Maria Teresa Alcantara, CPA vs Ensign Services Inc et al
Maria Teresa Alcantara, CPA vs Ensign Services Inc et al
Case Number
23CV05084
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Mon, 10/06/2025 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Demurrer to First Amended Complaint; Motion: Strike
Tentative Ruling
Maria Teresa Alcantara v. Ensign Services, Inc., et al.
Case No. 23CV05084
Hearing Date: October 6, 2025
HEARINGS: 1. Demurrer of Powers Park Healthcare, Inc. and The Ensign Group, Inc. to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint
2. Powers Park Healthcare and The Ensign Group, Inc’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint
ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiff Maria Teresa Alcantara: David S. Secrest
For Defendants Powers Park Healthcare, Inc. dba Channel Islands Post-Acute, Ensign Services, Inc., and The Ensign Group, Inc.: Michael J. O’Connor, Jr., Glen A. Williams
TENTATIVE RULINGS:
- Defendants’ demurrer to plaintiff’s first amended complaint is sustained, with leave to amend, as to the second, third, and eighth causes of action.
- Defendants’ motion to strike portions of plaintiff’s first amended complaint is denied, without prejudice, as moot.
- Plaintiff shall file and serve her second amended complaint no later than October 20, 2025.
Background:
This action commenced on November 17, 2023, by the filing of the original complaint by plaintiff Maria Teresa Alcantara (“plaintiff”) against defendants Ensign Services, Inc., Channel Islands Post Acute, and Powers Park Healthcare Inc. (“Powers Park”) (collectively “defendants”), for: (1) Discrimination in Violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), (2) Harassment in Violation of FEHA, (3) Retaliation in Violation of FEHA, (4) Violation of Rights under the California Family Rights Act (‘CFRA”), (5) Failure to Accommodate Disability, (6) Failure to Engage in Good Faith, Interactive Exchange re: Accommodation of Disability, (7) Failure to Investigate or Prevent Discrimination in Violation of FEHA, (8) Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy, (9) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and (10) Declaratory Judgment.
On July 10, 2024, Powers Park answered the complaint with a general denial and 45 affirmative defenses. Also, by way of its answer Powers Park indicated that the complaint erroneously named Powers Park Healthcare, Inc. dba Channel Islands Post-Acute as separate entities.
On April 24, 2025, plaintiff substituted The Ensign Group, Inc. in place of Doe 1.
On February 19, 2025, plaintiff filed her motion for leave to file her first amended complaint (“FAC”), making mostly minor corrections and also adding a cause of action for Retaliation in Violation of Labor Code section 1102.5. On May 5, 2025, the motion was granted.
On May 7, 2025, plaintiff filed the operative FAC for: (1) Discrimination in Violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), (2) Harassment in Violation of FEHA, (3) Retaliation in Violation of FEHA, (4) Violation of Rights under the California Family Rights Act (‘CFRA”), (5) Failure to Accommodate Disability, (6) Failure to Engage in Good Faith, Interactive Exchange re: Accommodation of Disability, (7) Failure to Investigate or Prevent Discrimination in Violation of FEHA, (8) Retaliation in Violation of Labor Code section 1102.5, (9) Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy, and (10) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. (Note: The causes of action contained in the FAC are the same as the original complaint except for the addition of cause of action No. 8 and the omission of a cause of action for declaratory relief.)
As alleged in the FAC:
Defendants own and operate at least 300 skilled nursing facilities, including one in Santa Barbara. (FAC, ¶ 14.) Plaintiff was employed by defendants in various capacities beginning on January 2, 2020, until her termination on December 31, 2021. (FAC, ¶ 2.)
At the time of her December 31, 2021 termination, plaintiff was 49 years old and suffered from a medical disability that was know to defendants for approximately one year. (FAC, ¶ 15.)
Plaintiff’s father died on November 7, 2021, in the Philippines, and plaintiff went there on a leave of absence, that was not documented but was approved by her Administrator at Channel Islands Post-Acute, to care for her mother who was having significant medical issues in the Philippines. (FAC, ¶ 16.) Plaintiff was informally and verbally advised by defendants that her leave of absence was approved for two months. (Ibid.)
Plaintiff travelled to the Philippines with her daughter, who tested positive for Covid on December 30, 2021. (FAC, ¶ 17.) Plaintiff advised her Administrator of the diagnosis. (Ibid.) The following day, via telephone, defendants terminated plaintiff for allegedly “causing six nurses to quit (prospectively).” (FAC, ¶ 18.) The claim was false and pretextual. (Ibid.) Shortly thereafter, defendants replaced plaintiff with Assistant Director Bernie Vutac, age 34, who was given a salary that was significantly less than plaintiff’s salary. (FAC, ¶ 19.)
Plaintiff returned to the United States on January 15, 2022. (FAC, ¶ 20.)
The FAC sets forth allegations of violations of the FEHA and other statutes, which will be discussed below where appropriate.
Defendants now demur to: (1) The Second Cause of Action for Harassment in Violation of FEHA, (2) The Third Cause of Action for Retaliation in Violation of FEHA, and (3) The Eighth Cause of Action for Retaliation in Violation of Labor Code Section 1102.5.)
Defendants also move to strike several portions of the FAC.
Plaintiff opposes the demurrer and the motion to strike.
Analysis:
Request for Judicial Notice
For both the demurrer an the motion to strike, defendants request that the court take judicial notice of: (1) Plaintiff’s original complaint in this action, (2) The operative FAC, (3) Plaintiff’s memorandum of points and authorities in support of plaintiff’s motion for leave to file FAC, filed February 19, 2025, and (4) the declaration of plaintiff’s counsel in support of motion for leave to file first amended complaint.
“When the ground of demurrer is based on a matter of which the court may take judicial notice pursuant to Section 452 or 453 of the Evidence Code, such matter shall be specified in the demurrer, or in the supporting points and authorities for the purpose of invoking such notice, except as the court may otherwise permit.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.70.)
The court may take judicial notice of “Records of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States.” (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
“[J]udicial notice of a document does not extend to the truthfulness of its contents or the interpretation of statements contained therein, if those matters are reasonably disputable. [Citations.] Our Supreme Court noted this limitation in StorMedia Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 449, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 976 P.2d 214 (StorMedia), explaining: “ ‘In ruling on a demurrer, a court may consider facts of which it has taken judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) This includes the existence of a document. When judicial notice is taken of a document, however, the truthfulness and proper interpretation of the document are disputable. [Citation.] . . ..’ ” [Citation.]” (Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 222, 241.)
The court will take judicial notice of the documents.
Demurrer
“The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds:
“(a) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading.
“(b) The person who filed the pleading does not have the legal capacity to sue.
“(c) There is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.
“(d) There is a defect or misjoinder of parties.
“(e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
“(f) The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, “uncertain” includes ambiguous and unintelligible.
“(g) In an action founded upon a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct.
“(h) No certificate was filed as required by Section 411.35.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.)
“When any ground for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).)
“[A] court must treat a demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, it does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.” (Travelers Indem. Co. of Connecticut v. Navigators Specialty Ins. Co. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 341, 358, citing Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)
“If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer. “ ‘[W]e are not limited to plaintiffs’ theory of recovery in testing the sufficiency of their complaint against a demurrer, but instead must determine if the factual allegations of the complaint are adequate to state a cause of action under any legal theory. The courts of this state have . . . long since departed from holding a plaintiff strictly to the ‘form of action’ he has pleaded and instead have adopted the more flexible approach of examining the facts alleged to determine if a demurrer should be sustained.’ ” [Citations.]” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38-39.)
“To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)
A demurrer searches for defects in the allegations of the pleading. “A demurrer is simply not the appropriate procedure for determining the truth of disputed facts.” (Ramsden v. Western Union (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 873, 879.)
Eighth Cause of Action for Retaliation in Violation of Labor Code Section 1102.5:
Defendants first argue that the Whistleblower Retaliation claim and new allegations in the Public Policy Cause of Action, included in the eighth cause of action, are barred by the statute of limitations.
“(a) An employer, or any person acting on behalf of the employer, shall not make, adopt, or enforce any rule, regulation, or policy preventing an employee from disclosing information to a government or law enforcement agency, to a person with authority over the employee, or to another employee who has authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance, or from providing information to, or testifying before, any public body conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry, if the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation, regardless of whether disclosing the information is part of the employee’s job duties.
“(b) An employer, or any person acting on behalf of the employer, shall not retaliate against an employee for disclosing information, or because the employer believes that the employee disclosed or may disclose information, to a government or law enforcement agency, to a person with authority over the employee or another employee who has the authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance, or for providing information to, or testifying before, any public body conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry, if the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation, regardless of whether disclosing the information is part of the employee’s job duties.
“(c) An employer, or any person acting on behalf of the employer, shall not retaliate against an employee for refusing to participate in an activity that would result in a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation.” (Lab. Code, § 1102.5, subds. (a)-(c).)
There is no dispute between the parties that the statute of limitations for bringing an action under Labor Code section 1102.5 is three years after the date when the retaliation occurred. (see Taswell v. Regents of University of California (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 343, 362, Minor v. Fedex Office & Print Services, Inc. (2016) 182 F.Supp.3d 966, 988 (“California’s statute of limitations for “ ‘[a]n action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture’ ” is three years. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 338(a). Therefore, actions commenced under § 1102.5 must be brought within three years.”).)
Neither party disputes that the latest date that the statute of limitations regarding the cause of action would expire is December 31, 2024, which is after the filing of the original complaint but before the filing of the motion to file the FAC.
“ ‘[I]t is difficult for demurrers based on the statute of limitations to succeed because (1) trial and appellate courts treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded and (2) resolution of the statute of limitations issue can involve questions of fact. Furthermore, when the relevant facts are not clear such that the cause of action might be, but is not necessarily, time-barred, the demurrer will be overruled. [Citation.] Thus, for a demurrer based on the statute of limitations to be sustained, the untimeliness of the lawsuit must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint and matters judicially noticed.’ ” [Citation.]” (Schmier v. City of Berkeley (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 549, 554.)
Notwithstanding the expiration of the statute of limitations, plaintiff argues that the cause of action is allowed pursuant to the “Relation Back” doctrine.
“The relation-back doctrine requires that the amended complaint must (1) rest on the same general set of facts, (2) involve the same injury, and (3) refer to the same instrumentality, as the original one. [Citations.]” (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 408-409.)
The original complaint is factually similar to the FAC and alleged the identical underlying facts, including:
Plaintiff was employed by defendants in various capacities beginning on January 2, 2020, until her termination on December 31, 2021. (Compl., ¶ 2.) At the time of her termination, plaintiff was 49 years old and suffered from a medical disability known to defendants for approximately one year. (Compl., ¶ 15.)
Plaintiff’s father died on November 7, 2021, in the Philippines, and plaintiff went there on a leave of absence, that was not documented but was approved by her Administrator at Channel Islands Post-Acute, to care for her mother who was having significant medical issues in the Philippines. (Compl., ¶ 16.) Plaintiff was informally and verbally advised by defendants that her leave of absence was approved for two months. (Ibid.)
Plaintiff travelled to the Philippines with her daughter, who tested positive for Covid on December 30, 2021. (Compl., ¶ 17.) Plaintiff advised her Administrator of the diagnosis. (Ibid.) The following day, via telephone, defendants terminated plaintiff for allegedly “causing six nurses to quit (prospectively).” (Compl., ¶ 18.) The claim was false and pretextual. (Ibid.) Shortly thereafter, defendants replaced plaintiff with Assistant Director Bernie Vutac, age 34, who was given a salary that was significantly less than plaintiff’s salary. (Compl., ¶ 19.)
Plaintiff returned to the United States on January 15, 2022. (Compl., ¶ 20.)
All of the allegations of the original complaint pertain to retaliation, and other statutory violations, that was triggered by plaintiff’s “gender, age, disability, race, requests for reasonable accommodation, and legitimate complaints of retaliation, harassment and discrimination.” (Compl., ¶ 30.)
Plaintiff further alleged that she “contemporaneously or promptly opposed and objected to the adverse, retaliatory and discriminatory actions, statements and conduct by defendants . . ..” (Compl., ¶ 31.)
By way of the FAC, plaintiff includes additional allegations that includes:
“During her employment, Plaintiff disclosed to Defendants’ managers her reasonable belief that Defendants were acting in violation of law, statute, regulations or ordinance, objected to these actions, and refused to participate, including, but not limited to, 2 Cal. Code of Regs. §§11000, 11065, 11068, 11069, 11021, §11094; Cal. Govt. Code §§ 12926(h), 12940(a), (h), (j), (k), (m), (n), 12941, 12943, 12945, 12945.2(a), 12945.2(l); 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733; 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a; 18 U.S.C. § 1347; 18 U.S.C. § 1349.” (FAC, ¶ 121.) “Thereafter, Defendants discharged Plaintiff and engaged in other adverse employment action against Plaintiff.” (FAC, ¶ 122.)
Plaintiff argues that the cause of action is based on the same general set of facts in that the original complaint was entirely premised on the events surrounding her employment and termination on December 31, 2021. Plaintiff acknowledges that the original complaint did not include any facts “about Plaintiff reporting illegal conduct or refusing to engage in illegal conduct, but that the FAC did and that “this disclosure and retaliation occurred prior to and leading up to her termination . . ..” (Opposition, p. 6, ll. 8-13.) Plaintiff further argues that the cause of action “simply adds another motive” for the termination and that the underlying incident, of plaintiff being terminated, and the time-period remain the same. (Id. at p. 6, ll. 15-18.)
Plaintiff next argues that the injury for which plaintiff seeks relief, pursuant to the cause of action, is identical to that in the original complaint. Namely that she was unlawfully terminated and suffered lost wages, emotional distress, and related harms. (Opposition., p. 6, ll. 22-24.) The court agrees with plaintiff that the FAC involves the same injuries as the original complaint.
Plaintiff’s final argument, regarding the relation back doctrine, is that the cause of action involves the same instrumentality as alleged in the original complaint. Plaintiff broadly describes this instrumentality as: “Defendants’ conduct as an employer (through their supervisors and managers) in effectuating that termination.” (Opp., p. 7, ll. 4-5.)
“Cases applying this relation back rule have made it clear that “ ‘it is the sameness of the facts rather than the rights or obligations arising from those facts that is determinative. [Citation.]’ ” [Citation.] Thus, amendments alleging a new theory of liability against the defendant have been found to relate back to the original complaint, so long as the new cause of action is based on the same set facts previously alleged. [Citations.] Likewise, an amendment seeking new damages relates back to the original complaint if such damages resulted from the same operative facts - i.e., the same misconduct and the same injury - previously complained of.” (Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1199-1200.)
“The same instrumentality” refers to the specific cause or mechanism of the injury or harm alleged in the original pleading.
Despite plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary, the cause of action for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 is based on entirely different factual allegations than those contained in the original complaint and the instrumentality is entirely different in the FAC than it was in the original complaint. By way of the FAC, plaintiff makes entirely new allegations regarding the motivation for her termination. The original complaint did not allege, nor even imply, that plaintiff had been enticed to engage in illegal conduct, refused to engage in the illegal conduct, or complained about the alleged illegal conduct. In fact, plaintiff’s counsel has admitted that he only ascertained that there was a potential basis for the cause of action in the course of preparing discovery responses, after the original complaint was filed.
Here, while demurrers based on statute of limitations are not usually sustained, the untimeliness of the eighth cause of action clearly and affirmatively appears on the face of the complaint and matters judicially noticed. The eighth cause of action for Retaliation in Violation of Labor Code Section 1102.5 is barred by the three-year statute of limitations. As such, the demurrer will be sustained.
“ ‘ “[F]or an original complaint, regardless of whether the plaintiff has requested leave to amend, it has long been the rule that a trial court’s denial of leave to amend constitutes an abuse of discretion unless the complaint “ ‘shows on its face that it is incapable of amendment.’ ” [Citations.]’ ” [Citation.]” (Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 764, 800.)
While the court is skeptical that plaintiff will be able to amend to state a cause of action that would withstand a challenge based on the statute of limitations, as this is the original complaint, plaintiff will be given leave to amend.
Second Cause of Action for Harassment in Violation of FEHA and Third Cause of Action for Retaliation in Violation of FEHA
“It is an unlawful employment practice, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification, or, except where based upon applicable security regulations established by the United States or the State of California: . . .
“(h) For any employer, labor organization, employment agency, or person to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because the person has opposed any practices forbidden under this part or because the person has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this part. . . .
“(j)(1) For an employer, labor organization, employment agency, apprenticeship training program or any training program leading to employment, or any other person, because of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age, sexual orientation, reproductive health decisionmaking, or veteran or military status, to harass an employee, an applicant, an unpaid intern or volunteer, or a person providing services pursuant to a contract. Harassment of an employee, an applicant, an unpaid intern or volunteer, or a person providing services pursuant to a contract by an employee, other than an agent or supervisor, shall be unlawful if the entity, or its agents or supervisors, knows or should have known of this conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. An employer may also be responsible for the acts of nonemployees, with respect to harassment of employees, applicants, unpaid interns or volunteers, or persons providing services pursuant to a contract in the workplace, if the employer, or its agents or supervisors, knows or should have known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. In reviewing cases involving the acts of nonemployees, the extent of the employer’s control and any other legal responsibility that the employer may have with respect to the conduct of those nonemployees shall be considered. An entity shall take all reasonable steps to prevent harassment from occurring. Loss of tangible job benefits shall not be necessary in order to establish harassment.” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subds. (h)(j))
“To establish a prima facie case of unlawful harassment under FEHA, a plaintiff must show “ ‘(1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) he was subjected to unwelcome . . . harassment; (3) the harassment was based on [the plaintiff’s membership in an enumerated class]; (4) the harassment unreasonably interfered with his work performance by creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) [defendant] is liable for the harassment.’ ” (Martin v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 149, 170.)
“ ‘The elements of a claim for retaliation in violation of [the FEHA], are: ‘ “(1) the employee’s engagement in a protected activity . . .; (2) retaliatory animus on the part of the employer; (3) an adverse action by the employer; (4) a causal link between the retaliatory animus and the adverse action; (5) damages; and (6) causation.’ ” [Citation.] Protected activity subject to protection from retaliation is now defined in two, separate provisions of the FEHA. Under section 12940, subdivision (h), “ ‘protected activity takes the form of opposing any practices forbidden by FEHA or participating in any proceeding conducted by the DFEH or the Fair Employment and Housing Council (FEHAC).’ ” [Citations.] Additionally, requesting reasonable accommodation for a disability is also activity protected from retaliation. (§ 12940, subd. (m)(2).)” (Miller v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 261, 285.) Here, plaintiff brings her retaliation claim under Government Code section 12940, subdivision (h).
Plaintiff argues that: “At the pleading stage, Plaintiff is not required to enumerate each and every derogatory remark or action; it is enough that she pleads the nature of the harassment and a factual basis for inferring a discriminatory motive.” (Opposition, p. 12, ll. 6-8.) In this regard, plaintiff’s argument is a misstatement of the law with respect to statutory causes of action.
Plaintiff’s second and third causes of action, like the other causes of action, are statutory. “And where, as here, the challenged claims are statutory, the material facts supporting the claims must be alleged with particularity.” (Frankland v. Etehad (2025) 335 Cal.Rptr.3d 489, 495.)
“Plaintiffs’ claims for harassment and retaliation are founded on the provisions of FEHA and are based exclusively on that statutory scheme since FEHA is not a codification of preexisting common law. [Citation.] Accordingly, we apply the general rule that facts in support of each of the requirements of a statute upon which a cause of action is based must be specifically pled. [Citation.]” (Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 604, italics added.)
Plaintiff’s allegations lack any particularity or specificity. The allegations are conclusory. For example, under the second cause of action, plaintiff alleges: “Plaintiff was subjected to unwanted harassing conduct, and a hostile work environment, based on gender, age, disability and race. Defendants engaged in conduct that created a hostile work environment by intentional, improper conduct including, but not limited to, rude comments, questions and behavior directed to Plaintiff on a regular basis, including disability-based, derogatory comments directed to Plaintiff; shunning of Plaintiff; belittling of Plaintiff’s job; reprimands of Plaintiff in front of Plaintiff’s coworkers; hostile social interactions with Plaintiff in the workplace; lying to Plaintiff about the terms and conditions of employment; failing to pay Plaintiff all amounts owed and earned; refusing to assign work to Plaintiff; firing Plaintiff based on knowingly fabricated grounds; and similar actions undertaken in a way that sent a demeaning or offensive message to Plaintiff, and consisted of a combination of hostile social interactions and official employment actions that reinforced an underlying hostile message, which constitute evidence of harassment, and created a hostile working environment.” (FAC, ¶ 54.)
Not a single, specific, incident of alleged harassment is set forth. The same is true for the third cause of action for retaliation. No specifics are given.
Both causes of action fail due to the lack of required specificity. As such, the demurrer will be sustained as to the second and third causes of action, with leave to amend.
Motion to Strike
Defendants move to strike several portions of plaintiff’s FAC. All the portions that defendants seek to have stricken from the FAC relate to either the second, third, or eighth causes of action. As plaintiff is being given leave to amend, the motion to strike is moot.