Alma Medel v. American Honda Motor Co., et al

Case Number

24CV00525

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 09/04/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests For Production of Documents (Set Two)

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiff Alma Medel: Kevin Y. Jacobson, Gregory Sogoyan, Quill & Arrow, LLP

For Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc.: Soheyl Tahsildoost, Theta Law Firm, LLP                                    

For Defendant Cappo Management XXXI, Inc., dba Ocean Honda of Ventura: No appearance.

                       

RULING

For the reasons set forth herein, plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to requests for production of documents, set two, is denied.

Background

This action was commenced on January 31, 2024, by the filing of the complaint by plaintiff Alma Medel (“plaintiff”) against defendants American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (“Honda”) and Cappo Management XXXI, Inc., dba Ocean Honda of Ventura, alleging violations of the Song-Beverly Act and negligent repair related to a 2022 Honda Civic that was purchased by plaintiff on February 21, 2022.

On May 31, 2024, plaintiff propounded requests for production of documents, set two, on Honda. Honda provided responses on June 20, 2024. (Sogoyan Decl., ¶¶ 16, 17 & Exhs. 3, 4.)

Arguing that Honda’s responses were non-compliant, on June 20, 2024, plaintiff sent Honda a 51 page, including attachments, meet and confer letter. (Sogoyan Decl., ¶ 19 & Exh. 5.) On July 15, 2024, plaintiff sent Honda a second meet and confer letter. (Sogoyan Decl., ¶ 20 & Exh. 6.)

Plaintiff now moves to compel further responses to all of the requests for production. Honda opposes the motion.

Analysis

The motion and the opposition both suffer from multiple procedural and substantive issues.

First: “All electronic documents must be in text searchable format and must comply with the formatting and content requirements of the California Rules of Court for electronic documents, including particularly CRC 3.1110(f)(4) requiring electronic bookmarks.” (Super. Ct. Santa Barbara County, Local Rules, rule 1012 (c)(1).)

“Unless they are submitted by a self-represented party, electronic exhibits must include electronic bookmarks with links to the first page of each exhibit and with bookmark titles that identify the exhibit number or letter and briefly describe the exhibit.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.110 (f)(4).)

“Compliance with all of the formatting requirements for electronic documents is extremely important for the court’s timely consideration of e-filed documents. In cases of noncompliance, the court may, in its discretion, order any, or all, of the following in addition to any other sanction permitted by law: (i) the noncomplying document to be stricken as improperly filed; (ii) the continuance of the hearing to which the noncomplying document pertains; or, (iii) the imposition of monetary sanctions for violation of the California Rules of Court or these Local Rules, following adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.” (Super. Ct. Santa Barbara County, Local Rules, rule 1012 (c)(2).)

Plaintiff’ counsel’s declaration in support of the motion, consisting of 171 pages, is not bookmarked. Likewise, Honda counsel’s declaration in opposition, consisting of 201 pages, is not properly bookmarked. Counsel is reminded of their obligation to comply with the California Rules of Court as well as the Local Rules in any future filings with the court.

Second: “We recognize that it is very common for [attorneys] to include argument in their declarations (we know it is done all the time, and we do not want to single out the trial lawyers in this regard), but it is a sloppy practice which should stop. Even at its most benign, it is a practice that forces the trial and appellate courts, and opposing counsel, to sort out the facts that are actually supported by oath from material that is nothing more than the statement of an opinion ostensibly under oath. More fundamentally, however, it makes a mockery of the requirement that declarations be supported by statements made under penalty of perjury. The proper place for argument is in points and authorities, not declarations.” (In re Marriage of Heggie (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 28, 30, fn. 3.)

An attorney is competent to recite events occurring during the course of the litigation. An attorney’s declaration of what the client’s testimony would be, based on the attorney’s discussion with the client and an investigation of the facts, is not competent. (See Donnelly v. Ayer (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 978, 984.)

In any future declarations filed with this court, counsel should keep this in mind.

Third: California Rules of Court, rule 3.1345 provides:

“(a) Separate statement required

Except as provided in (b), any motion involving the content of a discovery request or the responses to such a request must be accompanied by a separate statement. The motions that require a separate statement include a motion:

“(1) To compel further responses to requests for admission;

“(2) To compel further responses to interrogatories;

“(3) To compel further responses to a demand for inspection of documents or tangible things;

“(4) To compel answers at a deposition;

“(5) To compel or to quash the production of documents or tangible things at a deposition;

“(6) For medical examination over objection; and

“(7) For issue or evidentiary sanctions.

“(b) Separate statement not required

A separate statement is not required under the following circumstances:

“(1) When no response has been provided to the request for discovery; or

“(2) When a court has allowed the moving party to submit--in place of a separate statement--a concise outline of the discovery request and each response in dispute.

“(c) Contents of separate statement

A separate statement is a separate document filed and served with the discovery motion that provides all the information necessary to understand each discovery request and all the responses to it that are at issue. The separate statement must be full and complete so that no person is required to review any other document in order to determine the full request and the full response. Material must not be incorporated into the separate statement by reference. The separate statement must include--for each discovery request (e.g., each interrogatory, request for admission, deposition question, or inspection demand) to which a further response, answer, or production is requested--the following:

“(1) The text of the request, interrogatory, question, or inspection demand;

“(2) The text of each response, answer, or objection, and any further responses or answers;

“(3) A statement of the factual and legal reasons for compelling further responses, answers, or production as to each matter in dispute;

“(4) If necessary, the text of all definitions, instructions, and other matters required to understand each discovery request and the responses to it;

“(5) If the response to a particular discovery request is dependent on the response given to another discovery request, or if the reasons a further response to a particular discovery request is deemed necessary are based on the response to some other discovery request, the other request and the response to it must be set forth; and

“(6) If the pleadings, other documents in the file, or other items of discovery are relevant to the motion, the party relying on them must summarize each relevant document.

“(d) Identification of interrogatories, demands, or requests

A motion concerning interrogatories, inspection demands, or admission requests must identify the interrogatories, demands, or requests by set and number.”

As to both the separate statement in support of the motion, and the separate statement in opposition to the motion: The separate statements are filled with generic legal citations that fail to address the specific requests in dispute. They are prolix. They are repetitive. They obfuscate the issues. And they lack substance.

Further, it is not until the fifteenth page that plaintiff even gets to the individual requests. Even then, as a reason to compel further responses, she sets forth a general argument that essentially indicates that other courts “have repeatedly found these documents relevant,” without specifically addressing the request in dispute or explaining exactly why she is entitled to discovery of the specific documents requested. Plaintiff then, for requests Nos. 2 through 9 states as the reasons to compel further responses: “Plaintiff incorporates by reference the Reasons to Compel Further Response and Production set forth under RFP No. 1, supra.” This reference to the reasons set forth in response to request No. 1 is insufficient and not in compliance with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(c)(3), quoted in full above. The moving party must provide: “A statement of the factual and legal reasons for compelling further responses, answers, or production as to each matter in dispute.” (Italics added.) They must also not incorporate information by reference.

Plaintiff then provides “reasons” to compel a further response to request No. 10 that suffers from the same deficiencies as the reasons stated for request No. 1. Plaintiff then, for requests Nos. 11 through 32, states as the reasons to compel further responses: “Plaintiff incorporates by reference the Reasons to Compel Further Response and Production set forth under RFP No. 10, supra.” Again, this is improper.

As has been pointed out to plaintiff’s counsel previously (in Case No. 23CV05126): The court has discretion to disregard a nonconforming separate statement and to deny a motion to compel discovery for failure to comply with the requirements for a proper separate statement. (Mills v. U.S. Bank (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 871, 893; see also Neary v. Regents of University of California (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1136, 1145 [discussing plaintiff’s failure to adequately support a motion to compel discovery due to a nonconforming separate statement].)

Additionally, the “reasons” to compel further responses, improperly incorporated by reference, do not apply to most of the requests to which plaintiff applies them. For example: Request No. 2 seeks “All DOCUMENTS regarding the SUBJECT VEHICLE that are within YOUR Customer Relations Center.”

The reason given, which, again, is stated as the reason to compel further responses to request No. 1, includes: “This Request seeks documents and information concerning Defendant’s Lemon Law, warranty, and recall policies and procedures, that includes production of Defendant’s Warranty Policy and Procedure Manual. Courts have repeatedly found these documents relevant to SBA claims. See, e.g., Jensen v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 136 (1995), as modified on denial of reh’g (June 22, 1995) (“ ‘whether the manufacturer had a written policy on the requirement to repair or replace’ ” is one of “ ‘the factors to be considered by the jury’ ” concerning whether defendant willfully violated the SBA); Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 23 Cal.App.4th 174, 186 (1994) (“ ‘Whether the lack of a written policy demonstrates [defendant’s willful violation of the SBA] is a question to be answered by a properly instructed jury. . . .’ ”).” (Italics in original.)

Quite clearly, Request No. 2 is not seeking “documents and information concerning Defendant’s Lemon Law, warranty, and recall policies and procedures.” It is seeking documents regarding the subject vehicle that are within Honda’s Customer Relations Center. Likewise, nearly all the other requests that improperly incorporate the reasons to compel a further response to request No. 1, or that incorporate the reasons to compel a further response to request No. 10, seek documents that are not in any way related to the “incorporated by reference” reasons.

A motion to compel further responses to a demand for production of documents “shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) To establish good cause, the burden is on the moving party to make a “fact-specific showing of relevance.” (Glenfed Development Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117.)

Despite the pervasive non-conformance with the separate statement and the motion itself, the court has reviewed each of the requests and applied plaintiff’s “reasons” to each of them. Plaintiff has failed to set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demands. The separate statement, and the motion itself, is completely devoid of any fact-specific showing of relevance.

Likewise, Honda has also failed to provide sufficient argument, tailored to each of the requests, to justify its objections. (See Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.)

Fourth: “It is a central precept to the Civil Discovery Act of 1986 . . . that civil discovery be essentially self-executing. [Citation.] The Discovery Act requires that, prior to the initiation of a motion to compel, the moving party declare that he or she has made a serious attempt to obtain “ ‘an informal resolution of each issue.’ ” [Citations.] This rule is designed “ ‘to encourage the parties to work out their differences informally so as to avoid the necessity for a formal order. . . .’ ” [Citation.] This, in turn, will lessen the burden on the court and reduce the unnecessary expenditure of resources by litigants through promotion of informal, extrajudicial resolution of discovery disputes.” (Townsend v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1434-1435.)

“Courts must insist discovery devices be used as tools to facilitate litigation rather than as weapons to wage litigation. These tools should be well calibrated; the lancet is to be preferred over the sledge hammer.” (Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221.)

“A meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040; italics added.)

Based on the 51 page, with attachments, form “meet and confer” letter, which is identical in many respects to the letter sent to defense counsel in Case No. 23CV05126, plaintiff’s counsel did not make a reasonable and good faith effort to resolve the discovery dispute. The letter is essentially a recitation of basic discovery law and a claim that “other courts” have found certain documents relevant. The letter does not discuss each request individually. Rather, as with the separate statement here, the requests are lumped into groups of categories and the reasons given do not apply to each of the requests. It is clear that plaintiff’s counsel had no expectation of the letter resolving the dispute. The letter is basically a demand that defendant turn over everything they have and waive all objections rather than a good faith attempt to resolve a dispute. Not blameless, defense counsel does assert inapplicable boilerplate objections and appears to resist providing some documents that they should provide. There have been countless discovery rulings in the various Song-Beverly cases throughout California over many years. And, as the court is certain counsel knows, some counties have even implemented standing discovery orders in these cases. Counsel on both sides should have a very good idea of what is discoverable and what is not. These pervasive discovery disputes are largely unnecessary and contrary to the rule that discovery should be self-executing.

For all of the above reasons, plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to request for production of documents, set two, will be denied in its entirety.