Julie Westerfield, et al. v. Jordana Snider, et al

Case Number

24CV00431

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 08/20/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Plaintiff Julie Westerfield’s Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiff Julie Westerfield and Cross-Defendant Christopher Westerfield: Brant K. Berglund, John J. Thyne III, Thyne Taylor Fox Howard, LLP

For Defendant and Cross-Complainant Jordana Snider: Justin M. Alvarez, David A. Shaneyfelt, The Alvarez Firm, A Law Corporation

RULING

For all reasons discussed herein, Plaintiff Julie Westerfield’s motion for attorney fees is granted in part and denied in part as follows:

1. Attorneys’ Fees in the amount of $276,797.50 are awarded in favor of Plaintiff Julie Westerfield and against Defendant Jordana Snider, payable to the attorney for Plaintiff by October 1, 2025; if not paid they will accrue interest at the legal rate.
2. Costs in the amount of $28,783.53 are awarded in favor of Plaintiff Julie Westerfield and against Defendant Jordana Snider, payable to the attorney for Plaintiff by October 1, 2025; if not paid they will accrue interest at the legal rate.

Background

On January 26, 2024, Plaintiffs Julie aka Julia Westerfield (Julie or Ms. Westerfield) and Thomas “Gerry” Westerfield (Thomas or Mr. Westerfield) (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed their original complaint in this matter against Defendants Jordana Snider (Snider or Ms. Snider) and Brian Chossek (Chossek). (Note: Due to common familial surnames, the Court will refer to some Plaintiffs by their first names. No disrespect is intended.)

On May 2, 2024, Julie filed a first amended complaint (the FAC) alleging eight causes of action against Snider and removing Thomas as a Plaintiff and Chossek as a Defendant. Thomas is Julie’s husband and was her guardian ad litem in this litigation. The FAC contains causes of action for: (1) Undue Influence; (2) Financial Abuse of an Elder; (3) Violation of California Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.6; (4) Breach of Fiduciary Duty; (5) Constructive Fraud; (6) Mistake; (7) Unjust Enrichment; and (8) Cancelation of an Instrument.

As alleged in the FAC:

“The subject of this action is the real property commonly known as 1002 N. Signal Street, Ojai, CA, situated in Ventura County, California (hereinafter referred to as the ‘ “Property” ’) and is owned by [Julie], a resident of Santa Barbara, CA.” (FAC., ¶ 3.)

“This case involves the fraudulent scheme by an adult real estate agent (Ms. Snider) who has ingratiated herself to a family led by an elderly matriarch (Ms. Westerfield) who suffers from cognitive failures and is severely susceptible to influence by Ms. Snider. To ensure she could effectuate her plan to steal from this family, in 2022 Ms. Snider (as an adult) had herself adopted by Ms. Westerfield and then exerted undue influence to convince Ms. Westerfield to convey the Property, worth at least $2,200,000, to Ms. Snider at no cost [while claiming the “parent to child” exclusion based upon the adult adoption]. Ms. Snider has alienated Ms. Westerfield on specific occasions when it suits her, and Ms. Snider has had Ms. Westerfield write her checks, first $300,000 that bounced, then $200,000 that cleared, and later claimed this was a “loan” despite there being no evidence of a loan. [NOTE: Ms. Snider returned these funds when her scam was discovered.] Ms. Snider, who previously agreed to re-convey the Property to Ms. Westerfield, now refuses to deed the Property back to Ms. Westerfield. This has substantially harmed Ms. Westerfield.” (FAC., ¶ 5.)

Snider is a licensed real estate broker who has known the Westerfield family for many years. (FAC, ¶¶ 6, 7.) Over the years, Snider learned that Julie owned valuable property that Julie had inherited, and, at some point, Snider concocted a scheme to steal the property from Julie. (FAC, ¶¶ 9, 10.)

On August 1, 2022, Julie was diagnosed with cognitive impairment and pre-Alzheimer’s disease. (FAC, ¶ 11.)

Over the course of the relationship between Snider and Julie, Snider persuaded Julie to pay for Snider’s children to attend various schools and universities. (FAC, ¶¶ 14, 15, 16.)

“On or about March 9, 2016, Ms. Westerfield appointed Ms. Snider as her successor Agent under her Power of Attorney that was prepared through the offices of Mullen & Henzel, LLP.” (FAC, ¶ 18.) On March 29, 2022, Snider, who was approximately 51 years old, convinced Julie to adopt her. (FAC, ¶ 19.) Thomas agreed to the adoption without fully understanding what was happening. (Ibid.)

“On or about September 21, 2022, at the insistence of Ms. Snider, Ms. Westerfield wrote Ms. Snider a check in the amount of $300,000 with the memo line left blank. This check was refused by Ms. Snider’s bank due to insufficient funds in Ms. Westerfield’s bank account.” (FAC, ¶ 24.) “The next day, Ms. Snider convinced Ms. Westerfield to write her another check in the amount of $200,000.00.” (FAC, ¶ 25.) The $200,000 check was cashed, but Julie soon realized that she could not afford to convey a check for that amount, and, upon request, Snider returned the $200,000. (FAC, ¶ 26.)

On February 10, 2023, Snider coerced Julie into quitclaiming the subject property to Snider, which was worth over $2,200,000 for no consideration. (FAC, ¶ 27.) Due to her pre-Alzheimer’s cognitive decline and lack of real estate expertise, Julie was unaware that quitclaiming the property deprived her of title and conveyed the property to Snider. (FAC, ¶ 28.)

As of January 18, 2024, Julie stated that she was unaware that she no longer owned title to the property. (FAC, ¶ 31.)

To assist Thomas in managing Julie’s financial matters, Julie designated Snider as her Attorney-in-Fact pursuant to a Power of Attorney dated May 26, 2023. (FAC, ¶ 40.) On January 18, 2024, the Power of Attorney was revoked. (FAC, ¶ 43.)

Julie and Thomas requested that Snider deed the property back to them, but Snider refused. (FAC, ¶ 42.)

By way of the FAC, Julie sought: (1) Compensatory Damages; (2) Punitive Damages; (3) Rescission or Cancellation of the Gift Deed dated February 10, 2023; (4) Rescission of the Decree of Adoption of Snider; (5) Constructive Trust over the Property; and (6) Costs of Suit Including Attorney Fees.

On May 31, 2024, Snider filed a cross-complaint against Julie’s son Christopher Westerfield (Christopher) for: (1) Undue Influence; (2) Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations; (3) Tortious Interference with Expected Inheritance – Real Property; and (4) Tortious Interference with Expected Inheritance – Estate Plan.

On June 27, 2024, this case was ordered related to: (1) Case No. 24CV00027 – Julia Westerfield v. Jordana Brie Snider; (2) Case No. 24CV00031 - Julia Westerfield v. Brian Chossek; and (3) Case No. 24PR00353 – Conservatorship of Julia Westerfield.

On August 21, 2024, in Case No. 24PR00353, Mark Watson was appointed as the Conservator of the Estate of Julie. On October 2, 2024, Jeffrey Soderborg was appointed attorney for the Conservatee. On November 20, 2024, Soderborg was relieved as counsel for Julie and on January 6, 2025, Dana Longo was appointed counsel for Julie.

The present matter proceeded to jury trial over 12 Court days in March and April 2025. The jury deliberated and returned a verdict on April 22, 2025. The jury determined: (1) Julie proved her complaint by a preponderance of the evidence such that she is entitled to recission of the gift deed to the property; (2) Julie proved by clear and convincing evidence that she is entitled to punitive damages against Snider in the amount of $150,000.00; and (3) Snider did not prove her cross-complaint against Christopher.

On May 5, 2025, the Court issued its Judgment after Trial, reflecting the jury verdict and making the following additional rulings on equitable issues before the Court: (1) In Case No. 24CV00027, the Court ruled that the case should proceed to a permanent (3-year) restraining order protecting Julie, as well as Christopher and Gerry, from Snider; (2) In Case No. 24CV00031, the Court ruled that the case should proceed to a permanent (3-year) restraining order protecting Julie, as well as Christopher and Gerry, from Chossek; and (3) The Court denied Julie’s request for recission of the adult adoption of Snider by Julie.

In short, judgment was entered in favor of Julie on all her causes of action. The only relief requested that was denied, was rescission of the decree of adoption. It was also ordered that Julie bring the current motion as a post-trial motion.

Julie now moves for prevailing party attorneys’ fees and costs in the following amounts:

1. $276,000.00 in attorneys’ fees incurred in prosecuting this action;
2. $14,542.00 in conservator fees incurred in protecting Julie’s interests;
3. $6,925.70 in conservator attorney fees incurred in this case; and
4. $30,376.52 in litigation costs.

Snider opposes the motion.

Analysis

Attorneys’ Fees

“California follows the ‘American rule,’ under which each party to a lawsuit ordinarily must pay his or her own attorney fees.” (Musaelian v. Adams (2009) 45 Cal.4th 512, 516.) “[A] Court has no discretion to award costs not statutorily authorized.” (Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774.)

However, attorneys’ fees are allowable as costs if authorized by “contract,” “statute,” or “law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(A)-(C).)

In the present matter, attorneys’ fees are allowable as authorized by statute. Despite Snider’s argument to the contrary, Plaintiff prevailed on her financial elder abuse cause of action. Snider’s argument that Plaintiff failed to prove the essential elements of her claims is simply untrue.

“Where it is proven by a preponderance of the evidence that a Defendant is liable for financial abuse, as defined in Section 15610.30, in addition to compensatory damages and all other remedies otherwise provided by law, the Court shall award to the Plaintiff reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. The term “ ‘costs’ ” includes, but is not limited to, reasonable fees for the services of a conservator, if any, devoted to the litigation of a claim brought under this article.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.5, subd. (a).)

“ ‘Prevailing party’ includes the party with a net monetary recovery, a Defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a Defendant where neither Plaintiff nor Defendant obtains any relief, and a Defendant as against those Plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that Defendant. If any party recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified, the ‘prevailing party’ shall be as determined by the Court, and under those circumstances, the Court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not and, if allowed, may apportion costs between the parties on the same or adverse sides pursuant to rules adopted under Section 1034.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).)

When determining prevailing party attorney fees awards: “ ‘A typical formulation is that ‘ “Plaintiffs may be considered “ ‘prevailing parties’ ” for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” ’ [Citation.]” (Quiles v. Parent (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1015.)

“[I]t is well settled that “ ‘[p]artially successful Plaintiffs may recover attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.’ ” [Citation.]” (City of Oakland v. Oakland Police & Fire Retirement System (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 688, 708.)

“The trial Court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623-624.)

“Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d) requires the attorney fees to be based on “ ‘actual time expended” ’ ” and to have been “ ‘reasonably incurred.’ ” In Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 818–819 (Robertson), the Court concluded, “ ‘the statutory language of section 1794, subdivision (d), is reasonably compatible with a lodestar adjustment method of calculating attorney fees’ ” because “ ‘the lodestar adjustment method is based on actual, reasonable attorney time expended as the objective starting point of the analysis [citation], it is compatible with this statutory provision.’ ” The lodestar method is applicable to calculating attorney fees under section 1794, subdivision (d), the Court reasoned, because “ ‘the lodestar adjustment method is the prevailing rule for calculation of statutory attorney fees unless the statute expressly indicates a contrary intent, and no such contrary intent is apparent.’ ” (Robertson, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 821, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 731.) We agree. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 997.)

“[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the Court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.)

One of the issues that the Court has with the present motion is that Plaintiff includes fees for the related cases as well as the present case. The cases were not consolidated. The motion was only filed in this case. The conservator and conservator’s attorney were not appointed in this case. They were appointed in Case No. 24PR00353. The Court offers no opinion as to the recoverability of the fees and costs from the probate case, but any motion must be made in that case rather than this case. As such, Plaintiff’s request for conservator fees in the amount of $14,542.00 and conservatory attorney fees in the amount of $6,925.70, will be denied without prejudice. Should Plaintiff wish to recover those costs, she will be required to file and serve the motion in the proper case.

With respect to the tasks that were performed in the present case, counsel has provided a declaration and billing invoices that reflect the work performed. Although lightly redacted, the billing records are sufficient to determine the necessity and reasonableness of the time spent.

Snider argues that not all the claimed fees are proper because not all of the fees incurred were directly related to the financial elder abuse cause of action.

“ ‘When a cause of action for which attorney fees are provided by statute is joined with other causes of action for which attorney fees are not permitted, the prevailing party may recover only on the statutory cause of action. However, the joinder of causes of action should not dilute the right to attorney fees. Such fees need not be apportioned when incurred for representation of an issue common to both a cause of action for which fees are permitted and one for which they are not. All expenses incurred on the common issues qualify for an award.’ ” [Citations.] “ ‘When the liability issues are so interrelated that it would have been impossible to separate them into claims for which attorney fees are properly awarded and claims for which they are not, then allocation is not required.’ ” [Citation.] (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 157.)

Here, all the fees incurred in this case were the result of litigating issues that were so interrelated that it is impossible to separate them into claims for which attorney fees are properly awarded and claims for which there are not.

Snider also argus that Plaintiff should not be awarded fees for opposing the conservatorship petition, opposing a demurrer, filing an unsuccessful motion to compel, filing unsuccessful motions in limine, and having two attorneys at trial. Snider’s arguments fail.

“Generally, parties “ ‘who qualify for a fee should recover compensation for ‘ “all the hours reasonably spent . . ..” ’ ” [Citations.] This includes work on unsuccessful arguments. [Citation.]” (State Farm General Insurance Company v. Lara (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 197, 218.) Here, although not always successful in their arguments, all of the time spent by Plaintiff’s counsel in this litigation was reasonably spent.

Likewise, given the issues presented by this case, it was not unreasonable to have two attorneys represent Plaintiff at trial. It is common for cases of this type to require the skill and effort of more than one attorney when conducting a jury trial. The Court finds that it was reasonably necessary.

The Court has carefully reviewed the declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel, as well as the billing invoices, and finds the time claimed to be reasonable and necessary. Plaintiff’s attorneys were experienced and skillful, the interrelated issues were somewhat complex, Plaintiff prevailed, and the attorneys’ fees are within the range of other similarly skilled attorneys in Santa Barbara. As such, after deducting the claimed time for fees incurred in the probate matter, Plaintiff will be awarded reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees in the amount of $276,797.50.

Costs

“Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (b).)

“If items on a memorandum of costs appear to be proper charges on their face, those items are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services are proper and necessarily incurred. [Citations.] The burden then shifts to the objecting party to show them to be unnecessary or unreasonable.” (Doe v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Servs. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 675, 693.)

CCP § 1033.5(a) identifies cost items that are allowable under section 1032; CCP § 1033.5(b) identifies items that are not allowable; and CCP § 1033.5(c)(4) provides that “[i]tems not mentioned in this section … may be allowed or denied in the Court’s discretion.” “Allowable costs shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation” and “shall be reasonable in amount.” CCP § 1033.5(c)(2) & (3). “If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs. [Citation] Whether a cost item was reasonably necessary to the litigation presents a question of fact for the trial Court….” Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774 (“Ladas”).  

“Initial verification will suffice to establish the reasonable necessity of the costs claimed. There is no requirement that copies of bills, invoices, statements, or any other such documents be attached to the memorandum. Only if the costs have been put in issue via a motion to tax costs must supporting documentation be submitted.” (Jones v. Dumrichob, 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1267 (1998).) Plaintiffs have provided sufficient documentation of claimed costs.

As noted above, Plaintiff seeks $30,376.52 in costs. Snider argues that the parties should bear their own costs and that certain costs are inappropriate or excessive. Specifically, Snider challenges $870.00 for filing and motion fees, $8,493.77 for models, enlargements, and photocopies of exhibits, $675.00 for electronic filing or service, and $47.99 for “other.”

As for the argument that the parties should bear their own costs: Plaintiff prevailed and is entitled to statutory costs.

By way of her reply brief, Plaintiff fails to adequately address the challenge to the $870.00 in filing and motion fees of $675.00 for electronic filing or service. It is unclear to the Court which of those costs are related to the present case and which were incurred in the related cases. Because Plaintiff has failed to support those claimed costs, they will be denied.

Plaintiff does justify incurring $8,493.77 for models, enlargements, and photocopies of exhibits.

“Models, the enlargements of exhibits and photocopies of exhibits, and the electronic presentation of exhibits, including costs of rental equipment and electronic formatting, may be allowed if they were reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(13).) The acceptance and use of technology at trial has increased greatly since 1995. As one result of this fact, Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(13) was amended to include, as a recoverable cost, “the electronic presentation of exhibits.” This addition reveals the legislature’s recognition of the persuasive effect of technological presentations at trial and the acknowledgment that presenting such evidence results in costs. This acceptance of the use of technology can also be seen in the language of Bender v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 968, 991.

The use of the exhibits was helpful to the jury in reaching their verdict. The Court finds the costs incurred reasonable and necessary and they will be allowed.

Finally, by way of the reply, Plaintiff has justified the $47.99 “other” costs as being for a certified copy of the judgment. The claimed cost is disallowed by Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (b)(5) as a transcript of Court proceedings not ordered by the Court. The cost will not be allowed.

After deducting the costs that will not be allowed, Plaintiff will be awarded costs in the amount of $28,783.53.