Mariette Wingard et al vs Jordan Walker et al

Case Number

23CV05001

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 11/21/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

CMC; Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP)

Tentative Ruling

For the reasons set forth below, the motion of defendants County of Santa Barbara, Jordan Walker, Frank Vasquez, James Furber, John Savrnoch, Joyce Dudley, Anthony Davis, Morgan Lucas, Lee Carter, and Kristina Perkins to Strike plaintiffs’ Complaint Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16, is granted. Plaintiffs’ complaint, as to the moving parties, is dismissed with prejudice.

Background:

This action commenced on November 9, 2023, by the filing of the complaint by plaintiffs Mariette Wingard (Wingard), Herbal Angels Inc. (Herbal), and Mary Fritz (Fritz) (collectively “plaintiffs”), against defendants J. Blair Pence II (Pence), Jordan Walker (Walker), Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Office (Sheriff), County of Santa Barbara (County), Santa Barbara County District Attorney’s Office (DA), Santa Barbara County Building and Planning (Planning Dept.), Frank Vasquez (Vasquez), James Furber (Furber), John Savrnoch (Savrnoch), Joyce Dudley (Dudley), Anthony Davis (Davis), Morgan Lucas (Lucas), Lee Carter (Carter), and Christina Perkins (Perkins) (collectively “defendants”) for: (1) Violations of due process rights; (2) Abuse of process; (3) Illegal search and seizure; (4) Takings in violation of the prohibitions within the Federal and California Constitutions; (5) Conversion; (6) Trespass to chattel; (7) Conspiracy to deprive and violate Constitutional rights; (8) Monell violation of Civil Rights Policy Claim; (9) Malicious prosecution; (10) Malicious prosecution – resulting from civil litigation; (11) Violation of the right to privacy; (12) Defamation; (13) Intentional interference with economic prospective; (14) Civil conspiracy; and (15) Respondeat Superior. All of the individual defendants were, at all relevant times, employees of either Sheriff or DA.

As alleged in the complaint:

In March 2020, DA and Deputy DA Davis filed criminal charges against Wingard for cannabis cultivation without a license and possession of cannabis for sale without a license, on the basis that she was cultivating without a State cannabis cultivation license (Case No. 20CV02691). (Compl., ¶ 46.) Prior to filing the criminal charges against Wingard, “the County Actors” knew there was no basis to charge her. (Ibid.) Prior to filing the criminal charges against Wingard, “the County Actors” knew Herbal had active State cannabis cultivation licenses. (Ibid.) Prior to filing the criminal charges against Wingard, Sheriff and DA knew that cannabis cultivation took place at 2761 Cebada Canyon Road, Lompoc (the “property”) prior to January 19, 2016. (Ibid.)

Prior to November 9, 2022, two superior court judges disregarded the State cannabis cultivation licenses issued to Herbal, by authorizing search warrants and summarily denying Wingard’s demurrer to counts 3 and 4 of the criminal complaint. (Compl., ¶ 47.)

On November 9, 2022, following three years of litigation, Judge Adams ruled that Wingard was immune from arrest, prosecution, and asset forfeiture. (Compl., ¶ 48.) The court specifically ruled that Wingard was connected to Herbal, that Herbal possessed active State licenses at the time of the criminal investigation and raid, and that only the State has authority to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke State licenses. (Id. at ¶ 49.) The criminal charges were dismissed. (Id at ¶ 50.) Despite the findings and dismissal of the criminal charges, the court continues to deny Wingard’s factual innocence. (Id. at ¶ 51.)

In September 2019, Sheriff began an “illegal” investigation of Herbal’s cultivation site without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. (Compl., ¶ 70.) Prior to investigating Herbal and Wingard, County, DA, and Sheriff had actual knowledge that Wingard was connected to Herbal, and that Herbal had the licenses needed to cultivate cannabis in Santa Barbara County. (Id. at ¶ 71.)

The investigation commenced when Walker was serving a search warrant at the property on September 14, 2019, and noticed “hoop houses” at the property. (Compl., ¶ 72.) Every fact uncovered by Walker after September 14, 2019, showed that Herbal was the cannabis operator at the property and that Herbal was a licensed cannabis cultivator with 12 active licenses issued by the State of California, and that Herbal and Avo Vista Farms, LLC were seeking zoning permits from Planning Dept. in accordance with the County’s cannabis ordinances. (Ibid.)

On December 13, 2019, and December 16, 2019, Walker filed an affidavit in support of a requested search warrant for the property, Wingard’s residence, the residence of a previous owner of Avo Vista Farms, and the office location for Avo Vista Farms, “for evidence of illegal cannabis cultivation, paraphernalia, records, proceeds and other evidence . . . which will . . . show that persons associated with this property are cultivating cannabis as a public offense, in violation of H.S. 11358(c).” (Compl., ¶ 73.) Walker stated in the warrant affidavit that Herbal, at the time, had 12 active State cannabis cultivation licenses that would remain active until May 2020. (Id. at ¶ 74.) A superior court judge signed the search warrants knowing that Herbal had 12 active State cultivation licenses that would remain active until May 2020. (Id. at ¶ 75.)

Sheriff, DA, and Davis fabricated evidence against Wingard and Herbal by failing to inform the court that the 12 active State cannabis cultivation licenses conferred absolute immunity from charges of cultivation without a license on Wingard and Herbal by informing the court that the State cannabis licenses were invalid despite knowing the State never investigated, disciplined, conditioned, suspended, or revoked the licenses, by concealing from the court and from Wingard prior cultivation at the property. (Compl., ¶ 76.) Planning and Sheriff colluded to “destroy” Herbal via the investigation. (Id. at ¶ 77.) Davis colluded with Sheriff to “destroy” Herbal via the investigation, and Davis colluded with Sheriff to fabricate evidence during the investigation, search, and seizure of Wingard and Herbal. (Id. at ¶ 78.)

On December 16, 2019, Wingard, her infant daughter, her toddler daughter, and Wingard’s mother Fritz left Wingard’s residence in Wingard’s family van. (Compl., ¶ 79.) Approximately one mile from her home, Wingard was pulled over and two law enforcement officers approached the vehicle, took Wingard’s phone, and asked if there were any guns in the vehicle. (Ibid.) Shortly thereafter, two more officers arrived. (Ibid.) Fritz asked if she could leave and was told that she was being detained but was not told why. (Id. at ¶ 80.) An officer threatened Fritz and Wingard that Wingard’s infant would likely be taken away from the family by children’s services. (Id. at ¶ 81.) Wingard and Fritz informed the officers that the infant needed to nurse and could not be separated from Wingard, but the officer reiterated that the infant might be taken. (Ibid.)

Fritz, the infant, and the toddler were not the subject of the investigation or persons of interest. (Compl., ¶ 82.) Fritz asked to leave with Wingard’s infant and toddler, but the officers refused to let her leave with the children. (Ibid.)

The officers searched and seized Fritz’s belongings, including the money from her wallet, despite there being no evidence to indicate Fritz was in any way connected to the criminal investigation. (Compl., ¶ 83.) Sherriff still has Wingard’s and Fritz’s belongings and refuses to release them on the basis that they still must be retained as evidence of a crime. (Ibid.)

Eventually, Wingard was allowed to permit a friend to pick up the toddler. (Compl., ¶ 84.) After the toddler was picked up, the officers ordered Wingard to return to her residence with Fritz and the infant. (Ibid.) Fritz was still not allowed to leave. (Ibid.)

At Wingard’s residence, Wingard, Fritz, and the infant were detained in the living room while officers searched the residence for several hours. (Compl., ¶ 85.) Fritz was not permitted to leave until the search was complete, and she was not told why she was being detained or allowed to see the search warrant. (Ibid.)

Sheriff found no evidence of cannabis cultivation without a license but, despite this fact, Sheriff seized $206,418.72 from Herbal, Wingard, and Eli Sheiman (Sheiman), destroyed legally cultivated cannabis worth millions of dollars, and terrorized Wingard, Fritz, and Sheiman, as well as their two young children over the years. (Compl., ¶ 96.) Because County seized all of Wingard’s funds, Fritz loaned Wingard $130,000.00 for rent, food, clothing, medical bills, taxes, transportation, insurance, therapy, and preschool tuition. (Id. at ¶ 97.) Fritz was retried prior to the incident but went back to working full-time in 2020 to help support Wingard and Wingard’s children. (Ibid.)

During its investigation and search and seizure of Wingard and Herbal, Sheriff destroyed over $3,500,000.00 in lawfully cultivated cannabis, trade secrets, business property, and seized over $200,000.00 from Herbal, as well as all of Herbal’s business records. (Compl., ¶ 98.) The seizure and destruction of Herbal’s assets destroyed the business, destroyed the business’s goodwill and reputation within the community, and made any attempts to revive the business and its conditional use permit futile. (Id. at ¶ 99.)

Despite the criminal case against Wingard being dismissed on November 9, 2022, it took nearly a year for DA and Sheriff to return the funds seized from Wingard and Herbal. (Compl., ¶ 100.)

Davis and Sheriff colluded to destroy Herbal’s conditional use permit. (Compl., ¶ 101.)

Wingard was charged with the misdemeanor crimes of cultivating more than six cannabis plaints and possessing marijuana for sale. (Compl., ¶ 103.) Prior to the filing of the criminal complaint, DA and Sheriff were aware that Wingard was connected to Herbal, and that Herbal held active State cannabis cultivation licenses issued by the California Department of Agriculture Cannabis for the cultivation of marijuana at the property. (Ibid.)

What was presented as evidence in the criminal trial was the “false, manufactured, and fabricated” evidence by Davis, Walker, Vasquez, Perkins, Furber, Lucas, Carter, and the prosecutorial team. (Compl., ¶ 104.) Throughout the criminal action, and continuing to the present, defendants have joined and participated in Davis’s efforts to withhold and conceal exculpatory evidence that “would have unraveled the illegal case against Wingard.” (Ibid.) Defendants’ actions were part of defendants’ long-standing conspiracy to frame Wingard and Herbal for crimes they did not commit. (Id. at ¶ 105.)

On August 12, 2020, Wingard demurred to the criminal complaint on the grounds that she was immune from arrest, prosecution, and asset forfeiture for cultivation and possession of cannabis without a license because she was connected to Herbal and Herbal held an active State license for cannabis cultivation. (Compl., ¶ 106.) On August 31, 2021, the court denied the demurrer. (Ibid.)

As the sole basis for the criminal charges against Wingard, DA “ruled” that the State licenses issued to Herbal were invalid. (Compl., ¶ 111.) County has no authority to suspend, issue, or revoke State cannabis licenses. (Ibid.)

DA and Sheriff engaged in interviews with the press and misstated facts in an effort to pressure Wingard and Herbal to waive their rights and to destroy their reputations with other businesses and the public. (Compl., ¶ 115.)

Additional allegations of the complaint will be discussed below, where relevant to the analysis.

All defendants, other than Blair (who has a separately filed motion that is set to be heard on December 12, 2025), filed the present special motion to strike (anti-SLAPP) on June 16, 2025, arguing that all of plaintiffs’ causes of action arise from protected activity and that plaintiffs cannot show a probability of prevailing on their causes of action. Defendants also assert that all causes of action, other than the malicious prosecution cause of action, are barred by the litigation privilege.

Plaintiffs oppose the motion, arguing that defendants misconstrue the allegations of the complaint and that the causes of action are about defendants acting without jurisdiction or legal authority. (Note: The opposition was late filed, improperly formatted, and exceeds the allowable number of pages. While the court will exercise its discretion and consider the opposition, counsel is reminded of the importance of complying with the California Rules of Court, as well as the potential consequences of ignoring the Rules.)

Analysis:

Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 provides, in relevant part:

“(a) The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances. The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process. To this end, this section shall be construed broadly.

“(b)(1) A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.

“(2) In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.

“(3) If the court determines that the plaintiff has established a probability that he or she will prevail on the claim, neither that determination nor the fact of that determination shall be admissible in evidence at any later stage of the case, or in any subsequent action, and no burden of proof or degree of proof otherwise applicable shall be affected by that determination in any later stage of the case or in any subsequent proceeding.

* * *

“(e) As used in this section, “act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue” includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”

“Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps. First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by [Code of Civil Procedure] section 425.16. [Citation.] If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success. We have described this second step as a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure.’ [Citation, fn.] The court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law. [Citation.] ‘[C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.’ [Citation.]” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384–385.)

1. Public Interest Exception

Plaintiffs argue that the “public interest exception” bars the anti-SLAPP motion in its entirety, because “the general public has a fundamental right and interest against the government illegally invalidating State licenses and ignoring the rights and immunities conferred by the licenses.” (Opp., p. 20, ll. 17-19.)

“The Legislature “ ‘designed subdivision (b) of section 425.17 to prevent the use of the anti-SLAPP device against ‘ “specified public interest actions,” ’ among others. [Citation.]’ ” [Citation.] More specifically, the intent of the Legislature was to “ ‘ “make the SLAPP motion inapplicable to public interest and class action lawsuits “ ‘brought solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general public’ ” when three specified conditions are met.” ’ ” [Citation.] Those three conditions are as follows: “ ‘(1) The plaintiff does not seek any relief greater than or different from the relief sought for the general public . . .. [¶] (2) The action, if successful, would enforce an important right affecting the public interest, and would confer a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, on the general public or a large class of persons. [¶] (3) Private enforcement is necessary and places a disproportionate financial burden on the plaintiff in relation to the plaintiff’s stake in the matter.’ ” (§ 425.17, subd. (b).) “ ‘If a plaintiff's lawsuit comes within section 425.17, subdivision (b), it is exempt from the anti-SLAPP statute, and thus, a trial court may deny the defendants’ special motion to strike without determining whether the plaintiff's causes of action arise from protected activity, and if so, whether the plaintiff has established a probability of prevailing on those causes of action under section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1).’ ” [Citation.]” (The Inland Oversight Committee v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 671, 676.)

This is not a public interest or class action lawsuit “brought solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general public.” It is a private lawsuit that seeks significant damages, including over $100,000,000.00 to go to plaintiffs. Nothing in plaintiffs’ prayer for relief confers anything on any member of the public other than plaintiffs.

The public interest exception simply does not apply to this case.

2. First Prong – Arising From Protected Activity

Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ allegations can be grouped into the following three protected categories: “(1) the initiation and pursuit of criminal investigations and prosecutions; (2) official statements made in court and to the media regarding those investigations; and (3) regulatory and administrative enforcement actions related to land use and cannabis licenses.” (Motion, p. 8, ll. 21-25.)

Plaintiffs do not argue that the categories, as stated by defendants, do not constitute protected activity. Rather, plaintiffs argue that defendants’ grouping is incorrect and that the causes of action should be grouped into the following non-protected categories: “(1). The Sheriff’s Office and District Attorney’s Office acted without jurisdiction when they “ ‘invalidated’ ” Plaintiffs’ State issued cannabis licenses; (2). The Sheriff’s Office and District Attorney’s Office had no legal authority to invalidate the licenses; (3). the Sheriff’s Office and District Attorney’s Office usurped the sole authority of the Department of Cannabis Control to approve, deny, discipline, suspend, or revoke State issued cannabis licenses; (4). the Sheriff’s Office and District Attorney’s Office usurped the sole authority of the Santa Barbara Board of Supervisors and Executive Offices to approve, deny, suspend, discipline, or revoke local cannabis licenses, permits and other forms of local authorization; and (5) Once the criminal case against Mariette Wingard was over, the District Attorney’s Office prosecutorial function was complete and Anthony Davis’s defamatory statements to the press were outside the scope of the prosecution of Ms. Wingard and outside the scope of his official responsibilities.” (Opp., p. 6, ll. 16-25.)

“A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim. [Citations.] Critically, “ ‘the defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.’ ” [Citations.]” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1062-1063.)

“When moving to strike a cause of action under the anti-SLAPP statute, a defendant that satisfies its initial burden of demonstrating the targeted action is one arising from protected activity faces no additional requirement of proving the plaintiff’s subjective intent. [Citation.] Nor need a moving defendant demonstrate that the action actually has had a chilling effect on the exercise of such rights. [Citation.]” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 88.)

“[T]he mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. [Citation.] Moreover, that a cause of action arguably may have been “ ‘triggered’ ” by protected activity does not entail that it is one arising from such. [Citation.] In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical consideration is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected free speech or petitioning activity. [Citations.]” (Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 89.)

“In deciding whether the initial “ ‘arising from’ ” requirement is met, a court considers “ ‘the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.’ ” (§ 425.16, subd. (b).)” (Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 89.)

“ ‘The constitutional right to petition . . . includes the basic act of filing litigation or otherwise seeking administrative action.’ ” [Citation.] Just as communications preparatory to or in anticipation of the bringing of an action or other official proceeding are within the protection of the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) [citation], we hold that such statements are equally entitled to the benefits of section 425.16. [Citation.]” (Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 784.)

            Causes of Action Nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, and 11.

As noted above, cause of action No. 1 is for violations of due process rights, cause of action No. 2 is for abuse of process, cause of action No. 3 is for illegal search and seizure, cause of action No. 7 is for conspiracy to deprive and violate constitutional rights, and cause of action No. 11 is for violation of the right to privacy.

Defendants argue that these causes of action all involve allegations of actions taken by law enforcement and prosecutors during the investigation and prosecution of a criminal case and associated civil forfeiture proceedings. As such, defendants argue, they are all actions that are protected under the anti-SLAPP statute.

In opposition, plaintiffs do not address specific causes of action contained in the complaint. Plaintiffs simply make a broad argument that the case is about County voiding State issued licenses and that the public interest exception bars the anti-SLAPP motion. By way of presenting background facts, plaintiffs merely repeat the allegations contained in the complaint.

A review of the complaint shows that causes of action Nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, and 11 all arise out of alleged actions in connection with the investigation, detention, prosecution of Wingard, and asset seizure. (see Compl., ¶¶ 160, 162, 177, 178, 184, 185, 186, 229, 231, 279.) The alleged actions were part of official proceedings and are protected activities.

            Causes of Action Nos. 4, 5, and 6

As noted above, cause of action No. 4 is for takings in violation of the prohibitions within the Federal and California Constitutions, cause of action No. 5 is for conversion, and cause of action No. 6 is for trespass to chattel.

Defendants argue that these causes of action arise from acts conducted during official investigations and prosecution.

As is true with the entire opposition, plaintiffs fail to address the specific causes of action and fail to point to any portions of the complaint that they contend supports their argument regarding the nature of the action.

A review of the complaint shows that causes of action Nos. 4, 5, and 6 all arise out of alleged actions in connection with seizing plaintiffs’ property in conjunction with the investigation and prosecution of Wingard. (see Compl., ¶¶ 199, 209, 219.) The alleged actions were part of official proceedings and are protected activities.

            Cause of Action No. 8

As stated above, cause of action No. 8 is a Monell policy claim for violations of civil rights.

Defendants argue that the alleged actions arise from claims regarding the County’s policies and alleged failures in supervision employees involved in the criminal investigation, prosecution, and administrative actions, which are protected activities.

As is true with the entire opposition, plaintiffs fail to address the specific causes of action and fail to point to any portions of the complaint that they contend supports their argument regarding the nature of the action.

A review of the complaint shows that cause of action No. 8 arises out of allegations that County, DA, and Sheriff had “interrelated de facto polices, practices, and customs,” that were maintained and implemented with deliberate indifference, which resulted in encouragement to construct and fabricate evidence, to suppress, conceal, and destroy exculpatory evidence, to make false statements and reports, to give false testimony, to obstruct justice, to manipulate and obstruct State and Federal courts, and to pursue false arrests and prosecutions. (Compl., ¶¶ 239, 240.) Those allegations are in the context of the prosecution and seizure actions against Wingard and Herbal. (Compl., ¶ 243.)

As with the above causes of action, the alleged actions, as they are framed in the complaint, were part of official proceedings and are protected activities.

            Causes of Action Nos. 9 and 10

As stated above, causes of action No. 9 and 10 are for malicious prosecution.

Defendants argue that the alleged actions relating to the malicious prosecution cause of action consist of conducting the investigation, seeking warrants, and individuals carrying out duties as required by their positions.

As is true with the entire opposition, plaintiffs fail to address the specific causes of action and fail to point to any portions of the complaint that they contend supports their argument regarding the nature of the actions.

“[B]y its terms, section 425.16 potentially may apply to every malicious prosecution action, because every such action arises from an underlying lawsuit, or petition to the judicial branch. By definition, a malicious prosecution suit alleges that the defendant committed a tort by filing a lawsuit. [Citation.] Accordingly, every Court of Appeal that has addressed the question has concluded that malicious prosecution causes of action fall within the purview of the anti-SLAPP statute. [Citations.] Courts in our sister states construing similar statues are in accord.” (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 734-735.) “The Legislature clearly knows how to create an exemption from the anti-SLAPP statute when it wishes to do so. It has not done so for malicious prosecution claims.” (Id. at p. 735.)

A review of the complaint shows that all of the alleged actions were part of official proceedings and are protected activities.

            Causes of Action Nos. 12 and 13

As noted above, cause of action No. 12 is for defamation and cause of action No. 13 is for intentional interference with economic prospective.

Defendants argue that the complained of activities were statements that were made in connection with official investigations, prosecutions, or judicial proceedings and are protected activities because they consist of reports or statements to law enforcement, public comments by prosecutors or government officials, and media communications that relate to ongoing public controversies or governmental investigations.

As is true with the entire opposition, plaintiffs fail to address the specific causes of action and fail to point to any portions of the complaint that they contend supports their argument regarding the nature of the action.

A review of the complaint shows that the complained of activities were statements that were made to media regarding the investigation and prosecution, as well as statements made in the course of the investigation and prosecution. (see Compl., ¶¶ 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 294, and 295.)

The statements alleged are specifically defined as protected activities by Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e).

 

            Causes of Action Nos. 14 and 15

As noted above, cause of action No. 14 is for civil conspiracy and cause of action No. 15 is for respondeat superior.

Defendants argue that civil conspiracy and respondeat superior are not torts. Rather they are doctrines of liability. Defendants are correct.

“Civil conspiracy is not an independent cause of action. [Citations.] Instead, it is a theory of co-equal legal liability under which certain defendants may be held liable for “ ‘an independent civil wrong’ ” [citations] committed by others. A participant in the conspiracy “ ‘effectively adopts as his or her own the torts of other coconspirators within the ambit of the conspiracy.’ ” [Citation.]” (Navarrete v. Meyer (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1291.)

“The respondeat superior doctrine makes an employer vicariously liable for torts of its employee committed within the “ ‘scope of the employment.’ ” [Citation.] Liability under the respondeat superior doctrine does not rely on the employer’s fault, and thus “ ‘is a departure from the general tort principle that liability is based on fault.’ ” [Citation.] Instead, the doctrine imputes liability to the employer for the employee’s tortious act that injures a third party.” (Sunderland v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Systems Support Co. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1, 8.)

Plaintiffs do not appear to dispute the fact that civil conspiracy and respondeat superior are not torts. Even so, without potential liability based on some other proper cause of action, there can be no recovery under civil conspiracy or respondeat superior.

            Conclusions Regarding the First Prong:

The court has thoroughly reviewed plaintiffs’ complaint. The acts complained of are all associated with the defendants’ investigation of plaintiffs, and Wingard’s subsequent prosecution. While the complaint does mention that Wingard had valid permits and licenses issued by the State, the complaint is clearly not based on the County voiding the State permits.

In fact, the very first paragraph of the “General Allegations” section of the complaint states what the case is based on and arises out of: “This Complaint arises out of the concerted efforts of the County of Santa Barbara, the Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Office and the Santa Barbara County District Attorney’s Office . . . to systematically occlude Santa Barbara County cannabis operators from obtaining permits to legalize operations, instead focusing on enforcement vis a vi criminal investigation and malicious prosecution of Mariette Wingard.” (Compl., ¶ 45.) It is repeatedly stated throughout the complaint that the case is about fabricated evidence, illegal investigation, illegal detention, and illegal prosecution.

The fact that the complaint, and all causes of action contained therein, is based on the investigation, prosecution, and statements made in connection with the investigation and prosecution, is further demonstrated by the individual defendants that are named. For example, Sheriff and the individual officers would have no ability or role in invalidating or voiding any permits or licenses related to cannabis cultivation. The allegations against them pertain to alleged actions they took in the underlying investigation and prosecution, including obtaining warrants, seizing property, providing testimony, and speaking with the media. Additionally, Fritz being named as a plaintiff demonstrates that this case is not about the voiding of State issued cannabis cultivation licenses. The complaint does not allege, in any way, that Fritz was involved in the cultivation operation. The allegations stem solely from the investigation and detainment of her and Wingard. Ultimately, plaintiffs’ argument regarding the actions that give rise to the complaint is unpersuasive and is contradicted by the plain language of the complaint itself. In fact, despite some lip service regarding the voiding of permits, the argument presented by way of the opposition to the present motion also demonstrates that the conduct complained of was all protected activity under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.

Defendants have clearly met their burden under the first prong by showing that the complaint, and each cause of action contained therein, is based on statutorily protected activity.

3. Second Prong – Probability of Prevailing on the Merits

“If the defendant carries its burden, the plaintiff must then demonstrate its claims have at least “ ‘minimal merit.’ ” [Citations.]” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1061.)

“At this second stage, “ ‘a plaintiff seeking to demonstrate the merit of the claim “ ‘may not rely solely on its complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon competent admissible evidence.” ’ ” (Citation.)” (Young v. Midland Funding LLC (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 63, 79.)

“Argument of an attorney whether it be statements made at a hearing or statements contained in points and authorities is not proof legal or evidentiary.” (City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 25, 31 fn. 2.)

Here, plaintiffs have not provided any evidence at all. There are no declarations, other than that of plaintiffs’ counsel, and while there are references to Exhibits, no Exhibits were filed. Plaintiffs solely, and improperly, rely on the allegations of the complaint and argument of counsel. Pursuant to the authority cited above, this does not constitute evidence. Because plaintiffs have produced no evidence, they have not met their burden of showing that their claims have even minimal merit.

The anti-SLAPP motion will be granted and the claims against the moving defendants will be dismissed with prejudice.

Any issues regarding statutory fees are to be addressed by separate noticed motion.