Sierra Property Group INC vs Teri Chavez

Case Number

23CV04017

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 10/30/2023 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Demurrer

Tentative Ruling

Sierra Property Group, INC. vs. Teri Chavez 

Case No. 23CV04017

           

Hearing Date: October 30, 2023                                                         

MATTERS:             Demurrer To Plaintiff’s Complaint

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff Sierra Property Group, INC.: Lacy L. Taylor, Thyne Taylor Fox Howard LLP

For Defendant Teri Chavez: Alexander Entrekin, Karen Peabody, Legal Aid Foundation of Santa Barbara County

TENTATIVE RULING:

The demurrer of defendant to plaintiff’s complaint is overruled. Defendant’s time to file an answer to plaintiff’s complaint shall be extended until five days after service upon defendant of written notice of entry of the Court’s order overruling the demurrer, exclusive of any extended time periods provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 1013.

Background:

On September 14, 2023, plaintiff Sierra Property Group, INC, filed its complaint for unlawful detainer against defendant Teri Chavez. As alleged in the complaint, plaintiff is the property manager of premises located at 818 Salsipuedes Street, Unit D, located within the city limits of Santa Barbara, California (the premises). (Complaint, ¶¶ 1, 3.a, 3.b(1), 4.) On February 18, 2011, defendant agreed to rent the premises as a month-to-month tenancy pursuant to a written agreement (the rental agreement) with plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 6.a(1), 6.b(1), 6.e & Exh. 1.) Defendant agreed to pay monthly rent of $2,090 payable on the first of each month. (Id. at ¶¶ 6.a(2) & (3).) The rental agreement was later changed on October 31, 2022, by a Notice Of Change Of Terms Of Tenancy (the change notice) effective January 1, 2023, which provided an updated lease agreement. (Id. at ¶ 6.d & Exh. 1.) The tenancy is subject to Civil Code section 1946.2 (the Tenant Protection Act of 2019) and Santa Barbara City Ordinance No. 5979. (Id. at ¶¶ 7.b, 16.)

On July 20, 2023, plaintiff served defendant with a 30-day notice to quit (the 30-day notice) by personally handing a copy to defendant. (Complaint, ¶¶ 9.a(2), 9.e, 10.a(1), 10.b, 10.d & Exhs. 2, 3.) At the time the 30-day notice was served, the amount of rent due was $6,164. (Id. at ¶ 12.) The 30-day notice includes an election of forfeiture. (Id. at ¶ 9.d.) The period stated in the 30-day notice expired at the end of the day on August 19, 2023, and defendant failed to comply with its requirements by that date. (Id. at ¶ 9.b(1) & (2).)

Defendant has filed a special demurrer to the complaint on the grounds of uncertainty and a general demurrer on the grounds that the 30-day notice overstates the amount of rent due. Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to the demurrer.

Analysis:

On demurrer, the court determines only whether the complaint “alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.” (T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 162; accord, Mathews v. Becerra (2019) 8 Cal.5th 756, 768.) “ ‘The rules by which the sufficiency of a complaint is tested against a general demurrer are well settled. We not only treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also ‘give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.’ ” (Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 370, internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) If the complaint states a cause of action, it is good against a demurrer. (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38.)

Actions for unlawful detainer are authorized and governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 1161 et seq., The statutory scheme is “intended and designed to provide an expeditious remedy for the recovery of possession of real property.” (Larson v. City and County of San Francisco (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1297.) Due to the summary nature of an unlawful detainer proceeding, strict compliance with the statutory requirements is a prerequisite to a landlord’s recovery of possession. (Dr. Leevil, LLC v. Westlake Health Care Center (2018) 6 Cal.5th 474, 480.)

Defendant contends that the complaint presents claims that are uncertain, facially inconsistent, and unintelligible. Defendant asserts that although plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the rental agreement was entered into on February 18, 2011, and was later changed by the change notice, the rental agreement that is attached to the complaint as Exhibit 1 is not dated February 18, 2011. Defendant also asserts that Exhibit 1 to the complaint is not signed or initialed and that plaintiff does not allege that Exhibit 1 was served or provided to defendant. In addition, defendant contends that the accounting in the 30-day notice cannot be reconciled. For these reasons, defendant argues, the complaint is uncertain.

A party may object by special demurrer on the grounds that the pleading is uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) “ ‘[U]ncertain’ includes ambiguous and unintelligible.” (Ibid.) Consequently, “[a]s against special demurrers, the facts must be alleged with sufficient clarity to inform defendants of the issues to be met.” (Dumm v. Pacific Valves (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 792, 799.) Plaintiff must “set forth in his complaint the essential facts of his case with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficiently specific to acquaint the defendant of the nature, source, and extent of his cause of action.” (Smith v. Kern County Land Co. (1958) 51 Cal.2d 205, 209, internal quotation marks and citation omitted.)

The terms of the rental agreement attached to the complaint as Exhibit 1 indicate that it was entered into by plaintiff and defendant on October 28, 2022. (Complaint, Exh. 1, p. 1.) The terms further provide that the subject tenancy “originally started on 2/18/2011 and this written agreement is entered by the parties to update the terms and memorialize any new residents that moved in or became adults during the tenancy.” (Id. at p. 1, ¶ 1.) The change notice that is attached to the complaint as part of Exhibit 1 was signed by “Joe Herman” on October 31, 2022, and states that defendant’s “current lease has expired” and that defendant is being provided “a new month to month lease” that became effective January 1, 2023. (Id. at PDF p. 42.) According to the terms of the change notice and the allegations of the complaint, it does not appear that the monthly rent due for the premises changed upon plaintiff issuing the change notice or that the monthly rent for the premises was increased. (Ibid., see also Complaint, ¶ 6.a(2).)

Based on the allegations discussed above including facts alleged in the exhibits thereto, the complaint is not so uncertain that defendant cannot understand the nature, source, or extent of plaintiff’s cause of action for unlawful detainer or cannot reasonably respond to the complaint. (See Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616 [“[a] demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain”].) The Court also notes that because the present action is based solely on a default in the payment of rent, plaintiff is not required to attach a copy of the written rental agreement to the complaint. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1166, subd. (d)(1)(b)(iii).) Moreover, notwithstanding whether the 30-day notice overstates the amount of rent due from defendant, the 30-day notice is not so ambiguous or unclear that defendant cannot determine the issues and the nature of the claims directed against her. Therefore, the court will overrule defendant’s special demurrer to the complaint on the grounds of uncertainty.

Defendant further contends that the 30-day notice is defective and invalid because it does not state the amount of rent due as $2,090 per month, because it demands rent that, according to information contained in the 30-day notice, was paid for in April 2022 but not credited or accounted for, because it demands a balance owing that does not add up to $6,164, and because it demands rent that came due more than a year before the 30-day notice was served on defendant.

“A valid three-day pay rent or quit notice is a prerequisite to an unlawful detainer action. [Citations.] Because of the summary nature of an unlawful detainer action, a notice is valid only if the lessor strictly complies with the statutorily mandated notice requirements. [Citation.] [¶] A three-day notice must contain ‘the amount which is due.’ [Citation.] A notice which demands rent in excess of the amount due does not satisfy this requirement.[Citations.] This rule ensures that a landlord will not be entitled to regain possession in an unlawful detainer action unless the tenant has had the opportunity to pay the delinquent rent. [Citation.] [¶] Additionally, a three-day notice to pay or quit must be served within ‘one year after the rent became due.’ [Citation.] If a landlord waits over one year to sue for unpaid rent, the landlord is limited to collecting such rent in an ordinary breach of contract action, ‘with all the delays that remedy normally involves and without restitution of the demised property.’ [Citation.]” (Bevill v. Zoura (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 694, 697, fn. omitted (Bevill).)

As further discussed above, plaintiff expressly alleges that defendant agreed to pay the amount of $2,090 as monthly rent for the premises, which defendant concedes has remained unchanged since February 18, 2011. (See Exh. 1, ¶ 2; Demurrer, p. 5, ll. 12-14.) The 30-day notice demands an amount of monthly rent from April 1, 2022, through July 31, 2023, that is significantly less than the amount of monthly rent due for the premises alleged in the complaint. (See Complaint, Exh. 2.) While a 30-day notice that demands rent in excess of the purported amount due does not satisfy the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 1161, subdivision (2) (because that greater amount is not the amount due), defendant does not offer any legal authority to support her position that a 30-day notice that states less than the amount of rent potentially due is also defective (nor is the Court aware of any such authority). (See, e.g., Levitz Furniture Co. v. Wingtip Communications, Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1038 (Levitz); Bevill, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 697.)

Defendant suggests that the Court can make a “reasonable assumption” that a third party has paid monthly rental amounts on defendant’s behalf. Defendant contends that this reasonable assumption is supported by Exhibit 2 to the complaint because that exhibit mentions the Housing Authority of the City of Santa Barbara (the Housing Authority).

Included in Exhibit 2 to the complaint is a “Notice of Occupancy Rights under the Violence Against Women Act”. (Complaint, Exh. 2. [PDF p. 47].) Though the notice attached as part of Exhibit 2 advises defendant of her occupancy rights under the Violence Against Women Act, including under circumstances in which a tenant is qualifies for or is receiving assistance from the Housing Authority, there are no facts offered or contained in Exhibit 2 that allege, either expressly or by inference, that the Housing Authority has paid any monthly rental amounts on behalf of defendant. As these facts are not disclosed or alleged on the face of the complaint, the Court disregards these matters. (See Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881 [error for court to consider matters asserted in memorandum supporting demurrer not disclosed by the complaint].) Moreover, the truth of any allegation that defendant suggests can be assumed from Exhibit 2 with regard to whether the Housing Authority has paid monthly rental amounts on defendant’s behalf is a factual matter that the Court may not properly determine on demurrer.

In addition, the Court notes that the “rent due” for each month identified in the 30-day notice totals $1,164. (Complaint, Exh. 2 [“rent due” column.) This total also reflects an amount of monthly rent due for the premises for each month identified in the 30-day notice that is less than the monthly rent alleged in the complaint. Furthermore, the 30-day notice is not “automatically invalidated because it also sets out (or demands) rent due more than a year before the notice. Such invalidation is not mandated by the policy underlying the second provision of section 1161(2), that is, preventing a landlord from using long overdue rent—but no rent unpaid within one year—to effect an eviction.” (Levitz, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 1041.)

Here, the 30-day notice sets forth a specific amount of monthly rent in default and due from defendant to cure the purported breach and retain possession. The amount of rent alleged to be in default is not overstated because the amount demanded in the 30-day notice is less than the monthly rent owed for the premises as alleged in the complaint, including the exhibits thereto. Therefore, the notice is not defective on its face. The same analysis applies to defendant’s contentions regarding the total amount of rent demanded in the 30-day notice and whether the 30-day notice includes monthly rental amounts due more than a year before defendant was served with the 30-day notice. In addition, the factual matters asserted by defendant as further discussed above may be resolved at trial or through other appropriate means. Accordingly, for all reasons discussed above, the Court will overrule the demurrer.