Darwinian Ventures, LLC v. Mosaic Network, Inc.

Case Number

23CV02997

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 10/20/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion To Enforce Settlement Agreement

Tentative Ruling

Darwinian Ventures, LLC v. Mosaic Network, Inc.                 

Case No. 23CV02997

           

Hearing Date: October 20, 2025                                                         

HEARING:              Motion To Enforce Settlement Agreement

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff Darwinian Ventures, LLC: Ron Chow, Gardener, Riechmann & Chow

                                    For Defendant Mosaic Network, Inc.: No appearance

TENTATIVE RULING:

The motion of plaintiff Darwinian Ventures, LLC, to enforce settlement agreement is denied without prejudice.

Background:

On July 13, 2023, plaintiff Darwinian Ventures, LLC, (DVL) filed a complaint against defendant Mosaic Network, Inc., (Mosaic), alleging four causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) open book account; (3) account stated; and (4) quantum meruit. In the complaint, DVL alleges that on February 6, 2023, it made a written “Master Services Agreement” (the Agreement) with Mosaic, under which DVL provided goods and services to Mosaic for which Mosaic promised to pay. (Compl., ¶ 5 & Exh. A.) Mosaic allegedly breached the Agreement on May 13, 2023, by failing to pay for services provided by DVL, causing DVL to suffer damages in the amount of $29,250. (Compl., ¶¶ 6 & 8.)

Court records reflect that DVL filed a notice of conditional settlement of the entire case on August 28, 2024. On July 24, 2025, DVL filed a motion for an order enforcing the parties’ settlement agreement and entering judgment against Mosaic pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.

The present motion is supported by a declaration of DVL’s counsel, Ron Chow, who states or effectively states that the “Stipulation Re: Judgment Upon Conditional Settlement” (the Stipulation) attached to that declaration constitutes the parties’ settlement agreement, and that copies of an “email notice thread” given to Mosaic and a statement of account are attached to the Chow declaration as, respectively, exhibits B and C. (Chow Decl., ¶¶ 2-4 & Exhs. A-C.)

Analysis:

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, “[i]f the parties to the settlement agreement or their counsel stipulate in writing or orally before the court, the court may dismiss the case as to the settling parties without prejudice and retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6, subd. (a).)

“The court’s retention of jurisdiction under section 664.6 includes ‘jurisdiction over both the parties and the case itself, that is, both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.’ [Citation.]” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1061, original italics.) “The retention of jurisdiction pursuant to section 664.6 is intended to allow the court to ensure all parties perform pursuant to a settlement agreement that results in a dismissal of a lawsuit. [Citation.] Section 664.6 generally allows a court to enter judgment pursuant to a settlement agreement despite the dismissal of the complaint, which ordinarily deprives the court of continuing jurisdiction.” (Howeth v. Coffelt (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 126, 134.)

“A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.) For present purposes, the court will assume without deciding (and the court makes no findings as to this issue) that there exists a sufficient basis for subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute at issue in this case. (Shapell Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1110-1111 [general discussion].)

Notwithstanding whether the court acquired and has retained subject matter jurisdiction in this action, there is no information or evidence showing that the court acquired personal jurisdiction over Mosaic under the circumstances present here.

“Except as otherwise provided by statute, the court in which an action is pending has jurisdiction over a party from the time summons is served on him as provided by Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 413.10).” (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.50, subd. (a).) “In the absence of a voluntary submission to the authority of the court, compliance with the statutes governing service of process is essential to establish that court’s personal jurisdiction over a defendant.” (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1439 (Dill); see also Sternbeck v. Buck (1957) 148 Cal.App.2d 829, 832 [“[s]ervice of summons in conformance with the mode prescribed by statute is deemed jurisdictional”].) “A judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction of the person where there is no proper service of process on or appearance by a party to the proceedings.” (David B. v. Superior Court (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1016.)

The filing of a proof of service creates a rebuttable presumption of valid service of a summons “only if the proof of service complies with the applicable statutory requirements regarding such proofs.” (Dill, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1441-1442.) Though the court’s records in this case reflect that a summons to Mosaic was issued on July 13, 2023, the court has no record showing that DVL served the summons in a manner prescribed by Code of Civil Procedure section 413.10 et seq. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 413.10, subd. (a) [setting forth the law governing service of a summons within this state].) For example, DVL has not filed in this case a proof of service made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 417.10, showing that Mosaic, which the complaint alleges is a “forfeited” corporation (Compl., ¶ 2), was served by a method authorized by Code of Civil Procedure section 416.10, or any other statute.

“A general appearance by a party is equivalent to personal service of summons on such party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.50, subd. (a).) The court also has no information or evidence showing that Mosaic made a general appearance in this action, such as by seeking affirmative relief or otherwise participating in this proceeding. (Serrano v. Stefan Merli Plastering Co., Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1029; see also Roy v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 337, 341 [general discussion].) DVL also offers no reasoned argument showing why the record is sufficient to show that Mosaic signed the Stipulation, or why any signing of the Stipulation constitutes a general appearance in this case by Mosaic. (See Canaan Taiwanese Christian Church v. All World Mission Ministries (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1115, 1126-1127 [discussing conduct sufficient to constitute a general appearance].)

“Knowledge by a defendant of an action will not satisfy the requirement of adequate service of a summons and complaint.” (County of San Diego v. Gorham (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1226.) Further, in circumstances where, such as here, the court’s fundamental personal jurisdiction over a party is lacking, “there is an entire absence of power to hear or determine the case.” (Id. at p. 1225.) For all reasons discussed above, the available evidence and information indicates or shows that the court has not acquired personal jurisdiction over Mosaic, and lacks the power to impose or enter judgment pursuant to the Stipulation or decide the present motion. For these reasons, the court will deny the motion, without prejudice to its refiling upon DVL satisfying the requirements of proper service of process on Mosaic as further discussed herein.