Core SVA Santa Barbara Camino, LLC vs Sarai Bello et al

Case Number

23CV04961

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 12/18/2023 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Demurrer

Tentative Ruling

Core SVA Santa Barbara Camino, LLC vs. Sarai Bello 

Case No. 23CV04961

           

Hearing Date: December 18, 2023                                         

HEARING:              Demurrer To Plaintiff’s Complaint

                                                           

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff Core SVA Santa Barbara Camino, LLC: Lacy L. Taylor, Thyne Taylor Fox Howard LLP

                             For Defendant Sarai Bello: Alex Entrekin, Legal Aid Foundation of Santa Barbara County

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant’s demurrer to plaintiff’s unlawful detainer complaint is sustained without leave to amend.

Background:

On November 8, 2023, plaintiff Core SVA Santa Barbara Camino, LLC, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against defendant Sarai Bello. As alleged in the complaint:

On March 18, 2022, defendant entered into a Lease Renewal Agreement (the lease) with plaintiff’s predecessor in interest for premises located at 775 Camino Del Sur, #I04.3, Goleta, California, within the unincorporated area of Santa Barbara, California (the premises). (Compl., ¶¶ 3(a), 3(b)(2), 6(a)(1), 6(b), 6(e) & Exh. 1.) Defendant agreed to pay monthly rent of $1,423 payable on the first of each month. (Compl., ¶¶ 6(a)(2) & (3).) The lease was later changed on February 15, 2023, when defendant executed a change in roommate agreement removing Victor Ramirez and Michelle Lopez as a tenants and adding defendant as an assignee under the lease, which converted to a month-to-month tenancy. (Compl., ¶ 6(d) & Exh. 4.)

Plaintiff purchased the premises in February 2023, with the intention of undertaking substantial repairs and upgrades to the premises. (Compl., ¶ 4 & Attachment 17.) Plaintiff has obtained permits. (Ibid.) Work has commenced at the premises but it is now necessary that to have the units vacated to avoid interruptions in power, water, and plumbing, and exposure to asbestos containing materials. (Ibid.)

On April 4, 2023, plaintiff posted on the premises, gave to a person found residing at the premises, and mailed to defendant a copy of a 60-day notice to quit (the 60-day notice) which included an election of forfeiture. (Compl., ¶¶ 9(a)(3), 9(d), 9(e), 10(a)(1), 10(d) & Exhs. 2 & 3.) The period stated in the 60-day notice expired at the end of the day on June 25, 2023, and defendant failed to comply with its requirements by that date. (Compl., ¶ 9(b)(1) & (2).)

The tenancy was terminated for no-fault just cause pursuant to Civil Code section 1946.2, subdivision (b)(2). (Compl., ¶ 8(b).) Defendant was provided a direct payment of one month’s rent under Civil Code section 1946. 2, subdivision (d)(3), equaling $4,001. (Compl., ¶ 8(b)(2).)

The tenancy is subject to Civil Code section 1946.2 (the Tenant Protection Act of 2019 or the TPA) and “Santa Barbara County Ordinance 5175 / April 6, 2023”. (Compl., ¶¶ 7(b) & 16.)

Defendant has filed a demurrer to plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that plaintiff has failed to plead compliance with the just cause and notice provisions of the Code of the County of Santa Barbara, California (the County Code). Plaintiff opposes the demurrer. 

Analysis:

On demurrer, the court determines whether the complaint “alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.” (T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 162; accord, Mathews v. Becerra (2019) 8 Cal.5th 756, 768.) The court treats a demurrer “as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, it does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.” (Travelers Indem. Co. of Connecticut v. Navigators Specialty Ins. Co. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 341, 358, citing Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) Though affirmative defenses are not ordinarily reached by a general demurrer, a demurrer based on an affirmative defense “will be sustained only where the face of the complaint discloses that the action is necessarily barred by the defense.” (Ivanoff v. Bank of America, N.A. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 726; Casterson v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 177, 183.)

For present purposes, plaintiff “concedes that Chapter 44, Article IV [of the County Code] is more protective than Civil Code section 1946.2 and applies to [the premises].” (Opp. at p. 2, ll. 26-27; see also Civ. Code, § 1946.2, subd. (g)(1)(B)(i)-(iii) & (2) [providing that Civil Code section 1946.2 does not apply to certain residential real property subject to a local ordinance requiring just cause to terminate a tenancy that is “more protective”].)

The present dispute pertains in part to whether plaintiff must plead compliance with the just cause and notice provisions of the County Code based on the effective date of the ordinance adopting these provisions and whether plaintiff has sufficiently alleged compliance with the County Code. Defendant contends that, among other things, plaintiff has failed to allege service of a notice terminating defendant’s tenancy that contains all information required under the County Code, and to allege a sufficient “just cause” basis for terminating the tenancy. Defendant further contends that although plaintiff included information regarding the remodel of the premises in Attachment 17 to the complaint, this information was required to be but is not included in the 60-day notice. Therefore, defendant argues, the 60-day notice is defective under County Code section 44-19, et seq. which became effective on April 6, 2023.

On April 6, 2023, the Board of Supervisors of the County of Santa Barbara (the Board) adopted Ordinance No. 5175 (Ordinance 5175) which amended Chapter 44 of the County Code to add Article IV. (Santa Barbara County Ord. No. 5175, adding art. IV, § 44-19 et seq. to the County Code.) Ordinance 5175 was adopted as an “emergency ordinance” under Government Code sections 25123 and 25131. (Ibid. [§ 44-19, subd. (B)(8)].) Under the provisions of Government Code sections 25123, subdivision (d),  and 25131, Ordinance 5175 was passed immediately and became effective on April 6, 2023. (See Gov. Code, § 25123, subd. (d) [ordinances “for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety” declaring facts constituting the urgency take effect immediately]; see also Santa Barbara County Ord. No. 5175, adding art. IV, § 44-19 et seq. to the County Code at § 44-19, subd. (B)(1)-(6) & (8).)
 

In addition, on July 11, 2023, the Board adopted Ordinance No. 5186 which amended Chapter 44, Article IV of, and added Article V to, the County Code. (Santa Barbara County Ord. No. 5186, amending art. IV, §§ 44-19 et seq. and adding art. V, § 44-26 et seq. to the County Code.) Ordinance No. 5186 became effective on August 10, 2023. (See Gov. Code, §§ 25123.)

In its opposition, plaintiff contends that because the 60-day notice was served on April 4, 2023, prior to the date that Ordinance 5175 became effective, it is not required to comply with any provision of the County Code that applies to termination notices, including the provisions of County Code section 44-23, subdivisions (A) and (B), which set forth the required contents of a termination notice and supplemental notice, and County Code section 44-25, which requires that an owner seeking in good faith to recover possession to demolish or substantially remodel a rental unit provide tenants with an “early tenant alert notice”, “obtain all necessary permits”, and serve tenants with a copy of the permits along with sufficient written notice stating the reason for the termination, among other things. (See Opp. at p. 4, ll. 26-28; Santa Barbara County Code, ch. 44, art. IV, §§ 44-23, subds. (A)-(B) & 44-25, subd. (B)(2)(iv)(a)-(d).)

To support its contentions, plaintiff relies on language appearing in County Code section 44-19, which sets forth the legislative intent and purpose of Article IV of the County Code and which states that its requirements “shall apply to termination notices provided after the effective date of the urgency ordinance and in any unlawful detainer action initiated after the effective [date] of the urgency ordinance from which this article derives.” (Santa Barbara County Code, ch. 44, art. IV, § 44-19, subd. (A).) The court further notes that County Code section 44-24 provides that “[t]he requirements herein shall apply to any termination notices and in any unlawful detainer action initiated after the effective date of this article[.]” (Santa Barbara County Code, ch. 44, art. IV, § 44-24.)

Plaintiff further asserts that the notice requirements detailed in Article IV of the County Code include additional requirements that were not included in the County Code or any applicable state law as of April 4, 2023, the date of service of the 60-day notice. Because the 60-day notice complied with all state and local laws in effect at the time of service, plaintiff argues, it provided adequate and effective notice to terminate defendant’s tenancy. (See Opp. at p. 4, ll. 3-4 & p. 6, ll. 16-20.)

An action for unlawful detainer is a summary proceeding authorized and governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 1161 et seq., which is “intended and designed to provide an expeditious remedy for the recovery of possession of real property.” (Larson v. City and County of San Francisco (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1297.) Due to the summary nature of an unlawful detainer proceeding, strict compliance with the statutory requirements is a prerequisite to a landlord’s recovery of possession. (Dr. Leevil, LLC v. Westlake Health Care Center (2018) 6 Cal.5th 474, 480.)

In addition, the unlawful detainer statutes “do not preempt municipal limitations on grounds for eviction that aid in enforcing local rent control legislation.” (Rental Housing Assn. of Northern Alameda County v. City of Oakland (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 741, 764.) Accordingly, to the extent a local ordinance places a burden of proof on a landlord to prove a ground for eviction to recover possession, the landlord may be required to allege any such grounds in the unlawful detainer complaint. (Id. at p. 756.)

Assuming without deciding for present purposes that County Code section 44-19 et seq., which became effective on April 6, 2023, does not apply here (and the court presently makes no findings in this regard), for all reasons further discussed above, plaintiff must nevertheless plead compliance with state and local statutory notice requirements that were in effect prior to April 6, 2023, which plaintiff effectively concedes.

The TPA added Civil Code sections 1946.2, 1947.12, and 1947.13, effective January 1, 2020. (Borden v. Stiles (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 337, 346-347.) Civil Code section 1946.2, applicable here, provides that “after a tenant has continuously and lawfully occupied a residential real property for 12 months, the owner of the residential real property shall not terminate the tenancy without just cause, which shall be stated in the written notice to terminate tenancy.” (Civ. Code, § 1946.2, subd. (a).) (Note: Undesignated code references shall be to the Civil Code unless otherwise stated.)

“Just cause” includes “[a]t-fault just cause” and “[n]o-fault just cause” as those terms are defined in the statute. (Civ. Code, § 1946.2, subd. (b)(1) & (2).) Relevant here, no-fault just cause includes an “[i]ntent to demolish or to substantially remodel the residential real property.” (Civ. Code, § 1946.2, subd. (b)(2)(D)(i).) Section 1946.2 also requires an owner, under specified circumstances, to provide relocation assistance, to waive rent for the final month of tenancy, and to comply with various additional notice requirements. (Civ. Code, § 1946.2, subds. (d), (f).)

For purposes of section 1946.2, subdivision (b)(2)(D)(i), “ ‘substantially remodel’ means the replacement or substantial modification of any structural, electrical, plumbing, or mechanical system that requires a permit from a governmental agency, or the abatement of hazardous materials, including lead-based paint, mold, or asbestos, in accordance with applicable federal, state, and local laws, that cannot be reasonably accomplished in a safe manner with the tenant in place and that requires the tenant to vacate the residential real property for at least 30 days. Cosmetic improvements alone, including painting, decorating, and minor repairs, or other work that can be performed safely without having the residential real property vacated, do not qualify as substantial rehabilitation.” (Civ. Code, § 1946.2, subd. (b)(2)(D)(ii).)

Section 1946.2 further provides that, to the extent a residential real property is subject to a local ordinance requiring just cause to terminate a residential tenancy that is adopted or amended after September 1, 2019, and that is “more protective” based on the criteria set forth in section 1946.2, subdivision (g)(1)(B)(i) through (iii), the local ordinance applies. (Civ. Code, § 1946.2, subd. (g)(1)(B).) Accordingly, as plaintiff contends that the 60-day notice complied with County Code provisions in effect prior to April 6, 2023, any such provisions could not lessen the protections provided under section 1946.2. For this reason, notwithstanding whether “more protective” provisions of the County Code that were in effect prior to April 6, 2023, apply to the 60-day notice, the 60-day notice must meet the minimum requirements of Civil Code section 1946.2 to the extent plaintiff alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer based on defendant’s failure to comply with the requirements of the 60-day notice. (Stancil v. Superior Court (2021) 11 Cal.5th 381, 394-395.)

The 60-day notice states that defendant’s tenancy is being terminated “because [plaintiff] intends to substantially remodel the [p]remises.” (Complaint, Exh. 2.) Though Attachment 17 to the complaint includes information that appears to indicate that the substantial remodel generally referenced in the 60-day notice does not constitute “cosmetic improvements” alone, this information is not included in the 60-day notice.

The mere parroting of the language of section 1946.2, subdivision (b)(2)(D)(i), without more, is insufficient to permit defendant to determine whether the “substantial remodel” referenced in the 60-day notice includes cosmetic improvements which alone would not qualify as no-fault just cause sufficient to terminate the tenancy under section 1946.2. For this reason, plaintiff has failed to sufficiently state the just cause for terminating the tenancy in the 60-day notice as required by section 1946.2, subdivision (a). Therefore, plaintiff has failed to plead strict compliance with statutory requirements.

Moreover, though plaintiff does not cite or set forth the text of the County Code provisions that were in effect prior to April 6, 2023, as further discussed above, these provisions could only provide a tenant with more and not less protection than those provided under section 1946.2 as further discussed above. Therefore, as the 60-day notice fails to comply with section 1946.2, the 60-day notice would also be defective under any necessarily “more protective” County Code provisions that plaintiff contends apply here.

While the court cannot provide advisory opinions regarding what statements would be sufficient to meet statutory notice requirements, the language of section 1946.2, subdivisions (a) and (b)(2)(D)(ii), appears to require a plaintiff to provide, at a minimum, enough information to give notice of the nature and scope of a substantial remodel sufficient to allow the tenant and the court to determine whether the just cause stated in the written notice to terminate the tenancy meets the minimum statutory requirements set forth in section 1946.2, or any more protective requirements under an applicable local ordinance.

For all reasons discussed above, and as plaintiff has not alleged an excuse from compliance, the court will sustain the demurrer on the grounds that the 60-day notice fails to strictly comply with statutory requirements. As it appears that the complaint cannot be amended due to the deficiencies in the 60-day notice served by plaintiff on April 4, 2023, the court will deny leave to amend. (See Cooper v. Leslie Salt Co. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 627, 636; Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.)

The court need not, at this time, address the remaining grounds for defendant’s demurrer, including whether provisions of the County Code that became effective on April 6, 2023, apply here.