Judith Rehfeld v. City of Santa Barbara, et al
Judith Rehfeld v. City of Santa Barbara, et al
Case Number
23CV02551
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Wed, 12/18/2024 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Motion of City of Santa Barbara for Terminating Sanctions
Tentative Ruling
For Plaintiff Judith Rehfeld: Self Represented
Sara J. Knecht / Tom R. Shapiro / Delaney R. Satz of City Attorney’s Office for Defendant City of Santa Barbara
Daniel R Friedenthal / Jay D. Brown of Friedenthal, Heffernan & Brown, LLP for Defendant Sanctuary Centers of Santa Barbara, Inc.
RULING
For the reasons set forth herein the motion of the City of Santa Barbara for terminating sanctions is granted. Plaintiff Judith Rehfeld’s complaint is stricken, and the case is dismissed with prejudice. City shall give notice.
Background
This action commenced on June 14, 2023, by the filing of the complaint by Plaintiff Judith Rehfeld (“Plaintiff”) against Defendants City of Santa Barbara (“the City”) and Sanctuary Centers of Santa Barbara, Inc. (“Sanctuary”). Plaintiff alleges that on August 2, 2022, she was injured when she stepped into a hole in the sidewalk adjacent to 1136 De La Vina Street, Santa Barbara.
On May 1, 2024, as the result of a motion filed by the City, Plaintiff was ordered to appear remotely for deposition on May 15, 2024, at 10:00 a.m., and she and her attorney were ordered to pay monetary sanctions in the amount of $1,250. The order additionally states: “If Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order the Court will consider additional sanctions including evidence preclusion and dismissal of Plaintiff’s case.” The City noticed Plaintiff’s deposition for the specified day but neither she nor her attorney appeared. (Satz Decl., ¶¶ 6-8.)
On May 8, 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel moved to be relieved as counsel of record, setting the hearing on the motion for June 26, 2024. The motion was based upon the declaration of counsel, who stated that there had been a significant breakdown in communication, rendering it impossible for counsel to continue the representation. That motion was opposed—not by Plaintiff, but by Defendant City of Santa Barbara.
On June 5, 2024, Defendant City of Santa Barbara filed the current motion for terminating sanctions, setting the hearing on the motion for July 3, 2024, one week after the motion by Plaintiff’s counsel to be relieved as her attorney of record was set for hearing. Defendant Sanctuary Centers of Santa Barbara, Inc. filed a joinder in the motion for terminating sanctions.
At the June 26, 2024, hearing on counsel’s motion to be relieved, the Court granted the motion and, in order to protect Plaintiff’s due process rights and provide her with an opportunity to obtain replacement counsel to represent her, the Court continued the hearing on the motion for terminating sanctions to September 11. In order that Plaintiff would be made well aware of these events, the Court directed Plaintiff’s counsel to submit a new proposed order on his motion to be relieved, in which Box 5.a. is checked (related to the time when the order relieving counsel would be effective), and at No. 8 to specify the new hearing date on the motion for terminating sanctions, and to note that the Court has continued the hearing for the express purpose of permitting Plaintiff, Judith Rehfeld, to obtain replacement counsel to represent her with respect to that hearing, specifically, and in this action, generally. Also, as part of its ruling, the Court vacated the then-pending MSC (8/2/24) and Trial (9/11/24) dates.
Counsel submitted a new proposed order which complied with the Court’s directive as to Box 5.a. With respect to No. 8, it included only the original hearing date—and not the continued hearing date—on the motion for terminating sanctions, and did not include the notation which the Court’s minute order on the matter required.
To complicate this matter further, this Court inadvertently executed the original proposed order submitted when the motion was filed, rather than the amended proposed order that it had directed Plaintiff’s counsel to submit.
On September 11, 2024, the court further continued the hearing on this motion, to December 18, 2024, and ordered Plaintiff’s counsel to prepare a further amended proposed order granting Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion to be relieved as counsel and to serve it on Plaintiff. The further amended order contains language that includes: “The Court has continued the hearing on the City’s motion to impose terminating sanctions against Plaintiff, and dismiss her case, to December 18, 2024, at 10:00 a.m., in Dept. 3 of the Santa Barbara Superior Court. It has done so for the express purpose of permitting Plaintiff, Judith Rehfeld, to obtain replacement counsel to represent her with respect to that hearing, specifically, and in this action, generally. Any opposition to the motion must be filed no later than December 5, 2024.”
Plaintiff’s now prior counsel filed a proof of service that Plaintiff was served with the further amended order on September 25, 2024. Plaintiff has not filed opposition to the present motion, or any other response.
Analysis
“Any party may obtain discovery within the scope delimited by Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 2017.010), and subject to the restrictions set forth in Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 2019.010), by taking in California the oral deposition of any person, including any party to the action. The person deposed may be a natural person, an organization such as a public or private corporation, a partnership, an association, or a governmental agency.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.010.)
“If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person designated by an organization that is a party under Section 2025.230, without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent’s attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (a).)
“If that party or party-affiliated deponent then fails to obey an order compelling attendance, testimony, and production, the court may make those orders that are just, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against that party deponent or against the party with whom the deponent is affiliated. In lieu of, or in addition to, this sanction, the court may impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against that deponent or against the party with whom that party deponent is affiliated, and in favor of any party who, in person or by attorney, attended in the expectation that the deponent’s testimony would be taken pursuant to that order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (h).)
Misuses of the discovery process include: “Failing to respond to or submit to an authorized method of discovery” and “Disobeying a court order to provide discovery.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subds. (d), (g).)
“To the extent authorized by the chapter governing any particular discovery method or any other provision of this title, the court, after notice to any affected party, person, or attorney, and after opportunity for hearing, may impose the following sanctions against anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process: . . .
“(d) The court may impose a terminating sanction by one of the following orders:
“(1) An order striking out the pleadings or parts of the pleadings of any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process.
“(2) An order staying further proceedings by that party until an order for discovery is obeyed.
“(3) An order dismissing the action, or any part of the action, of that party.
“(4) An order rendering a judgment by default against that party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (d)
The discovery statutes evince an incremental approach to discovery sanctions, starting with monetary sanctions and ending with the ultimate sanction of termination. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 991.) A terminating sanction should generally not be imposed until the court has attempted less severe alternatives and found them to be unsuccessful, and the record clearly shows lesser sanctions would be ineffective. (Lopez v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 604–605.)
Here, the City has been attempting to take Plaintiff’s deposition since November 2023. (Satz Decl., ¶ 2.) Plaintiff has refused to appear for deposition, and on March 13, 2024, the City filed a motion to compel. (Id., at ¶ 4.) As noted above, on May 1, 2024, the court granted the motion to compel. Plaintiff failed to appear at deposition, on May 15, 2024, as she had been ordered to do, and failed to pay the monetary sanctions that were ordered. (Id., at ¶¶ 8, 9.)
Based on Plaintiff’s failure to follow the court order and appear for deposition, as well as other evidence that Plaintiff does not intend to fully participate in litigation that she initiated, it is clear that lesser sanctions would be ineffective. The motion for terminating sanctions will be granted. For clarity, the court notes that the terminating sanctions are being granted based primarily on Plaintiff’s continued failure to appear at deposition rather than for failure to pay the previously ordered sanctions. It would be an abuse of discretion to grant terminating sanctions based solely on failure to pay monetary sanctions. “[A] terminating sanction issued solely because of a failure to pay a monetary discovery sanction is never justified.” (Newland v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608, 615.)
The City also requests that this court “enforce its May 1 Order ordering Plaintiff and her counsel to pay $1,250 in sanctions . . .” It is not clear what the City is requesting that the Court do in this regard. “Weil and Brown observe that many attorneys seem to be unaware that monetary sanction orders are enforceable through the execution of judgment laws. (Weil & Brown, Cal.Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial 3 (1994) ¶¶ 9:344.21, 9:344.22, p. 9(1)–92.) These orders have the force and effect of a money judgment, and are immediately enforceable through execution, except to the extent the trial court may order a stay of the sanction.” (Ibid.) The court issued its prior ruling, granting monetary sanctions against Plaintiff and her counsel, and the City may attempt to enforce the order through the execution of judgment law.
Lastly, the City requests further monetary sanctions to compensate it for the necessity of bringing the present motion. As the court will be issuing terminating sanctions, no further monetary sanctions will be ordered.