Santa Barbara County Coalition for Responsible Cannabis et al v Ceres Farms LLC et al

Case Number

23CV03885

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 03/05/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion for Class Certification

Tentative Ruling

Robert Curtis, Aaron L. Arndt, for Plaintiffs [“Plaintiffs”]

Patrick D. Toole, John P. Kinsey, Ethan M. Mora for Defendant Valley Crest Farms [“Valley Crest”]

     

Acknowledgements

The Court acknowledges and appreciates the professional work done by counsel in the case.[1] The case has been contentious; acrimonious at times.

RULINGS 

Despite the language of the Motion the Court does not invite or expect any evidence to be introduced at the hearing. This matter will be resolved on the documents submitted.

1. Plaintiffs’ Class is certified as to all claims for relief as set forth in Plaintiffs’ Class Action Complaint, defined as follows:

a. All owner-occupiers of real property located within one mile of Valley Crest’s cannabis operations who purchased their property prior to January 19, 2016 (the “Class”).

b. Plaintiffs William Hahn, Danielle Dall’Armi, and Chonnie Bliss Jacobson are certified and appointed as the representatives of the Class.

c. Robert A. Curtis of the law firm Foley Bezek Behle & Curtis, LLP is appointed as class counsel.

d. Robert A. Curtis shall prepare the “Notice to the Class” and provide a copy of said Notice to counsel for Valley Crest for approval. Any disagreement that the parties are unable to work out can be brought to the Court at a Notice Approval Hearing set by the attorneys. Briefs no longer than 5 pages can be submitted 5 days prior to the Notice Approval Hearing.

2. The Court sets dates and deadlines for the trial of the Certified Class as follows:

a. Trial Date Wednesday March 5, 2026, at 11:30am in this Department. 

b. MSC Friday February 2, 2026, in Department 5 at 8:30am via Zoom.

c. Next CMC to discuss the progress of the case is specially set for Friday -- September 5, 2025, at 8:30am. Status reports due one week in advance.

3. Robert A. Curtis reported at the hearing that the status of the Conditional Settlement Dismissal that was to be filed by 2/25/25 is _____________.

Analysis

The Complaint was filed on 9/7/23.

The Valley Crest Answer was filed 11/13/23.

A Conditional Settlement

On 10/18/24 Plaintiff filed a Notice of Conditional Settlement with some but not all Defendants. Specifically, Plaintiffs entered into a binding settlement agreement to settle this entire matter with Defendants Ceres Farm, LLC, Alex Van Wingerden, The Wingerden Family Trust and Case Van Wingerden. The settlement was conditional in that the Settlement Agreement conditions dismissal of this matter on satisfactory completion of specified terms that cannot be performed within 45 days of the date of the settlement. Given these conditions, a request for dismissal would likely not be filed until after February 25, 2025.   

That left Valley Crest as the sole remaining defendant. 

The Class Certification Motion

Filed 2/6/25; 26 pages; summarized: The motion is made on the grounds that there is an ascertainable class, there are common, similar, and unique questions of fact and law, the class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, Plaintiffs should be the class representatives and is a member of the class and, along with Plaintiffs’ counsel, can and will adequately represent the interests of the class as a whole. The motion is based on the notice of motion, the memorandum of points and authorities offered in support thereof, the Declarations of Aaron L. Arndt, Chonnie Bliss Jacobson, Danielle Dall’Armi, J.J. Gobbell, and Lionel Neff, along with the request for judicial notice, and the proposed order filed and all the papers, records, and documents on file.

Plaintiffs Dr. William Hahn and Danielle Dall’Armi are residents of Carpinteria and reside at 5950 Casitas Pass Road, Carpinteria, California, having owned this property since the early 1990s. Dr. Hahn is a well-known gastroenterologist practicing in Santa Barbara and Ms. Dall’Armi runs a rose business (and previously ran a wedding venue business) on the couple’s property. Valley Crest’s cannabis operation has severely affected the enjoyment of the Plaintiffs’ property. The neighborhood surrounding their property has a thick, heavy, strong stench of cannabis on a near daily basis. The proximity to the ever-present spraying of the odor control system has caused chemicals and essential oils from the system to settle on their property, and landscaping. Plaintiff Dall’Armi’s rose business, wedding business and house rental income have all lost money because of the ever-present smell of cannabis. The cannabis operation has also affected the real estate value of their home. The Valley Crest commercial cannabis operation is less than one-tenth of a mile from their home.

Plaintiff Chonnie Bliss Jacobson is a resident of Santa Barbara County and resides at 6217 Casitas Pass Road, Carpinteria, California, having owned or lived on the property since 1985. Ms. Bliss grows avocados on the property and loves to garden.  Valley Crest’s commercial cannabis operation has severely affected the enjoyment of the Plaintiff Chonnie Bliss Jacobson's property. Ms. Bliss smells the strong stench of cannabis every morning shortly after Valley Crest lets the air out of its greenhouse. She and her children suffer from the ever-present smell, and she finds herself gardening less and not opening the houses windows (despite not having air conditioning) because of the strong odors emanating from Valley Crest’s cannabis operation. She also believes Valley Crest’s cannabis operation has affected the real estate value of her home.

Plaintiff Coalition is a California nonprofit that was formed in the County of Santa Barbara. The Coalition is a County-wide organization that has recognized the need for a collective voice to educate the public and government leaders regarding cannabis operations, protect our environment, and maintain our community legacy. Pursuant to the purpose for which the Coalition was formed, it has received and investigated complaints that form the basis of this action, including complaints against Valley Crest that concern the awful smells, noxious odors, and chemicals being emitted from Valley Crest’s commercial cannabis operations. Accordingly, the Coalition has expended considerable time, resources, and money to investigate such complaints—expenditures that would have been otherwise unnecessary were it not for Valley Crest’s wrongful conduct.

Valley Crest is a California Limited Liability Company doing business in Santa Barbara County with its principal place of business located at 5980 Casitas Pass Road, Carpinteria. Valley Crest holds 39 provisional state cannabis licenses and is actively cultivating cannabis in vented greenhouses located at 5980 Casitas Pass Road. Valley Crest was formed on February 28, 2018. Shortly after formation, on March 2, 2018, Case Van Wingerden executed a sworn “Affidavit for County Letter for Temporary State Licensing for Medical Marijuana Cultivation Locations” on behalf of Valley Crest stating that it was “operating a medical marijuana cultivation site … that is a legal nonconforming site … operated in compliance with State law continuously since or before January 19, 2016” for the location of 5980 Casitas Pass Road.

The strong odors produced by growing cannabis are often described as pungent, skunky, even “sewer-like.” The characteristic odor associated with cannabis is attributed to the release of chemical compounds into the air known as volatile organic compounds. In addition, the malodors associated with cannabis cultivation and processing has, in some cases, been attributed to the presence of volatile sulfurous compounds referred to as thiols and terpenes.

The Environmental Impact Report dated December 2017 generated regarding the Cannabis Land Use Ordinance and Licensing Program deems the odor from cannabis cultivation a nuisance. And the Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District has stated that “strong odors associated with cannabis operations can negatively affect the surrounding community and cause a public nuisance.” Terpenes and other cannabis malodors travel in the airstream and are moved by breeze, fog, thermals, and wind. Odors are strongest when the flower is budding, when the flower buds are harvested or agitated, and during the drying process.

Every single week for the last five years, Valley Crest has been harvesting cannabis and producing strong odors that travel from its facility onto neighboring properties owned by the class. The reason that odor escapes their facility and travels to adjoining parcels is because Valley Crest’s greenhouses are vented. 

At Valley Crest, every day at or around sunrise, hundreds of vents open to allow heat and humidity which has built up in the over 7-acre greenhouse to escape. When that hot air rises through the vents it takes with it all the strong odor built up from the cannabis operation while the vents were closed and deposits that concentrated odor into the air outside the facility. This nuisance odor then travels in the airstream and is moved by breeze, fog, thermals, and wind onto the properties surrounding Valley Crest’s facility. 

As a result of its daily release of highly concentrated cannabis odors from its vented greenhouses, Valley Crest has been the subject of numerous odor complaints from putative class members and the public at large.

The cannabis odors and chemical deodorants being emitted from Valley Crest’s cannabis operation daily are a public nuisance to its surrounding community. 

Two Notice of Violation obtained from the County of Santa Barbara, the County cited Valley Crest for violation. In Notice of Violations dated November 23, 2023, and again on January 25, 2024, the County states: 

“The processing building currently in use is not compliant with their approved OAP. The stated primary method of odor control (two, single zone high pressure Fogco pumping odor control systems) has not been installed. 

The two notices of violation told Valley Crest it must “Cease use of processing building for processing and storing of cannabis - You MUST cease the use of your Processing building and schedule an inspection within thirty (30) days from the receipt of this Notice of Violation.” Valley Crest didn’t cease operations, and, in fact, Valley Crest did nothing. The County of Santa Barbara fined Valley Crest and Valley Crest just paid the fine.

Definition of the Class. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the Plaintiff class. These questions are the same for each class member and include (1) whether Valley Crest’s conduct constitutes a trespass, a public nuisance, or a private nuisance; (2) whether Valley Crest’s conduct violates California statutes such as Section 17200 of the California Business Professions Code and the Health and Safety Code; and, among other things, (3) whether Valley Crest’s conduct has diminished the value of neighboring properties. These questions of law and fact predominate over questions that affect only individual class members. Therefore, proof of a common or single state of facts will establish the right of each member of the class to recover. Because of these common issues, all class members have a unified interest in seeing the litigation resolve in the same manner. There are no conflicts among the class members that would prevent Plaintiffs from faithfully represented the interests of the class.

This commonality also means that the claims of the proposed class representatives are typical of those of the class and support a finding that the class representatives will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the entire class.

The prosecution of individual cases by members of the class could establish inconsistent rulings and leave to disparate standards regarding the conduct that gave rise to Valley Crest’s liability. This would likely result in the impairment of class members’ rights and the disposition of their interests through actions to which they were not parties. For example, the answer to whether the odors and particulate matter emanating from Valley Crest’s property—based on (among other things) Valley Crest’s refusal to install carbon filtration systems—are a nuisance and a trespass on the class members’ property is the same for each class member. It is in the interest of justice that there be a single determination on Valley Crest’s conduct and potential liability. 

The Class Is Numerous and Joinder of All Members Is Impracticable. Plaintiffs submit ample evidence to demonstrate numerosity of the class. The class definition in this case is geographical in nature, encompassing all real property and the owner/operators of that property within one mile of Valley Crest’s operations. The number of class members, and the exact members of the class, can be ascertained by using a map of the area one mile of the undisputed location of Valley Crest’s facility. Even a rough estimate of the number of properties involves amounts to several dozen potential class members. That number alone is sufficient. And importantly, this numerosity also makes joinder of all class members impracticable. In other words, the management of multiple, separate actions will consume dramatically more judicial resources and would be manifestly inefficient. Having each Plaintiff file their own complaints, retain their own experts, and conduct individualized discovery would serve no rational purpose. Therefore, the time, volume of work, and cost of pursuing individual claims shows that joinder is impracticable.

The Class Is Ascertainable. The ability to identify the class members is objective, readily determinable, and facilitates notice to the members. Plaintiffs propose a geographic definition of the class, placing all class members within one mile of Valley Crest’s cannabis operations. Membership in this class can easily be ascertained through maps of undisputed validity and publicly available property records. The class definition will allow for the identification of and notification to the proposed class members through direct mail. Providing notice is not anticipated to be a problem. Therefore, the class is readily ascertainable and providing notice does not pose any significant impediment. 

The Class Has a Well-Defined Community of Interest. Here, the basis for the liability of Valley Crest depends upon the same facts and law: (1) Whether Valley Crest’s conduct constitutes a trespass, a public nuisance, or a private nuisance; (2) whether Valley Crest’s conduct violates California statutes such as Section 17200 of the California Business Professions Code and the Health and Safety Code; and, among other things, (3) whether Valley Crest’s conduct has diminished the value of neighboring properties. These are all questions that must be uniformly answered, across the class, as this case unfolds. More specifically, it is a common question whether the emanating odors and particulate matter from Valley Crest’s facilities constitutes a trespass and nuisance under California law. In addition, Plaintiffs have alleged that Valley Crest falsely claimed—in a sworn affidavit submitted to the State of California—that it was cultivating cannabis for medicinal purposes prior to January 19, 2016, in order to obtain grandfathered status for its purportedly existing grow operation. Plaintiffs contend that this was a violation of the California Business and Professions Code in that it wrongly provided Valley Crest with a business advantage. These are questions of law and fact that predominate over the entire class and should therefore be decided on a class wide basis. 

Danielle Dall’Armi, William Hahn, and Chonnie Bliss Are Adequate Class Representatives. Plaintiffs William Hahn, Danielle Dall’Armi, and Chonnie Bliss Jacobson are all residents of Carpinteria and reside within the one-mile radius of Valley Crest’s business. Dr. Hahn is a well-known gastroenterologist practicing in Santa Barbara and Ms. Dall’Armi runs a rose business on the couple’s property. Ms. Bliss grows avocados on her Carpinteria property and loves to garden. As with the rest of the class, Valley Crest’s cannabis operation has severely affected the named Plaintiffs’ ability to enjoy their property. The neighborhood surrounding their property is regularly impacted by the strong odor of cannabis on a near daily basis. And the proximity to the ever-present spraying of the odor control system has caused chemicals and essential oils from the system to settle on their property, and landscaping. Each named Plaintiff has also suffered a loss of value in their homes because of Valley Crest’s cannabis operations. The experiences of the proposed class representatives, and the injuries they have suffered and continue to suffer, make their claims typical of the proposed class. Plaintiffs and their properties have been harmed by the odors and other materials that travel from Valley Crest’s operations to their properties. These odors have harmed both their personal enjoyment of Plaintiff’s property and their ability to conduct business on their properties. And importantly, there are no conflicts between Plaintiffs’ interests and the interests of the class. Plaintiffs seek the same relief, based on the same conduct by Valley Crest, as does the rest of the class. 

Foley Bezek Behle & Curtis, LLP is adequate class counsel. As a result of the presence of Mr. Curtis as counsel since the beginning of this litigation, there is no attorney in a better position to prosecute the rights of the plaintiff class. Not only is Mr. Curtis intimately familiar with the many material facts and legal issues involved, having been engaged in discovery, prepared the pleadings and other papers, and has the established relationship with Plaintiffs. Mr. Curtis also has significant experience in representative litigations. Foley Bezek Behle & Curtis, LLP has the capability of taking the present litigation through trial. Mr. Curtis has already kept the case moving forward for more than a year and his firm can continue to support this case through the remainder of discovery and trial. In preparation for the prosecution of this class action, Mr. Curtis contracted and/or confirmed the availability of two experts in 2025 and 2026. These expert witnesses include Dr. Mark Kram’s expert opinion which will address the spreading of odors and particulate matter from Valley Crest’s operations based on his substantial experience as an environmental scientist. J.J. Goebbel is an extremely qualified real estate appraiser located in the County of Santa Barbara, will be able to quantify the diminished value of the class member’s real property caused by Valley Crest’s conduct.

Certification Is Superior to Other Methods for the Adjudication of the Claims. Ultimately the question of certification comes down to finding that the class action proceeding is superior to alternate means for a fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation. There is no substitute for class treatment here. The allegations against Valley Crest involve common questions of law and fact. The risk of inconsistent judgments posed by maintaining numerous separate lawsuits is both potentially high and unnecessary considering the relative ease of identifying and notifying the class members. Plaintiffs have already been litigating the present dispute in this action more than a year.

Supported by the Declaration of John J. Gobbell, Jr.

Filed 2/5/25; 9 pages [includes Exhibit K]; read and considered.

Supported by the Declaration of Chonnie Bliss

Filed 2/5/25; 3 pages; read and considered.

Supported by the Declaration of Danielle Dall’Armi

Filed 2/5/25; 3 pages; read and considered.

Supported by the Declaration of Lionet Neff

Filed 2/5/25; 2 pages; read and considered.  

Supported by the Declaration of Aaron L. Arndt

Filed 2/5/25; 101 pages [includes Exhibits A through J]; read and considered.  

Supported by the Declaration of Robert A. Curtis

Filed 2/5/25; 5 pages; read and considered.  

Valley Crest’s Opposition

Filed 2/20/25; 25 pages; summarized: Valley Crest opposes the motion; for several reasons, including the completely arbitrary “fail safe” class definition, compel the conclusion that Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification in this case should be denied. 

While Plaintiffs’ Complaint defines the putative class as “[a]ll owner-occupiers of real property located within two miles of Defendants’ cannabis operations who purchased their property prior to January 19, 2016”, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification redefines the putative class as “[a]ll owner-occupiers of real property located within one mile of Defendants’ cannabis operations who purchased their property prior to January 19, 2016.” Plaintiffs’ shifting class definition highlights the fatally overbroad and unascertainable nature of the class, and exemplifies the complete absence of any discernable “well-defined community of interest” based on the following: 

1. Each class member’s inherent inability to pinpoint the source of a particular odor at a given time, coupled with the locations of many putative class members’ properties within the vicinity of multiple other cannabis operations, make ascertaining precisely who is a member of the putative class extraordinarily cumbersome and time-consuming, if not impossible. Plaintiffs make no effort to articulate any objective means by which to determine whether (let alone how often) putative class members “occupy” their properties, or which proposed class members consider the smell of cannabis offensive. 

To the extent some property owners can establish any odor is emanating only from Valley Crest’s facility, those class members must further distinguish that odor from other odors they may experience during the same time period(s) from other agricultural operations. Because Plaintiffs’ claims depend on their theory that the class members’ property values have been diminished, which, in turn, depends on a showing of each property’s value, Valley Crest’s liability hinges upon each putative class member’s use and individual motivations for purchasing their respective properties. Thus, before liability for any diminution in property value to any putative class member can be determined, the absence of the purported odor at the time of the purchase must be shown to be a reason the class member purchased the property in the first place. Similarly, Valley Crest cannot be held liable for diminution in property value unless the class member shows that he, she, or it does not and has not conducted or permitted any cannabis-related activity on their property. 

Even assuming some members of the putative class could make the individualized showings required of them, each class member must further demonstrate that they suffered damages or financial loss due to the alleged impact of Valley Crest’s conduct on the value of each class member’s property. The inability of Plaintiffs to recall when certain odors became prominent on their properties, and the absence of records showing the location and size of all the active cannabis operations in Carpinteria before January 19, 2016, will - absent extensive questioning and cross-examination - also render this aspect of this action unmanageable.

For all these reasons, the proposed class is wildly overbroad, unascertainable without multiple individualized inquiries, and lacks a continuity of interest.  Therefore, this Court should deny Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification.

The California Supreme Court has “consistently admonished trial courts to carefully weigh respective benefits and burdens and to allow maintenance of the class action only where substantial benefits accrue both to litigants and to the courts.” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.3d 447, 459 (1974).

Accordingly, California courts insist that two fundamental requirements be met before an action can be certified as a class action.

First, there must be an ascertainable class. Determining whether there is an ascertainable class requires examination of factors such as (i) the definition of the proposed class, (ii) the size of the class, and (iii) the means of identifying class members. (City of San Jose, 12 Cal. 3d at 459,) If membership in the putative class cannot be readily ascertained, class certification is inappropriate for that reason alone. (See Eaton v. Ventura Port Dist. (1975) 45 Cal. App. 3d 862, 868.)

Second, there must be a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved in the case. (See Cal.Civ.Proc. Code § 382; Kennedy, 43 Cal. App. 4th at 808.) The “community of interest” inquiry comprises three separate factors: (1) whether common questions of law and fact predominate over individual questions; (2) whether the proposed class representative has claims that are typical of the class; and (3) whether the class representative would be an adequate representative of the class. (Kennedy, 43 Cal. App. 4th at 808 (citing Richmond v. Dart Indus. (1981) 29 Cal. 3d 462, 470.)

Plaintiffs cannot meet either of these requirements. Class certification should be denied.

The Putative Class Is Not Readily Ascertainable. “A class is ascertainable if it identifies a group of unnamed plaintiffs by describing a set of common characteristics sufficient to allow a member of that group to identify himself or herself as having a right to recover based on the description.” (Bartold v. Glendale Federal Bank (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 816, 828; see also Sevidal v. Target Corp. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 905, 920.) “While often it is said that ‘[c]lass members are “ascertainable” where they may be readily identified without unreasonable expense or time by reference to official records’ [citations], that statement must be considered in light of the purpose of the ascertainability requirement.” (Medrazo v. Honda of N. Hollywood (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th at 101.) 

The goal in defining an ascertainable class “is to use terminology that will convey ‘sufficient meaning to enable persons hearing it to determine whether they are members of the class plaintiffs wish to represent.’ [Citation.] ... ‘Otherwise, it is not possible to give adequate notice to class members or to determine after the litigation has concluded who is barred from relitigating.’”  (Global Minerals Metal Corp. v. Superior Court, (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 836, 858.)

Plaintiffs ask this Court to certify a putative class of “[a]ll owner-occupiers of real property located within one mile of Defendants’ cannabis operations who purchased their property prior to January 19, 2016.” Plaintiffs allege that “a simple aerial map from a reputable, judicially noticeable source will establish the location of Defendant’s operations at 5980 Casitas Pass Road and a one-mile radius can be determined to conclusively show all of the real property that falls under the class definition.”

Plaintiffs appear to fundamentally misunderstand the ascertainability requirement because, as a threshold matter, clearly not all the real property located within a mile of Valley Crest’s facility can plausibly fall within Plaintiffs’ proposed class definition. For example, Plaintiffs’ proposed class definition includes at least nine other cannabis facilities, none of which can maintain claims against Valley Crest relating to the smell of cannabis, which they themselves generate and permit to exist on their own properties.  Using public records Valley Crest has prepared a map to visualize the various cannabis locations [reviewed by the Court]. 

Plaintiffs’ class definition includes several criteria relating to the general location, occupancy, and time at which a putative class property must have been purchased. These criteria do precisely nothing to narrow or sufficiently clarify Plaintiffs’ untenable class definition. The one (or two mile) radius is completely arbitrary considering the total land area in Carpinteria is just 2.59 square miles.  The proposed definition also fails to account for the fact that nearly all putative class members’ properties located within a one-mile radius of Valley Crest’s facility are further from Valley Crest’s facility than they are from any one among several other cannabis facilities located nearest each of their respective properties. 

The January 19, 2016 date by which putative class members must have purchased their property is similarly arbitrary.  For example, the definition permits the inclusion of class members who may have purchased their properties after the smell of cannabis became present thereon. [“In December 2017, the Board of Supervisors adopted a form of ‘Affidavit under Penalty of Perjury’ averring that declarant has been growing medical marijuana lawfully under California law since prior to January 19, 2016 thereby qualifying as a legal nonconforming user.”] Class members who purchased their properties subject to the odors and/or contaminants complained of in the Complaint have not suffered a compensable loss of value in their homes as a result. Identifying which class members purchased their properties with the smell of cannabis already present is clearly an individualized fact-intensive inquiry. 

Plaintiffs’ “occupancy” requirement (requiring that putative class members not only own, but also occupy their properties) serves no apparent purpose.  For example, Ms. Bliss—a Colorado resident who “occupies” her Carpinteria property on occasion is put forth as a putative class representative but is not a fulltime resident. Similarly, the Rose Story Plaintiffs have a beach house in Montecito where they spend a portion of their time. To the extent any individual or entity may have purchased his, her, or its property prior to January 19, 2016, Plaintiffs offer no objective means by which to determine whether he [she, it, they] also occupied their property for any reasonable period and experienced harms allegedly attributable to Valley Crest’s purported conduct.

Plaintiffs’ class definition also ignores the existence of individuals who own properties situated geographically downwind, or relatively far away from (though still within a one-mile radius of) Valley Crest’s facility.  Such individuals, despite falling under Plaintiffs’ proposed class definition, may not have experienced any odors or interferences plausibly attributed to Valley Crest.  To be sure, the variable conditions and “light winds” Plaintiffs describe in their Complaint as purportedly transporting “malodorous air” to various “specific locations” throughout Carpinteria do not discriminately transport air emanating solely from one facility.  Conceivably, these very same factors transport all sorts of odors to and from locations throughout Carpinteria and beyond—Dr. Hahn even testified as much:  “My experience is such that normally driving by those two properties [Valley Crest’s and Ceres’ facilities] or biking by, which I do a lot of, I am immediately aware of the odor as I am very close to their [Valley Crest’s and now-dismissed defendant, Ceres’ Farms’] properties, but as I then distance myself to the point that, say, I’m now half a mile away or a quarter of a mile away, that odor seems to dissipate.” 

Accordingly, the proposed putative class members cannot be ascertained merely by reviewing a map and property records as Plaintiffs seem to suggest.  (See Compl., ¶ 53 (“membership in the Class is ascertainable based upon, inter alia, the records of the County of Santa Barbara.”).) In fact, membership in the proposed class evidently cannot be ascertained by reason of any independent criteria, but only after extensive individualized inquiry of when a property was purchased, how it is occupied, the uses of their particular property and whether any persons on that property are harmed by a specific odor that emanates from Defendant’s facility.  Because Plaintiffs fail to provide any reliable and administratively feasible way to determine whether a particular person is a member of their fatally speculative and impermissibly overbroad putative class, class membership is unascertainable; and for that reason alone, certification must be denied. (See Bozaich, 32 Cal. App. 3d at 694.)

The Proposed Class Does Not Satisfy the Numerosity Requirement.  A party seeking class certification bears the burden of satisfying the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 382, including numerosity; and in deciding of whether a “plaintiff has presented substantial evidence of the class action requisites,” the trial court is entitled to consider “the totality of the evidence in making that determination.” (Quacchia v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1442.)  According to Plaintiffs, “[e]ven a rough estimate of the number of properties involves [sic] amounts to several dozen potential class members. That number alone is sufficient.” Plaintiffs’ mere speculation as to the size of the class is not sufficient. 

Even if Plaintiffs’ putative class were construed as permissibly broad enough to include properties of every type, use, and zoning designation located within a mile, or even a two-mile radius of Valley Crest’s facility, Plaintiffs’ proposed class would still fail the numerosity requirement for at least two independent reasons. First, the Rose Story Plaintiffs seem to be the only people in the world who own property located closer to Valley Crest’s facility than to another cannabis operation. Second, cannabis odor has been largely if not completely undetectable (by both olfactometers and on-site human inspectors) mere feet from the perimeter of Valley Crest’s facility, and Plaintiffs offer no credible evidence to support their speculation that any odors or airborne particulates allegedly emanating from Plaintiffs’ facility have traveled any distance further. 

Other than the bare allegation that “dozens of individuals” purportedly comprise the putative class, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate, by way of declarations, exhibits, deposition testimony, or anything else, that putative class members can be identified, and Plaintiffs cannot rely on their pleadings alone for this support. (Pleadings are allegations, not evidence, and do not suffice to satisfy a party’s evidentiary burden. [San Diego Police Officers Assn. v. City of San Diego (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1736, 1744.]) Because Plaintiffs have not submitted any competent evidence of numerosity, Plaintiffs’ proposed class cannot be certified, and membership is limited only to those plaintiffs who filed the declarations submitted with Plaintiffs’ Motion. 

There Is No Well-Defined Community of Interest Among the Proposed Class Members. In every class action case, “the ultimate question . . .  is whether the issues which may be jointly tried, when compared with those requiring separate adjudication, are so numerous or substantial that the maintenance of a class action would be advantageous to the judicial process and to the litigants.” (Brown v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., (1984) 151 Cal. App. 3d 982, at 1104-05.) To prevail on a motion for class certification, a plaintiff must show the existence of both common questions of law and common questions of fact. (See Bozaich, 32 Cal. App. 3d at 694-95; Brown, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 988-89 (class actions not permitted “where there are diverse factual issues to be resolved, even though there may be many common questions of law”)).

It is the plaintiffs’ burden to “establish the requisite community of interest and . . . that questions of law or fact common to the class predominate over the questions affecting the individual members.” (Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Superior Court, (2003) 29 Cal. 4th 1096, 1104.) A plaintiff fails to establish the existence of a community of interest if, following a trial of common issues, individual trials would be required for each putative class member “to individually litigate numerous and substantial questions to determine his right to recover.” (City of San Jose, at 12 Cal.3d at 459.)

Common Questions of Law and Fact Do Not Predominate Over Individual Questions That Cannot Be Resolved On a Classwide Basis. Predominance is a factual question that requires that common questions substantially outweigh individualized issues. (Sav-On Drug Stores Inc. v. Superior Ct. (2004) 34 Cal. 4th at 327.)   Plaintiffs’ Motion concludes that three questions of law and fact “predominate over questions that affect only individual class members,” including “(1) whether Defendant’s conduct constitutes a trespass, a public nuisance, or a private nuisance; (2) whether Defendant’s conduct violates California statutes such as Section 17200 of the California Business Professions Code and the Health and Safety Code; and, among other things, (3) whether Defendant’s conduct has diminished the value of neighboring properties.”

Yet, Plaintiffs fail to provide any objective analysis demonstrating the predominating “common law or fact.” To the contrary, the evidence shows the proposed class representatives’ circumstances and interests diverge significantly from the other putative class members, and even from one another, such that the inquiries upon which Plaintiff pins its hope for class treatment are simply incapable of class wide resolution. 

The Uses, Locations, and Conditions of Putative Class Members’ Properties Are Diverse Factors Impacted by Many Variables; But None Are Determinative of Classwide Issues. To satisfy the commonality requirement, Plaintiffs must show that class members’ claims depend on a common contention capable of class wide resolution. (Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011).) Plaintiffs’ Motion alleges that “the answer to whether the odors and particulate matter emanating from Defendant’s property—based on (among other things) Valley Crest’s refusal to install carbon filtration systems—are a nuisance and a trespass on the class members’ property is the same for each class member.” There is no showing by Plaintiffs that any specific odor originating at Defendant’s facility.  Even assuming this fact, the uses, sizes, types, zoning, topography, physical conditions, and relative geographic locations of the putative class members’ properties are the factors critical to the issue of liability.  In City of San Jose v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court explained that claims involving various properties located near an airport could not proceed as a class action due to a lack of commonality. (City of San Jose, at pp. 458, 462-463.) There, much like the scenario in this case, the class was diverse and included “industrial plants, public buildings, body shops, warehouses, gas stations, office buildings, multi-unit apartments, single family residences, and vacant land—some being farmed.” According to this state’s high court: While landing or departure may be a fact common to all, liability can be established only after extensive examination of the circumstances surrounding each party. Development, use, topography, zoning, physical condition, and relative location are among the many important criteria to be considered. No one factor, not even noise level, will be determinative as to all parcels. 

Further, where liability is “predicated on variables like the degree of noise, vapor, and vibration, the problem is compounded by the factors of distance and direction affecting these variables.” Here, with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims for nuisance and trespass, the putative class members have or will inevitably experience differing levels of exposure depending on many of the same factors considered by the City of San Jose Court denying class certification, none of which were determinative in that case, or here. As the California Supreme Court discerned, the difficulty in determining liability is only compounded by the varying distance and direction of the putative class members’ properties relative Valley Crest’s facility—and in this case specifically, relative to other cannabis facilities, as well.

Therefore, determining whether Valley Crest’s conduct affected a particular person, let alone a substantial number of people and entities at the same time, will be unmanageable on a classwide basis because no single factor, not even the degree of vapor emissions or the strength of cannabis odor each class member has experienced, will be determinative as to all properties owned by putative class members.

The Rose Story Plaintiffs Are the Only Putative Class Members Who Own Property Located Closer to Valley Crest Than to Another Cannabis Operation. No common classwide set of facts can account for the relative distance between Valley Crest, a putative class member’s hypothetical property, and the cannabis facility nearest each putative class member’s property. Such distance is critical to assessing liability and causation. Individualized inquiries will be required for each class member in this regard, rendering class treatment unmanageable. Because Plaintiffs’ class definition does not specify any means by which to exclude from class membership those owner-occupiers of properties who may have experienced contaminants or odors for which Defendant cannot be held liable, class certification should be denied.

Owners of Agriculturally-Zoned Properties Comprise an Impermissible “Fail Safe” Class.  

Plaintiffs assert that “a simple aerial map” reflecting a one-mile radius around Valley Crest’s facility will “conclusively show all of the real properties that fall under the class definition.” Not so. To the extent the contemplated map includes the individual Plaintiffs (the proposed class representatives) identified in Plaintiffs’ Motion - each of whom owns land zoned for agricultural use - such Plaintiffs would, pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 3482.5, need to effectively prevail on their nuisance claims against Valley Crest to obtain class certification. Plaintiffs’ class is therefore a “fail safe” class and should be unequivocally denied on that basis. 

The California Legislature enacted Cal. Civ. Code § 3482.5 with the express goal of “[k]eeping agricultural land in agricultural use,” and intending stop the “dangerous cycle” of lawsuits brought “against agricultural operations for . . . smells and other things commonly associated with the operation of an agricultural enterprise”. Subdivision (a)(1) of the statute reads: “No agricultural activity, operation, or facility, or appurtenances thereof, conducted or maintained for commercial purposes, and in a manner consistent with proper and accepted customs and standards, as established and followed by similar agricultural operations in the same locality, shall be or become a nuisance, private or public, due to any changed condition in or about the locality, after it has been in operation for more than three years if it was not a nuisance at the time it began.” 

The parties do not dispute that Valley Crest has been operating its facility for more than three years, and evidently Plaintiffs have no records showing when Valley Crest’s conduct alleged constituting a nuisance began. Pursuant to Section 3482.5, Plaintiff’s class definition constitutes an impermissible a “fail safe” class because it is “defined in terms of success on the merits.” See Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 7 Cal. 5th 955, 977 (2019). Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification must be denied because certification of Plaintiffs’ nuisance claims would expressly deny Valley Crest § 3482.5 immunity. 

To be clear, the putative class representatives would not be permitted to join a hypothetical subclass either, as class membership can only be determined by establishing the nuisance liability of Valley Crest to those hypothetical sub-class members. (See Landa v. Christopher Ranch, LLC, No. 2015-1-CV-286346, 2020 WL 14024697 Dec. 18, 2020) (finding that “three of the sub-classes were fail-safe classes because membership could only be determined by first establishing the liability of Defendants to the class members.”) 

Proposed Class Representatives’ Trespass and UCL Claims are Not Typical of the Putative Class. The typicality requirement ensures that the named plaintiffs’ claims are representative of the class. (Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc., 29 Cal. 3d 462, 470 (1981).) 

Plaintiffs’ allegations relating to trespass are limited to prospective class members who own property within 4,500 feet of Defendant’s facility - any putative class member who asserts trespass claims is not typical of the other property owner-occupiers within the broader, arbitrary one mile (or two mile) radius. (“Plaintiffs and Class Members are the owners and/or lawful occupants of real property within 4,500 feet of Defendants cannabis growing operations.”) However, even among this significantly limited set of class members, whether, and the degree to which, any class member has experienced harm will vary substantially.

As to Plaintiffs’ UCL and trespass claims, there is also a discrepancy as to whether even the putative class representatives all claim the same types of damages. ((See, Adams v. Paul, 11 Cal. 4th at 586, 589-90 (1995)) (holding that, for UCL claims, the claimed injury must be “manifest and palpable” and result in an actual loss or substantial impairment of a right or remedy).)

Plaintiffs’ Trespass Claims Rely on Particularized Evidence of Physical Intrusion. As with nuisance, determining whether cannabis odors constitute a trespass relies on a highly fact-specific inquiry, that must consider the proximity and direction of the property; the frequency and intensity of exposure; and unique property characteristics, such as the levels of insulation, air filtration, ventilation, and other activities conducted on the property, all of which influence the degree of vapor transport. 

Unlike Plaintiffs’ nuisance claims, however, the elements of trespass requiring intentional entry and interference with the use of the plaintiff’s property, require Plaintiffs to demonstrate proof of physical invasion of each putative class members’ property as well. Demonstrating physical intrusion will require even more particularized proof for each of the putative class members. Nominal damages alone are not available in cases involving intangible intrusions such as noise and vibrations; proof of actual damage to the property is required: “[T]he rule is that actionable trespass may not be predicated upon nondamaging noise, odor, or light intrusion . . . .” (San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893, 936, internal citation omitted.)

Plaintiffs’ UCL Claims Require Individualized Proof of Economic Damages. Plaintiffs’ Complaint states that “[t]he main goal of this lawsuit is not money.” More recently, Ms. Bliss testified that she would be satisfied if Valley Crest simply installed carbon scrubbers. To the extent any putative class members seek relief beyond equitable relief, such distinct remedies do not establish a typical claim necessary to support class certification.  Moreover, Plaintiffs cannot avoid the immunity provided to Valley Crest under § 3482.5 by asserting UCL claims that merely recharacterize or relabel Valley Crest’s conduct in the guise of trespass to bring it outside the ambit of the statute. The California Court of Appeal expressly barred this type of technical gamesmanship in Souza v. Lauppe (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 8658.  To the extent Plaintiffs’ theory of liability is based on nuisance, the Souza court’s ruling instructs that section 3482.5 bars Plaintiffs’ UCL claims.  Therefore, there is absolutely no benefit in Plaintiffs’ attempt to burden this Court with the myriad of individualized inquires and cross-examinations that would be required under class treatment. 

Relating to FogCo Vapor and Cannabis Odors Are Distinct. Plaintiffs allege a violation of the Clean Air Act, which apparently relates to Valley Crest’s use of its FogCo systems, though this is not clearly articulated in Plaintiff’s Complaint. (“By engaging in the above-described practice, Defendants have committed one or more acts of unlawful business practices by violating, inter alia, the California Clean Air Act . . . .”).) At no point have Plaintiffs ever proposed any method for identifying which, if any, putative class members have been harmed by the FogCo vapor or cannabis odors. The distinction between Plaintiffs allegations concerning FogCo must be carefully distinguished from the allegations concerning cannabis because, throughout Plaintiffs’ Motion and pleadings, Plaintiffs routinely conflate the two, by describing both as offensive “malodors” Plaintiffs have certainly not presented evidence to suggest that any putative class members have “manifest and palpable injuries” allegedly caused by FogCo vapor, and any claims related thereto would not be typical of the putative class members’ claims. 

Plaintiffs Complaint asserts that Carpinteria is essentially awash in the smell of cannabis—not FogCo vapor. Extensive individualized inquiries and cross-examination will be necessary to determine whether each putative class members are pursuing claims relating to cannabis odor, and separately, to FogCo vapor; as well as when and how those claims first arose; and Valley Crest’s relative liability, if any, for each. For these reasons, class treatment would be unmanageable.

Proposed Class Representatives Are Inadequate Representatives of the Putative Class. As explained in Earley v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1420, 1434: “A class action is a representative action in which the class representatives assume a fiduciary responsibility to prosecute the action on behalf of the absent parties. The representative parties not only make the decision to bring the case in the first place, but even after class certification and notice, they are the ones responsible for trying the case, appearing in court, and working with class counsel on behalf of absent members.” “The party seeking class certification has the burden of proving the adequacy of its representation.” (Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470.) 

To meet their burden, Ms. Dall’Armi and Ms. Bliss each declared that they “have fulfilled or will shortly fulfill” their obligations as class representatives “by among other things: (a) reviewing documents provided to me by my counsel; (b) producing documents as requested by Defendant; and (c) assisting my counsel in the preparation of various legal documents (including this Declaration).”

These declarations fall short of establishing Plaintiffs’ willingness to act as fiduciaries for absent class members, as neither Ms. Bliss nor Ms. Dall’Armi express their willingness or intent to do anything beyond what any litigant would do in prosecuting an action on his or her own behalf. Among these and the various other reasons fully articulate above, Plaintiffs are inadequate class representatives. 

Plaintiff Danielle Dall’Armi Seeks to Recover on Distinct Legal Theories, Which Rely Upon Unique Facts. How Ms. Dall’Armi, let alone any other class member, might be able to distinguish the smell of FogCo from the smell of plant terpenes, perfumes, and any other airborne smell drifting through the wind in Carpinteria for from up to a mile of the source is not clear. What is clear is that whether each class member’s property has been affected by Valley Crest’s use of its FogCo systems is not an inquiry that relies on a common classwide set of facts.

Among the various types of roses grown on the Rose Story Plaintiffs’ property, there are variants that, according to Ms. Dall’Armi, smell “like your grandmothers perfume,” some of which are too pungent to even be included on a dinner table. As a result of her work as a rose farmer, Ms. Dall’Armi - who has testified that she has developed a unique sense of smell for floral scents, akin to a sommelier’s ability to distinguish wine - can perhaps distinguish the smell of cannabis from the smell of the FogCo vapor, which, to her, has a “sweet kind of detergent smell.”

However, any alleged harms experienced by Plaintiff Danielle Dall-Armi would certainly not be typical of facts that would support harms experienced by other class members, even Ms. Dall’Armi’s own husband. (Compare, Mora Decl., Ex. B, 49:20-24 [“Q: And are there certain parts of the property that -- the Rose Story Farm property where you believe the smells from the misters are more prevalent than others? A: No, I think it's the whole property.”], Mora Decl., Ex. A, 59:10-13 [“Q: Are you aware of any instance where you ever smelled the [FogCo] misters at your residence, the two story house? A: I am not certain I have smelled it there.”]

Plaintiff Chonnie Bliss Does Not Seek Economic Damages. Plaintiffs’ Motion suggests Plaintiffs do, in fact, attempt to allege economic damages. (“Each named Plaintiff has also suffered a loss of value in their homes because of Defendant’s cannabis operations.”).) However, more recently, Ms. Bliss testified that she is not seeking restitutionary relief through this litigation: 

“Q: And are you through this litigation trying to achieve a result where Valley Crest would install [carbon] scrubbers as opposed to paying you money for the diminution in value of your property? 

A: Yes.” (Mora Decl., Ex. C, 49:8-12.)

As mentioned above, the discrepancies between the relief sought by Plaintiffs render the class unsuitable for class treatment.

Class Action Is Not the Superior Method of Adjudication. As with the foregoing factors, the proponent of class certification bears the burden of establishing that a class action will be a superior means of resolving the dispute. (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 460; Newell v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1101.) In determining the superiority of class treatment, the trial court must weigh the respective benefits and burdens of class litigation; maintenance of the class action will only be permitted where substantial benefits accrue to both the litigants and the court. (Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co., (2000) 23 Cal.4th at p. 435; see also Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 758 [“This ‘superiority’ criterion has been held to be ‘manifest’ in the . . . requirement that the class mechanism confer ‘substantial benefits’”].)

Class treatment is inferior to individual actions where individualized inquiries predominate. (Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Assn., (2014) 59 Cal. 4th at 29.) 

Here, individualized issues such as the degree of exposure, property characteristics, and damages require case-by-case adjudication. (See Arenas v. El Torito Restaurants, Inc. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 723, 731 (substantial evidence showed class action not superior where the evidence demonstrated “that resolution of the common issues would require mini trials inquiring into the circumstances of each individual's job duties”).)

Further, many putative class members may not have actionable claims, given the varying impacts of the alleged nuisance and trespass. Individual lawsuits or smaller, targeted actions are more appropriate to resolve these disputes. 

In Nguyen v. BDO Seidman, LLP, No. SACV-07-01352-JVS, 2009 WL 7742532, at 1 (C.D. Cal. July 6, 2009), the court determined that class treatment was not a superior means of adjudication because plaintiff and the putative class members sought damages in amounts that would provide them with sufficient incentive to pursue their individual claims. (Id. p. 8). The Nguyen court reasoned that “this class action would be unmanageable given the predominance of the individual issues necessary to establish BDO’s liability for each of the putative class members.” (see Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 773, [citing Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., rule 23 (28 U.S.C.) in evaluating superiority criterion].)

Here, as mentioned, the restitutionary relief sought by the (conceivably) exceedingly few plaintiffs, provides them with sufficient incentive to pursue their individual claims. As importantly, substantial evidence establishes that class treatment is not superior in this action.

Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden under California law to establish the prerequisites for class certification. Individualized issues relating to nuisance, UCL, and trespass, combined with an overbroad and diverse class, make class treatment inappropriate. Defendant requests that this Court deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in its entirety.

Supported by the Declaration of Ethan Mora

Filed 2/20/25; 131 pages [includes Exhibits A through F]; read and considered.

Supported by the Declaration of Ethan Mora Notice of Errata

Filed With 2/21/25; 4 pages; read and considered. 

Supported by a Request for Judicial Notice

Valley Crest Requests Judicial Notice in Support of Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Class Certification for (1) Private Nuisance; (2) Public Nuisance; (3) Violation of Business and Profession Code§ 17200; and (4) Trespass filed on September 7, 2023, in the above-entitled matter.

The Court: This document is judicially noticeable pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d), as a record of the court.

Plaintiffs’ Reply

Filed 2/20/25; 21 pages; summarized:  

The Court should ignore arguments concerning the merits of this case. Valley Crest opposes the Motion filed by plaintiffs by raising multiple arguments that are, simply put, irrelevant to whether this case should proceed as a class action. Repeatedly, Valley Crest makes assertions concerning the merits of this litigation as reasons for why class certification should be denied. Defendant says that Plaintiffs have failed to show that any “specific odor” emanates from the Valley Crest facility, that Defendant’s grow operation is somehow immune from liability in this action because it was not a nuisance at the time it started its operations, and that there are other cannabis facilities in the class-defined area. However, it is well established that the question at class certification is whether facts and law common to the class can resolve the question of defendant’s liability. (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 460.)

The question at class certification is not whether Valley Crest is liable but whether that liability can be determined on a class wide basis.

As to that question, Federal and state courts around the country, including in California, routinely certify classes of real property owners claiming trespass and nuisance. (See, e.g., Behar v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (C.D.Cal. July 1, 2024, No. 2:21-cv-03946-HDV-SKx) 2024 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 157399 at *53 [certifying class trespass and nuisance claims for residents of 3,294 homes with houses above the contamination plume].

Valley Crest relies heavily on the decision City of San Jose, essentially arguing that class certification of any property claim is unfeasible. But the City of San Jose reasoning does not advance Valley Crest’s position. In City of San Jose, class treatment was not appropriate because the plaintiffs could not establish the “basic issue of liability” on a class wide basis.

Here, however, Plaintiffs will present evidence establishing Valley Crest’s basic liability to each class member, since Valley Crest’s conduct led directly to the nuisance odors and the spreading of particulate matter onto each class member’s property. In fact, courts have made clear since the City of San Jose decision that class actions can involve the type of property claims at issue here. (E.g., Department of Fish & Game v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1336, 1341.)

Upon review of Valley Crest’s Opposition brief, Valley Crest plans to contest liability and causation in this litigation. But these are the commonly provable, predominating issues that support class treatment of this case, not dozens of separate, individual cases. (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1022 [“As a general rule if the defendant’s liability can be determined by facts common to all members of the class, a class will be certified even if the members must individually prove their damages”].)

Whether Valley Crest’s facility emits odors and particulate matter that affects the class members, and their property is the fundamental question at the center of this case. Valley Crest’s arguments that there is no such emission, or that other parties are to blame for Plaintiffs’ injuries, are not only misplaced at the class certification stage but demonstrate that these questions should be resolved on a class wide basis. 

The California Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished that, unless it’s necessary to decide whether a class should be certified, trial courts must not decide the merits of a case at class certification. (Brinker, supra, at p. 1023 [“The certification question is essentially a procedural one that does not ask whether an action is legally or factually meritorious.”]; Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 326; [“A class certification motion is not a license for a free-floating inquiry into the validity of the Complaint’s allegations; rather, resolution of disputes over the merits of a case generally must be postponed until after class certification has been decided, with the court assuming for purposes of the certification motion that any claims have merit.”].)

Despite this clear statement from the Supreme Court, Valley Crest frequently inserts arguments directed to the merits of this litigation to attack class certification. Such arguments are not only irrelevant to class certification but also wrong.

First, Valley Crest contends that the geographical portion of the class definition—a circle with a one-mile radius extending from Valley Crest’s property—includes “at least nine” other cannabis facilities. From this fact, Valley Crest reasons that Plaintiffs’ class is not ascertainable because (1) these facilities cannot maintain claims against Defendant because of the odor on their own properties and (2) these facilities may be the cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries. Neither of these arguments support a finding that Plaintiffs’ have not set forth an ascertainable class. As to the potential claims of these other facilities, the class definition Plaintiffs seek to certify covers “owner-occupiers” within the geographical region. This language refers to residential properties and does not include these cannabis operations because commercial cannabis grows are not “owner-occupied.” And if Valley Crest contends that other parties, cannabis facilities or otherwise, are the cause of Plaintiffs’ complaints, then it is incumbent on Valley Crest to bring them into this action as indispensable parties or cross-complaint against them for indemnity or contributory liability. In truth, these other facilities are not the problem as many of them have installed or began to install carbon scrubbers to prevent to release of odors and particulate matter; measures the County of Santa Barbara requires and Valley Crest simply refuses to undertake. 

Second, Valley Crest argues that the class is not ascertainable because it does not account for properties that are “geographically downwind, or relatively far away from (though still within the one-mile radius of) Valley Crest’s facility.” Not true. These are not ascertainability issues but are attacks on the merits of Plaintiffs’ case. They go to Valley Crest’s liability and whether the odors and other materials released by Valley Crest’s greenhouses are the cause of the injuries Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer. And to the extent there actually are material differences in Plaintiffs’ injuries based on whether their property is “downwind” from Valley Crest’s property, or if there are meaningful differences based on a class member’s proximity to the property, then that can be addressed through a damages model offered at the time of trial. (ABM Industries Overtime Cases (2017) 19 Cal.App.5th 277, 309 [“… individualized issues regarding proof of the amount of damages class members may recover does not defeat a class action so long as there are common questions of liability amenable to class resolution.”].) The wind in Carpinteria blows in all directions depending on the time of day or the prevailing weather patterns, so all properties within the one-mile radius are “downwind” from Valley Crest at some point during each week.  

Third, in order to argue that the class is not ascertainable, Defendant asserts that “cannabis odor has been largely if not completely undetectable … mere feet from the perimeter of Valley Crest’s facility.” This is a naked attempt to argue the merits of this case and has no bearing on any of the elements necessary for class certification. It is also wrong. Valley Crest claims there is no odor but ignores the fact that there have been a significant number of complaints filed with the County concerning odors emanating from Valley Crest’s facility or the fact that consultants hired by the County detected strong odors during a recent visit to the facility. As it relates to Plaintiffs’ Motion, a determination of whether odors and other particulate matter are being emitted from Valley Crest’s facility is the perfect example of why this action should be resolved on a class wide basis. If Valley Crest believes that its facility does none of these things, then it should want that question resolved on a class wide basis instead of facing dozens of individual suits claiming otherwise.

Plaintiffs have narrowed the class definition in good faith. Valley Crest states that Plaintiffs have modified the definition of the class they seek to certify in their Motion. The class definition set forth in the complaint includes properties within two miles of Valley Crest’s grow facility, while Plaintiffs define the class as those properties within one mile of Valley Crest’s operation in the Motion. Contrary to Valley Crest’s assertion that this change somehow shows the overbreadth and unascertainability of the class, Plaintiffs made this change after extensive discovery and consultation with their consulting expert. At trial, Plaintiffs will offer testimony that the type of odors and particulate matter released from Valley Crest’s greenhouses can, and frequently do, travel at least one mile.

Valley Crest’s argument here is particularly odd because Plaintiffs seek to narrow the definition of the class, not expand it. Courts routinely permit plaintiffs to narrow the class definition between the filing of their complaint and class certification. Valley Crest does not contend that it has been prejudiced by this change because it has not. Instead, Valley Crest seeks to punish Plaintiffs for engaging in good faith advocacy and for not pursuing a distance in the Motion that Plaintiff could not support at trial via expert testimony. Plaintiffs have modified the class definition in response to the evidence they have obtained since the filing of the complaint. This demonstrates that the class definition is based on objective criteria and is not arbitrary as Valley Crest contends.

Valley Crest’s reliance on City of San Jose is misplaced. The opposition brief hangs almost entirely on Valley Crest’s characterization of the Supreme Court’s City of San Jose decision from 1974. But a thorough reading of the decision, as well as a review of subsequent case law, shows that the Supreme Court’s ruling does not support a denial of Plaintiffs’ Motion. In City of San Jose, plaintiffs alleged nuisance and inverse condemnation from noise, vibrations, and dust from aircraft that affected their properties in the flight path. The class included different land uses: industrial plants, public buildings, body shops, warehouses, gas stations, office buildings, multi-unit apartments, single family residences, and vacant land. Although flight patterns could be shown, the plaintiffs lacked class wide proof to show the effects of the noise, vibrations, and dust. Instead, the aircraft “may or may not give rise to actionable nuisance or inverse condemnation depending on a myriad of individualized evidentiary factors,” and “[n]o one factor, not even noise level, will be determinative as to all parcels.” The differences in development, use, topography, and physical condition meant that “liability can be established only after extensive examination of the circumstances surrounding each party.” Thus, key to the Court’s San Jose holding was its reasoning that a class judgment must “establish the basic issue of defendant’s liability to the purported class.” By contrast, if each class member individually had to litigate a right to recover, with liability “predicated on variables,” there was “little or no benefit in maintaining the action as a class.”

Here, however, unlike San Jose, the instant class is comprised of only “owner-occupier” properties, not a wide range of differing types of real property uses. And, most critically, Plaintiffs will establish Valley Crest’s liability to the entire class by common proof that the odors and particulate matter from their greenhouses physically invaded each of the class members’ properties. Through the testimony of Plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, they will show not only the extent of the odor and particulate deposition on individual parcels (the harm), but also class damages, offering an analysis establishing the diminution of value for the affected parcels. Accordingly, the principle of City of San Jose supports certification here. As the San Jose court noted, class certification was proper in other cases, where “the issue of defendant’s liability to the class as a whole could be determined by facts common to all.” (12 Cal.3d at p. 460.) That is the case here.

Perhaps most critically, San Jose does not include a claim for trespass but merely nuisance and inverse condemnation. Thus, San Jose does not address the certifiability of trespass claims and it is “axiomatic” that a decision does not stand for a proposition not considered by the court. (Agnew v. State Bd. of Equalization (1999) 21 Cal.4th 310, 332.) Accordingly, based on Plaintiffs’ proffer of common proof of class injury, certification should be proper for the trespass claim, at the very least. 

The Class is ascertainable.  When establishing whether a class can be ascertained, it is not necessary to have identified the particular members of the class for purposes of certification of the class. (Evans v. Lasco Bathware, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1417, 1422.) As the Supreme Court has stated, “… the objectives of this requirement are best achieved by regarding a class as ascertainable when it is defined in terms of objective characteristics and common transactional facts that make the ultimate identification of class members possible when that identification becomes necessary.” (Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 955, 980, emphasis added.) Plaintiffs have met this requirement.

Valley Crest contends that the class cannot be ascertained based on Plaintiffs’ class definition because (1) the geographic area includes other cannabis grow operations, (2) is arbitrary because of the size of the City of Carpinteria, (3) includes individuals that purchased their properties both before and after Valley Crest began operating, and (4) the term “owner-occupier” in the class definition is insufficiently precise. All these arguments are without merit.

Common questions of law and fact predominate over individual issues. Under California class action law, a party seeking class certification must show a “community of interest,” which has three distinct parts. Plaintiffs must show that there are (1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives that possess claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class. (Sav-On Drug Stores, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 326.) None of the arguments raised by Valley Crest diminish the reasons for class certification set forth in Plaintiffs’ Motion. 

First, as to predominant common questions of law and fact, Valley Crest again improperly attack the merits of Plaintiffs’ case by asserting that no odors are emitted from their facility. Plaintiffs have already addressed this argument.

Second, Valley Crest argues that the installation of a carbon filtration system - relief that Plaintiffs seek in their class action complaint - are not correlated to the amount of odors emitted by a cannabis facility. Thus, according to Valley Crest, there is no guaranty that carbon scrubbers will resolve or even significantly ameliorate Plaintiffs’ complaints. This is wrong. Carbon filtration systems are not some experimental technologies but are, instead, the gold standard for odor abatement that are required in most states and, more importantly, has recently been mandated by the County Board of Supervisors. Valley Crest’s argument here only serves to underscore the need to certify Plaintiffs’ class; Valley Crest not only refuses to comply with County requirements but, in this lawsuit, continues to recycle the same arguments against carbon filtration that the County Board of Supervisors has rejected. Simply put, this lawsuit is necessary to ensure that Valley Crest complies with local and state law in the operation of its business.  

Third, Valley Crest argues that Plaintiffs’ claims against Valley Crest’s operation run afoul of the Right to Farm Act (Civ. Code, § 3482.5) and therefore cannot be certified. This argument fails for two reasons: (1) the Right to Farm Act does not apply to the cultivation of cannabis and (2) the application of the Act heavily depends on factual findings that must be resolved by a jury and not decided at class certification. 

The Act does not apply to cannabis, which is not an “… agricultural activity, operation, or facility …” (Civ. Code, § 3482.5, subd. (a)(1).) In California, cannabis is sui generis, subject to strict and comprehensive regulation and taxation unlike any other agricultural commodity. Cannabis is not subject to statutes and programs authorized in the Food & Agriculture Code (e.g. The California Marketing Act of 1937, the Produce Dealers Act), the Civil Code (such as Right to Farm protections), and the Insurance Code. It similarly is not an “agricultural commodity” under the Williamson Act. It is akin to timber, which also is not an agricultural commodity under State law and is subject to its own statutory framework pursuant to the California Timberland Productivity Act of 1982. Timber is excluded from the Williamson Act’s definition of “any and all plants” and is thus not an “agricultural commodity.” In short, California’s statutory scheme protects agricultural commodities but does not apply to agricultural products. 

Further, in 2017, the Legislature passed a budget trailer bill, Senate Bill 94, that integrated the Medical Cannabis Regulation and Safety Act (for medical cannabis use) with the Adult Use of Marijuana Act (for recreational cannabis use) to create the “Medicinal and Adult-Use Cannabis Regulation and Safety Act” (MAUCRSA). Under MAUCRSA, a single regulatory system governs the medicinal and adult-use cannabis industry in California. The Legislature knew about the Williamson Act’s definition of “agricultural commodity” (protected) when MAUCRSA was drafted and chaptered into law, yet the Legislature chose to use the term “agricultural product” (not protected) instead of “agricultural commodity” to distinguish the two types of agriculture. In contrast, the Right to Farm protections specifically protect “agricultural activities, operation[s], or facility[ies], or appurtenances thereof … include[ing], but not be limited to, the cultivation and tillage of the soil, dairying, the production, cultivation, growing, and harvesting of any agricultural commodity …” and do not include “agricultural products” like cannabis. Courts presume that the Legislature is aware of laws in existence when it enacts a statute.

Furthermore, even if the Act applied to the cultivation of cannabis, a determination of whether the Act applied specifically to Valley Crest relies on factual determinations that must be decided by the trier of fact. The Act provides that: No agricultural activity, operation, or facility, or appurtenances thereof, conducted or maintained for commercial purposes, and in a manner consistent with proper and accepted customs and standards, as established and followed by similar agricultural operations in the same locality, shall be or become a nuisance, private or public, due to any changed condition in or about the locality, after it has been in operation for more than three years if it was not a nuisance at the time it began. (Civ. Code, § 3482.5, subd. (a)(1), emphasis added.) Thus, for Act to apply to Valley Crest it must show that it has been (1) operating in a manner consistent with proper and accepted customs and standards, (2) in operation for more than three years, and (3) that it was not a nuisance at the time its operation began. As is the case with much of its Opposition, Valley Crest simply asserts that these factual findings are either already made or will be resolved in its favor. These are not questions Valley Crest can answer but ones that the jury must resolve.

 As to the specific claims, Valley Crest cannot contend that it is operating its facility “consistent with proper and accepted customs and standards” when, at the same time, it flouts County ordinances that require (among other things) the instillation of carbon filtration systems. And can it be said that Valley Crest’s current “operation” has been active for “more than three years” when it has only had a functioning on-site processing facility (the smelliest part of the operation) within the past year? Of course, Plaintiffs do not expect these issues to be resolved at this stage of the case but reiterates that these are factual issues that cannot be resolved at class certification but instead can be decided by a jury on a class wide basis. 

The Class representatives have typical claims and defenses.  “Typicality refers to the nature of the claim or defense of the class representative, and not to the specific facts from which it arose, or the relief sought. … The test of typicality is whether other class members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct, which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other [class] members have been injured by the same course of conduct.” (Martinez v. Joe’s Crab Shack Holdings (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 362, 375.) Contrary to Valley Crest’s assertions, these rules are all met in this case.

First, Valley Crest argues that Plaintiffs’ trespass cause of action relies on particularized evidence of physical intrusion and therefore cannot be resolved on a class wide basis. Incorrect. Trespass is the invasion of the interest in exclusive possession of land, as by entry upon it. (Wilson v. Interlake Steel Co. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 229, 234.) An invasion of dust or particulates, even without injury, constitutes trespass. (Polin v. Chung Cho (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 673, 676 [action for trespass may be maintained without proof of injury to property]; Thrifty-Tel v. Bezenek (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1566, n. 6 [microscopic particles]; Roberts v. Permanente Corp. (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 526 [dust].) And trespass claims are commonly certified in real property damage cases like this, where common proof demonstrates liability to the class. (See, e.g., Behar, supra, [trespass and nuisance]; In re Delta, supra, [trespass and nuisance]; Turner v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. (E.D. La. 2006) 234 F.R.D. 597, 609 [nuisance and trespass claims].) Thus, an individualized analysis of each parcel is not necessary for class certification; the question remains as to Valley Crest’s liability; namely, does Valley Crest’s facility emit particulate matter and, if so, how far does that matter extend. The specific effect on a property is a damages question that can be resolved after a class wide determination of liability. (See Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1022.)

Second, Defendant contends that the Chonnie Bliss Jacobson’s UCL claim is not typical of the class because she allegedly doesn’t seek monetary damages. This contention is based on a blatant mischaracterization of Ms. Jacobson’s deposition testimony. Plaintiffs’ class action complaint states that the “… main goal of this lawsuit if not money.” But, at the same time, Plaintiffs seek damages for lost business and diminution in value of Plaintiffs’ properties. In full context, Ms. Jacobsen’s testimony is merely echoing the allegations contained in Plaintiffs’ complaint and do not show any difference between the remedy she seeks, and the remedy being sought by the class.

Plaintiffs have established the adequacy of the proposed class representatives. Valley Crest’s arguments attacking the adequacy of the named plaintiffs to serve as class representatives should be rejected by this Court. First, Valley Crest asserts that the declarations offered by the named Plaintiffs are not sufficient to show that they are willing “… assume a fiduciary responsibility to prosecute the action on behalf of the absent parties.” Nonsense. There is no magic language that a plaintiff must include in their declaration for a court to find that they are adequate class representatives. But, in quoting Plaintiffs’ declarations, Valley Crest conveniently omits the fact that each named Plaintiff has stated, under oath, that they “… understand that, as the representative of the Class in this action,  [they] have an obligation to act at all times in the best interests of the members of the Class” and that they “… have an obligation to ensure that the claims alleged on behalf of the Class are zealously pursued by my counsel.” (See, e.g., Declaration of Chonnie Bliss Jacobson in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, ¶ 7.) This language clearly shows Plaintiffs’ understanding of their responsibility and their willingness to assume the obligations of being a class representative. 

Second, plaintiff Danielle Dell’Armi’s particularly sensitive and developed sense of smell does not make her an inadequate class representative. Nuisance is the substantial or unreasonable interference with a plaintiff’s enjoyment of their property. This is an objective standard; “the question is not whether the particular plaintiff found the invasion unreasonable, but whether reasonable persons generally, looking at the whole situation impartially and objectively, would consider it unreasonable.” (San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893, 938-939.) Thus, Ms. Dell’Armi’s particular sensitivities do not prevent her from representing the class.

Plaintiffs request that their Motion for Class Certification be granted, and that the Court enter an order certifying the class proposed herein; appointing the named Plaintiffs as class representatives; and appointing class counsel as requested.

The Court’s Conclusions

In determining whether sufficient community of interest exists to justify the maintenance of a class action, we start from certain settled premises: Before the imposition of a judgment binding on absent parties can be justified, it must be shown that substantial benefits both to the litigants and to the court will result. The burden of such a showing fall on Plaintiffs and the ultimate determination of whether the class action is appropriate turns on the existence and extent of common questions of law and fact. Each member must not be required to individually litigate numerous and substantial questions to determine his right to recover following the class judgment; and the issues which may be jointly tried, when compared with those requiring separate adjudication, must be sufficiently numerous and substantial to make the class action advantageous to the judicial process and to the litigants. (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 460.)

The Court has read and considered the hundreds of pages of documents submitted and finds that the Plaintiffs contentions are sound; persuasive; have merit. Plaintiffs should be permitted to proceed with this as a class action.

The Court finds the City of San Jose case very instructive. That was a 4-3 decision; Justice Tobiner [joined by Justices Mosk and Taylor] dissented and argued the case did indeed qualify for class action certification. When the Court reads the San Jose case and overlays the facts of this case it is very plain that this case qualifies.

The legal reasoning of the majority decision in San Jose comports with the very real practical consequence of certifying class action in airport noise cases. If permitted the Courts would be awash in such cases.

Even so, in light of the practical and legal reasoning of the majority, Justice Tobriner concluded that what the majority opinion [in San Jose] overlooks are the manifest benefits arising from the use of a class action to resolve such controversies; the mere filing of a single complaint and answer, in place of several hundred complaints and answers, represents a substantial saving of time and effort. The court could determine the question of compliance with the claims statute on the basis of a single class claim in place of numerous individual claims. Extensive -- and expensive -- expert testimony need be presented once, difficult legal issues of liability and immunity need be resolved but once; appraisers could assess damages to related properties without need for individual trials; that neither the grounds stated in the majority opinion, nor the diverse issues present, preclude the maintenance of this suit as a class action. The substantial saving in judicial time and litigation expense which would result from use of the class action format fully justify the trial court's exercise of its discretion. (12 Cal.3d 468.)

The case now before this Court involves Plaintiffs reasoned claim that they can establish Valley Crest’s liability to the entire class by common proof that the odors and particulate matter from their greenhouses physically invaded each of the class members’ properties within a well-defined, reasonably small, perimeter.

Here there is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the Plaintiff class. These questions are the same for each class member and include (1) whether Valley Crest’s conduct constitutes a trespass, a public nuisance, or a private nuisance; (2) whether Valley Crest’s conduct violates California statutes such as Section 17200 of the California Business Professions Code and the Health and Safety Code; and, among other things, (3) whether Valley Crest’s conduct has diminished the value of neighboring properties.

These questions of law and fact predominate over questions that affect only individual class members. Therefore, proof of a common or single state of facts will establish the right of each member of the class to recover. Because of these common issues, all class members have a unified interest in seeing the litigation resolve in the same manner. There are no conflicts among the class members that would prevent Plaintiffs from faithfully represented the interests of the class.

Valley Crest opposes the Motion filed by plaintiffs by raising multiple arguments that are irrelevant to whether this case should proceed as a class action. The question at class certification is not whether Valley Crest is liable but whether that liability can be determined on a class wide basis. Valley Crest consistently makes assertions concerning the merits of this litigation as reasons why class certification should be denied. That was not helpful to their cause and complicates a reasoned analysis.

Here common questions of law and fact predominate over individual issues. Among other factors Valley Crest argues that the installation of a carbon filtration system - relief that Plaintiffs seek in their class action complaint - are not correlated to the amount of odors emitted by a cannabis facility. According to Valley Crest, there is no guaranty that carbon scrubbers will resolve or even significantly ameliorate Plaintiffs’ complaints. Plaintiffs contend vigorously this is wrong and it appears to be so.

As explained by Plaintiffs, carbon filtration systems are the gold standard for odor abatement that has recently been mandated by the County Board of Supervisors. Valley Crest’s argument here only serves to underscore the need to certify Plaintiffs’ class. Valley Crest not only refuses to comply with County requirements but, in this lawsuit, continues to make the same arguments against carbon filtration that the County Board of Supervisors has rejected. Plaintiffs’ argument that this lawsuit is necessary to ensure that Valley Crest complies with local and state law in the operation of its business is compelling.  

Valley Crest argues that Plaintiffs’ claims against Valley Crest’s operation run afoul of the Right to Farm Act and therefore cannot be certified. But Plaintiffs’ argument in opposition is persuasive. Plaintiffs maintain that this argument fails because the Right to Farm Act does not apply to the cultivation of cannabis because the application of the Act heavily depends on factual findings that must be resolved by a fact finder and not decided at class certification. 

Valley Crest contends that it is operating its facility consistent with proper and accepted customs and standards. Plaintiffs contend that it is not in compliance with County ordinances that require the instillation of carbon filtration systems. Plaintiffs’ contention supports a viable request for class action certification.

As to Valley Crest’s contention that its current “operation” has been active for “more than three years” the Plaintiffs’ counter contention is that they do not expect these issues to be resolved at this stage of the case, but these are factual issues that cannot be resolved at class certification stage. Plaintiffs’ contention has merit. 

Valley Crest’s argument related to narrowing the geographical area from two miles to one mile is perplexing. Valley Crest points out – correctly - that Plaintiffs have modified the definition of the class they seek to certify in their Motion. The class definition set forth in the complaint includes properties within two miles of Valley Crest’s grow facility, while in the Motion Plaintiffs define the class as those properties within one mile of Valley Crest’s operation. Valley Crest’s asserts that this change somehow shows the unascertainability of the class. But Plaintiffs’ point out that they made this change after discovery and consultation with their expert, and they therefore seek to narrow the definition of the class. That argument makes sense; it has merit. This Court will not find narrowing the scope of the case as in impediment to class action certification. It is everyone’s best interest. As argued by Plaintiffs, this demonstrates that the class definition is objective and not arbitrary as Valley Crest contends.

Valley Crest’s arguments attacking the adequacy of the named plaintiffs to serve as class representatives should be rejected. The declarations offered by the named Plaintiffs are sufficient to show that they are willing to assume a fiduciary responsibility to prosecute the action on behalf of the absent parties. The declarations are persuasive based upon the claims made here. There is no magic language that a plaintiff must include in their declaration for the court to find that they are adequate class representatives.

The Class representatives have typical claims and defenses.  Contrary to Valley Crest’s assertions, these rules are all met in this case. An individualized analysis of each parcel is not necessary for class certification; the question remains as to Valley Crest’s liability; does Valley Crest’s facility emit particulate matter and, if so, how far does that matter extend. The specific effect on a property is a damages question that can be resolved after a class wide determination of liability. As for Chonnie Bliss Jacobson’s UCL claim Plaintiffs’ class action complaint states that the main goal of this lawsuit is not money and at the same time, Plaintiffs seek damages for lost business and diminution in value of Plaintiffs’ properties; Ms. Jacobsen’s testimony repeats the allegations contained in Plaintiffs’ complaint and does not show any material difference between the remedy she seeks, and the remedy being sought by the class.

This Court echoes and paraphrases Justice Tobriner’s conclusion in City of San Jose that that neither the grounds stated in the Valley Crest opposition, nor the diverse issues here present, preclude the maintenance of this suit as a class action. The substantial saving in judicial time and litigation expense which would result from use of the class action format fully justify the trial court's exercise of its discretion.

The request made by Plaintiffs should be granted.

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[1] The Court apologizes for any grammatical and typographical errors in this decision and apologizes for the length of this ruling; it takes several days, sometimes not consecutive days, to read, consider and assimilate everything; summarizing what was said is helpful to this Court in reaching a decision.