Isaiah Rickard Garnica vs Hilton Hotel Employer LLC
Isaiah Rickard Garnica vs Hilton Hotel Employer LLC
Case Number
23CV05469
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Wed, 04/10/2024 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Demurrer First Amended Complaint
Tentative Ruling
For Plaintiff Isaiah Paul Rickard Garnica: Self Represented
For Defendant Hilton Hotel Employer LLC: Connie L. Chen, Andrew L. Smith, Scott M. Nenni
Hearing:
Demurrer of Defendant Hilton Hotel Employer LLC to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint
RULING
This case is on the Court’s CMC Calendar at 8:30am and the Law & Motion Calendar at 10:00am. Both matters will be called at 8:30am.
The Demurrer: For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is sustained with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall file and serve his second amended complaint no later than May 1, 2024.
The CMC: The CMC is continued to July 10, 2024, at 8:30am
Background
This action commenced on December 11, 2023, by the filing of the original judicial council form complaint by Plaintiff Isaiah Paul Rickard Garnica (“Plaintiff”) against Defendant Hilton Hotel Employer, LLC. (“Defendant”), setting forth one cause of action for common counts.
On January 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed his judicial council first amended complaint (“FAC”) again setting forth a single cause of action for common counts.
As alleged in the complaint: Defendant became indebted to Plaintiff on an open book account within the last four years in an “unlimited” amount.
Defendant demurs to the FAC, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, on the grounds that: (1) The FAC does not state a cause of action, and consists of a form complaint completely devoid of factual allegations or even bare legal contentions; (2) The FAC does not state a cause of action because it is impermissibly uncertain; and (3) The FAC is subject to demurrer because it may be founded upon a contract, but it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct, nor any of its terms, nor even its basic subject matter.
Plaintiff opposes the demurrer.
Analysis
“When any ground for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the Court is required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) “Our consideration of the facts alleged includes ‘those evidentiary facts found in recitals of exhibits attached to [the] complaint.’ [Citation.]” (Alexander v. Exxon Mobil (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1250.)
“[A] Court must treat a demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, it does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.” (Travelers Indem. Co. of Connecticut v. Navigators Specialty Ins. Co. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 341, 358, citing Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)
“To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the Plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)
As stated above, Plaintiff’s only allegations are that Defendant became indebted to him on an open book account within the last four years in an unlimited amount.
“Common counts” is a long-established common law form of pleading that is an exception to many of the modern rules of pleading.
Typically:
“(a) A complaint or cross-complaint shall contain both of the following:
“(1) A statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.
“(2) A demand for judgment for the relief to which the pleader claims to be entitled. If the recovery of money or damages is demanded, the amount demanded shall be stated.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a).)
However, in the case of a cause of action for common counts: It is not necessary to state when the Plaintiff paid, laid out, expended, loaned, or advanced to and for the Defendant the moneys sued for, or when Defendant became indebted to Plaintiff therefor, or when Defendant requested Plaintiff to make such payments, expenditures, loans, or advancements. Nor was it necessary to set forth the items of the account. The statute expressly provides that the items of an account need not be set forth in a pleading, but a bill of particulars must be furnished on demand.” (Pleasant v. Samuels (1896) 114 Cal.34, 38.) “If the question were new, there might be good ground for saying that the common counts do not comply with the provision of our Code of Civil Procedure (section [425.10]) that the complaint must contain ‘ “a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action in ordinary and concise language.” ’ But the practice of pleading in this form has been too long established in this state to be now open to question.” (Pike v. Zadig (1915) 171 Cal.273, 276.)
This does not mean that a Plaintiff is excused from pleading any relevant facts at all. A Plaintiff must still plead the elements of the cause of action.
“A common count for reasonable value has the following elements: (1) Plaintiff performed certain services for the Defendant; (2) the reasonable value of those services; (3) the services were rendered at the request of the Defendant; and (4) the services were unpaid.” (State Compensation Insurance Fund v. ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 422, 449.)
“[A] complaint is not good as a common count unless it either expressly alleges a promise by the Defendant to pay or alleges facts from which such a promise is implied by law. No such facts appear here. If it were alleged that Plaintiff’s services were rendered to and received by the Defendant, the complaint would be good, under the authorities just cited, because from this fact a promise to pay would be implied. But here the allegation is that the services were rendered to another, and in the absence of a request by respondent therefor, no promise to pay can be implied and the complaint cannot be upheld as a common count, unless some liability to pay for these services is otherwise cast upon respondent by law.” (Smith v. Bentson (1932) 127 Cal.App.Supp. 789, 794.)
Because Plaintiff alleges none of the elements of a cause of action for common counts, the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer will be sustained. As it is reasonably likely that the FAC is capable of amendment to state a valid cause of action, the demurrer will be sustained with leave to amend.