Julie Westerfield et al vs Jordana Snider et al

Case Number

24CV00431

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 08/07/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Demurrer and Motion to Strike

Tentative Ruling

CIVIL LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR

    August 7, 2024

10:00 am

Julie Westerfield, et al. v. Jordana Snider, et al. # 24CV00431

MATTERS

1. Defendant Jordana Snider’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended

Complaint.

                            

2. Defendant Jordana Snider’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ First

Amended Complaint

ATTORNEYS

For Plaintiff Julie Westerfield, Guardian Ad Litem Thomas Gerry Westerfield,

and Cross-Defendant Christopher Westerfield: Brant K. Berglund, John J.

Thyne III.

For Defendant and Cross-Complainant Jordana Snider: Justin M. Alvarez, David A. Shaneyfelt.

RULING

For all reasons discussed herein:

1. The demurrer to plaintiff’s first amended complaint is overruled.

2. The motion to strike portions of plaintiff’s first amended complaint is denied.

3. Defendant Jordana Snider shall file and serve her answer to the first amended complaint no later than August 21, 2024.

4. The Trial Date of 3/26/25 and the MSC Date of 3/7/25 are confirmed.

Background

On January 26, 2024, plaintiffs Julie aka Julia Westerfield (Julie or Ms. Westerfield) and Thomas “Gerry” Westerfield (Thomas or Mr. Westerfield) (collectively, plaintiffs) filed their original complaint in this matter against defendants Jordana Snider (Snider or Ms. Snider) and Brian Chossek (Chossek). (Note: Due to common familial surnames, the Court will refer to some plaintiffs by their first names. No disrespect is intended.)

On May 2, 2024, Julie filed a first amended complaint (the FAC) alleging eight causes of action against Snider and removing Thomas as a plaintiff and Chossek as a defendant. Thomas is Julie’s husband, and her guardian ad litem in this litigation. The FAC contains causes of action for: (1) Undue Influence; (2) Financial Abuse of an Elder; (3) Violation of California Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.6; (4) Breach of Fiduciary Duty; (5) Constructive Fraud; (6) Mistake; (7) Unjust Enrichment; and (8) Cancelation of an Instrument.

As alleged in the FAC:

“The subject of this action is the real property commonly known as 1002 N. Signal Street, Ojai, CA, situated in Ventura County, California (hereinafter referred to as the ‘“Property”’) and is owned by [Julie], a resident of Santa Barbara, CA.” (Compl., ¶ 3.)

“This case involves the fraudulent scheme by an adult real estate agent (Ms. Snider) who has ingratiated herself to a family led by an elderly matriarch (Ms. Westerfield) who suffers from cognitive failures and is severely susceptible to influence by Ms. Snider. To ensure she could effectuate her plan to steal from this family, in 2022 Ms. Snider (as an adult) had herself adopted by Ms. Westerfield and then exerted undue influence to convince Ms. Westerfield to convey the Property, worth at least $2,200,000, to Ms. Snider at no cost [while claiming the “parent to child” exclusion based upon the adult adoption]. Ms. Snider has alienated Ms. Westerfield on specific occasions when it suits her, and Ms. Snider has had Ms. Westerfield write her checks, first $300,000 that bounced, then $200,000 that cleared, and later claimed this was a “loan” despite there being no evidence of a loan. [NOTE: Ms. Snider returned these funds when her scam was discovered.] Ms. Snider, who previously agreed to re-convey the Property to Ms. Westerfield, now refuses to deed the Property back to Ms. Westerfield. This has substantially harmed Ms. Westerfield.” (Compl., ¶ 5.)

Snider is a licensed real estate broker who has known the Westerfield family for many years. (Compl., ¶¶ 6, 7.) Over the years, Snider learned that Julie owned valuable property that Julie had inherited, and, at some point, Snider concocted a scheme to steal the property from Julie. (Compl., ¶¶ 9, 10.)

On August 1, 2022, Julie was diagnosed with cognitive impairment and pre-Alzheimer’s disease. (Compl., ¶ 11.)

Over the course of the relationship between Snider and Julie, Snider persuaded Julie to pay for Snider’s children to attend various schools and universities. (Compl., ¶¶ 14, 15, 16.)

“On or about March 9, 2016, Ms. Westerfield appointed Ms. Snider as her successor Agent under her Power of Attorney that was prepared through the offices of Mullen & Henzel, LLP.” (Compl., ¶ 18.) On March 29, 2022, Snider, who was approximately 51 years old, convinced Julie to adopt her. (Compl., ¶ 19.) Thomas agreed to the adoption without fully understanding what was happening. (Ibid.)

“On or about September 21, 2022, at the insistence of Ms. Snider, Ms. Westerfield wrote Ms. Snider a check in the amount of $300,000 with the memo line left blank. This check was refused by Ms. Snider’s bank due to insufficient funds in Ms. Westerfield’s bank account.” (Compl., ¶ 24.) “The next day, Ms. Snider convinced Ms. Westerfield to write her another check in the amount of $200,000.00.” (Compl., ¶ 25.) The $200,000 check was cashed, but Julie soon realized that she could not afford to convey a check for that amount, and, upon request, Snider returned the $200,000. (Compl., ¶ 26.)

On February 10, 2023, Snider coerced Julie into quitclaiming the subject property to Snider, which was worth over $2,200,000 for no consideration. (Compl., ¶ 27.) Due to her pre-Alzheimer’s cognitive decline and lack of real estate expertise, Julie was unaware that quitclaiming the property deprived her of title and conveyed the property to Snider. (Compl., ¶ 28.)

As of January 18, 2024, Julie stated that she was unaware that she no longer owned title to the property. (Compl., ¶ 31.)

To assist Thomas in managing Julie’s financial matters, Julie designated Snider as her Attorney-in-Fact pursuant to a Power of Attorney dated May 26, 2023. (Compl., ¶ 40.) On January 18, 2024, the Power of Attorney was revoked. (Compl., ¶ 43.)

Julie and Thomas requested that Snider deed the property back to them, but Snider refused. (Compl., ¶ 42.)

Snider now demurs to each cause of action contained in the FAC. While specifying various grounds for demurrer, as to each cause of action, Snider makes three brief arguments: (1) “Plaintiff alleges no legal interest in the property, because the gift deed shows the trustee conveyed the property and the trustee is not a party to this action.” (Demurrer, p. 12, ll. 2-4); (2) “Plaintiff admits legal counsel prepared the gift deed and allowed Julie to execute it, without explaining how and why legal counsel did so and how Jordana [Snider] caused counsel to do so.” (Id., at p. 13, ll. 11-13); and (3) “Plaintiff’s claims for undue influence, breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud are unintelligible, because no allegations exist regarding any breach of the DPA.” (Id., at p. 13, ll. 23-25.)

Julie opposes the demurrer, essentially arguing that Julie is the proper party withstanding because she is the trustee of the trust, the presence of legal counsel in drafting the gift deed does not negate the coercion and undue influence of Snider, and that the existence of a fiduciary relationship and breach thereof has been sufficiently alleged.

Snider also moves to strike item No. 4 of the FAC, which is the prayer for relief requesting recission of the decree of adoption of Snider, and item No. 2 of the prayer for relief requesting punitive damages.

Analysis

          1. Demurrer

“The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds:

“(a) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading.

“(b) The person who filed the pleading does not have the legal capacity to sue.

“(c) There is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.

“(d) There is a defect or misjoinder of parties.

“(e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

“(f) The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, “uncertain” includes ambiguous and unintelligible.

“(g) In an action founded upon a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct.

“(h) No certificate was filed as required by Section 411.35.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.)

“When any ground for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) “Our consideration of the facts alleged includes ‘those evidentiary facts found in recitals of exhibits attached to [the] complaint.’ [Citation.]” (Alexander v. Exxon Mobil (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1250.)

“[A] court must treat a demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, it does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.” (Travelers Indem. Co. of Connecticut v. Navigators Specialty Ins. Co. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 341, 358, citing Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

“If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer. “ ‘[W]e are not limited to plaintiffs’ theory of recovery in testing the sufficiency of their complaint against a demurrer, but instead must determine if the factual allegations of the complaint are adequate to state a cause of action under any legal theory. The courts of this state have . . . long since departed from holding a plaintiff strictly to the ‘form of action’ he has pleaded and instead have adopted the more flexible approach of examining the facts alleged to determine if a demurrer should be sustained.’ ” [Citations.]” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38-39.)

Snider’s first argument, that the trustee is not a party to this action, is not tied to any particular cause of action. Rather, Snider argues that the entire FAC is subject to demur based on lack of standing.

Snider’s arguments fail for several reasons, including that the alleged defect does not appear on the face of the FAC, which would require the court to improperly consider extrinsic evidence, and the fact that the gift deed, that was attached to the original complaint and referred to by Snider, clearly indicates that Julie is the trustee of the trust that transferred the property. Snider’s argument that Thomas, as guardian ad litem, has no authority to take legal action on behalf of Julie (Demurrer, p. 13, ll. 1-5) is simply incorrect and wholly unsupported by any legal authority.

Snider’s second argument, that the involvement of legal counsel in transferring the property makes the entire FAC subject to demurrer, is set forth in a single paragraph that is devoid of any legal authority. The entire argument is:

“Plaintiff admits that Julie had separate legal counsel involved to assist her in transferring the Property to Jordana. Mullen & Henzel prepared the Gift Deed for Julie and presumably understood that she had capacity to execute it. Plaintiff makes no allegations about how and why Mullen & Henzel prepared that Deed and allowed Julie to execute it, and how Jordana was able to insert herself into that legal work and exercise undue influence and undertake other actionable activity over Julie. Attorneys are held to strict ethical standards and are presumed to be in compliance with professional duties unless and until proven otherwise. In any case, without further details about how Jordana was able to exercise undue influence over Julie when Julie had her own legal counsel involved, all of Plaintiff’s claims fail as they fail to state a cause of action. C.C.P. § 430.10(e). Alternatively, they are “ ‘uncertain’ ” or “’ unintelligible.’ ” C.C.P. § 430.10(f).” (Demurrer, p. 13, ll. 13-22.)

Snider’s argument is completely without merit. The presence of legal counsel has little to do with the allegations directed at Snider. At most, the presence of legal counsel is a matter that may impact the weight of evidence presented at trial. It is certainly not a valid argument at the pleading stage.

Snider’s final argument, that Julie’s claims for undue influence, breach of fiduciary duty, and constructive fraud are unintelligible because no allegations exist regarding a breach of the durable power of attorney (“DPA”), is also without merit.

Snider appears to be “missing the forest for the trees” with her argument. The causes of action for undue influence, breach of fiduciary duty, and constructive fraud, are not dependent on a breach of the DPA. Even if the causes of action were dependent on allegations that Snider breached the DPA, the FAC does contain sufficient allegations that she did so. The facts alleged in the FAC, including those set forth above, are more than sufficient to overcome demurrer.

The demurrer will be overruled in its entirety.

          Motion to Strike

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) “Irrelevant matter” includes a “demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subds. (b)(3), (c).) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)

“[J]udges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)

As noted above, Snider moves to strike items 2 and 4, in the prayer for relief, of the FAC.

Item No. 2 in the prayer for relief seeks punitive damages based on constructive fraud, undue influence, and financial abuse of an elder. Snider’s argument is, as her second argument in her demurrer, based on Julie being represented by counsel. Snider makes a conclusory argument that somehow the presence of counsel negates any potential of recovering punitive damages.

Punitive damages are recoverable for fraud actions involving intentional misrepresentation. (Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1241.) “[F]raud alone is an adequate basis for awarding punitive damages.” (Glendale Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Marina View Heights Dev. Co. (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 101, 135.)

“A fraud cause seeking punitive damages need not include an allegation that the fraud was motivated by the malicious desire to inflict injury upon the victim. The pleading of fraud is sufficient.” (Stevens v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 605, 610.)

The FAC contains sufficient allegations to support an award for punitive damages. As such, the motion to strike item No. 2 of the prayer for relief will be denied.

Item No. 4 in the prayer for relief seeks recission of the decree of adoption of Snider. Snider’s entire argument is:

“Section 9340 of the California Family Code specifies the process by which an adoptive parent may terminate an adoptive relationship. Item 4 of the Prayer for Relief asks for “ ‘recission of the decree of adoption of Defendant Snider.’ ” This is not the process required in Section 9340. Accordingly, Item 4 should be stricken.” (Motion to Strike, p. 6, ll. 21-25.)

Julie argues that Snider has failed to establish that the Family Code is the sole mechanism for terminating an adoptive relationship, and that one may be terminated by way of an action in equity.

Family Code section 9340 relates solely to the filing of a petition to terminate an adoption by the person that has been adopted. It in no way addresses the termination of an adoption by the adoptive parent.

Snider, as the moving party, has failed to meet her burden of establishing that the court should strike item No. 4 in the prayer for relief. The motion to strike will be denied.