Julian Gonzalez Arranz et al vs Jaguar Land Rover North America LLC

Case Number

23CV05126

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 05/24/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion to Compel

Tentative Ruling

For all reasons discussed herein, the motion of plaintiffs to compel the further responses of defendant to requests for production of documents, set one, is denied without prejudice as to request nos. 2 and 15 through 31. The Court will continue the hearing with respect to request nos. 1 and 3 through 14 to June 21, 2024. The parties shall further meet and confer fully and in good faith as further provided herein. On or before June 7, 2024, plaintiffs shall file and serve an amended separate statement which complies with and includes all information required by this ruling. To the extent defendant chooses to file a response to the amended separate statement of plaintiffs, any such response shall be filed and served on or before June 14, 2024, in accordance with this ruling. No other papers apart from those authorized herein shall be filed in support of or in opposition to the motion of plaintiffs.

Background:

Plaintiffs Julian Gonzalez Arranz and Hayley Jayne Gonzalez (collectively, plaintiffs) filed a complaint in this matter on November 20, 2023, alleging three causes of action against defendant Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (Land Rover): (1) violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act – breach of express warranty; (2) violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act – breach of implied warranty; and (3) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b). As alleged in the complaint:

On February 5, 2021, plaintiffs purchased a 2018 Land Rover Range Rover Velar (the vehicle) as a certified pre-owned (CPO) vehicle with a new and full CPO warranty which included a 4-year/50,000 mile express bumper to bumper warranty, a 4-year/50,000 mile powertrain warranty covering the engine and the transmission, various emissions warranties that exceed the time and mileage limitations of the bumper to bumper and powertrain warranties. The vehicle was delivered to plaintiffs with transmission, electrical, structural, suspension, emission, and engine system defects.

Plaintiffs presented the vehicle for repairs in October and December 2021, in September 2022, and in September 2023. Land Rover failed to repair and was unable to conform the vehicle to the express warranty after a reasonable number of repair attempts and did not commence repairs within a reasonable time. The vehicle is not fit for the purpose for which it was to be used.

Land Rover filed an answer to the complaint on December 22, 2023, generally denying its allegations and asserting twenty-eight affirmative defenses. 

On March 28, 2024, plaintiffs filed a motion for an order striking objections and compelling further responses of Land Rover to plaintiffs’ set one request for production of documents (RFP) nos. 1 through 31. In support of the motion, plaintiffs submit the declaration of their counsel, Joshua Kohanoff (Kohanoff), who offers information relating to plaintiffs’ presentment of the vehicle to Land Rover’s authorized repair facility, purported repairs to the vehicle performed by Land Rover, and what counsel contends is information demonstrating knowledge by Land Rover of the defects plaguing the vehicle obtained by Land Rover through its internal investigations and analyses and the release of Technical Service Bulletins or “TSB”. (Kohanoff Decl., ¶¶ 4-14 & Exhs. 1-3.)

Kohanoff further states that the RFP were propounded on Land Rover on January 8, 2024. (Kohanoff Decl., ¶ 17 & Exh. 4.) Kohanoff explains that RFP Nos. 1 through 14 relate to the vehicle, that RFP Nos. 15 through 29 relate to the warranty and repurchase policies and practices of Land Rover, and that RFP Nos. 30 and 31 relate to Land Rover’s knowledge of the same or similar defects in other vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the subject vehicle. (Id. at ¶¶ 23-25.) Land Rover responded to the RFP on February 12, 2024, with what Kohanoff describes as “boilerplate” objections which are not code compliant. (Id. at ¶ 18 & Exh. 5.) Kohanoff further states that Land Rover has failed to produce any documents responsive to the RFP. (Id. at ¶ 18.)

On February 15, 2024, Kohanoff emailed to counsel for Land Rover a letter attempting to meet and confer regarding Land Rover’s responses to the RFP. (Kohanoff Decl., ¶ 21 & Exh. 6.) Due to a lack of a response from Land Rover, on February 23, 2024, Kohanoff transmitted a further meet and confer letter addressing Land Rover’s assertion that its responses complied with the Code of Civil Procedure and Land Rover’s objections to the RFP. (Id. at ¶ 22.) Kohanoff states that Land Rover has not responded to his communications and has not produced responsive documents. (Id. at ¶¶ 20, 26.)

The motion is opposed by Land Rover. In support of its opposition, Land Rover submits the declaration of its counsel, Robert Cho, who states that on May 13, 2024, Land Rover served supplemental responses to the RFP which are attached to the Cho declaration as Exhibit A. (Cho Decl., ¶ 3 & Exh. A.)

Analysis:

Available information demonstrates that Land Rover has served a supplemental set of responses to RFP Nos. 17, 19 through 22, 25 through 27, and 29. In their reply, plaintiffs do not effectively address and offer no information to demonstrate a reasonable and good faith attempt to informally resolve any remaining issues with respect to the supplemental responses of Land Rover to RFP Nos. 17, 19 through 22, 25 through 27, or 29. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040; Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).)

If the discovery requested in a motion to compel is provided and the moving party proceeds with the motion, the court has substantial discretion to rule on the motion based on the circumstances of the case. (See Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 408-409.) The court may take the motion off-calendar, deny the motion as moot, narrow the scope of the motion to the issue of sanctions, or order the propounding party to “meet and confer … and file a separate statement.” (Id. at p. 409; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1348(a).)

Available information appears to indicate that, due to the timing of service of the supplemental responses by Land Rover, the parties have not attempted to meet and confer to determine whether any remaining issues with respect to RFP Nos. 17, 19 through 22, 25 through 27, and 29, may be resolved. Therefore, the court will deny the present motion as moot as to RFP Nos. 17, 19 through 22, 25 through 27, and 29. The court’s denial of the present motion as to these RFP is without prejudice to any future procedurally appropriate motion to compel further responses to RFP Nos. 17, 19 through 22, 25 through 27, and 29 by plaintiffs provided the parties meet and confer in good faith.

The court will narrow the scope of the present motion to whether there exists good cause for the requests stated in RFP Nos. 1 through 16, 18, 23, 24, 28, 30 and 31 (the subject RFP), whether the objections of Land Rover to the subject RFP are without merit, and whether further responses to the subject RFP are warranted.

The Court notes that attorney Kohanoff offers in his declaration factual information regarding services or repairs made to the vehicle by authorized technicians, the release of “Technical Service Bulletins” by Land Rover including the contents of those bulletins, and the purported failure of Land Rover to repurchase the vehicle after repair attempts. (Id. at ¶¶ 4-15.) Kohanoff has not offered information to sufficiently demonstrate that he possesses personal knowledge of the factual matters offered in his declaration or that these matters are of common knowledge. (See, generally, Evid. Code, §§ 702 & 720.) Furthermore, while an attorney is competent to recite events occurring during the course of the litigation, an attorney’s declaration based on an investigation of the facts is not competent. (See Donnelly v. Ayer (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 978, 984.)

RFP Nos. 1 and 3 through 14:

“In the more specific context of a request to produce documents, a party who seeks to compel production must show ‘good cause’ for the request [citation]….” (Glenfed Development Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117.)

The request stated in RFP No. 1 demands the production of all documents regarding the vehicle that are within the “Customer Relations Center” of Land Rover. (Sep. Stmt. at p. 15.) Plaintiffs contend that because RFP No. 1 seeks documents that concern the vehicle that is the subject of this action, there exists good cause for the request stated in this RFP. Land Rover has not submitted a response to the separate statement of plaintiffs. In the motion, apart from offering general and conclusory assertions regarding the RFP as a whole, Land Rover offers no reasoned argument specific to RFP No. 1 regarding whether there exists good cause for this request.

“[T]he right to discovery in this state is a broad one, to be construed liberally so that parties may ascertain the strength of their case and at trial the truth may be determined.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 538.) Code of Civil Procedure section 2016.010 et seq. (the Civil Discovery Act) permits discovery “regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) The term “subject matter” is “ ‘broader than the issues’ and is not limited to admissible evidence.” (Jessen v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 698, 711.) In addition, “[f]or discovery purposes, information is relevant if it ‘might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement....’ [Citation.] Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence. [Citation.] These rules are applied liberally in favor of discovery [citation], and (contrary to popular belief), fishing expeditions are permissible in some cases.” (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546, original italics.)

Though the documents described in RFP No. 1 may include materials that do not directly pertain to the defects alleged in the present action, the request stated in RFP No. 1 is reasonably calculated to reveal admissible evidence regarding the subject matter of the present action which includes defects in or repairs made to the subject vehicle. In addition, the documents described in RFP No. 1 may assist plaintiffs to evaluate their claims and prepare for trial. Moreover, “doubts about the permissible scope of discovery are to be resolved in favor of disclosure.” (Advanced Modular Sputtering, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 826, 835.) For these reasons, the court finds that good cause exists for the request stated in RFP No. 1.

RFP Nos. 3 through 14 also relate to the vehicle and include within their scope inspections of or warranty repairs made to the vehicle and the results of any such inspections or repairs, manuals or warranty booklets provided to plaintiffs in connection with the vehicle, contracts or agreements signed by plaintiffs with respect to the vehicle, advisories issued for the vehicle, communications between Land Rover and either its authorized repair facility or third parties concerning the vehicle, and communications between Land Rover and plaintiffs. (See Sep. Stmt. at pp. 17-25.) Though it appears that good cause exists for the requests stated in RFP Nos. 3 through 14, there exist deficiencies in the moving separate statement of plaintiffs.

A separate statement submitted in support of a discovery motion must be “full and complete” and must not incorporate material “by reference.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(c).) For each request, the separate statement must include “[a] statement of the factual and legal reasons for compelling further responses, answers, or production as to each matter in dispute[.]” (Cal Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(c)(2).) The court has discretion to disregard a nonconforming separate statement and to deny a motion to compel discovery for failure to comply with the requirements for a proper separate statement. (Mills v. U.S. Bank (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 871, 893; see also Neary v. Regents of University of California (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1136, 1145 [discussing plaintiff’s failure to adequately support a motion to compel discovery due to a nonconforming separate statement].)

In each of the statements of the reasons to compel a further response to RFP Nos. 3 through 14, plaintiffs incorporate by reference the reasons to compel a further response to RFP No. 1. However, the subject matter of and categories of documents sought in RFP Nos. 3 through 14 are not identical to the subject matter of or documents described in RFP No. 1. For this reason, and notwithstanding that the requests stated in RFP Nos. 3 through 14 relate to the vehicle at issue, plaintiffs have effectively failed to meet their burden to demonstrate good cause for each of the different requests stated in RFP Nos. 3 through 14 notwithstanding that on their face, these RFP relate to the vehicle.

Further, Land Rover has asserted objections to RFP Nos. 1 and 3 through 14. The separate statement of plaintiffs includes an introduction which is generally applicable to all of the RFP at issue in the present motion and in which plaintiffs contend that the objections of Land Rover as a whole are without merit. Apart from offering general and conclusory arguments regarding the objections of Land Rover, plaintiffs do not calibrate or tailor their arguments to each of the specific objections asserted in response to each specific RFP. Instead, plaintiffs incorporate by reference the entirety of the general and conclusory arguments included in the introductory section of the separate statement. For this reason, plaintiffs fail to sufficiently identify or explain, with reasoned argument specific to each RFP, which specific objections are without merit or why.

The manner in which plaintiffs have crafted their separate statement and presented their arguments with respect to RFP Nos. 3 through 14 is overly general and conclusory and forces the court to sift through the separate sections of the separate statement in an attempt to determine which specific arguments apply to each RFP or each objection to each RFP. Plaintiffs’ failure to include, for each RFP, a calibrated statement of the factual or legal reasons why a further response is necessary or why the objections are without merit impacts the Court’s ability to efficiently determine the motion. Notwithstanding the procedural deficiencies in the separate statement with respect to the objections asserted by Land Rover to RFP Nos. 1 through 14, the court notes that Land Rover has also failed offer arguments tailored to each RFP justifying each of its objections. (See Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.)

In addition, plaintiffs incorporate by reference the arguments set forth under RFP No. 1 to demonstrate why further responses to RFP Nos. 3 and 14 are warranted, notwithstanding that the specific subject matter encompassed in RFP Nos. 3 through 14 is different than the subject matter of RFP No. 1. Furthermore, each of the responses of Land Rover to RFP Nos. 3 and 14 are different from the response to RFP No. 1. For these additional reasons, plaintiffs’ failure to include, for each RFP at issue, a separate statement of reasons for compelling a further response tailored to each RFP presents significant obstacles to an efficient determination of the motion and impedes the Court’s ability to effectively determine whether the motion is meritorious. The deficiencies described above which result from the manner in which plaintiffs have crafted their separate statement constitutes a sufficient ground on which the court may deny the motion with respect to RFP Nos. 3 through 14.

RFP No. 2:

RFP No. 2 requests the production of documents that evidence or support the affirmative defenses set forth in the answer of Land Rover to plaintiffs’ complaint. (Sep. Stmt. at p. 16.) Though the subject matter of RFP No. 2 is wholly different from the subject matter of RFP No. 1, plaintiffs again incorporate by reference their reasons to compel a further response to RFP No. 1 into the reasons stated for RFP No. 2. (Sep. Stmt. at p. 17, ll. 5-6.) The incorporation of material by reference is improper and prevents the Court from determining the motion for all reasons further discussed above. Therefore, plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to show that there exists good cause for the request stated in RFP No. 2.

RFP Nos. 15, 16, and 18:

In the reasons to compel a further response to RFP Nos. 16 and 18, plaintiffs incorporate by reference the reasons set forth under RFP No. 15. (See Sep. Stmt. at p. 27, ll. 17-19 & p. 28, ll. 19-20.) Therefore, the court will address RFP Nos. 15, 16, and 18, together.

RFP No. 15 requests that Land Rover produce documents which “evidence, describe, refer, or relate to [Land Rover’s] rules, policies, or procedures since 2017 concerning the issuance of refunds to buyers or providing replacement vehicles to buyers in the State of California under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.” (Sep. Stmt. at p. 26, ll. 8-11.) Citing Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112 (Jensen) and Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 174, 185 (Kwan), plaintiffs contend that courts have “repeatedly” found these categories of documents relevant to the type of claims alleged in the present complaint.

Neither Jensen nor Kwan involved a dispute over the discovery of documents relating to a vehicle manufacturer’s rules, policies, or procedures regarding refunds or replacements of vehicles under Civil Code section 1790 et seq. (the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act or the Act). However, the court in Jensen noted that “[u]nder [Civil Code] section 1794, subdivision (c), the court may impose a civil penalty up to two times the amount of actual damages if the buyer proves the manufacturer’s failure to comply was willful.” (Jensen, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 136.) The court further noted that, to determine whether a manufacturer’s failure to replace or refund the purchase price of a vehicle was willful and not the result of a good faith and reasonable belief that there were no facts imposing the obligation under the Act, the trier of fact is to consider whether, among other things, “the manufacturer had a written policy on the requirement to repair or replace.” (Id. at p. 136.)

Though Land Rover’s written policy regarding its statutory obligations to repair or replace the vehicle under the Act is relevant to the subject matter of the present action for reasons discussed above, plaintiffs have failed to explain why policies that were in place since 2017 or prior to the year plaintiffs purchased their vehicle are relevant here. For this reason, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate good cause for the request stated in RFP No. 15.

RFP Nos. 16 and 18 request, respectively, the production of documents which “evidence, describe, refer, or relate” to Land Rover’s “Call Center Policies and Procedures for escalating customer complaints relating to any defects present in their vehicle” and “Policies and Procedures for determining whether a vehicle should be repurchased or replaced under the … Act.” (See Sep. Stmt. at p. 27, ll. 5-7 & p. 28, ll. 7-10.) Plaintiffs’ incorporation by reference of the reasons to compel a further response to RFP No. 15 into the reasons stated under RFP Nos. 16 and 18 is a sufficient basis on which the court may deny the motion. In addition, the requests stated under RFP Nos. 16 and 18 are, on their face, potentially unlimited with respect to time and geographic scope, among other things. Therefore, and for all reasons discussed above, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate good cause for the requests stated in RFP Nos. 16 and 18.
 

RFP Nos. 23, 24, and 28:

Because plaintiffs incorporate by reference the reasons to compel a further response to RFP No. 23 into the reasons to compel a further response to RFP No. 24 and 28, the court will address RFP Nos. 23, 24, and 28, together. (See Sep. Stmt. at p. 32, ll. 19-21 & p. 34, ll. 24-26.)

RFP No. 23 requests the production of documents that relate or refer to Land Rover’s “Warranty Policy and Procedure Manuals provided to [its] authorized repair facilities with respect to how to determine whether repairs should be covered under warranty from 2017 to the present.” (Sep. Stmt. at p. 31, ll. 1-4.) The request stated in RFP No. 24 is substantially the same as RFP No. 23 with the exception of plaintiff’s inclusion of the term “goodwill” to qualify the term “warranty”. (See Sep. Stmt. at p. 32, ll. 6-9.) In RFP No. 28, plaintiffs request the production of “Warranty Policy and Procedure Manuals” also from 2017 to the present regarding the type of repairs that would not be reimbursed by Land Rover. (Sep. Stmt. at p. 34, ll. 12-15.)

As the requests in RFP Nos. 23, 24, and 28 include policies in effect prior to the date of purchase of the vehicle and as plaintiffs improperly incorporate material by reference into the separate statement with respect to these RFP, the same analysis and reasoning applies here. For all procedural and substantive reasons further discussed above, plaintiffs have failed to show good cause for the requests stated in RFP Nos. 23, 24, and 28.

RFP No. 30 and 31:

Because plaintiffs also incorporate by reference the reasons to compel a further response to RFP No. 30 into the reasons to compel a further response to RFP No. 31, the Court will also address RFP Nos. 30 and 31, together. (See Sep. Stmt. at p. 40, ll. 1-3.)

The request stated in RFP No. 30 demands the production of a “list or compilation” of other customer complaints within Land Rover’s database that are “SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR to complaints made by [p]laintiffs with respect to the SUBJECT VEHICLE in other 2022 Volkswagen Atlas vehicles.” The term “SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR” is defined as a complaint that is of the “same nature of the reported system, malfunction, trouble code, Technical Service Bulletin Recommendation, dashboard indicator light, or other manifestation of a repair problem, as description [sic] listed in any warranty summary or repair order for the [vehicle].” (See Sep. Stmt. at p. 35, ll. 20-23.)

Though the definition of the terms “substantially similar” limit the scope of RFP No. 30 to complaints of the same or similar defects claimed by plaintiffs in this matter, by its express terms, RFP No. 30 is potentially unlimited in scope to the extent it includes complaints relating to vehicles that were purchased outside of California and which are of a different year, make, or model than the vehicle at issue in the present action.

In their separate statement, plaintiffs rely on the decisions in Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334 (Santana), Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967 (Doppes), and Donlen v. Ford (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138 (Donlen), to justify the potentially unlimited scope of the request stated in RFP No. 30. In Santana, Doppes, and Donlen, the documents and testimony addressed by the court and cited by plaintiff related directly to either the specific defect or component at issue in each case or specific visits to an authorized repair facility by plaintiff in each case. (See, e.g., Santana, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at pp. 341-342 [discussion of defective “TPIM” installed in vehicle at issue]; Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at pp. 973-974 [discussion of demand to produce documents at deposition which was specific to rust inhibitor used on vehicle at issue]; Donlen, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 154 [documents and testimony limited to the same transmission model installed in plaintiff’s vehicle]. However, and for all reasons discussed above, RFP No. 30 is not so limited by virtue of its inclusion of potentially all vehicles manufactured by Land Rover including vehicles of a different year, make, or model than the subject vehicle. To the extent the inclusion of “2022 Volkswagen Atlas vehicles” within the scope of RFP No. 30 is an inadvertent error, plaintiffs may clarify or correct the category of documents sought this RFP in any future request

“Courts must insist discovery devices be used as tools to facilitate litigation rather than as weapons to wage litigation. These tools should be well calibrated; the lancet is to be preferred over the sledge hammer.” (Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221.) The request stated in RFP No. 30 is not appropriately calibrated to the subject matter of the present action. Therefore, plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to demonstrate good cause for the production of documents described in RFP No. 30. As plaintiffs incorporate by references the same reasons to compel a further response to RFP No. 31, the same analysis applies.

Conclusion:

For all reasons discussed above, the court will deny the motion as moot with respect to RFP Nos. 17, 19 through 22, 25 through 27, and 29, without prejudice to any future procedurally appropriate motion to compel that may be filed by plaintiffs provided the parties meet and confer in good faith regarding the supplemental responses of Land Rover to RFP Nos. 17, 19 through 22, 25 through 27, and 29.

Because plaintiffs have, for all reasons further discussed above, failed to meet their burden to demonstrate good cause for the requests stated in RFP Nos. 2, 15, 16, 18, 23, 24, 28, 30, and 31, the court will deny the motion with respect to these RFP, also without prejudice to a future procedurally appropriate motion to compel to the extent plaintiffs choose to narrow the categories of documents described in RFP Nos. 2, 15, 16, 18, 23, 24, 28, 30, and 31 in any future demand. Nothing herein shall be construed as an advisory opinion by the Court regarding the manner in which plaintiffs may further narrow these requests.

As it appears that good cause exists for the requests stated in RFP Nos. 1 and 3 through 14, the court will, for all reasons discussed above, continue the hearing on the present motion to permit plaintiffs to submit an amended, procedurally appropriate, full and complete separate statement that does not incorporate material by reference and that otherwise complies fully with the requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(c), and to permit Land Rover to submit a procedurally appropriate response to the amended separate statement.

The Court will also order the parties to further and fully meet and confer, in good faith, with respect to the requests stated in RFP Nos. 1 and 3 through 14, in consideration of the court’s ruling herein. While the court’s ruling shall not be construed as an advisory opinion, it is intended to provide guidance with respect to the manner in which the court intends to rule regarding RFP Nos. 1 and 3 through 14. The court will also order plaintiffs to include in their amended moving separate statement sufficient information describing the parties’ efforts to further meet and confer regarding the requests stated in and the responses of Land Rover to RFP Nos. 1 and 3 through 14, and what, if any, issues remain. To the extent the parties are able to resolve any remaining issues with these requests, plaintiffs shall also include this information in the amended separate statement ordered herein.