LeeAnn Morgan vs HipCamp Inc et al

Case Number

24CV00291

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 12/20/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

3 Demurrers and Motion to Strike

Tentative Ruling

For the reasons set forth below:

1. The Demurrer of defendant HipCamp, Inc. to plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for breach of contract, of the second amended complaint, is sustained without leave to amend.

2. The Demurrer of defendant Sierra Falso to plaintiff’s third cause of action for fraud and fourth cause of action for breach of contract, of the second amended complaint, is sustained without leave to amend.

3. The Demurrer of defendant Freedog Farms @ Cactus Flower Ranch, LLC to plaintiff’s third cause of action for fraud and fourth cause of action for breach of contract, of the second amended complaint, is sustained without leave to amend.

4. Defendant HipCamp, Inc.’s motion to strike “punitive damages” from paragraph 14, subdivision a. (2), at page 3 of the SAC, is granted.

5. The remaining causes of action are: (1) Negligence, and (2) Premises Liability.

5. Defendants shall file and serve their answers to the SAC, as modified by this ruling, no later than January 15, 2025.    

Background:

On January 22, 2024, plaintiff LeeAnn Morgan (“Morgan” or “plaintiff”) filed her original complaint against defendants HipCamp, Inc. (“HipCamp”), Freedog Farms @ Cactus Flower Ranch, LLC (Freedog”), Sierra Fiechter, and Darin Fiechter (“Fiechter”).

On March 7, 2024, Morgan filed her first amended complaint (“FAC”), removing Sierra Fiechter as a named defendant, and adding Sierra Falso (“Falso”) The judicial counsel form complaint alleged causes of action for: (1) General Negligence - alleged as to all defendants; (2) Premises Liability - alleged as to Freedog, Fiechter, and Falso; and (3) Intentional Tort.

Demurrers to the FAC were sustained with leave to amend and, on August 23, 2024, Morgan filed the operative second amended complaint (“SAC”) against HipCamp, Freedog, and Falso setting forth causes of action for: (1) General Negligence – alleged as to all defendants; (2) Premises Liability – alleged as to all defendants; (3) Fraud – alleged as to Freedog and Falso; and (4) Breach of Contract – alleged as to HipCamp, Freedog, and Falso.

The allegations of the SAC relate to an injury Morgan alleged she sustained on February 14, 2022, at Freedog Farms, a HipCamp “registered host” campsite located at 1350 Highway 101, Gaviota, CA. The injury was the result of an unstable step outside of a sleeping structure. More specific allegations will be discussed below where appropriate.

HipCamp demurs to the fourth cause of action for breach of contract on the grounds that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and is uncertain as to HipCamp.

Falso and Freedog each demur to the third cause of action for fraud on the grounds that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Falso and Freedog also demur to the fourth cause of action for breach of contract on the grounds that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and is uncertain.

HipCamp moves to strike the words “punitive damages” at page 3 of the SAC on the grounds that the “allegations constitute a pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule or an order of the court or constitute a pleading which is irrelevant, false or improper matter.” (Notice of Motion, p. 1, l. 26 – p. 2, l. 2.)

Morgan opposes the demurrers but has not filed timely opposition, or any other timely response, to the motion to strike.

Analysis:

As an initial matter, Morgan filed “rejoinders” to the defendants’ reply briefs on December 16, 2024, and several more supplemental documents on December 17, 2024. The filings are unauthorized, improper, and will not be considered.

            Standard on Demurrer

“The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds:

            “(a) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading.

            “(b) The person who filed the pleading does not have the legal capacity to sue.

            “(c) There is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.

            “(d) There is a defect or misjoinder of parties.

            “(e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

            “(f) The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, “uncertain” includes ambiguous and unintelligible.

            “(g) In an action founded upon a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct.

            “(h) No certificate was filed as required by Section 411.35.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.)

“When any ground for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) “Our consideration of the facts alleged includes ‘those evidentiary facts found in recitals of exhibits attached to [the] complaint.’ [Citation.]” (Alexander v. Exxon Mobil (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1250.)

“[A] court must treat a demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, it does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.” (Travelers Indem. Co. of Connecticut v. Navigators Specialty Ins. Co. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 341, 358, citing Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

              Demurrers to Third Cause of Action for Fraud

Plaintiff’s fraud claim is based on claimed fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and promissory fraud. It is alleged against Falso and Freedog.

“ ‘To establish a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, the plaintiff must prove: ‘ “(1) the defendant represented to the plaintiff that an important fact was true; (2) that representation was false; (3) the defendant knew that the representation was false when the defendant made it, or the defendant made the representation recklessly and without regard for its truth; (4) the defendant intended that the plaintiff rely on the representation; (5) the plaintiff reasonably relied on the representation; (6) the plaintiff was harmed; and (7) the plaintiff’s reliance on the defendant’s representation was a substantial factor in causing that harm to plaintiff.” ’ ” [Citation.]” (Graham v. Bank of America, N.A. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 605-606.)

“ ‘The required elements for fraudulent concealment are (1) concealment or suppression of a material fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he or she did if he or she had known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact. [Citation.]’ ” [Citation.]” (Hambrick v. Healthcare Partners Medical Group, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 124, 162.)

“ ‘The elements of promissory fraud . . . are: (1) a promise made regarding a material fact without any intention of performing it; (2) the existence of the intent not to perform at the time the promise was made; (3) intent to deceive or induce the promisee to enter into a transaction; (4) reasonable reliance by the promisee; (5) nonperformance by the party making the promise; and (6) resulting damage to the promise[e].’ ” [Citation.]” (Rossberg v. Bank of America, N.A. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1498.)

“To establish that a cause of action has been adequately pled, a plaintiff must demonstrate he or she has alleged ‘facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action.’ [Citation.]” (Williams v. Sacramento River Cats Baseball Club, LLC (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 280, 286.)

“For policy reasons, some causes of action, such as fraud and negligent misrepresentation, must be pleaded with particularity - that is, the pleading must set forth how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were made. [Citation.]” (Foster v. Sexton (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 998, 1028.)

As to Falso and Freedog regarding the alleged fraudulent misrepresentation, the SAC alleges that Falso made representations that: (1) On February 13, 2022, plaintiff could pay HipCamp online after the overnight stay and defendants would approve it retroactively; (2) On February 23, 2022, defendants told Morgan that they did not have any liability insurance other than HipCamp’s; (3) On February 28, 2022, that defendants require official campers to sign the “Freedog Waiver” before camping; and (4) On March 2, 2022, defendants declined plaintiff’s payment in the HipCamp online system, stating to HipCamp that plaintiff was not a paying HipCamp guest.

Morgan checked the box on the Judicial Council form complaint, which states that defendants knew the statements were false, made the statements with the intent to defraud and induce Morgan to act, that Morgan did not know the representations were false, and that Morgan acted in justifiable reliance upon the truth of the representations resulting in her damages. The form allegations are conclusory. Looking at the facts, as alleged, it does not appear that there were any misrepresentations that Morgan justifiably relied on and that resulted in damages. The third and fourth alleged statements, above, do not appear to be misrepresentations at all. The first and second statements, if untrue as alleged, fail to amount to actionable fraudulent misrepresentations. Morgan shows neither a reliance on the statements, nor any causal relationship between the representations and Morgan’s injuries. The injuries alleged are solely the result of Morgan’s fall on the unstable or defective step.

As to fraudulent concealment, the SAC alleges: (1) Falso concealed her homeowner’s policy at the time of the incident; and (2) Falso concealed the February 14, 2022, incident from HipCamp and suppressed Morgan’s agreed upon HipCamp status on February 13, 2022.

Again, the facts alleged are insufficient to support the fraudulent concealment claim. The allegations do not have any tendency to show that Morgan relied on either of the alleged concealments to her detriment.

As to promissory fraud, the SAC alleges that on February 13, 2022, defendants agreed to Morgan’s overnight stay as a HipCamp guest and that on that date, two types of liability coverage went into effect, but, after the February 14, 2022, incident, Falso made false statements to both Morgan and HipCamp to prevent Falso’s homeowners policy and prevent HipCamp’s additional liability coverage from being triggered.

The allegations do not constitute any type of promise from any defendant to Morgan. As there is no actual promise alleged, none of the other elements of promissory fraud are capable of being properly pled.

The demurrers to the third cause of action for fraud, by Falso and Freedog, will be sustained. Morgan’s opposition sets forth some proposed language that she claims could remedy the deficiencies of the fraud cause of action. The court has reviewed the proposed additions, and they do not change anything about the nature of the allegations. As Morgan does not sufficiently demonstrate how the SAC can be amended to state a valid cause of action for fraud, and based on the facts alleged by Morgan, there is no reasonable possibility that the SAC’s defects can be cured by amendment. The sustaining of the demurrers will be without leave to amend.

              Fourth Cause of Action for Breach of Contract

The fourth cause of action is alleged against HipCamp, Falso, and Freedog.

“A contract is an agreement to do or not do a certain thing.” (Civ. Code, § 1549.)

“It is essential to the existence of a contract that there should be:

              “1. Parties capable of contracting;

              “2. Their consent;

              “3. A lawful object; and,

              “4. A sufficient cause or consideration.” (Civ. Code § 1550.)

The essential elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are “(1) the contract; (2) the plaintiff’s performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance; (3) the defendant’s breach; and (4) the resulting damage to the plaintiff.” (Richman v Hartley (2014) 224 Cal. App. 4th 1182, 1186.)

“A contract is either express or implied.” (Civ. Code, § 1619.) “An implied contract is one, the existence and terms of which are manifested by conduct.” (Civ. Code, § 1621.)

Although Morgan sets forth many allegations under the cause of action for breach of contract, reading through them fails to disclose the existence of any actual contract, either express or implied, between Morgan and any of the defendants, or, even if some of the conduct did constitute a contract, how the contract was breached resulting in Morgan’s damages. This is a straightforward negligence and premises liability case. The demurrers to the fourth cause of action will be sustained. As with the fraud causes of action, the breach of contract cause of action does not appear capable of being amended to cure the deficiencies. The sustaining of the demurrers will be without leave to amend.

              HipCamp’s Motion to Strike

As noted above, HipCamp moves to strike “punitive damages” at page 3 of the SAC. The prayer is located at paragraph 14, subdivision a. (2). As noted above, Morgan did not timely file any opposition or other response to the motion to strike.

Following the sustaining of the demurrers, the two remaining causes of action will be negligence and premises liability.

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) “Irrelevant matter” includes a “demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subds. (b)(3), (c).) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)

“In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.)

“[J]udges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)

To survive a motion to strike allegations of punitive damages, ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pleaded. (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) The facts and circumstances constituting the claim for punitive damages must be set forth “with sufficient particularity to apprise the opposite party of what he is called on to answer, and to enable the court to determine whether, on the facts pleaded, there is any foundation [for the claim].” (Lehto v. Underground Construction Company (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 933, 944.)

Under Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a), punitive damages are recoverable where it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with malice, oppression, or fraud. “Malice” means “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “Oppression” means “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(3).)

“California does not recognize punitive damages for conduct that is grossly negligent or reckless.” (Colombo v. BRP US Inc. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1442, 1456, fn. 8.)

As a matter of law, Morgan has failed to plead any facts that would cause any reasonable trier of fact to conclude that HipCamp acted with malice, oppression, or fraud. By failing to oppose the motion, Morgan implicitly acknowledges that punitive damages are not warranted. The motion to strike will be granted.