Isabel B. Chen v. Ramsey Asphalt Construction Corp

Case Number

23CV04636

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 03/26/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion of Defendant Ramsey Asphalt Construction for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiff Isabel B. Chen: Adam T. Carralejo, Brant K. Berglund, Thyne Taylor Fox Howard, LLP

For Defendant Ramsey Asphalt Construction Corporation: Airene Williamson, Williamson Law Office, PC

                       

RULING

For the reasons set forth below, the motion for attorney fees is granted in the amount of $78,342.90. The court declines to rule on the request for costs at this time.

Background

This action was commenced on October 18, 2023, by the filing of the original complaint by plaintiff Isabel B. Chen (“Chen”) against defendant Ramsey Asphalt Construction Corporation (“Ramsey”). On March 22, 2024, Chen filed her operative first amended complaint (“FAC”) against Ramsey for: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Negligence - Construction Defect; and (3) Unfair, Unlawful and/or Fraudulent Business Practices.

As alleged in the FAC:

Chen and Ramsey entered into a home improvement contract on December 6, 2021, for a driveway. (FAC, ¶¶ 13, 14.) Ramsey breached the contract by failing to perform the work in compliance with the terms of the contract. (FAC, ¶ 16.)

(Note: Despite indicating that the contract was attached to the FAC as Exhibit A, no contract is attached to the FAC.)

On May 10, 2024, Ramsey filed its answer to the FAC, asserting a general denial and 30 affirmative defenses.

The matter proceeded to a five-day Bench Trial in February 2025, concluding on February 14, 2025. Ramsey prevailed in the trial.

Following trial, the court issued its statement of decision. Paragraph No. 18 of the statement of decision holds, in pertinent part: “Ramsey is entitled to his reasonable  attorney fees. They will be considered on post judgment motion to be submitted promptly by declaration . . ..”

Ramsey now moves for prevailing party attorney fees.

Chen opposes the motion.

Analysis

Ramsey seeks $78,342.90 in attorney’s fees and $25,141.74 in costs as the prevailing party.

“In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs.” (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (a).)

The contract that Chen sued upon, which is attached to the original complaint as well as admitted into evidence at trial, is a signed proposal that contains the following language: “If any action or proceeding is brought for the enforcement of this Agreement, or for a declaration of rights and duties hereunder, or because of an alleged dispute, breach, default or misrepresentation with any provision of this agreement, the successful or prevailing Party shall be entitled to recover attorney’s fees and other costs incurred in connection with that action or proceeding, in addition to any other relief to which the Party may be entitled.”

Chen first argues that there is no finding of a prevailing party’s attorney’s fee provision by the court. Chen is incorrect. By way of the statement of decision, as well as the Judgment, the court found that Ramsey is entitled to attorney fees. Even had the court not made that finding, it would not matter. There is no requirement that a specific finding be made at trial. There is no legal authority that precludes a party claiming entitlement to contractual attorney fees from making the claim by way of post-trial motion. Indeed, the court instructed Ramsey to seek the fees by post-trial motion. Likewise, Chen’s claim that “[t]here was no finding by the Court that Defendant was the prevailing party (Opp., p. 2, ll. 11-12), is false. The Judgment specifically finds, at page 5, that Ramsey is the prevailing party. Given that the court found entirely in favor of Ramsey, any claim that Ramsey is not the prevailing party would be disingenuous.

Ramsey is the prevailing party and is entitled to contractual attorney’s fees.

“[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. ‘California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.’ [citation] The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work. [citation] The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. [citation] Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. [citation].” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)

“[T]rial courts must carefully review attorney documentation of hours expended” in assessing reasonable and necessary attorney fees. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4h 1122, 1132.)

“[T]he [party] . . . seeking fees and costs ‘bear[s] the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.’ [Citation.]’” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320.) “To that end, the court may require [a] defendant . . . to produce records sufficient to provide ‘a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expended. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

“California case law permits fee awards in the absence of detailed time sheets. . . .” (Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 255.) The court may award fees based on time estimates for attorneys who do not keep time records. (Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1006–1007.) It properly awards fees based on an attorney's declaration. (Weber v. Langholtz (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1587.)

Chen argues that the declaration of Ramsey’s counsel is inconsistent with the attached billing invoices. It is not. The attached invoices, excluding costs, reflects $78,342.90 in attorney fees. That is exactly the amount claimed by Ramsey’s counsel.

The invoices are entirely unredacted and adequately explain which task the attorney undertook. Chen does not contest any of the specific entries. All the claimed work appears to the court to have been reasonable and necessary in defending the action.

Ramsey’s attorney filed a declaration that declares her hourly rate for commercial litigation matters as $565.00. Despite Chen’s argument that this amount is “inflated and unreasonable for Santa Barbara County” (Opp. p. 3, ll. 7-8), based on the court’s experience, the amount is consistent with what other attorneys charge for similar work in Santa Barbara County. The court finds the hourly rate reasonable.

The attorney’s fees will be awarded to Ramsey in the amount of $78,342.90, to be paid by Chen.

Costs

As noted above, Ramsey also seeks $25,141.74 in costs.

“A prevailing party who claims costs must serve and file a memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of service of the notice of entry of judgment or dismissal by the clerk under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.5 or the date of service of written notice of entry of judgment or dismissal, or within 180 days after entry of judgment, whichever is first. The memorandum of costs must be verified by a statement of the party, attorney, or agent that to the best of his or her knowledge the items of cost are correct and were necessarily incurred in the case.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(a)(1).)

Although Ramsey claims, via the present motion, that a separate memorandum of costs was filed, the court has no record of the same. To the extent that Ramsey seeks to recover its claimed costs, as allowable under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, a timely memorandum of costs must be filed and served.

As the prevailing party, as stated in the Judgment, Ramsey is entitled to costs. However, Ramsey must proceed by way of the memorandum of costs and any necessary and proper motion thereafter.