Tentative Ruling: Santa Barbara County Coalition for Responsible Cannabis, et al., v. Ceres Farms, LLC, et al
Case Number
23CV03885
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Wed, 10/14/2026 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Defendant Valley Crest Farms, LLC’s, Motion for Summary Judgment Or, In The Alternative, Summary Adjudication
Tentative Ruling
For Plaintiffs Santa Barbara County Coalition for Responsible Cannabis, William Hahn, Danielle Dall’Armi, and Chonnie Bliss Jacobson: Robert A. Curtis, Aaron L. Arndt, Foley Bezek Behle & Curtis, LLP
For Defendant Valley Crest Farms, LLC: John M. Cardot, Matthew W. Quall, G. Andrew Slater, Quall Cardot LLP, Patrick D. Toole, John P. Kinsey, Ethan E. Mora, Wanger Jones Helsley, P.C.
For Defendants Ceres Farm LLC, Case Van Wingerden, Alex Van Wingerden, and the Van Wingerden Family Trust: Beth A. Collins, Amy M. Steinfeld, Marcus S. Bird, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP
RULING
For the reasons stated herein, the motion of defendant Valley Crest Farms, LLC, for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication is denied.
Background
As alleged in the class action complaint of plaintiffs Santa Barbara County Coalition for Responsible Cannabis (the Coalition), William Hahn (Hahn), Danielle Dall’Armi (Dall’Armi), and Chonnie Bliss Jacobson (Jacobson):
Hahn and Dall’Armi reside at 5950 Casitas Pass Road in Carpinteria, California. (Complaint, ¶ 8.) Jacobson resides at 6217 Casitas Pass Road. (Complaint, ¶ 9.) Ceres Farm, LLC, (Ceres Farm) holds 17 provisional state cannabis licenses and is actively cultivating cannabis in vented greenhouses located at 6030 Casitas Pass Road (the Ceres Farm Greenhouses). (Complaint, ¶ 12.) Valley Crest Farms, LLC, (Valley Crest) holds 39 provisional state cannabis licenses and is actively cultivating cannabis in vented greenhouses located at 5980 Casitas Pass Road (the Valley Crest Greenhouses). (Complaint, ¶ 13.)
On March 2, 2018, Alex Van Wingerden (A Van Wingerden) executed a sworn “Affidavit for County Letter for Temporary State Licensing for Medical Marijuana Cultivation Locations” (the Affidavit) on behalf of Ceres Farm, stating that it was “operating a medical marijuana cultivation site … that is a legal nonconforming site … operated in compliance with State law continuously since or before January 19, 2016” at the Ceres Farm Greenhouses. (Complaint, ¶ 12.) That same day, Case Van Wingerden (C Van Wingerden) executed the Affidavit on behalf of Valley Crest, stating that it was “operating a medical marijuana cultivation site … that is a legal nonconforming site … operated in compliance with State law continuously since or before January 19, 2016” at the Valley Crest Greenhouses. (Complaint, ¶ 13.)
A Van Wingerden and C Van Wingerden (collectively, the Van Wingerdens) and the Van Wingerden Family Trust (the Trust) own the underlying real estate, and the Van Wingerdens operate the cannabis companies, at the Ceres Farm Greenhouses and the Valley Crest Greenhouses. (Complaint, ¶¶ 14-16.)
The cultivation of cannabis by Ceres Farm, Valley Crest, the Van Wingerdens, and the Trust (collectively, Defendants) creates noxious cannabis malodors which travel in the airstream; which are strongest when the flower is budding, when the flower buds are harvested or agitated, and during the drying process; and which have been detected up to two miles from the source of the odors. (Complaint, ¶¶ 42, 45.) The characteristic odor associated with cannabis is attributed to the release of volatile organic compounds or “VOCs” and, in some cases, has been attributed to the presence of volatile sulfurous compounds referred to as thiols which are malodorous even at minute concentrations. (Complaint, ¶¶ 42, 43.) The year-round blooming, harvesting, and drying cycle of commercial cannabis growers in greenhouses that vent directly to the outside air contributes significantly to the pervasive, odor-saturated problems for the residents of Carpinteria. (Complaint, ¶ 46.)
Defendants’ vents open and close at various times and release the concentrated odors. (Complaint, ¶ 36.) Those variable conditions allow the malodorous air to accumulate and be transported by light winds to specific locations, causing periods of intense odors that can start and stop quickly from wind transport, dissipation, and other factors. (Ibid.) These conditions also allow the transport of offensive concentrations of the malodors that can be sustained or periodic in nature. (Ibid.)
To control the cannabis malodors, the greenhouses operated by Defendants rely primarily on a vapor-phase odor control technology that sends vapors pumped through PVC piping around the perimeter of the greenhouse. (Complaint, ¶ 49.) The PVC piping contains holes that release a chemically-based odor neutralizer or deodorant similar to the “Febreeze” spray used to mask bathroom odors, and that is equally malodorous to some people. (Ibid.) The dispensing of the chemical deodorants into the ambient air allows those deodorants to travel across property lines, into Plaintiffs’ homes and businesses, and to areas that are used by the public. (Ibid.) Defendants have not disclosed the chemical constituents of that deodorant to Plaintiffs or the public. (Ibid.)
Plaintiffs believe that Ceres Farm agreed to use carbon-scrubbers in 2022 but has not ordered or installed those scrubbers. (Complaint, ¶ 49.) Plaintiffs also believe that Defendants’ odor control system does not effectively control cannabis malodors generated at Defendants’ greenhouses and emitted onto Plaintiffs’ properties and other nearby lands. (Ibid.) The chemicals used by Defendants’ vapor-phase systems have never been tested at chronic levels of exposure to determine the health effects of low level, long-term exposure on humans. (Complaint, ¶ 50.) Numerous residents have complained about increases in allergies, asthma, and other respiratory ailments since the installation of the vapor-phase systems. (Ibid.)
Hahn, Dall’Armi, and Jacobson reside within a certain proximity of the commercial cannabis operations run or owned by Defendants. (Complaint, ¶ 1.) Defendants’ commercial cannabis operation has severely affected the enjoyment of the Plaintiffs’ properties. (Complaint, ¶ 8.) The neighborhood surrounding that property has a thick, heavy, strong stench of cannabis on a near daily basis, and the proximity to the ever-present spraying of the odor control system has caused chemicals and essential oils from the system to settle on Plaintiffs’ properties and landscaping. (Ibid.) The cannabis operation has also affected the real estate value of Plaintiffs’ homes. (Complaint, ¶¶ 8, 9.)
The Coalition, pursuant to the purpose for which it was formed, has received and investigated complaints against Defendants concerning the smells, noxious odors, and chemicals being emitted from Defendants’ properties, and has expended considerable time, resources, and money to investigate those complaints which would have been otherwise unnecessary were it not for Defendants’ conduct. (Complaint, ¶¶ 10, 11.)
Plaintiffs filed their class action complaint against Defendants on September 7, 2023, asserting four causes of action: (1) private nuisance; (2) public nuisance; (3) violation of Business & Professions Code section 17200 (against Valley Crest, the Van Wingerdens, and the Trust only); and (4) trespass. The complaint is brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and of a class of “[a]ll owner-occupiers of real property located within two miles of Defendants’ cannabis operations who purchased their property prior to January 19, 2016.” (Complaint, ¶ 51.)
On November 8, 2023, the Van Wingerdens, the Trust (collectively, the Van Wingerden Defendants), and Ceres Farm filed an answer to the complaint, generally denying its allegations and asserting 44 affirmative defenses.
On November 13, 2023, Valley Crest filed an answer to the complaint, generally denying its allegations and asserting 33 affirmative defenses.
On October 18, 2024, plaintiffs filed a notice of conditional settlement with Ceres Farm and the Van Wingerden Defendants, which indicated that a request for dismissal would be filed on or after February 25, 2025.
On July 20, 2026, Valley Crest filed a motion for summary judgment which is made on the grounds that Plaintiffs cannot prove the elements of any cause of action asserted against Valley Crest; possess no admissible evidence attributing any alleged odor, physical intrusion, economic injury, or other harm to Valley Crest; and cannot establish an actionable physical invasion, standing, or liability under the Unfair Competition Law, including the alleged predicate statutory violation or an available remedy. (Notice at p. 1, ll. 9-14.) In the alternative, the motion seeks summary adjudication of the first, second, third, and fourth causes of action asserted in the complaint, and of Plaintiffs’ claim for permanent diminution in value damages. (Notice at p. 1, l. 15 – p. 2, l. 11.)
On August 14, the court signed and entered an order finding that the settlement agreement between Ceres Farm and Plaintiffs was made in good faith within the meaning and effect of Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6.
On September 24, a dismissal as to the claims against Ceres Farm and the Van Wingerden Defendants was entered, with prejudice.
On September 29, Plaintiffs filed their opposition to the motion of Valley Crest.
Analysis
There exist procedural deficiencies in the motion which warrant its denial.
“If summary adjudication is sought, whether separately or as an alternative to the motion for summary judgment, the specific cause of action, affirmative defense, claims for damages, or issues of duty must be stated specifically in the notice of motion and be repeated, verbatim, in the separate statement of undisputed material facts.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(b).) “A motion for summary adjudication tenders only those issues or causes of action specified in the notice of motion, and may only be granted as to the matters thus specified. ... The motion must be denied if the movant fails to establish an entitlement to summary adjudication of the matters thus specified; the court cannot summarily adjudicate other issues or claims, even if a basis to do so appears from the papers.” (Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 728, 743–744 (Schmidlin).)
The notice of the motion specifically states the causes of action and claim for damages which are the subject of the alternative motion of Valley Crest for summary adjudication. Those causes of action and damages are not repeated verbatim in the separate statement submitted in support of the motion. Instead, the separate statement lists “Issue No. 1”, “Issue No. 2”, “Issue No. 3”, and “Issue No. 4”, each of which are also not specifically stated in the notice. (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 2, 5, 6, & 10.)
For example, though the notice of the motion specifically states as to the first cause of action for private nuisance, that “Plaintiffs cannot establish that Valley Crest was a substantial factor in causing the alleged interference with the use and enjoyment of their properties”, and as to the second cause of action for public nuisance, that “Plaintiffs cannot establish that Valley Crest was a substantial factor in causing the alleged public nuisance or the individual Plaintiffs’ alleged injury” (notice at p. 1, ll. 17-20), those statements are not repeated verbatim in the separate statement. Instead, the separate statement lists “Issue No. 1” as “Valley Crest is entitled to summary adjudication of the first and second causes of action for private and public nuisance because Plaintiffs cannot establish defendant-specific causation.” (Sep. Stmt. at p. 2.)
The same reasoning and analysis apply as to the third and fourth causes of action specifically stated in the notice of the motion. Though the notice specifically states those causes of action, they are not repeated verbatim in the separate statement. Instead, the separate statement lists “Issue No. 2” as “Valley Crest is entitled to summary adjudication of the fourth cause of action for trespass because Plaintiffs cannot establish a tangible physical entry or property damage attributable to Valley Crest”, and “Issue No. 3” as “Valley Crest is entitled to summary adjudication of the third cause of action for violation of the Unfair Competition Law.” (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 5 & 6.) Noted above, those matters are not specifically stated in the notice of the motion.
As to the third cause of action, the notice also states that Plaintiffs “cannot establish a loss of money or property caused by either alleged unlawful practice; the Coalition cannot establish an organizational economic injury independent of this litigation; Plaintiffs cannot establish a violation of Health and Safety Code section 41700 or applicable zoning laws governing legal nonconforming uses; and neither restitution nor prospective injunctive relief is available.” (Notice at p. 1, ll. 22-27.) As to the fourth cause of action, the notice states that Plaintiffs “cannot establish that any tangible material originating from Valley Crest entered or physically damaged their properties, and an alleged nondamaging odor intrusion does not constitute actionable trespass.” (Notice at p. 2, ll. 1-3.) Each of those statements is also not repeated verbatim in the separate statement.
The separate statement also appears to include additional matters that are not specifically stated in the notice of the motion. For example, the separate statement includes separately labeled sections under Issue No. 1 which assert that (section A) “multiple potential odor sources exist in the area”; (section B) “Plaintiffs have not identified a method of attributing the alleged odors to Valley Crest”, and (section C) “Plaintiffs’ recent expert submission provides no completed source-attribution result”. (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 2-4.)
Under Issue No. 3, the separate statement includes separately labeled sections stating that (section A) Plaintiffs “have not identified a realized loss of money or property”; (section B) the Coalition “has not identified a concrete organizational economic injury independent of this litigation”; (section C) Plaintiffs “have not identified evidence establishing either alleged predicate violation”; (section D) “Plaintiffs have not identified restitutionary property”; and (section E) “the conduct targeted by Plaintiffs request for prospective injunctive relief has ceased”. (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 6-9.)
It also appears, based on the matters asserted in the separate statement submitted in support of the motion, that Valley Crest seeks summary adjudication of legal issues or claims for damages “that do[] not completely dispose of a cause of action, affirmative defense, or issue of duty” pursuant to subdivision (t) of Code of Civil Procedure section 437c. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (t).) The court has no record showing that the parties have submitted to the court “[a] joint stipulation stating the issue or issues to be adjudicated” or “[a] declaration from each stipulating party that the motion will further the interest of judicial economy by decreasing trial time or significantly increasing the likelihood of settlement.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (t)(1)(A)(i), (ii).)
For all reasons discussed above, the separate statement of Valley Crest “reflects no attempt to comply with” the requirements described above. (Schmidlin, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 744.) “Nor [is] the notice of motion sufficient to tender, as a distinct subject for summary adjudication,” the matters set forth in the separate statement, considering that the notice “pray[s] only for an adjudication of the entire [first, second, third, and fourth] cause[s] of action.” (Ibid.) For these and all further reasons discussed above, Valley Crest is “entitled either to summary adjudication on the entire [first, second, third, and fourth] cause[s] of action, or to no relief at all.” (Ibid., original italics.)
In addition to the procedural deficiencies appearing in the motion described above, and for the reasons further discussed below, the present record demonstrates the existence of triable issues of material fact.
“A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(1).) “A defendant ... has met that party’s burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
“The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 & fn. 12 (Aguilar).) “From commencement to conclusion, the moving party bears the burden of persuasion that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Id. at pp. 845, 850.)
“In reviewing a defense summary judgment, [the court] appl[ies] the traditional three-step analysis ..., that is, [the court] (1) identif[ies] the pleaded issues, (2) determine[s] if the defense has negated an element of the plaintiff’s case or established a complete defense, and if and only if so, (3) determine[s] if the plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact.” (Meddock v. County of Yolo (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 170, 175, fn. omitted.)
“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)
“A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(2).)
Noted above, a defendant may show that it is entitled to summary judgment “by establishing that the plaintiff cannot establish one or more elements of all of his causes of action ....” (Risely v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 196, 207.) For the reasons discussed above, it is the court’s understanding that the motion seeks summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiffs cannot establish one or more elements of each cause of action asserted against Valley Crest, for which the motion alternatively seeks summary adjudication, and that there is no merit to the claim for diminution-in-value damages.
A separate statement of undisputed material facts submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication must “separately identify” the “cause of action” or the “claim for damages ... that is the subject of the motion” and “[e]ach supporting material fact claimed to be without dispute with respect to the cause of action [or] claim for damages ... that is the subject of the motion.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d)(1)(A)-(B).) A “material fact” is one that “relate[s] to” the cause of action or claim for damages and “that could make a difference in the disposition of the motion.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(a)(2).)
With respect to the first and second causes of action for, respectively, private nuisance and public nuisance that are the subject of the motion, the separate statement filed by Valley Crest lists 12 facts (the UMF) which the motion asserts are material and without dispute as to those of action. (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 2-5.) “ ‘[T]he separate statement effectively concedes the materiality of whatever facts are included. Thus, if a triable issue is raised as to any of the facts in [the] separate statement, the motion must be denied!’ [Citation.]” (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252, original italics.)
The facts that Valley Crest contends are material and without dispute as to the first and second causes of action include “[w]hen asked whom she blamed for the odors she perceived, Dall’Armi testified, ‘I don’t know who to blame.’ She further testified, ‘I assume that it’s the greenhouse directly below us which is Valley Crest.’ (Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 5.)
“The trial court must consider all evidence set forth in the parties’ papers, and summary judgment is to be granted if all the papers submitted show there is no triable issue of material fact in the action, thereby entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.” (Sanchez v. Swinerton & Walberg Co. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1461, 1466, original italics.) “[I]f a plaintiff in response to a defendant’s summary judgment request demonstrates the existence of a triable dispute with ‘specific facts’ [citation] by making a prima facie showing of the merit of the complaint, the motion must be denied. There is to be no weighing of evidence.” (Kids’ Universe v. In2Labs (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 870, 880.)
Plaintiffs submit with their opposition to the motion, a declaration of their counsel, Robert A, Curtis (attorney Curtis), to which is attached a transcript of the deposition of Dall’Armi that proceeded on February 11, 2025. (Curtis Dec., ¶ 7 & exhibit E.) That transcript reflects that Dall’Armi stated at her deposition that she “[a]bsolutely 100 percent” knew for a fact that Valley Crest is contributing to the odor because “[t]heir vents are open, you can see them open. That’s when we smell it -- I mean, 100 percent.” (Curtis Dec., exhibit E at p. 83, ll. 10-15.)
“[S]ummary judgment shall not be granted by the court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence if contradicted by other inferences or evidence that raise a triable issue as to any material fact.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) To the extent UMF no. 5 described above gives rise to an inference that Plaintiffs have not or cannot attribute any alleged odors to Valley Crest, the testimony of Dall’Armi also described above gives rise to a competing inference reasonably deducible from the evidence presented here, that Plaintiffs can attribute the odors to Valley Crest.
“The requirement of a separate statement from the moving party and a responding statement from the party opposing summary judgment serves two functions: to give the parties notice of the material facts at issue in the motion and to permit the trial court to focus on whether those facts are truly undisputed.” (Parkview Villas Assn., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1210.) For the reasons discussed above, by including UMF no. 5 purporting to show, expressly or by inference, that Plaintiffs cannot attribute or identify a method of attributing the alleged odors at issue to Valley Crest, the motion effectively concedes the materiality of UMF no. 5. To the extent a reasonable trier of fact could infer from the evidence presented by Plaintiffs that Dall’Armi can attribute or identify a method of attributing the odors to Valley Crest, any inference reasonably deducible from UMF no. 5 is, for all reasons discussed above, contradicted by other inferences that raise a triable issue as to that fact.
As to the third and fourth cause of action for, respectively, trespass and violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200, the separate statement asserts or effectively asserts that Valley Crest “relies on” UMF no. 5 to show Plaintiffs’ inability to attribute any alleged odor or airborne material to Valley Crest, and to connect any alleged statutory effect to a discharge from Valley Crest including as to the claim for prospective injunctive relief. (See Sep. Stmt. at pp. 5, 8, 10.) Therefore, the same reasoning and analysis apply as to the third and fourth causes of action that are the subject of the motion.
“The defendant may also present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence—as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855 & fn. 24.) The separate statement also lists the following material facts as UMF no. 6, which relates to the first and second causes of action: “Special Interrogatory No. 30 required Plaintiffs to identify how they distinguish cannabis odor originating from Valley Crest from cannabis odor originating at another property within one mile. Plaintiffs responded that they ‘cannot respond to this request,’ and their supplemental responses did not identify a method of source attribution.” (Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 6.)
With their opposition, Plaintiffs submit a declaration of their expert, Scott Bourdon, to show that during the week of August 31, 2026, cannabis testing by the County of Santa Barbara at property line of Valley Crest measured “4 D/T for greater than three minutes”; that this testing “demonstrates that odors (VCF) migrate off property at the numerical level of the Santa Barbara County cannabis odor standard”; that the “low odor thresholds, airborne concentrations at which they could be smelled, in combination with the various factors such as wind speed, elevation, temperature, edifices in the surrounding area, and cloud cover would certainly lead to a wide range of such odor concentrations in the nearby region and make regional properties susceptible to ... odors from [Valley Crest]”; and that, based on Bourdon’s “expertise and professional experience, various environmental and operational conditions likely lead to odiferous contaminants from [Valley Crest] migrating at nuisance levels up to a mile in distance from the [Valley Crest] property.” (Bourdon Dec., ¶¶ 3-5.)
Even if UMF no. 6 described above was sufficient to show that Plaintiffs do not possess evidence necessary to identify a method of source attribution, the motion does not, for the reasons described above, show why Plaintiffs cannot reasonably obtain necessary evidence. As the separate statement also asserts, in the same manner described above, that Valley Crest relies on UMF no. 6 to show why it is entitled to summary adjudication of the third and fourth causes of action asserted in the complaint, the same reasoning and analysis apply. (See Sep. Stmt. at pp. 5 [fourth cause of action] & 8 [third cause of action].)
When determining a motion for summary judgment or adjudication, the court “must view the evidence in a light favorable to plaintiff ..., liberally construing her evidentiary submission while strictly scrutinizing defendants’ own showing ....” (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768.) “Doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion should be resolved in favor of the opposing party.” (Evan F. v. Hughson United Methodist Church (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 828, 842.) Though the examples provided above are intended to be illustrative but not exhaustive, the present record demonstrates the existence of triable issues of material fact and competing inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence described above, in regard to whether Plaintiffs can establish one or more elements of the first, second, third, and fourth causes of action asserted in the complaint. (Pierson v. Helmerich & Payne Internat. Drilling Co. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 608, 627.) For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will deny the request for summary adjudication of those causes of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)
As the motion also fails to show, for the same reasons discussed above, that each of the causes of action asserted against the Valley Crest have no merit, the court will also deny the request for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(1).)
As to the request for summary adjudication of Plaintiffs’ claim for permanent diminution-in-value damages, the grounds stated in the notice are that Plaintiffs cannot recover those damages “for an alleged nuisance they contend is continuing and capable of abatement, and “possess no competent appraisal or valuation evidence establishing that any property suffered diminution in value.” (Notice at p. 2, ll. 4-7.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 437c authorizes summary adjudication of “one or more claims for damages ... if the party contends ... that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code ....” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) “The reference to ‘one or more claims for damages’” in subdivision (f)(1) of section 437c “is ... qualified by, and limited to, punitive damages.” (DeCastro West Chodorow & Burns, Inc. v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 410, 421 (DeCastro).) For these and all further reasons discussed above, subdivision (f)(1) of section 437c “does not permit summary adjudication of a single item of ... damage which does not dispose of an entire cause of action.” (Id. at p. 422; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1) [the motion must “completely dispose of ... a claim for damages ....”].)
“Two distinct classifications have emerged in nuisance law which determine the remedies available to injured parties and the applicable statute of limitations. On the one hand, permanent nuisances are of a type where ‘by one act a permanent injury is done, [and] damages are assessed once for all.’ [Citations.] The cases finding the nuisance complained of to be unquestionably permanent in nature have involved solid structures, such as a building encroaching upon the plaintiff’s land [citation], a steam railroad operating over plaintiff’s land [citation], or regrade of a street for a rail system [citation]. In such cases, plaintiffs ordinarily are required to bring one action for all past, present and future damage within three years after the permanent nuisance is erected. [Citations.] The statutory period is shorter for claims against public entities. [Citation.] Damages are not dependent upon any subsequent use of the property but are complete when the nuisance comes into existence.
“On the other hand, if a nuisance is a use which may be discontinued at any time, it is considered continuing in character and persons harmed by it may bring successive actions for damages until the nuisance is abated. [Citation.] Recovery is limited, however, to actual injury suffered prior to commencement of each action. Prospective damages are unavailable.” (Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority (1985) 39 Cal.3d 862, 868–869, fn. omitted.)
Even if the motion could present evidence showing that there exist no triable issues of material fact as to whether the alleged nuisance can be abated and that as a matter of law, Plaintiffs could not recover damages for any permanent diminution in value, wholly absent from the motion is any reasoned argument showing why summary adjudication of that claim for damages completely disposes of the associated cause or causes of action for nuisance. (DeCastro, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will also deny the motion for summary adjudication of Plaintiffs’ claim for permanent diminution-in-value damages.
Request for judicial notice:
In support of the motion, Valley Crest requests judicial notice of the complaint; the court’s order granting Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification; and Santa Barbara County Ordinance No. 5244. (RJN, ¶¶ 1-3 & exhibits X, Y, Z.)
Though not necessary, the court will grant the request of Valley Crest for judicial notice of the complaint filed by Plaintiffs in this case. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1).)
The court order granting Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and the Santa Barbara County ordinance described above are not necessary to the court’s adjudication of the motion. For these reasons, the court will deny the request for judicial notice of those records and materials. (See Evid. Code, § 350; Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063, overruled on other grounds in In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1276.)
Evidentiary objections:
Plaintiffs submit objections to material contained in the declaration of Payton D. Dolenar filed by Valley Crest in support of the motion. Valley Crest submits objections to material contained in the declarations of Orell Anderson, Scott Bourdon, Lionel Neff, attorney Curtis, and exhibits to the declaration of attorney Curtis.
“In granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).)
The court will overrule objection nos. 12, 13, and 15 of Valley Crest.
The court also notes that the written objections of Valley Crest fail to comply with court rules, which require that “[e]ach written objection must be numbered consecutively and must:
“(1) Identify the name of the document in which the specific material objected to is located;
“(2) State the exhibit, title, page, and line number of the material objected to;
“(3) Quote or set forth the objectionable statement or material; and
“(4) State the grounds for each objection to that statement or material.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(b)(1)-(4).) “Written objections to evidence must follow one of the ... two formats” set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(b).)
Though the written objections of the Valley Crest identify the document where the material objected to is located and quote the objectionable material, those objections fail to follow the format set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354. For example, Valley Crest asserts multiple objections to multiple statements contained in each cited paragraph of the Bourdon declaration. The manner in which those written objections are formatted effectively forces the court to guess whether Valley Crest contends that all or only some statements within each cited paragraph are objectionable, and why. For these reasons, the court may disregard those objections. (Hodjat v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1, 8 [trial court may decline to rule on improperly formatted objections].)