Bui Simon etc. v. Angela Scott, et al.
Bui Simon etc. v. Angela Scott, et al.
Case Number
23CV02376
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Wed, 11/20/2024 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Motion of Plaintiff Bui Simon to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set Four, to Defendant Angela Scott
Tentative Ruling
For Plaintiff Bui Simon, derivatively on behalf of Office of Angela Scott LLC: Patricia L. Glaser, Cynthia E. Organ, Alexander R. Miller, Glaser Weil Fink Howard Jordan & Shapiro LLP
For Defendants Angela Scott, Scott Milden, and Milden, LLC: Bert H. Deixler, Patrick J. Somers, David T. Freenock, Kendall Brill & Kelly LLP
RULING
(1) For the reasons and as set forth herein, the motion of Plaintiff Bui Simon to compel further responses to special interrogatories, set four, is granted in part and denied in part. The motion is denied as to interrogatory Nos. 53 through 56; no further response is required as to these interrogatories. The motion is granted as to interrogatory Nos. 57 through 115 as follows: All objections other than as to privilege are overruled. To the extent that the substantive response is true and complete as of the date of the last served verification applicable to that interrogatory, as each interrogatory is construed by the Court as explained herein, and no responsive information is withheld on the grounds of privilege, no further response is required except as set forth immediately below. To the extent that a substantive response requires additional information to be true and complete, or to the extent that responsive information is withheld on the grounds of privilege, a further response will be required to provide all such non-privileged information as well as sufficient information regarding the withheld information so as to permit the Court and the parties to determine the application of the asserted privilege.
(2) On or before November 27, 2024, Defendant Angela Scott shall serve: (i) a declaration stating that no further response is required by this order as to all special interrogatories, set four, or as to particular interrogatories within set four subject to this order (identified by number); and (ii) further verified responses to any interrogatory subject to this order not identified in the concurrently-served declaration, without objection other than as to privilege, in the form required by the Code of Civil Procedure, and otherwise consistent with this order. To the extent applicable, Scott may respond to any particular interrogatory in the manner set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.230, provided that the response complies with that section and the documents are either particularly identified among documents previously produced in discovery or otherwise in the possession of Plaintiff Simon (by Bates number or other unique identifier) or concurrently identified and produced with the further response.
(3) All requests for awards of monetary sanctions are denied.
Background
(Note: This case is now consolidated with Simon v. Scott, case number 23CV03184.)
In this action, Plaintiff Bui Simon (Simon), a founder and 50 percent owner/ member of The Office of Angela Scott LLC (TOOAS or Company), asserts derivative claims against Defendant Angela Scott (Scott), the other 50 percent owner/ member of TOOAS, and Scott’s husband, Defendant Scott Milden (Milden) and Milden’s company, Defendant Milden, LLC (Milden LLC). Simon alleges that Scott and Milden breached duties to TOOAS, including by making unauthorized payments for their own benefit.
On March 13, 2024, Simon propounded a set of requests for admissions to Scott (Nos. 67-73) seeking to admit facts regarding spreadsheets previously produced in discovery. (Organ decl., ¶¶ 3-4.) Scott objected on the grounds of the mediation privilege. (Organ decl., ¶ 5.) Simon did not move to compel further responses to these requests for admission. (Freenock decl., ¶ 8.)
Following the parties’ meet-and-confer process as to the requests for admission and in response to that process, on May 22, 2024, Simon propounded her special interrogatories, set four (SI4), to Scott. (Organ decl., ¶ 6 & exhibit A.)
On July 9, 2024, Scott served responses to the SI4. (Organ decl., ¶ 7 & exhibit B.) Among other objections, Scott objected that the SI4 were previously the subject of Simon’s first set of special interrogatories (SI1). (Ibid.)
Following a meet-and-confer process, on October 9, 2024, Scott served supplemental response to the SI4. (Organ decl., ¶ 11 & exhibit G.)
Following a further, unsuccessful meet-and-confer process, Simon filed this motion to compel on October 23, 2024. The hearing on this motion was advanced to this date by stipulation and order of the Court. The motion is opposed by Scott.
Analysis
“On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the following apply:
“(1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete.
“(2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate.
“(3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).)
“[I]f a timely motion to compel has been filed, the burden is on responding party to justify any objection.” (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.)
SI4 consists of interrogatory Nos. 53 through 115, all of which are at issue in this motion.
SI4 No. 53 is: “Identify all personal expenses (including but not limited to airline, hotel, lodging, vehicle, charity, furniture, home, garden, florist, medical, and veterinary expenses) from January 1, 2015 through the present for which YOU (the term ‘YOU’ means and refers to Defendant Angela Scott) received reimbursement from TOOAS (the term ‘TOOAS’ means and refers to The Office of Angela Scott, LLC).”
The original response to SI4 No. 53, following a preliminary statement and a series of general objections, is: “Responding Party incorporates by reference its general objections set forth above. Responding Party further objects to this interrogatory on the grounds that it has been previously propounded, Propounding Party did not move to compel any further response, and Propounding Party is not permitted to seek the same information again through another interrogatory. See
Response to Special Interrogatory No. 1; Professional Career Colleges, Magna Inst., Inc. v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. App. 3d 490 (1989). Responding Party further objects to this interrogatory as exceeding the limit of 35 special interrogatories for the improper purpose of propounding redundant interrogatories to annoy, oppress, and harass. Responding Party further objects to this interrogatory as argumentative because it requires the adoption of an assumption, i.e., that Responding Party ‘received reimbursement from TOOAS’ for ‘personal expenses,’ which is improper. Responding Party further objects to this interrogatory on the grounds that it is vague and ambiguous with respect to the phrase ‘personal expenses’ and the term ‘reimbursement from TOOAS.’ Responding Party further objects to this interrogatory on the grounds that it seeks information equally or more available to Propounding Party because Propounding Party has access to all Company documents and communications and Responding Party does not. Responding Party further objects to this interrogatory to the extent it requires an analysis, compilation, or abstract of documents in the possession, custody, or control of the Company, not Responding Party. Responding Party further objects to this interrogatory to the extent that it calls for information protected by attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine, or any other applicable privilege or protection, including tax return privilege.
“Subject and without waiving the foregoing objections, Responding Party responds as follows: This interrogatory is an impermissible attempt to compel a further response to Special Interrogatory No. 1, which Propounding Party served on Responding Party on June 21, 2023, and which asked Responding Party to ‘DESCRIBE (the term “DESCRIBE” means to describe in as much detail as possible) all reimbursements YOU (the terms “YOU,” and “YOUR” mean and refer to Defendant Angela Scott) have received from the COMPANY (the terms “TOOAS” or the “COMPANY” mean and refer to The Office of Angela Scott LLC, a Texas limited liability company) for personal expenses . . . .’ Responding Party objected to Special Interrogatory No.1 on the grounds that, among other things, the interrogatory ‘necessitates the making of a compilation, abstract, and/or multiple writings,[’] ‘would be overly burdensome,’ and ‘seeks information equally obtainable by Plaintiff.’ Responding Party further objected on the grounds that the interrogatory was ‘overly broad, vague, and ambiguous as to the phrase “personal expenses” ’ and ‘as to the term ‘reimbursements.” ’ Subject to and without waiving its general and specific objections, Responding Party responded to Special Interrogatory No. 1 as follows: “Ms. Scott has not received any reimbursements from the Company for personal expenses. Any of Ms. Scott’s personal expenses covered by the Company were supposed to be recorded as taxable income in Ms. Scott’s Guaranteed Payments and reported on the Company taxes and Ms. Scott’s K1’s.’ Propounding Party did not file a motion to compel a further response and is not permitted to propound another interrogatory seeking the same information and warranting the same response.”
The supplemental response to SI4 No. 53, after incorporating prior objections by agreement (as to the text not as to the merit of the objections) is: “Responding Party responds that she has not received reimbursement from TOOAS for personal expenses from January 1, 2015 through the present.”
Scott’s first objection is improper redundancy and, correspondingly, that the motion to compel is untimely. “[I]t would be an absurdity to say that a party who fails to meet the time limits of [former Code of Civil Procedure] section 2030 may avoid the consequences of his delay and lack of diligence by propounding the same question again. Such a construction of the statute would obviously encourage delay and provide no incentive to attempt to resolve any dispute with the opposing party. The Legislature has explicitly stated that unless a party moves to compel further response within forty-five days of the unsatisfactory response, he waives any right to compel a further response. We hold that this means what it says; Plaintiff’s motion was therefore untimely.” (Professional Career Colleges, Magna Institute, Inc. v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 490, 494.) (For simplicity of writing, the Court will refer to this principle as the “rule of redundancy” and the objection as the “redundancy objection.”)
Scott refers specifically to SI1 No. 1: “DESCRIBE (the term ‘DESCRIBE’ means to describe in as much detail as possible) all reimbursements YOU (the terms ‘YOU,’ and ‘YOUR’ mean and refer to Defendant Angela Scott) have received from the COMPANY (the terms ‘TOOAS’ or the ‘COMPANY’ mean and refer to The Office of Angela Scott LLC, a Texas limited liability company) for personal expenses, including but not limited to the expenses identified in paragraphs 8 and 47-53 of the
COMPLAINT (the term ‘COMPLAINT’ means and refers to the Complaint for Damages in the filed by the PLAINTIFF in the above-entitled action in Santa Barbara Superior Court on June 2, 2023).” (Organ decl., ¶ 7 & exhibit C.)
Scott’s response to SI1 No. 1, after a preliminary statement and general objections: “Objection: The Responding Party incorporates her general objections above to this
response.
“Objection: This Interrogatory necessitates the making of a compilation, abstract, audit and/or multiple writings.
“Objection: This Interrogatory calls for production of documents or information protected by the attorney-client privilege.
“Objection: This Interrogatory calls for production of documents or information protected by the attorney work-product doctrine.
“Objection: Responding to this Interrogatory would be overly burdensome.
“Objection: This Interrogatory calls for information that is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
“Objection: This Interrogatory is overly broad, vague, ambiguous as to the phrase
‘personal expenses’.
“Objection: This Interrogatory does not specify a time period for the information sought.
“Objection: This Interrogatory seeks information equally obtainable by Plaintiff.
“Objection: This Interrogatory is overly broad, vague, ambiguous as to the term
‘reimbursements’.
“Subject to and without waiving the forgoing general and specific objections, Responding Party responds as follows:
“Ms. Scott has not received any reimbursements from the Company for personal expenses. Any of Ms. Scott’s personal expenses covered by the Company were supposed to be recorded as taxable income in Ms. Scott’s Guaranteed Payments and reported on the Company taxes and Ms. Scott’s K1’s.” (Organ decl., ¶ 7 & exhibit C.)
In making this motion, Simon argues that SI4 No. 53 is not duplicative of SI1 No. 1 because SI4 No. 53 requests specific information regarding particular expenses. The underlying dilemma presented by this argument is the extent to which a party asking first an overbroad interrogatory is barred by the rule of redundancy from asking a later, narrower interrogatory within the subject matter of the first interrogatory. The solution to this dilemma depends upon the context in which the first interrogatory is asked and answered. General questions imply general answers; too general interrogatories inevitably solicit objections that they are too general. When faced with an objection that an interrogatory is too general, a party may reasonably prefer to serve a narrower interrogatory to cure the fault that is the subject of the objection rather than to move to compel a further response to that interrogatory. Otherwise, the parties are forced into making and opposing a motion to compel further responses to an interrogatory both parties agree is too general.
So for example, if a propounding party asks an interrogatory that states, “Provide all information about everything relevant to this case,” and if the propounding party fails to move to compel a further response to that interrogatory because it is acknowledged as improperly too general, under a rule of redundancy that includes the entire scope of information possibly covered by the propounded interrogatory, the propounding party would appear to be forever precluded from asking any further interrogatories, regardless of how focused or relevant. To avoid this hypothetical result, the Court would be required to either preclude discovery over an entire subject matter because the original interrogatory is too general, to preclude further interrogatories attempting to refine general response, or to permit interrogatories to do more or less than they were intended by the propounding party by the Court reframing the interrogatories. All of this defeats the principles behind the Civil Discovery Act to take the gamesmanship out of litigation. (Cf. Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 376.) The Code of Civil Procedure does not, and should not, penalize a propounding party from serving better interrogatories; but, correspondingly, the Code does not permit a party to avoid the penalty for a lack of diligence in following up improper objections to a proper interrogatory by re-serving essentially the same interrogatory.
In this context, the Court will start the analysis by comparing the former and present interrogatories. By this comparison, it is clear that SI4 No. 53 is redundant as to SI1 No. 1. With only a minor change in wording, the two interrogatories are identical in content except the limitation in SI4 No. 53 as being from January 1, 2015, through the present. While this limitation resolves the objection to SI1 No. 1 that SI1 No. 1 is unlimited as to time, this “limitation” is, practically speaking, not a limitation at all as it effectively covers all relevant time periods. The redundancy objection is sustained as to SI4 No. 53.
The same analysis and result applies to SI4 Nos. 54 and 55.
SI4 No. 56 is: “DESCRIBE (the term ‘DESCRIBE’ means to describe in as much detail as possible) how each personal expense from January 1, 2015 through the present for which YOU received reimbursement from TOOAS was classified by TOOAS for accounting purposes.”
The original response to SI4 No. 56, following a preliminary statement and a series of general objections, is: “Responding Party incorporates by reference its general objections set forth above. Responding Party further objects to this interrogatory on the grounds that it has been previously propounded, Propounding Party did not move to compel any further response, and Propounding Party is not permitted to seek the same information again through another interrogatory. See Response to Special Interrogatory Nos. 1 and 29; Professional Career Colleges, Magna Inst., Inc. v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. App. 3d 490 (1989). Responding Party further objects to this interrogatory as exceeding the limit of 35 special interrogatories for the improper purpose of propounding redundant interrogatories to annoy, oppress, and harass. Responding Party further objects to this interrogatory as argumentative because it requires the adoption of an assumption, i.e., that Responding Party ‘received reimbursement from TOOAS’ for ‘personal expense,’ which is improper. Responding Party further objects to this interrogatory on the grounds that is vague and ambiguous with respect to the phrase ‘personal expense’ and the term ‘reimbursement from TOOAS.’ Responding Party further objects to this interrogatory on the grounds that it seeks information equally or more available to Propounding Party because Propounding Party has access to all Company documents and communications and Responding Party does not. Responding Party
further objects to this interrogatory to the extent it requires an analysis, compilation, or abstract of documents in the possession, custody, or control of the Company, not Responding Party. Responding further objects to this interrogatory on the grounds it is vague and ambiguous with respect to the phrase ‘classified by TOOAS for accounting purposes.’ Responding Party further objects to this interrogatory to the extent it requires Responding Party to respond on behalf of
TOOAS. Responding Party further objects to this interrogatory to the extent that it calls for information protected by attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine, or any other applicable privilege or protection, including tax return privilege.
“Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Responding Party responds as follows: Responding Party has not received any reimbursements from the Company for personal expenses. Based on consultation with tax professionals, any of Responding Party’s personal expenses covered by the Company were to be recorded as taxable income in Responding Party’s Guaranteed Payments and reported on the Company taxes and Responding Party’s K1s.”
The supplemental response to SI4 No. 56, after incorporating prior objections by agreement (as to the text not as to the merit of the objections) is: “Responding Party responds that she has not received reimbursement from TOOAS for personal expenses from January 1, 2015, through the present.”
SI4 No. 56 is narrower than SI1 No. 1. SI1 No. 1 asks for a description of “all reimbursements” of “personal expenses,” SI4 No. 54 asks for the accounting classifications for reimbursements of personal expenses. However, in order to respond to SI4 No. 56, Scott would still need to describe all of the expenses as requested in response to SI1 No. 1 and be subject to the same objections as SI1 No. 1 as to its generality. This puts this interrogatory in the same category as the improper interrogatory discussed in Professional Career Colleges, Magna Institute, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at page 492. The redundancy objection will be sustained as to this interrogatory.
SI4 No. 57 is: “Identify all personal hotel expenses from January 1, 2015 through the present for which YOU received reimbursement from TOOAS.”
The original and supplemental response to SI4 No. 57 is essentially the same as for SI4 No. 53.
SI4 No. 57 is significantly narrower than SI1 No. 1. Importantly, the narrow focus of SI No. 57 to a particular type of expense reasonably appears as a response to, and an effort to cure issues raised by, Scott’s objections to SI1 No. 1. It is therefore not essentially the same interrogatory even though it seeks information within the same general subject matter as SI1 No. 1. The redundancy objection will be overruled as to this interrogatory.
As to the remaining objections and arguments, Scott’s general objection are not addressed and will be therefore overruled to the extent not otherwise discussed herein. Scott objects that this interrogatory exceeds the limit of 35 special interrogatories. This objection may only be raised by protective order (Catanese v. Superior Court (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165, abrogated on other grounds in Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1236, 1243-1244; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.040, subd. (b), 2030.050), and will be overruled.
Scott objections that the interrogatory seeks information equally available to Simon. “If the responding party does not have personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully to an interrogatory, that party shall so state, but shall make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to other natural persons or organizations, except where the information is equally available to the propounding party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subd. (c).) This objection applies “when the material to be ‘discovered’ consists, … solely of information available to both parties” so that “it defeats the purpose of the Discovery Act to compel one party to perform another party’s research, whether such be laborious or not.” (Bunnell v. Superior Court (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 720, 724.) Here, however, it appears that the information sought by the interrogatory would not be equally available because Scott would be the recipient of any such reimbursements. Scott has not met her burden to substantiate this objection and it will be overruled.
Scott objects that the interrogatory seeks a compilation. “If the answer to an interrogatory would necessitate the preparation or the making of a compilation, abstract, audit, or summary of or from the documents of the party to whom the interrogatory is directed, and if the burden or expense of preparing or making it would be substantially the same for the party propounding the interrogatory as for the responding party, it is a sufficient answer to that interrogatory to refer to this section and to specify the writings from which the answer may be derived or ascertained. This specification shall be in sufficient detail to permit the propounding party to locate and to identify, as readily as the responding party can, the documents from which the answer may be ascertained. The responding party shall then afford to the propounding party a reasonable opportunity to examine, audit, or inspect these documents and to make copies, compilations, abstracts, or summaries of them.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.230.) The response does not comply with section 2030.230. The objection that the response requires a compilation will be overruled.
Scott also objects on the grounds of privilege. It does not appear that any information has been withheld on the grounds of privilege. However, to the extent that any responsive information has been withheld, there is insufficient information for the Court to determine the application of any privilege. It is meaningful to note that the mediation privilege is not expressly asserted in the response but is argued in the opposition separate statement. As the Court has previously ruled, the mediation privilege applies to the particular spreadsheet documents but not to the underlying information contained in those documents. The Court understands the interrogatory as seeking underlying information whether or not also set forth in the spreadsheets. Based upon this understanding of the interrogatory, the mediation privilege does not apply and any implied objection on that ground is to that extent overruled.
The remaining objections relate to the words used in the text of the interrogatory. Scott objects that the interrogatory is argumentative by assuming that Scott received reimbursements for personal expenses, and that the terms “personal expenses” and “reimbursement from TOOAS” are ambiguous. These objections need to be understood in the context of the substantive response that Scott has not received any reimbursements from the Company for personal expenses. In order to give the substantive response meaning, the ambiguities asserted in the objection must be resolved.
It is not immediately obvious, for example, whether Scott is asserting that there have been no reimbursements for personal hotel expenses at all or whether Scott is asserting that any such reimbursements were misclassified so as not to be accounted as income to Scott. The Court understands “personal hotel expenses” as expenses for hotel stays or services that were not Company expenses, as characterized by Scott. In responding to this interrogatory, Scott is not obligated to accept Simon’s characterization of what is a “personal expense” as contrasted with a “Company” expense. (The Court will assume that Scott asserts that any reimbursed expenses not identified as a personal expense, if any exist, are asserted as Company expenses.) At the same time, the applicable definition of “reimburse” is “[t]o pay back or compensate (another party) for money spent or losses incurred.” (American Heritage Dictionary (3d ed. 1992) p. 1522.) Accordingly, “reimbursements” would be those payments made by the Company to Scott, or to a third party to Scott’s credit. Putting these phrases together, SI4 No. 57 is understood to require Scott to identify those personal hotel expenses, i.e., not Company hotel expenses, for which Scott has either been paid or has been credited, as for example, by a payment made by the Company on Scott’s credit card. On the other hand, any expenses (personal or otherwise) paid by the Company directly to a vendor, such as a car lease payment, is not a “reimbursement.” The distinction between a reimbursement and an ordinary expense principally being that Scott has not spent her own money or incurred any personal liability with respect to the expense (not including the liability claimed by Simon in this action).
With this understanding of the meaning of SI4 No. 57 and assuming no information has been withheld on the basis of privilege, Scott’s supplemental response that “Responding Party responds that she has not received reimbursement from TOOAS for personal hotel expenses from January 1, 2015 through the present” is a full and complete response. With this understanding, if the supplemental response is true, no further response is required for SI4 No. 57. If, with this understanding, the supplemental response is not true or complete, Scott will need to provide a further response to make the response full and complete, except as to information withheld on the grounds of privilege for which the response will need to provide sufficient information regarding the withheld information for the Court to determine the claim of privilege.
With this same understanding of “reimbursement” and with the understanding of “personal” with respect to an expense to mean an expense that is not a Company expense, the same analysis and conclusion apples to SI4 Nos. 58 through 112.
Simon also moves to compel further responses to SI4 Nos. 113, 114, and 115. Scott argues that the motion is untimely as to these interrogatories.
Scott responded to these interrogatories in her initial responses, served electronically on July 9, 2024. (Freenock decl., ¶ 10 & exhibit G.) The 45-day deadline to file a motion to compel further responses was therefore August 27. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1010.6, subd. (a)(3)(B), 2030.300, subd. (c).) The parties stipulated to extend the deadline to file a motion to compel for three weeks, to September 17. (Organ decl., exhibit E.) The parties again stipulated to extend the deadline to file a motion to compel to October 8 and then to October 11. (Organ decl., exhibit F.) The supplemental responses were served on October 9. (Organ decl., ¶ 11 & exhibit G.) The parties’ further meet and confer thereafter addressed only the sufficiency of the supplemental responses. The parties did not further discuss either an extension of the deadline specific to the interrogatories for which no supplemental response was served or the substance of those interrogatories.
“Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the propounding party waives any right to compel a further response to the interrogatories.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (c).)
It is unclear how the 45-day time limit of section 2030.300, subdivision (c) applies in these circumstances. The 45-day time limit runs from “the service of the verified response” (singular). The motion may be filed on “receipt of a response to interrogatories.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).) Subdivision (a) refers to a response (singular) to interrogatories (plural), but permits the motion to refer to “a particular interrogatory” (singular). (Id., subd. (a)(1).) It therefore appears that the service of the verified response refers to a response to the same set of interrogatories, and not on an interrogatory-by-interrogatory basis.
This reading is consistent with Golf & Tennis Pro Shop, Inc. v. Superior Court (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 127 (Golf & Tennis). In Golf & Tennis, the Court addressed the same language in section 2030.300, subdivision (c) to determine when the 45-day deadline began to run where the responding party served hybrid responses consisting of unverified factual responses to some interrogatories and objections. (Id. at pp. 132-133.) Construing the language of subdivision (c), the Golf & Tennis Court found that if responses (plural) were not verified, the 45-day period did not begin to run. (Id. at pp. 135-136.) The Court expressly rejected a “response-by-response approach.” (Id. at p. 136, fn. 6.)
At least in this context it would not make much sense that a party could promise further responses to a large set of interrogatories (plural) shortly before the 45-day deadline runs and, as here, then argue that the deadline ran as to those interrogatories for which a further response had been omitted. The Court therefore finds that the 45-day time period does not make motion untimely as to SI4 Nos. 113, 114, and 115.
SI4 No. 113 is: “Identify all personal expenses from January 1, 2015 through present for which YOU received reimbursement from TOOAS that YOU contend were misclassified as business expenses.”
The response to SI4 No. 113 is: “Responding Party incorporates by reference its general objections set forth above. Responding Party further objects to this interrogatory on the grounds that it has been previously propounded, Propounding Party did not move to compel any further response, and Propounding Party is not permitted to seek the same information again through another interrogatory. See Response to Special Interrogatory Nos. 1 and 29; Professional Career Colleges, Magna Inst., Inc. v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. App. 3d 490 (1989). Responding Party further objects to this interrogatory as exceeding the limit of 35 special interrogatories for the improper purpose of propounding redundant interrogatories to annoy, oppress, and harass. Responding Party further objects to this interrogatory as argumentative because it requires the adoption of an assumption, i.e., that Responding Party ‘received reimbursement from TOOAS’ for ‘personal expenses,’ which is improper. Responding Party further objects to this interrogatory on the grounds that it is vague and ambiguous with respect to the phrase ‘personal expenses’ and the term ‘reimbursement from TOOAS.’ Responding Party further objects to this interrogatory on the grounds that it seeks information equally or more available to Propounding Party because Propounding Party has access to all Company documents and communications and Responding Party does not. Responding Party further objects to this interrogatory to the extent it requires an analysis, compilation, or abstract of documents in the possession, custody, or control of the Company, not Responding Party. Responding Party further objects to this interrogatory on the grounds it is a premature contention interrogatory and seeks information subject to expert discovery. Responding Party further objects to this interrogatory to the extent that it calls for information protected by attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine, or any other applicable privilege or protection, including tax return privilege.
“Responding Party has not received any reimbursements from the Company for personal expenses. Based on consultation with tax professionals, any of Responding Party’s personal expenses covered by the Company were to be recorded as taxable income in Responding Party’s Guaranteed Payments and reported on the Company taxes and Responding Party’s K1s. The Company has not identified any supposedly ‘misclassified’ ‘personal expenses,’ and Responding Party is not making a contention at this time that any specific ‘personal expenses for which’ Responding Party ‘received reimbursement from TOOAS’ ‘were misclassified as business expenses.’ To the extent Propounding Party later contends the Company misclassified a business expense, Responding Party reserves her right to respond but lacks knowledge to respond further at this time.”
There is no supplemental response to SI4 No. 113.
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will overrule the objections, except as to privilege, and apply the same understanding of the terms “personal” and “reimbursement.” The objection that the interrogatory calls for premature expert discovery is not applicable at this time. Expert discovery is not now premature and, to the extent Scott has an expert who will provide an opinion regarding this subject, any attorney work product objection is thereby, and to that extent, waived. At the same time, the completeness of the interrogatory, including the application of work product objections, must be determined as of the date of its service.
“Each answer in a response to interrogatories shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subd. (a).) “If an interrogatory cannot be answered completely, it shall be answered to the extent possible.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subd. (b).) “If the responding party does not have personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully to an interrogatory, that party shall so state, but shall make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to other natural persons or organizations, except where the information is equally available to the propounding party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subd. (c).)
As with SI4 Nos. 58 through 112, to the extent that Scott’s response is true and complete as of the date of the service of the responses while employing the Court’s understanding of terms, no further response is required. To the extent a further response is required to make the response true and complete as of the date of service, the further response will need to include additional information to make it true and complete as of the date of that further response.
The same analysis applies to SI4 No. 114 and 115. Further responses will be required only to the extent that the substantive responses are not true and complete as of the date of service.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that any award of monetary sanctions would be unjust under the totality of the circumstances here. All requests for awards of monetary sanctions will be denied.