Meridian Group Real Estate Management Inc. vs Gerard Pepe

Case Number

24CV00159

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 02/26/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion: Strike Portions of Complaint

Tentative Ruling

Meridian Group Real Estate Management, Inc. v. Gerard Pepe 

Case No. 24CV00159        

Hearing Date: February 26, 2024                                                      

MATTERS:             Motion To Strike

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff Meridian Group Real Estate Management, Inc.: James B. Cole, Slaughter, Reagan & Cole, LLP

                             For Defendant Gerard Pepe: Alexander Entrekin, Legal Aid Foundation of Santa Barbara County

TENTATIVE RULING:

The motion to strike of defendant Gerard Pepe is granted, in part, with leave to amend. The following matters shall be stricken from plaintiff’s complaint: “late fees pursuant to Lease” appearing in paragraph 19(i)(2) of the complaint. Except as otherwise herein granted, the motion to strike of defendant is denied. Defendant shall give notice of this ruling to plaintiff on or before February 28, 2024, and file proof of service of the notice. Plaintiff shall file and serve its amended complaint, if any, on or before March 4, 2024.

Background:

On January 9, 2024, plaintiff Meridian Group Real Estate Management, Inc. (Meridian) filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against defendant Gerard Pepe (Pepe). As alleged in the complaint, plaintiff is the agent of the owner of premises located at 627 De La Vina Street, Unit 7, within the city limits of Santa Barbara, California (the premises). (Complaint, ¶¶ 3(a), 3(b)(1), 4, 6(b)(4).) Plaintiff has authority to prosecute unlawful detainers. (Id. at ¶ 4.)

On April 19, 2023, Pepe agreed to rent the premises as a twelve-month lease pursuant to written agreement (the lease) made with Meridian. (Complaint, ¶¶ 6(a)(1), 6(b)(4).) A copy of the lease is attached to the complaint. (Id. at ¶ 6(e) & Exh. 1.) Pepe agreed to pay rent of $2,400 payable monthly on the first of the month. (Id. at ¶ 6(a)(2) & (3).) The tenancy is subject to the Tenant Protection Act of 2019. (Id. at ¶ 7(b).)

On December 12, 2023, Meridian posted on the premises, gave a copy to a person found residing at the premises, and mailed to Pepe a copy of a 3-day notice to pay rent or quit (the 3-day notice). (Complaint, ¶ 9(a)(1), 10(a)(3), 10(d) & Exhs. 2 & 3.) The 3-day notice included an election of forfeiture. (Id. at ¶ 9(d).) On December 15, 2023, the period stated in the 3-day notice expired at the end of the day and Pepe failed to comply with its requirements by that date. (Id. at ¶ 9(b)(1) & (2).) The tenancy was terminated for at-fault just cause. (Id. at ¶ 8(a).)

At the time the 3-day notice was served, the amount of rent due from Pepe was $539. (Compl., ¶ 12.) The fair rental value of the premises is $80 per day. (Id. at ¶ 13.)

On January 23, 2024, Pepe filed a motion to strike language appearing in plaintiff’s complaint: “damages at the rate stated in item 13 from … December 16, 2023” and “late fees pursuant to Lease.” (Compl., ¶ 19(g); 19(i)(2).) Pepe contends that “late fees” and damages from December 16, 2023, claimed by Meridian in the complaint do not include either rent or damages accruing during the period of Pepe’s purported unlawful detention. Therefore, Pepe argues, these damages are unlawful.

Meridian has not filed an opposition to the motion to strike.

Analysis:

“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) In ruling on a motion to strike, a court may “strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading” or “strike all or part of any pleading not filed in conformity with applicable law, court rules, or an order of the court” (Code Civ. Proc., §436, subds. (a) & (b).) The grounds for a motion to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or from matters which the court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)

“It is well established in California that unlawful detainer actions are purely statutory [citations], and only damages authorized by statute as being incidental to recovery of the premises are recoverable in these proceedings [citation]. The purpose of such actions is to expedite return of possession of real property wrongfully withheld or detained. [Citation.] To this end, ‘[t]he statutes prevail over inconsistent general principles of law and procedure because of the special function of unlawful detainer actions to restore immediate possession of real property. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Any statutory allowance of incidental relief is strictly construed. [Citation.]” (Hudec v. Robertson (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1156, 1162-1163.)

If a landlord prevails in an unlawful detainer action, damages that “result from the unlawful detention and accrue during that time” are proper. (Vasey v. California Dance Co. (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 742, 748.) An “award of damages for breaches of the lease occurring before the unlawful detainer [citation] and of ‘future damages’ for continued unlawful possession beyond the date of the judgment until such time as possession is returned to the landlord are not permitted in unlawful detainer.” (Hudec v. Robertson (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1156, 1163.)

Accrued rent that remains unpaid prior to any purported unlawful detainer by Pepe may be recovered in this proceeding to the extent Meridian’s right to possession is founded upon a failure to pay rent following the service of the 3-day notice under Code of Civil Procedure section 1161, subdivision 2. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1161, subd. (2); 1174, subd. (b); Saberi v. Bakhtiari (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 509, 513.) However, for all reasons discussed above, Meridian’s claim for “late fees” does not, on the face of the complaint, appear to constitute damages resulting from any unlawful detention by Pepe.

With respect to the claim for “damages” at $80 per day from December 16, 2023, appearing in paragraphs 13 and 19(g) of plaintiff’s complaint, these damages appear to relate to the daily fair rental value of the premises from the date plaintiff alleges that Pepe remained in unlawful possession of the premises after the period stated in the 3-day notice expired. To the extent Meridian alleges that Pepe remained in possession or deprived Meridian of possession of the premises as of December 16, 2023, the damages alleged in paragraph 19(g) appear to be proper. (See Garfinkle v. Montgomery (1952) 113 Cal.App.2d 149, 153 [“In an unlawful detainer action where the lessee remains in possession or deprives the lessor of possession until the rendition of judgment the allowance of rental to the date of judgment is proper”]; cf. Superior Motels, Inc. v. Rinn Motor Hotels, Inc. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1032, 1073 [“ ‘future damages’ beyond the date of the judgment until such time as [the tenant] return[s] possession of the premises …. is not permitted in unlawful detainer”].)
 

For all reasons discussed above, to the extent the motion to strike is directed at the claim for “late fees” stated in paragraph 19(i)(2) of the complaint, the court will grant the motion to strike. As this is Meridian’s original complaint and as it does not appear from the face of the complaint that the defects further discussed herein are incapable of cure, the court will grant Meridian leave to amend. (Eghtesad v. State Farm General Insurance Company (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 406, 411.)