Thomas Schiferl vs General Motors LLC

Case Number

23CV03439

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 12/08/2023 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Demurrer and Motion to Strike

Tentative Ruling

(1) For all reasons stated herein, the demurrer of defendant General Motors, LLC, is sustained as to the second cause of action alleged in plaintiff’s complaint, with leave to amend. Except as otherwise herein sustained, defendant’s demurrer is overruled.

(2) For all reasons stated herein, defendant’s motion to strike is denied.

(3) Plaintiff shall file and serve a first amended complaint on or before December 18, 2023.

Background:

This action arises out of the purchase of a vehicle manufactured by defendant General Motors, LLC (GM). As alleged in the complaint filed by plaintiff Thomas Schiferl on August 8, 2023:

On September 16, 2020, plaintiff travelled to Bunnin Chevrolet in Santa Barbara, California, to acquire a safe and reliable electric vehicle that would be able to go at least 259 miles per charge and that did not have any defects with its battery. When plaintiff arrived at the dealership, he met with the salesperson and asked her to show him a 2020 Chevrolet Bolt EV (the vehicle). The salesperson assured plaintiff that there were no problems with the battery in the vehicle. Once plaintiff was satisfied by the representations made by the salesperson and by GM, through its advertisements and publications, that the vehicle’s range on a single charge was 259 miles and that there were no problems with the vehicle’s battery, plaintiff executed a lease for the vehicle on June 23, 2020.

All owners and lessees of 2020 GM vehicles receive multiple express warranties directly from GM for periods of up to 8 years or 100,000 miles. Owners and lessees receive these express warranties without regard to who they acquired the vehicle from or the terms of acquisition. By issuing the express warranties directly to plaintiff, GM undertook to preserve or maintain the utility or performance of the vehicle or to provide compensation if there was a failure in the vehicle’s utility or performance.

Unbeknownst to plaintiff, the battery that GM installed in the vehicle can start a fire which resulted in GM issuing numerous recalls. The recalls reduced the charge capacity of the battery and the distance the vehicle can be driven on a single charge. GM also advised vehicle owners not to charge the vehicle in their garages due to a risk of fire.

Pursuant to a recall issued by GM on August 20, 2021, plaintiff presented the vehicle to an authorized Chevrolet dealership to have the defective battery replaced. The dealership advised plaintiff that the parts were not available and that it had no information as to when they would be. Despite plaintiff’s repeated presentations of the vehicle to GM’s authorized repair facilities, GM has been unable to conform the vehicle to its express warranties. The vehicle remains in a defective condition.

GM was aware of the defective batteries plaguing Chevrolet Bolt vehicles, which includes cell battery imbalances or defects in the battery management system, as early as 2017. Plaintiff would not have leased the vehicle had he been advised that he could not drive 259 miles on a single charge, or had he been advised that the vehicle could catch fire and burn down plaintiff’s home.

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges six causes of action against GM: (1) fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation; (2) negligent misrepresentation; (3) unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts and practices (Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.; (4) violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (breach of express warranty); (5) violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (breach of implied warranty); and (6) violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b)).

GM has filed a demurrer to the first, second, and third causes of action alleged in the complaint on the grounds that each cause of action is barred by applicable statutes of limitation and that plaintiff has failed to allege each cause of action with the required particularity or specificity. GM has also filed a motion to strike from the complaint plaintiff’s demand for punitive damages. Plaintiff opposes the demurrer and motion to strike.

Analysis:

(1) Demurrer

In ruling on a demurrer, the court determines whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125.) A demurrer assumes the truth of properly pleaded material allegations, but not of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Ibid.) The pleading subject to demurrer is given a reasonable interpretation and is read as a whole, with all its parts in their context. (Ibid.)

Demurrer based on statutes of limitation:

GM asserts that the “Fraud Claims” alleged by plaintiff, which GM defines as the first, second, and third causes of action, are barred by the three-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d). (Demurrer at p. 6, ll. 1-2 & p. 7, ll. 13-15.) Plaintiff does not address this ground for demurrer in his opposing papers.

An “action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake” is subject to a three-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d). “To determine which statute of limitations applies to a particular action, we consider the ‘gravamen’ of the action rather than its form or the relief demanded.” (Bank of New York Mellon v. Citibank, N.A. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 935, 943.)

“The elements of fraud, which give rise to the tort action for deceit, are (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638 (Lazar).)

The first cause of action alleged in the complaint is based upon GM’s purported knowledge and intentional concealment of material facts regarding the presence of a defective battery pack in the vehicle for the purpose of selling the vehicle to plaintiff or to discourage plaintiff from seeking repair or replacement of the vehicle’s battery. (Complaint, ¶¶ 29, 30, 34.) As the first cause of action is based on alleged fraud by GM in knowingly concealing from plaintiff the presence of a defective battery in the vehicle, the claim is subject to the three-year limitations period under Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d). (Broberg v. The Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 912, 920 (Broberg).)

In the second cause of action, plaintiff alleges that representations made by GM were false. (Complaint, ¶¶ 38, 39, 41.) It can be inferred from the express allegations of the complaint that the false representations at issue relate to the vehicle’s range on a single battery charge and that there were no problems with the vehicle’s battery. (Complaint, ¶ 8.) Because the essence of the second cause of action is also based on purportedly false representations made by GM to plaintiff regarding defects in the vehicle battery, the second cause of action is also subject to the three-year limitations period under Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d). (Broberg, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 920.)

In the third cause of action, plaintiff alleges that GM’s conduct as alleged in the complaint, including purported violations of Civil Code section 1790 et seq. (the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act or Song-Beverly) and GM’s fraudulent concealment of the existence of a defect, constitutes unfair business acts or practices in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. (the UCL).

“A claim for unfair competition under Business and Professions Code section 17200 must be brought within four years of its accrual.” (Broberg, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 920; see also Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17208.) Accordingly, the third cause of action alleged in the complaint is not subject to the three-year limitations period under Code of Civil Procedure section 338.

GM’s demurrer on statute of limitations grounds is based on the date plaintiff executed a lease for the vehicle as alleged in the complaint. Because plaintiff alleges that he executed the lease for the vehicle on June 23, 2020, GM argues, plaintiff was required to file the complaint no later than June 23, 2023, pursuant to the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d). As the third cause of action alleged in the complaint is subject to the four-year statute of limitations under Business and Professions Code section 17208 for all reasons discussed above, GM’s demurrer to the third cause of action on this ground is overruled.

GM further contends that, with respect to the first and second causes of action alleged in the complaint, plaintiff cannot invoke the delayed-discovery rule because plaintiff alleges that the vehicle was delivered to him with serious defects. Therefore, GM argues, plaintiff has not alleged that he did not discover the conduct giving rise to his claim within the applicable limitations period.

“A general demurrer based on the statute of limitations is only permissible where the dates alleged in the complaint show that the action is barred by the statute of limitations. [Citation.] The running of the statute must appear ‘clearly and affirmatively’ from the dates alleged. It is not sufficient that the complaint might be barred. [Citation.] If the dates establishing the running of the statute of limitations do not clearly appear in the complaint, there is no ground for general demurrer. The proper remedy ‘is to ascertain the factual basis of the contention through discovery and, if necessary, file a motion for summary judgment ….’ [Citation.]” (Roman v. County of Los Angeles (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 316, 324-325, italics omitted.)

Though plaintiff alleges that he executed a lease for the vehicle on June 23, 2020, there are no allegations that indicate, either expressly or by inference, the date on which the vehicle was physically delivered to plaintiff following plaintiff’s execution of the lease. Therefore, to the extent the vehicle was not delivered to plaintiff on June 23, 2020, there are no allegations that indicate that plaintiff could have discovered the purported battery defects or any alleged fraudulent conduct on that date.

In addition, an action for relief based on fraud “is not deemed accrued ‘until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.’ [Citation.] The courts interpret discovery in this context to mean not when the plaintiff became aware of the specific wrong alleged, but when the plaintiff suspected or should have suspected that an injury was caused by wrongdoing. The statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff has information which would put a reasonable person on inquiry.” (Kline v. Turner (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1373–1374; Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (d).)

There are no facts alleged on the face of the complaint demonstrating that plaintiff had any reason to suspect that wrongdoing by GM caused any injury to plaintiff or that plaintiff had any reason to discover a cause of action based on fraud either as of the date plaintiff executed the lease for the vehicle or as of the date the vehicle was delivered to plaintiff. (See Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807; see also Gutierrez v. Mofid (1985) 39 Cal.3d 892, 897 [“the uniform California rule is that a limitations period dependent on discovery of the cause of action begins to run no later than the time the plaintiff learns, or should have learned, the facts essential to his claim”].)

Moreover, facts expressly alleged in the complaint suggest that the earliest date that plaintiff learned about any purported defects in the vehicle’s battery was on or after August 20, 2021, when plaintiff alleges that GM announced it was adding all remaining 2019 model Bolt vehicles to its battery recall. (See Complaint, ¶ 22.) However, these express allegations, including facts which may be inferred therefrom, do not demonstrate that plaintiff suspected or had reason to suspect wrongdoing as of the date GM issued the announcement described above. Even if these allegations demonstrate that plaintiff had actual or presumptive knowledge of facts sufficient to put him on inquiry notice of fraud on August 20, 2021 (and the court does not make any findings in this regard), the complaint filed on August 8, 2023, would be timely under Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d).

For all reasons discussed above, the demurrer of GM on the grounds that the first, second, and third causes of action are barred by applicable statutes of limitation is overruled.

Demurrer to first and second causes of action based on failure to plead facts with the requisite specificity:

GM contends that the first, second, and third causes of action must each be alleged with specificity. GM appears to conflate the pleading requirements applicable to the first, second, and third causes of action alleged in the complaint, and the elements of the claims asserted in these causes of action.

Though a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation (here, the second cause of action) is similar to a cause of action for fraud (here, the first cause of action), there exist key differences in the elements of these claims. (See, e.g., West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 792 (West) [noting that the elements of negligent misrepresentation and fraud are the same “except for the second element”].) Furthermore, the pleading requirements applicable to a cause of action under Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. (here, the third cause of action) are not the same those applicable to claims of fraud or negligent misrepresentation. (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 619 [a plaintiff alleging unfair business practices under the statute must state with reasonable particularity the facts supporting the elements of the violation].)

The court further notes that the title under which the factual basis for relief is alleged in the first cause of action of the complaint is stated as “[f]raudulent [c]oncealment and [m]isrepresentation” (See Complaint at p. 7, l. 12.) If the complaint states a cause of action under either theory, “that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer.” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38 (Quelimane).) Furthermore, to the extent that GM demurs to part of the first cause of action with respect to a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation only, the demurrer cannot be sustained. (See Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1047 (Kong) [“a demurrer cannot rightfully be sustained to part of a cause of action ….”].)

As further discussed above, the first cause of action is premised upon the purported concealment by GM of material facts regarding the defective battery pack installed in plaintiff’s vehicle. “The required elements for fraudulent concealment are: (1) concealment or suppression of a material fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he or she did if he or she had known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact.” (Graham v. Bank of America, N.A. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 606.)

“There are ‘four circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336.)

When, as here, a fiduciary relationship is not alleged, “ ‘a cause of action for non-disclosure of material facts may arise in at least three instances: (1) the defendant makes representations but does not disclose facts which materially qualify the facts disclosed, or which render his disclosure likely to mislead; (2) the facts are known or accessible only to defendant, and defendant knows they are not known to or reasonably discoverable by the plaintiff; [or] (3) the defendant actively conceals discovery from the plaintiff.” [Citation.]’” (Linear Technology Corp. v. Applied Materials, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 115, 132.)

Here, plaintiff has alleged that GM failed to disclose known defects in the vehicle’s battery that were known to it at the time of sale and when GM issued recalls for the vehicle. Plaintiff also effectively alleges that the known defects in the battery which were concealed by GM impacted the vehicle’s range and created a risk of fire. (See, e.g., Complaint, ¶¶ 11, 12, 15, 25, 32, 33.) For all reasons discussed above, the complaint states a sufficient first cause of action for fraudulent concealment against GM.

In addition, plaintiff’s failure to identify specific individuals at GM who failed to disclose the purported battery defects is not, standing alone, a sufficient ground upon which to sustain the demurrer to the first cause of action. While the complaint does not specifically allege the identity of individuals at GM who purportedly concealed material facts regarding the alleged battery defects, the requirement of specificity is intended to apply to affirmative representations and not to claims of nondisclosure. (Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384.) Further, the identity of GM employees who drafted or issued the recalls, advertisements, and publications described in the complaint and which plaintiff alleges failed to disclose battery defects is or should be within GM’s knowledge. (West, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 794.)

Plaintiff’s allegations that GM intentionally concealed material facts regarding the battery defects are also sufficient. (Hoffman v. Kirby (1902) 136 Cal. 26, 28; see also Hall v. Mitchell (1922) 59 Cal.App. 743, 749 [in setting forth the necessary element of intent, a “simple and direct” allegation that the representation was made with the requisite intent would be sufficient]; City of Pomona v. Superior Court (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 793, 803 [“[a]llegations of the defendant's knowledge and intent to deceive may use conclusive language”].) Further, “even in the pleading of fraud, the rule is relaxed when it is apparent from the allegations that the defendant necessarily possesses knowledge of the facts.” (Quelimane, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 47.) For these reasons, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the requisite knowledge and intent.

For all reasons discussed above, the court finds that plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to constitute a first cause of action for fraudulent concealment, notwithstanding the manner in which plaintiff has titled the claim. Therefore, the court will overrule the demurrer to the first cause of action.

Regarding the second cause of action, “[t]he elements of negligent misrepresentation are (1) the misrepresentation of a past or existing material fact, (2) without reasonable ground for believing it to be true, (3) with intent to induce another's reliance on the fact misrepresented, (4) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation, and (5) resulting damage….In contrast to fraud, negligent misrepresentation does not require knowledge of falsity.” (Apollo Capital Fund, LLC v. Roth Capital Partners, LLC (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 226, 243 (Apollo).) To sufficiently allege a claim for negligent misrepresentation, “a positive assertion is required; an omission or an implied assertion or representation is not sufficient.” (Ibid.)

Though plaintiff alleges that he was induced to enter into a lease for the vehicle based on purported misrepresentations regarding the vehicle battery’s range and lack of defects, the allegations of the complaint are not sufficiently specific to give GM notice of what specific positive assertions were made, or how, when, where, to whom, and by what means any positive assertions were tendered to plaintiff, or to enable the court to determine whether there exists any foundation for the claim alleged in the second cause of action. (Apollo, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 240; Lazar, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 645 [also noting that the burden to allege a fraud claim against a corporate defendant is greater].) Therefore, the court will sustain the demurrer to the second cause of action alleged in the complaint.

As the complaint does not show on its face that the second cause of action is incapable of amendment, the court will grant plaintiff leave to amend. (Eghtesad v. State Farm General Insurance Company (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 406, 411-412.) Plaintiff may amend the second cause of action alleged in the complaint as authorized herein. (Harris v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023.)

Demurrer to third cause of action:

GM contends that plaintiff has failed to allege a claim for unfair competition under the UCL because plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to show the unlawfulness of GM’s conduct, fails to allege facts showing how, where, to whom, and by what means the representations that allegedly violated the UCL were tendered or were likely to deceive, fails to allege adequate standing under the UCL, fails to allege an injury in fact, and fails to plead facts necessary to constitute a cause of action for injunctive relief.

The term “unfair competition” is “broadly” defined in the UCL to include “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200; Gregory v. Albertson’s, Inc. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 845, 850-851 (Gregory).) “A business practice constitutes unfair competition if it is forbidden by any law, ‘be it civil or criminal, federal, state, or municipal, statutory, regulatory, or court-made’ [citation] or if it is unfair, that is, if it ‘ “ ‘offends an established public policy or ... is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Gregory, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 854.)

A cause of action for unfair competition under the UCL may be established independent of a contractual relationship between the parties and the “the quantum of lost money or property necessary to show standing is only so much as would suffice to establish injury in fact[.]” (Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 324 (Kwikset).) Accordingly, “[i]f a party has … proven a personal, individualized loss of money or property in any nontrivial amount, he or she has also … proven injury in fact.” (Id. at p. 325, 327-328 [at the pleading stage, allegations that plaintiff would not have bought the product at issue otherwise are sufficient to satisfy the UCL’s standing requirement].) “Under the UCL, damages cannot be recovered, and plaintiffs are generally limited to restitution and injunctive relief.” (Safeway, Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1147.)

GM contends that plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that members of the public are likely to be deceived by GM’s conduct. Under the “fraud” prong of the UCL, plaintiff is required to allege that members of the public are likely to be deceived by GM’s business practices in connection with the sale of similar vehicles. (Bardin v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1274.) However, in the third cause of action alleged in the complaint, plaintiff also alleges that GM’s conduct is unlawful under the UCL because it violates Song-Beverly. (Complaint, ¶ 45.) Plaintiff also alleges three separate causes of action based on purported violations of Song-Beverly by GM as further discussed above. GM does not challenge the sufficiency of these statutory causes of action in its demurrer.

“With respect to the unlawful prong, ‘[v]irtually any state, federal or local law can serve as the predicate for an action’ under section 17200. [Citations.] ‘ “[I]n essence, an action based on Business and Professions Code section 17200 to redress an unlawful business practice ‘borrows’ violations of other laws and treats these violations, when committed pursuant to business activity, as unlawful practices independently actionable under section 17200 et seq. and subject to the distinct remedies provided thereunder.” ’ [Citation.]” (People ex rel. Bill Lockyer v. Fremont Life Ins. Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 508, 515.)

For reasons discussed above, a demurrer to only part of the third cause of action cannot be sustained. GM fails to explain why the third cause of action fails to sufficiently allege a claim under the UCL’s unlawful prong based on alleged violations of Song-Beverly.

As plaintiff’s cause of action for unfair competition under the UCL is based in part upon alleged statutory violations by GM, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a claim under the UCL. In addition, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged an injury in fact with respect to the existence of a defect in the vehicle for which plaintiff executed a lease, and that plaintiff would not have leased the vehicle had he known the true range of the vehicle and the propensity of the batteries to burst into flames. (Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 325, 327-328 [“economic injury is itself a form of injury in fact”].) Therefore, for all reasons discussed above, the court will overrule GM’s demurrer to the third cause of action alleged in the complaint.

 

(2) Motion To Strike

“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) In ruling on a motion to strike, a court can strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in a pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 435, subd. (b)(1), 436, subd. (a).) For purposes of a motion to strike, “irrelevant” matter includes a “demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subds. (b)(3), (c).)

GM contends that plaintiff may not recover punitive damages under Song-Beverly, and that plaintiff cannot demand both a civil penalty under the Act and punitive damages.

Song-Beverly sets forth the measure of damages that a buyer of consumer goods may recover for a failure to comply with the statute’s obligations or under a warranty. (See Civ. Code, § 1794.) Song-Beverly imposes specific remedies that may be awarded to a successful plaintiff. (National R.V., Inc. v. Foreman (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1080.) If a buyer establishes that a failure to comply with its provisions was “willful,” “the judgment may include, in addition to the amounts recovered under Section 1794, subdivision (a), a civil penalty which shall not exceed two times the amount of actual damages.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (c); Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 174, 180, 184 (Kwan) [Song-Beverly “by its terms establishes a two-tier system of damages for willful and nonwillful violations”].)

“[T]he penalty under section 1794(c), like other civil penalties, is imposed as punishment or deterrence of the defendant, rather than to compensate the plaintiff. In this, it is akin to punitive damages.” (Kwan, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 184.) Under Song-Beverly, “a violation is not willful if the defendant's failure to replace or refund was the result of a good faith and reasonable belief the facts imposing the statutory obligation were not present.” (Id. at pp. 184-185 [also stating that “[n]either punishment nor deterrence is ordinarily called for if the defendant's actions proceeded from an honest mistake or a sincere and reasonable difference of factual evaluation”].) “Willful conduct does not require a purpose or specific intent to bring about a result. However, it does require more than negligence or accidental conduct.” (Patarak v. Williams (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 826, 829.)

While the civil penalties that may be imposed under Song-Beverly are similar to punitive damages, “unlike punitive damages, the [Song-Beverly] penalty for willful noncompliance does not require a showing of moral blameworthiness, malice, or a wrong toward the other party.” (Anderson v. Ford Motor Co. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 946, 972, FN. 15; Troensegaard v. Silvercrest Industries, Inc. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 218, 226 (Troensegaard) [an award for punitive damages and civil penalties may be based on substantially the same conduct].)

In addition, Song-Beverly defines the limits on the type and extent of damages that may be imposed under its provisions and does not include remedies “drawn from the law of torts.” (Bishop v. Hyundai Motor America (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 750, 757-758.) Therefore, the civil penalties that a buyer may recover under Song-Beverly are not punitive damages per se. (See Suman v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1309, 1317, 1319-1320.) While not relevant at the pleading stage, a party may not, for example, recover both punitive damages and civil penalties for the same willful, oppressive, or malicious acts. (Troensegaard, supra, 175 Cal.App.3d at p. 228.)

Plaintiff seeks to recover both civil penalties under Song-Beverly and punitive damages. (Complaint, Prayer For Relief, ¶¶ 5 & 7.) A reasonable interpretation of the complaint demonstrates that plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages is or may be based on the first cause of action for fraudulent concealment. At the pleading stage, plaintiff may allege a claim for punitive damages in addition to civil penalties provided the allegations themselves support a claim for punitive damages. (See Kong, supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 1047.)

GM further contends that plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages because plaintiff has failed to plead a viable cause of action for fraud. As the court will overrule the demurrer of GM to the first cause of action for fraudulent concealment alleged in the complaint, the court will deny GM’s motion to strike. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subds. (a) & (c)(3) [permitting recovery of punitive damages for concealment of a material fact known to the defendant].)