Beau Yeakel vs Toyota Motor Sales USA Inc et al

Case Number

23CV05486

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 09/12/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion: Attorney Fees; OSC Dismissal

Tentative Ruling

For the below reasons plaintiff Beau Yeakel’s motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses is granted in part and denied in part as follows:

1. Attorneys’ Fees are awarded in the reduced amount of $30,050.00 payable no later than October 17, 2025, by defendants to counsel for plaintiff.
2. The court declines to rule on plaintiff’s request for litigation costs. Any claimed costs are to be recovered by the procedure set forth in the California Rules of Court.

Background:

This action commenced on December 11, 2023, by the filing of the complaint by plaintiff Beau Yeakel against defendants Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (“Toyota”) and Ken Garff Automotive, LLC dba Lexus of Santa Barbara (“Lexus”) (collectively “defendants”) for various violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act and Negligent Repair.

Plaintiff alleges that he purchased a 2019 Lexus RX (the “vehicle”) which was manufactured or distributed by defendants, that was purchased or used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. (Compl., ¶ 12.) In connection with the purchase of the vehicle, plaintiff received an express written warranty in which defendants undertook to preserve or maintain the utility or performance of the vehicle or to provide compensation if there was a failure in utility or performance for a specified period of time. (Id. at ¶ 13.)

During the warranty period, the vehicle contained or developed: (1) defective electrical system, (2) defective engine, (3) defective structure or steel frame, (4) defective axle, (5) steering system and suspension, (6) defective tires, (7) defective infotainment system, (8) defective brake system, (9) defective technology system, (10) defective powertrain system, and (11) additional defects that plaintiff reported to defendants and defendants’ agents. (Compl., ¶ 14.)

Defendants and defendants’ representatives were unable to service or repair the vehicle to conform to the applicable express warranties after a reasonable number of opportunities. (Compl., ¶ 15.) Despite this, defendants failed to promptly replace the vehicle or make restitution to plaintiff as required by Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (d) and Civil Code section 1793.1, subdivision (a)(2). (Ibid.)

On February 9, 2024, Toyota answered the complaint with a general denial and 14 affirmative defenses.

On February 13, 2024, Lexus answered the complaint with a general denial and 15 affirmative defenses.

On March 13, 2024, Toyota served plaintiff with a Code of Civil Procedure section 998 Offer to Compromise (the “Offer”). (Azimtash Decl., Exh. D; Skanes Decl., Exh. N.) The terms of the Offer included Toyota paying plaintiff “the total sum of Fifty-Eight Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($58,000), plus an amount equaling the total amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based upon actual time expended, if any, that is determined by the court upon motion to have been reasonably incurred by Plaintiff in connection with the commencement and prosecution of this action, in exchange for a dismissal of this action in its entirety . . . with prejudice and return to [Toyota] of the vehicle that is the subject of this action . . . with clear title.” (Ibid.)

On May 3, 2024, plaintiff accepted the Offer. (Azimtash Decl., Exh. D; Skanes Decl., Exh. T.)

On July 16, 2024, plaintiff filed a notice of settlement of the entire case. The notice indicated that the settlement was conditional upon satisfactory completion of specified terms, and that a request for dismissal would be filed no later than January 3, 2025.

On May 13, 2025, plaintiff filed the present motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses, in the total amount of $53,864.91, pursuant to Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d), arguing: “(1) the parties agreed to settle the matter and as part of such agreement, the parties agreed that Plaintiff’s fees, costs, and expenses should be determined by noticed motion; (2) the parties agreed that for the sake of this Motion, Plaintiff is the prevailing party; and (3) Plaintiff reasonably incurred these attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses in connection with the commencement and prosecution of this action.” (Notice of Motion, p. 2, ll. 7-11.)

Toyota opposes the motion arguing that an award of attorneys’ fees and costs is not mandatory, that if the court is inclined to award any attorneys’ fees and costs the claimed fees should be reduced because they are excessive, that the court should reduce plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rate, and that the court should apply a negative multiplier.

Plaintiff filed his reply on September 5, 2025.

On September 10, 2025, plaintiff filed an “application to lodge unredacted declaration of plaintiff for in camera review in support of motion.” The application is untimely, and plaintiff did not comply with other procedural requirements for lodging documents under seal. The application is summarily denied.

Analysis:

As an initial matter, plaintiff filed a request for judicial notice that asks the court to judicially notice multiple other trial court rulings. Not blameless, Toyota also references other trial court rulings. While judicial notice may be taken of the rulings, pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d), “we cannot take judicial notice of the truth of hearsay statements in other decisions or court files [citation], or of the truth of factual findings made in another action. [Citations.]” (Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768.) “Thus, the rulings of other courts in purportedly similar matters are not relevant or helpful . . ..” (Ibid.) Further, the rulings of other trial courts have no precedential value and are not binding on this court. The court declines to take judicial notice of the rulings or to consider them for purposes of ruling on the present motion. In the future, counsel should refrain from using other trial court rulings in attempts to sway the opinions of this court.

“California follows the ‘American rule,’ under which each party to a lawsuit ordinarily must pay his or her own attorney fees.” (Musaelian v. Adams (2009) 45 Cal.4th 512, 516.) “[A] court has no discretion to award costs not statutorily authorized.” (Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774.)

However, attorneys’ fees are allowable as costs if authorized by “contract,” “statute,” or “law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(A)-(C).)

“ ‘Prevailing party’ includes the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant. If any party recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified, the ‘prevailing party’ shall be as determined by the court, and under those circumstances, the court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not and, if allowed, may apportion costs between the parties on the same or adverse sides pursuant to rules adopted under Section 1034.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).)

When determining prevailing party attorney fees awards: “ ‘A typical formulation is that ‘ “plaintiffs may be considered “ ‘prevailing parties’ ” for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” ’ [Citation.]” (Quiles v. Parent (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1015.)

“[I]t is well settled that “ ‘[p]artially successful plaintiffs may recover attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.’ ” [Citation.]” (City of Oakland v. Oakland Police & Fire Retirement System (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 688, 708.)

Toyota does not dispute, in theory, that plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees. However, Toyota requests that the court deny awarding them because of plaintiff’s lack of diligence, or, alternatively, that the court significantly reduce the loadstar amount and apply a negative multiplier due to “the unreasonable and unnecessary over-litigation of this matter by [p]laintiff’s counsel.” (Opp., p. 8, ll. 16-19.) Toyota bases this argument on several factors, including:

Immediately after Toyota filed its answer to plaintiff’s complaint, plaintiff served discovery on both defendants, consisting of requests for production of documents, form interrogatories, special interrogatories, and requests for admissions. (Skanes Decl., ¶ 8 & Exhs. D-K.) The discovery is nearly identical to discovery that plaintiff’s counsel has served on Toyota’s counsel in many other recent cases. (Id. at ¶ 9 & Exh. L.)

On March 13, 2024, Toyota served its Code of Civil Procedure section 998 Offer to Compromise, offering plaintiff $58,000 in exchange for the vehicle with clear title and a dismissal with prejudice. (Skanes Decl., ¶ 12 & Exh. N.) The Offer was just over the total contract price of the vehicle and did not include civil penalties. (Ibid.)

In an effort to resolve the matter, and avoid further litigation expenses, Toyota requested an extension of time to respond to the discovery. (Skanes Decl., ¶ 14.) Plaintiff’s counsel initially agreed to an extension, “but then appeared to retract that extension only to the extent Defendant extended the time for Plaintiff to respond to the Section 998 Offer. (Ibid. & Exh. O.) Toyota agreed to the extension. (Id. at ¶ 15.)

Toyota agreed to provide its document production informally, which included warranty claims and Toyota’s pre-suit claims file, and was not voluminous. (Skanes Decl. ¶¶ 17-19.) Plaintiff’s counsel claims to have spent 8.4 hours reviewing the document production of the course of two days, which is not credible and is evidence of inflated billing. (Id. at ¶ 19.) As another example of overbilling, plaintiff’s counsel claims to have spent 0.4 hours reviewing just over 4 pages of documents containing minimal information. (Id. at ¶ 20 & Exh. Q.)

On April 17, 2024, counsel for the parties had a brief call regarding the pending Offer and the pending discovery, wherein the parties agreed to provide mutual extensions through May 3, 2024. (Skanes Decl., ¶ 21.)

On May 3, 2024, defendants served discovery responses. (Skanes Decl., ¶ 24.) Shortly after receiving the discovery response, plaintiff accepted the Offer. (Id. at ¶ 27 & Exh. T.)

Toyota points out the multiple Orders to Show Cause re dismissal that were issued due to plaintiff’s failure to file a dismissal by January 3, 2025, which is the date for dismissal reflected in the Notice of Settlement. (Skanes Decl., ¶¶ 34-38 & Exhs. W-Y.)

The court agrees with Toyota that plaintiff was less than diligent in bringing the present motion. However, that is not grounds for denying the motion outright. Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees.

“Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d) requires the attorney fees to be based on “ ‘actual time expended” ’ ” and to have been “ ‘reasonably incurred.’ ” In Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 818–819 (Robertson), the court concluded, “ ‘the statutory language of section 1794, subdivision (d), is reasonably compatible with a lodestar adjustment method of calculating attorney fees’ ” because “ ‘the lodestar adjustment method is based on actual, reasonable attorney time expended as the objective starting point of the analysis [citation], it is compatible with this statutory provision.’ ” The lodestar method is applicable to calculating attorney fees under section 1794, subdivision (d), the court reasoned, because “ ‘the lodestar adjustment method is the prevailing rule for calculation of statutory attorney fees unless the statute expressly indicates a contrary intent, and no such contrary intent is apparent.’ ” (Robertson, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 821, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 731.) We agree. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 997.)

“[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.)

“[T]rial courts must carefully review attorney documentation of hours expended” in assessing reasonable and necessary attorney fees. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4h 1122, 1132.)

Plaintiff’s counsel attaches his billing invoices as Exhibit I to his declaration. The total amount requested for attorney fees, before application of a multiplier enhancement, totals $43,850.00, some of which are anticipated fees related to the present motion.

Toyota argues that the following entries are excessive and unreasonable, and should be reduced:

11.8 hours between October 24, 2023, and December 11, 2023, for “review” and “communications” prior to the filing of the complaint. (Opp., p. 10, ll. 12-22.) Toyota fails to specifically identify any individual entry in making the argument. The court does not find that the time spent between October 24, 2023, and December 11, 2023, to be unreasonable or unnecessary. The time will not be reduced.

10.5 hours for drafting form discovery between February 19, 2024, and February 23, 2024. The court agrees with Toyota that the discovery requests represent largely recycled requests that plaintiff’s counsel uses in practically every Song-Beverly Act matter. Only slight modifications are typically made to the requests. A reasonable amount of time for making the modifications to the discovery requests is 2 hours. The attorney fee award will be reduced accordingly.

15.1 hours of “communication” between plaintiff’s counsel and plaintiff. Even though this case settled quickly, some clients require more communication than others. It could indeed be considered malpractice for an attorney to avoid speaking with their client in an effort to reduce billable time. The court does not find the amount of time claimed for communications between plaintiff and his attorney unnecessary nor unreasonable. The time will not be reduced.

7.2 hours of  “communications” between plaintiff’s counsel and defense counsel. While arguing that the amount of time was unreasonable, Toyota does not argue that the time is fabricated. The court does not find the amount of time claimed for communications between plaintiff’s counsel and defense counsel unnecessary nor unreasonable. The time will not be reduced.

10.7 hours reviewing Toyota’s informal document production between March 23, 2024, and March 24, 2024. The court has reviewed the time entries, as well as considered the information in the declarations, and does find that the time claimed for reviewing the documents is excessive. It should have taken no more than 3 hours total to review the informally produced documents. The attorney fee award will be reduced to reflect 3 hours spent on the review.

15 hours in connection with the present motion. “[W]hen attorney fees are recoverable by statute, the reasonable attorney fees incurred in preparing the motion are also recoverable.” (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1002.) While the fees are recoverable, the amount claimed is excessive. The motion itself was unnecessarily lengthy and contained a large amount of information that was unhelpful or should not have been included (such as the other trial court rulings, which, the court notes, have previously informed counsel that other trial court rulings are neither binding nor persuasive). This is a straight-forward motion for attorneys’ fees. A reasonable amount of time for preparing the motion, reviewing opposition, preparing a reply, and appearing at hearing is 5 hours. The time will be reduced accordingly.

Toyota also argues that plaintiff should not be allowed to recover any fees following January 3, 2025, due to plaintiff counsel’s lack of diligence, consisting of 1.4 hours of preparation for and appearance at the January 10, 2025, Order to Show Cause re dismissal. The court agrees that Toyota should not have to pay for the appearance. Had plaintiff’s counsel been diligent, the appearance would not have needed to occur. The fee award will be further reduced by 1.4 hours.

As noted above, plaintiff seeks a fee enhancement and Toyota seeks a negative fee enhancement.

“[T]he trial court is not required to include a fee enhancement to the basic lodestar figure for contingent risk, exceptional skill, or other factors, although it retains discretion to do so in the appropriate case; moreover, the party seeking a fee enhancement bears the burden of proof.” (Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1138.) The court does not find that it would be appropriate to include a multiplier, either positive or negative, in the present matter. Each parties’ requests in this regard are denied.

Plaintiff’s counsel has an hourly billable rate of $500.00. Despite Toyota’s argument to the contrary, $500.00 per hour is a reasonable rate for an attorney of plaintiff counsel’s experience, performing comparable work, in Santa Barbara County. The attorney fee award will be calculated using that hourly rate.

As a result of the reductions, plaintiff’s attorney fee award is reduced by 27.6 hours, or $13,800.00. This results in total recoverable attorney fees of $30,050.00

            Costs

Toyota seeks costs in the amount of $1,244.91.

“A prevailing party who claims costs must serve and file a memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of service of the notice of entry of judgment or dismissal by the clerk under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.5 or the date of service of written notice of entry of judgment or dismissal, or within 180 days after entry of judgment, whichever is first. The memorandum of costs must be verified by a statement of the party, attorney, or agent that to the best of his or her knowledge the items of cost are correct and were necessarily incurred in the case.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(a)(1).)

“Any notice of motion to strike or to tax costs must be served and filed 15 days after service of the cost memorandum. If the cost memorandum was served by mail, the period is extended as provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 1013. If the cost memorandum was served electronically, the period is extended as provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6(a)(3).” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(b)(1).)

If plaintiff seeks to recover costs, he must do so pursuant to the California Rules of Court. The court will make no ruling regarding costs in connection with the present motion.