legal effect of the SAC. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) In addition, even if it were true that Brooke ignored lengthy honking by Lindsay, these additional facts would not support an award of punitive damages for all reasons discussed above.

The Court has provided Orsini with repeated opportunities to allege facts which would be sufficient to support an award of punitive damages. At this stage of the proceedings, it does not appear to the Court that the SAC can be truthfully amended in a manner that would be sufficient to show an entitlement to punitive damages against Brooke. Therefore, the Court will deny Orsini leave to amend. To the extent Orsini discovers facts that may change the analysis, the Court’s ruling herein is without prejudice to any procedurally appropriate motion for leave to amend the SAC to allege a claim for punitive damages that may be filed by Orsini in the future.