County of Santa Barbara vs American Surety Company

Case Number

23CV05612

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 04/19/2024 - 22:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion Set Aside

Tentative Ruling

American Surety Company’s motion to vacate summary judgment, reinstate, and exonerate bail bond is denied.

Background:

On July 16, 2021, in criminal case No. 21CR05624, defendant American Surety Company (“ASC”) posted bond number AS100-161926, in the amount of $100,000.00, for the release of criminal defendant Marlon Anibal Valle-Mejia (“Valle-Mejia”).

On July 19, 2022, Valle-Mejia failed to appear in court for a preliminary hearing. A bench warrant was issued, and the matter was continued. On August 8, 2022, Valle-Mejia again failed to appear for a preliminary hearing and the matter was again continued.

On August 29, 2022, Valle-Mejia again failed to appear in court and the bail was ordered forfeited. Notice was mailed to ASC on August 30, 2022. On December 19, 2023, summary judgment for bail bond forfeiture was entered in favor of plaintiff County of Santa Barbara (“The County”).

ASC now moves to set aside the summary judgment, discharge forfeiture, and exonerate bail arguing that the court lost jurisdiction over the bond when it failed to declare a forfeiture upon the non-appearance of Valle-Mejia on July 19, 2022, and August 8, 2022.

The County opposes the motion on the grounds of collateral estoppel.

Analysis:

“The purpose of bail and its forfeiture is to ensure a criminal defendant’s appearance in court and adherence to court orders. [Citation.] A bail bond is a contract between the court and a surety whereby the surety promises that a defendant released from custody will appear in court when ordered. If the defendant fails to appear, the surety becomes a debtor for the bond amount. [Citation.] Bail is forfeited when a defendant fails to appear as ordered before judgment is pronounced.” (People v. Lexington National Ins. Corp. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1144, 1147.)

The law disfavors bail forfeiture, and bail statutes are strictly construed to avoid forfeiture. (People v. Frontier Pac. Ins. Co. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 889, 894.) However, a surety bears the burden of establishing that a bail forfeiture should be set aside. (People v. Am. Su. Ins. Co. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 762, 768; see People v. International Fidelity Ins. Co. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 456, 461 [“The surety has the burden of showing, with competent evidence, that a forfeiture of its bail should be set aside.”].)

“The only issue in a challenge to the summary judgment is whether it was entered pursuant to the terms of the consent, which requires compliance with Penal Code sections 1305 and 1306.” (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1047.)

“ ‘ “When a person for whom a bail bond has been posted fails without sufficient excuse to appear as required, the trial court must declare a forfeiture of the bond. (§ 1305, subd. (a).) The 185 days after the date the clerk of the court mails a notice of forfeiture (180 days plus five days for mailing) to the appropriate parties is known as the appearance period. (§ 1305, subd. (b).) During this time, the surety on the bond is entitled to move to have the forfeiture vacated and the bond exonerated on certain grounds, such as an appearance in court by the accused. (§ 1305, subd. (c)(1).)” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. North River Insurance Co. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 1079, 1085-1086.)

Here, the 180-day period would have expired on February 27, 2023. However, that date was extended by ASC moving to extend the 180-day period pursuant to Penal Code section 1305.4, which provides: “Notwithstanding Section 1305, the surety insurer, the bail agent, the surety, or the depositor may file a motion, based upon good cause, for an order extending the 180-day period provided in that section. The motion shall include a declaration or affidavit that states the reasons showing good cause to extend that period. The court, upon a hearing and a showing of good cause, may order the period extended to a time not exceeding 180 days from its order.”

“The court may only enter summary judgment when the appearance period ‘has elapsed without the forfeiture having been set aside.’ (Pen. Code, § 1306, subd. (a), italics added.)  After the appearance period expires, the trial court must enter summary judgment against the surety within 90 days. (Pen. Code, § 1306, subds. (a) & (c); People v. Granite State Insurance Co. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 758, 763.) If the trial court fails to enter summary judgment within 90 days after the date upon which it may first be entered, the trial court loses the authority to enter such a judgment and the bond is automatically exonerated. (Pen. Code, § 1306, subd. (c).)” (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co., supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 1044.)

The court, in the criminal case, timely entered summary judgment within the 90 days as required.

In the criminal case, ASC twice moved to vacate forfeiture and exonerate bail. The motions were both denied. The motions were based on the same arguments that are being set forth by ASC in the present motion. No motion for reconsideration of either motion was filed by ASC, nor did they appeal the orders denying the motions.

The County argues that the two prior motions to vacate forfeiture and exonerate bail operate as collateral estoppel to the present motion. By way of its reply, ASC fails to effectively argue why collateral estoppel should not apply.

“ ‘Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings.’ [Citation.] The doctrine applies ‘only if several threshold requirements are fulfilled. First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth, the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding. [Citations.] The party asserting collateral estoppel bears the burden of establishing these requirements.’ ” (Pacific Lumber Co. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 921, 943.)

Here, the issue sought to be precluded is identical to that decided (twice) in the criminal case. The issue was actually litigated and was decided in favor of the County. The ruling was final, on the merits and ASC is the same party in the criminal proceedings. Collateral estoppel applies.

Based on the forgoing, the motion will be denied. Because ASC’s motion is barred by collateral estoppel doctrine, the court need not address the other arguments for or against the motion.