Lucero Milla et al vs Ryan Mori et al
Lucero Milla et al vs Ryan Mori et al
Case Number
23CV03784
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Mon, 01/08/2024 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Demurrer to Complaint
Tentative Ruling
Lucero Milla, et al. v. Ryan Mori, et al.
Case No. 23CV03784
Hearing Date: January 8, 2024
HEARING: Defendants’ Demurrer to Complaint of Plaintiffs Lucero Milla and Adali Guadarrama
ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiffs Lucero Milla and Adali Guadarrama: Jacob O. Partiyeli
For Defendants Ryan Mori, an individual, and Ryan Mori, trustee of the Ryan Mori Trust dated May 29, 2019: Melissa Fassett and Jeff F. Tchakarov
TENTATIVE RULING:
- Defendants’ demurrer to the ninth and fourteenth causes of action is sustained with leave to amend.
- Defendants’ demurrer is overruled as to all other causes of action.
- Plaintiffs shall file and serve their first amended complaint no later than January 29, 2024.
- Plaintiffs shall not add any new causes of action without first obtaining permission of the court to do so.
Background:
This action commenced on August 30, 2023, by the filing of the complaint by plaintiffs Lucero Milla and Adali Guadarrama (collectively “plaintiffs”) against defendants Ryan Mori, an individual, and Ryan Mori, trustee of the Ryan Mori Trust dated May 29, 2019 (collectively “defendants”). The complaint alleges 14 causes of action as follows: (1) Violation of California Civil Code section 1942.4; (2) Tortious breach of the warranty of habitability; (3) Private nuisance; (4) Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq.; (5) Negligence; (6) Breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment; (7) Intentional infliction of emotional distress; (8) Negligence per se; (9) Violation of Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Civil Code section 1750, et seq.; (10) Violation of Civil Code section 1946.2, et seq.; (11) Intentional misrepresentation; (12) Intentional influence to vacate; (13) Retaliatory Eviction, Civil Code section 1942.5; and (14) Code of Civil Procedure section 732.
As alleged in the 66-page complaint:
Plaintiffs were tenants of residential property located at 813 W. Mission Street, Santa Barbara. (Complaint, ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs have at all material times satisfied their lease and were in lawful possession of the property. (Ibid.) Defendants were plaintiffs’ landlords as owners and managers of the property. (Complaint, ¶ 3.)
Plaintiffs leased the property pursuant to a written lease agreement with defendants on April 1, 2020. (Complaint, ¶ 107.)
“Plaintiffs or had advance knowledge of the unfitness of agents, employees or representatives who committed the following unlawful acts against Plaintiffs, including on-site and off-site managers, regional managers, property supervisors, repairmen, pest control operators, licensed and unlicensed contractors, as well as individuals by the names who have been identified as DOE Defendants.” (Complaint, ¶ 15.) “Defendant employed such agent(s), employee(s) or representative(s) as identified as DOE Defendants with a conscious disregard of the rights and/or safety of others, authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct by among other things, refusing to change course of action or make repairs in spite of written notices to comply and enforcement measures by the City and County of Santa Barbara as alleged in the below paragraphs, in spite of actual notice and knowledge of harms suffered by Plaintiffs as alleged in this Complaint and for a period of time exceeding many years.” (Complaint, ¶ 16.)
“[T]he Subject Property has been subject to multiple inspections by the Santa Barbara Building & Safety Department that resulted in citations against the Defendant for multiple violations of the California Civil Code, the California Health and Safety Code, the Santa Barbara Municipal Code, or the respective city government municipal code corresponding to the Subject Property.” (Complaint, ¶ 17.)
“[T]he violations issued to Defendants include violations of the Santa Barbara Municipal Code§ 22.04.010, deeming the Subject Property a substandard dwelling.” (Complaint, ¶ 19.) Habitability violations included “mold contamination, improper weatherproofing, improper ventilation, moisture damage, dysfunctional plumbing systems, dysfunctional electrical systems, inoperable heater, leaking air conditioning system, unpermitted electrical and plumbing systems, illegal, unsafe construction, and excessive accumulations of trash.” (Complaint, ¶ 20; see also ¶¶ 23-31.)
“As a consequence of the conditions, Plaintiffs have sustained injuries and health problems caused or exacerbated by the conditions. As an additional consequence of the conditions and the physical injuries caused by the conditions, the Plaintiffs have also sustained mental suffering, frustration and emotional distress.” (Complaint, ¶ 22.)
On June 8, 2023, the City of Santa Barbara inspected the property and cited defendants for illegal conversion of the garage, garage unavailable for parking, roof dilapidation, interior remodel without permits, no working heater, dwelling unites lack required utilities, unpermitted sink and gas stove, no heating, unsanitary and substandard, accumulations of rubbish on the property, rodent or insect infestation, retaining wall built without permit, drainage on the property poses a storm water nuisance, plumbing system and fixtures not in proper working conditions, unsanitary drainage system, electrical system hazards, and work without permitting. (Complaint, ¶ 71.) The City of Santa Barbara Building & Safety Department inspected the property and issued additional citations for violations on June 12, 2023. (Complaint, ¶ 72.) After the citations, defendants failed to remedy any of the illegal conditions. (Complaint, ¶ 74.)
In February 2023, defendants raised plaintiffs’ rent in excess of the rent caps created by the Tenant Protection Act of 2019. (Complaint, ¶ 75.)
On April 24, 2023, plaintiffs received a notice of termination of tenancy from defendants stating that Mori’s family was going to move into the property.(Complaint, ¶ 77.) However, plaintiffs identified a rental listing for the property stating it was available for rent at an increased rate than what plaintiffs were paying, in order to circumvent rent control laws. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs did not receive any relocation assistance as required by law. (Complaint, ¶ 79.)
Defendants now demur to each cause of action.
Plaintiffs oppose the demurrer.
Analysis:
“When any ground for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) “Our consideration of the facts alleged includes ‘those evidentiary facts found in recitals of exhibits attached to [the] complaint.’ [Citation.]” (Alexander v. Exxon Mobil (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1250.)
“[A] court must treat a demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, it does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.” (Travelers Indem. Co. of Connecticut v. Navigators Specialty Ins. Co. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 341, 358, citing Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)
“To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)
“If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer. “ ‘[W]e are not limited to plaintiffs’ theory of recovery in testing the sufficiency of their complaint against a demurrer, but instead must determine if the factual allegations of the complaint are adequate to state a cause of action under any legal theory. The courts of this state have . . . long since departed from holding a plaintiff strictly to the ‘form of action’ he has pleaded and instead have adopted the more flexible approach of examining the facts alleged to determine if a demurrer should be sustained.’ ” [Citations.]” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38-39.)
Defendants’ demurrer, as to most of the causes of action, as set forth in the notice, is based upon misjoinder and uncertainty. Misjoinder and uncertainty will be addressed first and separately as they pertain to the complaint in general. As to the four causes of action that defendants have specifically argued, those will be addressed following the discussions regarding misjoinder and uncertainty.
Misjoinder
Defendants demur, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (d), arguing that Ryan Mori, as trustee of the Ryan Mori Trust dated May 29, 3019, is not a proper party to the action because it was not a lessor, had no contractual relationship with plaintiffs, and no legal basis exists for any claim against Mori as the trustee or the trust.
“(a) All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them:
“(1) Any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative, in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action; or
“(2) A claim, right, or interest adverse to them in the property or controversy which is the subject of the action.
“(b) It is not necessary that each defendant be interested as to every cause of action or as to all relief prayed for. Judgment may be given against one or more defendants according to their respective liabilities.
“(c) Where the plaintiff is in doubt as to the person from whom he or she is entitled to redress, he or she may join two or more defendants, with the intent that the question as to which, if any, of the defendants is liable, and to what extent, may be determined between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 379.)
“Demurrers on the ground of misjoinder lie only when the defect appears on the face of the complaint or matters judicially noticed.” (Royal Surplus Lines Ins. Co., v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 193, 198.)
Defendants’ argument is conclusory and unsupported by evidence before the court. As alleged in the complaint, the Trust, as one of the defendants, owned, leased, and managed the property. Plaintiffs have pled all necessary facts which, if taken as true, set forth a claim, right, or interest adverse to each of the named defendants. If the Trust is ultimately not a proper party to the action, it is not apparent from the complaint and it would be improper to sustain the demur, as to the Trust, on the grounds of misjoinder.
Uncertainty
Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ allegations “fail to place Defendants on notice as to: what specific habitability issues Plaintiffs experienced at the Property; exactly when Plaintiffs observed said issues for the first time; exactly when Plaintiffs complained about said issues to Plaintiffs or otherwise provided Plaintiffs with notice of any necessary repairs; how Plaintiffs complained or requested repairs (verbally or in writing); to whom Plaintiffs complained; what response Plaintiffs received; and if Defendants made repairs to the Property, why Plaintiffs consider said repairs insufficient and/or untimely.” (Demurrer, p. 16, ll. 20-26.)
“ ‘[U]ncertain’ ” includes ambiguous and unintelligible.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).)
“Demurrers for uncertainty . . . are disfavored. . . . A demurrer for uncertainty should be overruled when the facts as to which the complaint is uncertain are presumptively within the defendant’s knowledge.” (Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822.)
“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)
“Generally, the failure to specify the uncertain aspects of a complaint will defeat a demurrer based on the grounds of uncertainty.” (Fenton v. Groveland Community Services Dist. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 797, 809; disapproved by Katzberg v. Regents of University of California (2002) 29 Cal.4th 300 on other grounds.)
Defendants’ argument that the complaint is uncertain fails. As set forth above, plaintiffs set forth, and even repeat, the alleged habitability issues at the subject property. Plaintiffs also set forth the dates when the inspections took place, the citations that defendants allegedly received as a result of the inspections, and the damages suffered. Plaintiffs are not required to provide more at the pleading stage. Either defendants will have knowledge of the other facts they argue are missing or they will clarify the allegations through discovery. The court does not find the allegations uncertain and will overrule the demurrer based on uncertainty.
Ninth Cause of Action
Defendants demur to plaintiffs’ ninth cause of action for violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”) arguing that the CLRA is not applicable to residential leases and leased premises.
The court notes that defendants cite the unpublished and noncitable case of Freeman v. United Dominion Realty Trust, Inc. (2008) 208 WL 1838373 in support of his argument. This is a violation of California Rules of Court rule 8.115 subdivision (a). Counsel will be reminded to comply with the Rules of Court as well as all other statutes and laws.
In opposition, plaintiffs primarily argue the purpose of the CLRA, which is “to protect consumers against unfair and deceptive business practices and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection.” (Civ. Code, § 1760.)
Civil Code section 1770 provides a list of “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive actions or practices” that fall under the CLRA. None of the items appear to apply to any of plaintiffs’ claims.
The CLRA, by its plain language, applies to consumers. “ ‘Consumer’ means an individual who seeks or acquires, by purchase or lease, any goods or services for personal, family, or household purposes.” (Civ. Code, § 1761, subd. (d).)
“Goods” are “tangible chattels bought or leased for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, . . . including goods that, at the time of the sale or subsequently, are to be so affixed to real property as to become a part of real property, whether or not they are severable from the real property.” (Civ. Code, § 1761, subd. (a).)
“Services” are “work, labor, and services for other than a commercial or business use, including services furnished in connection with the sale or repair of goods.” (Civ. Code, § 1761, subd. (b).)
The court agrees with defendants that the definitions do not include real property. The complaint does not set forth any allegations that would bring plaintiffs’ claims within the protections of the CLRA. The demurrer to the ninth cause of action will be sustained for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Although the court has doubts regarding plaintiffs’ ability to amend to state a viable cause of action under the CLRA, leave to amend will be granted.
Fourteenth Cause of Action
Defendants demur to the fourteenth cause of action for violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 732, arguing that plaintiffs’ allegations of waste are not applicable against defendants.
In support of this argument, defendants again cite an unpublished and noncitable case: Murray v. Hull 2020 WL 5834394. Likewise, plaintiffs cite Lidd Enterprises, Inc. v. Auto Buyline, which does not appear to be either a published case or even an unpublished case. Should counsel continue to disregard the Rules of Court in the future, the court will be inclined to issue an order to show cause as to why substantial sanctions should not be imposed.
Plaintiffs argue that the cause of action is proper due to defendants allowing mold to proliferate and destroy clothing and other values that belonged to plaintiffs.
Code of Civil Procedure section 732 provides: “If a guardian, conservator, tenant for life or years, joint tenant, or tenant in common of real property, commit waste thereon, any person aggrieved by the waste may bring an action against him therefor, in which action there may be judgment for treble damages.” (Italics added.)
“ ‘ “[W]aste is conduct (including in this word both acts of commission and of omission) on the part of the person in possession of land which is actionable at the behest of, and for the protection of the reasonable expectations of, another owner of an interest in the same land. . . . Thus, waste is, functionally, a part of the law which keeps in balance the conflicting desires of persons having interests in the same land.” ’ [Citation.]” [Citation.] “ ‘[W]aste is defined as ‘ “an unlawful act or omission of duty on the part of a tenant, resulting in permanent injury to the [property].” ’ [Citations.]” [Citations.] “ ‘In order to state a cause of action for waste, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant was under a duty to preserve and protect the property involved.’ ” [Citation.]” (Avalon Pacific-Santa Ana, L.P. v. HD Supply Repair & Remodel, LLC (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1211-1212.)
“The gist of a waste claim is acts by the tenant causing injury to the lessor's reversion interest or the inheritance.” (Id. at p. 1214.)
By way of their complaint, plaintiffs allege “Defendants have committed waste at the Subject Property by and through their refusal to abate the presence of mold growth in the Subject Property for the many years of the Plaintiffs' tenancy.” (Complaint, ¶ 226.) The damages claimed by plaintiffs is: “The Plaintiffs have been aggrieved by the waste, as it has caused them severe emotional distress, knowing they and their young children are living in the presence of a toxic contaminant which could carry serious health impact on them and their development, and economic damages, as the mold growth has damaged their personal belongings, as alleged above herein.” (Complaint, ¶ 227.)
The cases cited by plaintiffs do not stand for the holdings that plaintiffs claim they do. For example: Cornelison v. Kornbluth (1975) 15 Cal.3d 590, Southern Pac. Land Co. v. Kiggins (1930) 110 Cal.App. 56, and Fuller v. Montafi (1921) 55 Cal.App. 314, despite plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary, all involved plaintiffs that possessed ownership interests in real property.
The statute, by its plain terms, is applicable to real property rather than the personal belongings that are pled by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs make no allegations of an ownership interest in the real property. For these reasons, the demurrer to plaintiffs’ fourteenth cause of action will be sustained. As above, the court doubts that plaintiffs will be able to amend the complaint to allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action under Code of Civil Procedure section 732 but will grant leave to amend.
Second and Sixth Causes of Action
Defendants demur to plaintiffs’ second cause of action for breach of the warranty of habitability and the sixth cause of action for breach of quiet enjoyment, arguing that, because they are based on a contractual breach (the lease) they are not pled with adequate specificity.
The California Supreme Court has held: “In an action based on a written contract, a plaintiff may plead the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise language.” (Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189 (Construction Protective Services).)
In Miles v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 394 (Miles), the “plaintiff alleged the basic elements of a breach of contract claim. ‘A cause of action for breach of contract requires proof of the following elements: (1) existence of the contract; (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance; (3) defendant’s breach; and (4) damages to plaintiff as a result of the breach.’ (citation.) Plaintiff alleged an express contract to refinance his loan, including the loan balance, the interest rate, and the monthly payment. He alleged he performed by making payments under the agreement. He alleged defendants breached that contract by repudiating it and refusing to accept payments under it. And he alleged he was damaged by various fees he was charged and by being evicted from his home.” (Id., at p. 402.) The court found those allegations sufficient and held that “plaintiff’s failure either to attach or to set out verbatim the terms of the contract was not fatal to his breach of contract cause of action.” (Ibid.)
As set forth above, under “background” as well as the “uncertainty” discussion, plaintiffs have, in the 66-page complaint, set forth more than adequate allegations regarding the lease agreement and the breaches constituting the second and sixth causes of action. Clearly, as the owners and landlords of the subject premises, defendants will have copies of the leases and other documents that are referenced in the complaint or, at the very least, will be able to obtain them in the course of discovery.
The demurrer will be overruled as to the second and sixth causes of action.
“The plaintiff may not amend the complaint to add a new cause of action without having obtained permission to do so . . .” (Harris v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023.) Plaintiffs will be ordered to not add any new causes of action to the first amended complaint without following the proper legal procedure.