Henry Fredy Castillo Cabel vs West Covina Wholesale Nursery LLC

Case Number

23CV03928

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 11/03/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion: Approval re Final Approval of Class Action and PAGA

Tentative Ruling

Henry Fredy Castillo Cabell v. West Covina Wholesale Nursery, LLC

Case No. 23CV03928

           

Hearing Date: November 3, 2025                                                      

HEARING:              Motion For Final Approval Of Class Action And PAGA Settlement

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff Henry Fredy Castillo Cabell: Megan E. Ross, Hannah Becker, Melmed Law Group P.C.

For Defendant West Covina Wholesale Nursery, LLC:  Jeffrey A. Dinkin, Jared W. Speier, Cory Baker, Stradling Yocca Carlson & Rauth LLP

TENTATIVE RULING:

The motion of plaintiff for final approval of class action and PAGA settlement is granted. Counsel shall appear at the hearing and be prepared to discuss the matters described herein.

Background:

On September 11, 2023, plaintiff Henry Fredy Castillo Cabell (Cabell) filed a class action complaint against defendant West Covina Wholesale Nursery, LLC (West Covina), alleging ten causes of action: (1) failure to pay all minimum wages; (2) failure to pay all overtime wages; (3) failure to provide rest periods and pay missed rest period premiums; (4) failure to provide meal periods and pay missed meal period premiums; (5) failure to maintain accurate employment records; (6) failure to pay wages timely during employment; (7) failure to pay all wages earned and unpaid at separation; (8) failure to indemnify all necessary business expenditures; (9) failure to furnish accurate itemized wage statements; and (10) violations of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. (the Unfair Competition Law). Cabell brings the complaint on behalf of himself and all individuals who are or were employed by West Covina as non-exempt employees from four years prior to the filing of the complaint.

As alleged in the complaint, during the time Cabell worked for West Covina, West Covina failed to compensate Cabell and other class members for all hours worked including overtime, denied meal and rest breaks, deducted time for denied meal breaks, failed to timely pay wages within seven calendar days following the close of payroll, failed to pay sums due at the time of termination and thereafter, failed to maintain and provide accurate wage statements, and failed to provide reimbursement for expenses incurred during the course of Cabell’s duties.

On October 13, 2023, West Covina answered the complaint by generally denying its allegations and asserting twenty-one affirmative defenses.

On January 12, 2024, with leave of court, Cabell filed a first amended complaint (the FAC), adding an eleventh cause of action for civil penalties under Labor Code section 2698 et seq. (the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 or PAGA).

On August 2, 2024, Cabell filed notice that the parties reached a settlement of this matter and, on August 28, 2024, filed an unopposed motion for an order preliminarily approving, among other things, the parties’ settlement agreement.

On September 23, 2024, the court ordered the motion for preliminary approval described above, off-calendar for failure to comply with the California Rules of Court.

On February 14 and March 17, 2025, Cabell separately filed, respectively, a subsequent and amended motion (collectively, the preliminary approval motion) for preliminary approval of class action and PAGA settlement, each of which were unopposed.

The preliminary approval motion requested an order: (1) certifying a settlement class for purposes of settlement only pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 382 and California Rules of Court, rule 3.769; (2) preliminarily appointing Cabell as the class representative for purposes of settlement; (3) appointing Cabell’s counsel Jonathan Melmed (Melmed) and Maria Burciaga (Burciaga) of Melmed Law Group P.C., as class counsel for purposes of settlement; (4) preliminarily approving a Settlement Agreement and Release of Class Action (the Settlement Agreement), including a payment by West Covina of a non-reversionary gross settlement amount of $400,000 (the GSA), as fair, adequate, and reasonable; (5) preliminarily approving payment of attorney fees and costs in an amount not to exceed one-third of the GSA (up to $133,333.33), plus necessary litigation costs not to exceed $23,000; (6) preliminarily approving an incentive payment in the amount of $10,000 from the GSA to Cabell as class representative; (7) appointing Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions (Phoenix) as the settlement administrator and preliminarily approving the payment of settlement administration costs to Phoenix, estimated to not exceed $8,000; (8) preliminarily approving an allocation from the GSA of $25,000 for penalties pursuant to PAGA, of which 75 percent or $18,750 would be paid to the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency (the LWDA), and 25 percent or $6,250 would be payable to aggrieved employees; (9) approving a proposed class notice to be disseminated to class members as provided in the Settlement Agreement; (10) directing Phoenix to mail the class notice to the proposed class; (11) approving proposed deadlines for the notice and administration process as reflected in the Settlement Agreement; and (12) setting a date for a final fairness or approval hearing.

The preliminary approval motion was supported by separately filed declarations of Cabell and Melmed.

After a hearing held on June 16, 2025, the court entered an order (the Preliminary Approval Order) granting the preliminary approval motion and provisionally finding the Settlement Agreement to be fair, adequate, reasonable, in the best interests of the putative class, and within the range of acceptable settlements that could be ultimately given final approval by the court.

In granting the preliminary approval motion, the court preliminarily approved payment by West Covina of the non-reversionary GSA in the amount of $400,000, to settle and release all claims asserted by Cabell on behalf of the “Settlement Class” which includes all individuals who are or were employed by West Covina as nonexempt employees in California from September 11, 2019, through the date of preliminary approval (the Class Period). The Settlement Class also includes a “PAGA Settlement Class” which includes those individuals (the Aggrieved Employees) who are or were employed by West Covina as non-exempt employees in California from September 11, 2022, through the date of the court’s approval of the Settlement Agreement (the PAGA Period).

The court appointed Phoenix to serve as the settlement administrator; Megan E. Ross (Ross) and Hannah Becker (Becker) of Melmed Law Group P.C., as “Class Counsel” for the Settlement Class; and Cabell as the “Class Representative”. 

Evidence and information presented in the preliminary approval motion showed that the GSA includes the following amounts, which will be deducted from the GSA to determine the Net Settlement Amount or “NSA” available for distribution to the Settlement Class: (1) an amount not to exceed $8,000, to be paid to Phoenix for costs and expenses associated with administering the settlement; (2) an amount not to exceed $133,333.33 to be paid to Class Counsel for attorney’s fees; (3) an amount not to exceed $23,000 to be paid to Class Counsel for litigation costs and expenses; (4) an “Incentive Award” of $10,000 to be paid to Cabell as the Class Representative; and (5) a “PAGA Payment” in the amount of $25,000, of which $18,750 will be paid to the LWDA and $6,250 will be distributed to the PAGA Settlement Class. The court noted that the PAGA Payment reflects the amount of civil penalties under PAGA that the parties agree constitutes a reasonable settlement of the PAGA claims asserted in this action.

The evidence and information presented by Cabell also showed that the NSA will be distributed to the Settlement Class after calculating each estimated “Individual Settlement Amount” to be paid to each member of the Settlement Class who does not timely request exclusion from the Settlement Agreement.

The preliminary approval motion was also sufficient to show the existence of a numerous, ascertainable class with a well-defined community of interest consisting of at approximately 359 current or former employees of West Covina who were purportedly subject to the same meal break violations, and unlawful employment policies and practices with respect to the payment of wages and the furnishing of accurate wage statements. There also appeared to be sufficient and reliable means available to identify class members from the payroll records of West Covina. Based on information appearing in the Cabell declaration submitted in support of the motion, Cabell appeared to have claims typical of, and to be able to adequately represent, the Settlement Class. For these reasons, the court determined that there exists reasonable support for provisional certification of the Settlement Class.

Cabell also presented evidence and information to show that West Covina’s realistic liability exposure for the claims alleged in this action totals $1,242,659.08. This evidence and information also showed that West Covina’s total realistic maximum exposure to civil penalties under PAGA is $73,965.

The court reviewed the proposed “Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement” (the Class Notice) submitted with the preliminary approval motion, which was accompanied by a “Class Action Settlement Share Form” (the Share Form) identifying each member of the Settlement Class (collectively, Class Members and individually, Class Member), the number of weeks (or “workweeks”) worked by each Class Member, and the estimated amount of the NSA that each member could expect to receive.

The court found the Class Notice easy to understand, and sufficient to apprise and notify each Class Member of the pendency of and the claims and defenses asserted in the present action, of each member’s rights and obligations in connection with the proposed Settlement Agreement, of the right and opportunity to opt out or present objections to the Settlement Agreement, and the scope of the claims to be released should a Class Member chose to participate in the settlement. The court also found the Share Form easy to understand, sufficient to apprise each Class Member of the number of workweeks utilized to calculate that that member’s allocated share of the NSA, and sufficient to explain the manner in which a Class Member may dispute their workweeks. For these reasons, the court found that the Class Notice complied with due process.

The preliminary approval motion also showed that Cabell submitted a copy of the Settlement Agreement to the LWDA on August 28, 2024. There was no information to suggest that the LWDA has indicated that it objects to the Settlement Agreement or intends to intervene in this action.

As further discussed in the Preliminary Approval Order, the court determined that the Settlement Agreement was entitled to preliminary approval, that the Settlement Class should be provisionally certified, that Class Counsel should be appointed as counsel for the settlement class, that Cabell should be appointed as Class Representative for settlement purposes, that Phoenix should be appointed as the settlement administrator, and that the Class Notice and settlement administration deadlines should be approved as set forth in the preliminary approval motion. For these and all further reasons discussed in that order, the court granted the preliminary approval motion.

The court scheduled a hearing for final approval of the Settlement Agreement on October 6, 2025, and stated that it will determine the reasonableness of attorney’s fees and costs, the Incentive Award, and the settlement administrative expenses upon noticed motion.

On September 12, 2025, Cabell filed an unopposed motion for final approval of the Settlement Agreement (the Final Approval Motion). In that motion, Cabell requests an order: (1) finally certifying the class as defined in the Settlement Agreement; (2) finally appointing Cabell as the Class Representative for purposes of settlement; (3) finally appointing Melmed and Burciaga of Melmed Law Group P.C., as Class Counsel for purposes of settlement; (4) finding that the Class Notice was properly provided to the class in accordance with the Preliminary Approval Order; (5) approving the settlement as fair, adequate, and reasonable based upon the terms set forth in the Settlement Agreement, including the allocations for attorneys’ fees and costs, settlement administration expenses, and payments pursuant to PAGA; (6) binding all participants to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, including as to the releases specified in that agreement; and (7) retaining jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement Agreement.

The Final Approval Motion is supported by a declaration of Kevin Lee (Lee), who is a Case Manager with Phoenix (Lee Decl., ¶ 1), and the declarations of Cabell and Melmed.

On October 6, 2025, the court adopted its tentative ruling on the Final Approval Motion as follows:

““[A] trial court has broad powers to determine whether a proposed settlement in a class action is fair.” (Mallick v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) A class action settlement is presumptively fair if it was reached through arm’s-length negotiations between experienced counsel after extensive investigation, litigation, and discovery. (Dunk v. Ford Motor Company (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1802; accord, Wershba v. Apple Computer (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 245 [a presumption of fairness exists where (1) the settlement is reached through arm’s-length bargaining, (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently, (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation, and (4) the percentage of objectors is small].)

With respect to the fourth element described above, information appearing in the Lee declaration, which was executed on September 10, 2025, shows that the deadline for Class Members to request exclusion from or to object to the Settlement Agreement, and to dispute the number of work weeks appearing in a Class Notice, was September 23, 2025. (Lee Decl., ¶¶ 8-10.) Though Lee asserts that Phoenix received no requests for exclusions, objections, or workweek disputes from Class Members, the deadline for Class Members to raise these matters had not yet passed. For these same reasons, the basis for Lee’s statement that there have been no timely requests for exclusion is also unclear. (See Lee Decl., ¶ 11.)

The court’s records also do not reflect that plaintiff filed an updated declaration of Lee after the deadline stated above expired.

For all reasons discussed above, as the deadline for Class Members to request exclusion from or object to the Settlement Agreement had not passed at the time Lee executed the declaration described above, there is insufficient information to permit the court to determine whether a presumption of fairness exists. For these reasons, the court will continue the present motion and require Cabell to submit a supplemental declaration of Lee addressing the matters described herein.” (Oct. 6, 2025, Minute Order.)

Pursuant to the court’s October 6, 2025, order, the court continued the hearing on the Final Approval Motion to November 3, and ordered Cabell to, on or before October 20, submit a supplemental declaration of Lee addressing the matters described above.

On October 15, Cabell submitted a supplemental declaration of Lee which provides a detailed description of the class administration duties and tasks performed by Phoenix, including: (1) preparing and mailing the Class Notice; (2) responding to inquiries from Class Members; (2) confirming the number of weeks each Class Member worked during the Class Period and each Aggrieved Employee worked during the PAGA Period; (3) determining the validity of any requests for exclusion from or written objections to the Settlement Agreement; (4) determining any disputes regarding workweeks submitted by the Class Members; (5) calculating the NSA and the Individual Settlement Amount to be paid to each Class Member; and (6) calculating and issuing payments for each Individual Settlement Amount, among other things. (Lee Supp. Decl., ¶ 2.)

Lee states that on June 16, 2025, Phoenix received a data file from West Covina which contained the names, last known mailing addresses, social security numbers, dates of employment, and workweeks for each Class Member (the Class Data) during the Class Period. (Lee Decl., ¶ 3.) The final mailing list contained 398 individuals identified as Class Members. (Ibid.)

On July 15, 2025, Phoenix conducted a National Change of Address or “NCOA” search in an attempt to update the addresses contained in the Class Data to ensure accuracy, and mailed the Class Notice via U.S. first class mail, in English and Spanish, to all Class Members. (Lee Decl., ¶¶ 4-5.)

Lee asserts that, as of October 13, 2025, fifty-six Class Notices have been returned to Phoenix without a forwarding address. (Lee Decl., ¶ 6.) For these Class Notices, Phoenix attempted to locate a current mailing address for each Class Member using TransUnion TLOxp, which Lee describes as one of the most comprehensive address databases available for skip tracing. (Ibid.) Fourteen updated addresses were obtained, and the Class Notice was promptly re-mailed to those Class Members via first class mail. (Ibid.) Forty-two Class Notices are considered undeliverable because an updated address could not be obtained via skip trace. (Lee Decl., ¶ 7.)

The deadline to request exclusion from or object to the Settlement Agreement, and to submit a dispute, was September 23, 2025. (Lee Decl., ¶¶ 8-10.) Lee states that Phoenix has received no requests for exclusions or objections from Class Members and no disputes regarding Class Member workweeks. (Ibid.)

Lee asserts that there exist 398 Class Members who are deemed “Class Participants” representing 100 percent of the Settlement Class, and who have worked a collective total of 30,460 workweeks during the Class Period, each of which is valued at approximately $6.63. (Lee Decl., ¶ 11.)

Lee further states that the NSA available to pay to the Class Participants totals $202,000.69, which Phoenix determined by subtracting from the GSA: Class Counsel’s attorney’s fees in the amount of $133,333.33; litigation costs and expenses to be paid to Class Counsel in the amount of $21,665.98; the PAGA Payment in the amount of $25,000; the Incentive Award to Cabell in the amount of $10,000; and the amount of $8,000 to be paid to Phoenix for administrative expenses. (Lee Decl., ¶ 13.)

According to Lee, the highest Individual Settlement Amount totals approximately $2,042.55; the lowest Individual Settlement Amount totals approximately $13.26, and the average Individual Settlement Amount will be approximately $507.54. (Lee Decl., ¶ 14.) The payments issued to the Class Participants will be subject to a reduction for the employee’s share of taxes and withholdings as to the wage portion of each Individual Settlement Amount. (Ibid.)

As to the $25,000 in penalties under PAGA to be allocated from the GSA, there exist 229 Aggrieved Employees who worked a total of 7,363 pay periods during the PAGA Period. (Lee Decl., ¶ 15.) The highest “Individual PAGA Payment” totals approximately $61.97, and the average Individual PAGA Payment will total approximately $27.29. (Ibid.)

West Covina will fund the employer-side taxes separately from the GSA. (Lee Decl., ¶ 16.) Costs incurred by Phoenix to administer the settlement agreement total $8,000. (Lee Decl., ¶ 17.)

Noted above, the Final Approval Motion is also supported by a declaration of Melmed, who provides details regarding Melmed’s relevant educational background and experience, including Melmed’s experience with representing a class. (Melmed Decl., ¶¶ 8-14.)

As to the attorney’s fees requested by Class Counsel, Melmed asserts that the amount of fees requested in the motion represents 33.33 percent of the GSA, which Melmed contends is reasonable under the circumstances present here and considering fee awards in other cases. (Melmed Decl., ¶ 15.) Melmed also states that Cabell signed an agreement stating that counsel will apply for attorneys’ fees from West Covina under the common fund doctrine, in an amount up to one-third of the total amount (i.e., the common fund) secured for the class, plus litigation costs. (Melmed Decl., ¶ 16.)

Melmed declares that, as of the filing of the Final Approval Motion, Class Counsel has incurred fees in an amount which is not less than $20,389. (Melmed Decl., ¶ 17.) Melmed includes in his declaration a table summarizing the time expended by each timekeeper in this matter. (Melmed Decl., ¶ 18.) This table shows that Melmed expended 5.5 hours at the hourly rate of $948; that Burciaga expended 17.8 hours at the hourly rate of $581; that attorney Becker expended 7 hours at the hourly rate of $473; and that paralegals Lorie Gutierrez and Ashley Carranza expended, respectively 1 hour and 4.9 hours at the hourly rate of $258. (Ibid.)

Melmed also states that Ross, who did not maintain contemporaneous billing records, expended a minimum of 20 hours in this matter, at the hourly rate of $1,141. (Melmed Decl., ¶ 21.)

Melmed anticipates that Class Counsel will expend an additional 15 hours throughout the settlement administration process. (Melmed Decl., ¶ 26.)

Melmed describes the background and experience of the attorneys identified above, and a description of the time spent by Class Counsel to investigate, research, and litigate the claims asserted in this action, including in preparing pleadings, conducting formal and informal discovery, attending mediation and negotiating with counsel for West Covina to reach the settlement at issue, and in connection with seeking approval of the Settlement Agreement, among other things. (Melmed Decl., ¶¶ 19-20 & 22-25.)

The actual litigation costs incurred by Class Counsel total $21,665.98. (Melmed Decl., ¶ 27.) The Melmed declaration includes an itemized list of these costs. (Melmed Decl., Exh. B.) Melmed asserts that these costs were reasonably necessary to successfully prosecute this action. (Melmed Decl., ¶ 27.)

Melmed also describes the time and effort expended by Cabell in assisting Class Counsel in this case, which include providing factual background and relevant documents; participating in numerous phone calls and mediation; and reviewing settlement documents. (Melmed Decl., ¶ 28.) Melmed asserts that Cabell accepted significant risk in bringing this action, noting that Cabell could have ordered to pay West Covina’s costs if Cabell had not succeeded. (Ibid.) Cabell has also agreed to a general release of Cabell’s claims. (Ibid.)

Melmed further asserts that Cabell has served the proposed settlement and the Preliminary Approval Order on the LWDA. (Melmed Decl., ¶ 31 & Exh. C.)

Cabell states that, as the Class Representative, Cabell understands that he has a duty to protect the interests of the Settlement Class as a whole, and that Cabell has no reason to believe that his interests conflict with those of the Class Members. (Cabell Decl., ¶ 4.) Cabell also understands that he stands in the shoes of the State of California in seeking PAGA penalties for the Labor Code violations alleged in this action. (Cabell Decl., ¶ 7.) Cabell also understands the terms of the Settlement Agreement. (See, e.g., Cabell Decl., ¶¶ 5-6 & 9-11.)

Cabell describes their participation in this action, the assistance provided by Cabell to Class Counsel, and the risks Cabell incurred to pursue this action, among other things. (Cabell Decl., ¶¶ 8 & 11-12.)

The above summary is not intended to be an exhaustive description of all information appearing in the Melmed and Cabell declarations. The court has considered all admissible evidence and information presented in support of the Final Approval Motion.

Analysis:

After preliminary approval of a class action and PAGA settlement, and upon notice being provided to the settlement class, the final approval hearing is the final step in the settlement approval process. During the final approval hearing, the court conducts a more detailed inquiry into the fairness of the proposed settlement. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(g).) If the court approves the settlement agreement at the final approval hearing, the court must make and enter a judgment that includes a provision for the court to retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the terms of the settlement. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(h).)

Noted above, the court “has broad powers to determine whether a proposed settlement in a class action is fair.” (Mallick v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) A class action settlement is presumptively fair if it was reached through arm’s-length negotiations between experienced counsel after extensive investigation, litigation, and discovery. (Dunk v. Ford Motor Company (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1802.) A presumption of fairness also exists where the parties’ investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently, counsel is experienced in similar litigation, and the percentage of objectors is small. (Wershba v. Apple Computer (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 245.)

Each of the first three elements in regard to the presumption of fairness and described above were established at the time of preliminary approval. No further evidence or information has been presented which would alter the court’s preliminary determination of these elements.

With respect to the fourth element described above, the available evidence and information shows that Phoenix did not receive any requests for exclusion from the settlement agreement from any Class Member who received a Class Notice, did not receive any objections to the Settlement Agreement from those Class Members, and did not receive any written disputes regarding individual workweeks or pay periods from the Class Members. Though forty-two of the Class Notices mailed to Class Members are considered undeliverable, as Phoenix received no objections, requests for exclusion, or disputes from those Class Members to whom Class Notices were mailed, the factors present here give rise to a presumption that the settlement was fair.

The court must also determine the adequacy of a class action settlement by independently satisfying itself that the consideration being received for the release of the class members’ claims is reasonable in light of the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and the risks of the particular litigation. (Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 129.) The court has reviewed the evidence and arguments presented by Cabell, including with respect to the strengths and weakness of the claims asserted in this action and the uncertainties of and risks inherent in protracted litigation. Based upon the totality of the circumstances present here, the court is satisfied that the settlement preliminarily approved is fair and reasonable, and will certify the Settlement Class for settlement purposes only.

The court will further affirm named plaintiff Henry Fredy Castillo Cabell as the Class Representative. The available information and evidence shows that Cabell expended time and effort, at Cabell’s own expense, to assist Class Counsel in pursuing the claims alleged in this action, and incurred risks in serving as the plaintiff and Class Representative. In light of the time and efforts expended by Cabell in this action, and considering the risk and Cabell’s relatively small financial interest in the outcome of the litigation, the court finds that the Incentive Award of $10,000 to be paid to Cabell as the Class Representative is reasonable. The court will therefore approve that award, in the amount of $10,000.

The court further affirms and approves the allocation of $25,000 of the GSA to the claims for civil penalties asserted under PAGA, and a payment of $18,750 to the LWDA, as required by law.

The court will also approve the appointment of Melmed Law Group P.C., as Class Counsel.

As to the attorney’s fees requested by Class Counsel, which total $133,333.33, “the court’s task in a negotiated settlement of fees is to determine if the negotiated fee is fair. That task requires the court to review the settlement as a whole, including the fee award, to ensure that it was fairly and honestly negotiated, is not collusive and adequately protects the interests of the [parties].” (Robbins v. Alibrandi (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 438, 444.)

The present record reflects that these fees represent approximately 33.33 percent of the GSA. Under the circumstances present here considering the contingent nature of the representation of Cabell by Class Counsel and its attendant risks, and the lodestar fee described in the Melmed declaration, the attorney’s fees sought by Class Counsel appear to be fair and reasonable. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will approve a payment of attorney’s fees to Class Counsel in the amount of $133,333.33.

The litigation costs incurred by Class Counsel also appear to be reasonably necessary, and will be approved in the amount of $21,665.98 as requested in the Final Approval Motion.

As to the costs to administer the settlement incurred by Phoenix, based on the information and evidence presented by Lee regarding the tasks undertaken by Phoenix to administer the settlement, the court will approve a payment of these costs to Phoenix, in the amount of $8,000.

For all reasons stated above, the court will grant the Final Approval Motion, and enter an order: (1) granting final approval of the Settlement Agreement; (2) granting final certification of the Settlement Class for settlement purposes only; (3) finding that notice has been given to 398 Class Members, with forty-two Class Notices being deemed as undeliverable; (4) appointing Phoenix as the settlement administrator; (5) finding that Phoenix has not received any objections to or requests for exclusion from the settlement, or disputes from any Class Members regarding workweeks; (6) appointing Cabell’s counsel the Melmed Law Group P.C., as Class Counsel for settlement purposes; (7) appointing Cabell as the Class Representative; (8) approving the terms of the Settlement Agreement as to the claims for civil penalties alleged under PAGA, and the allocation of $25,000 to settle Cabell’s representative PAGA claims, of which the amount of $18,740 will be paid to the LWDA; (9) approving an award of attorney’s fees to Class Counsel in the amount of $133,333.33; (10) approving an award of litigation expenses in the amount of $21,665.98, to be paid to Class Counsel; (11) approving an award of settlement administration costs to Phoenix in the amount of $8,000; and (12) approving the Incentive Award to be paid to Cabell, in the amount of $10,000.

Further, the court will reserve jurisdiction over the parties for the purposes of implementing, enforcing, and or administering the settlement agreement or enforcing the terms of the judgement.

The court has reviewed the proposed order submitted by Cabell and intends to sign it. Counsel shall appear at the hearing of the motion and be prepared to discuss a date for submission of a final accounting report and distribution of settlement funds, and any other matters remaining at this time.