The Jean Michele Cross Revocable Trust v. Four P’s Group, LLC, et al.

Case Number

23CV02092

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 12/11/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion of Plaintiff for Award of Contractual Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiff The Jean Michele Cross Revocable Trust: J. Paul Gignac

For Defendant Jeff L. Handy: Self-Represented        

           

RULING

For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted. Plaintiff shall give notice of the ruling and file a proof of service of same with the court.

Background

This action was commenced on May 12, 2023, by the filing of the complaint by Plaintiff The Jean Michele Cross Revocable Trust (“Cross”) against Defendants Four P’s Group, LLC (“Four P’s) and Jeff L. Handy (collectively “Defendants”). The operative first amended complaint (“FAC”) was filed on June 12, 2024, and alleges causes of action for breach of contract against both Defendants, and breach of personal guaranty against Handy.

As alleged in the complaint:

The action is for breach of a written 76-month convertible note agreement, dated October 26, 2020, that was entered into between Cross and Four P’s and was personally guaranteed by Handy. (FAC, ¶ 1.)

The note provided that in consideration for the payment of $734,000.00 to Defendants, Defendants would pay specified amounts to Cross on the before the 11th of each month. (FAC, ¶ 11.) The agreement provides that repayment will be personally guaranteed by Handy. (FAC, ¶ 13.) Defendants breached the agreement by making payments of less than was due and by failing to make payments. (FAC, ¶¶ 15 -17.)

As of the date of the FAC, Defendants had failed to pay a total of $77,990.00 in unpaid interest through April 11, 2024, the principal amount of $734,000.00, as well as late fees in the amount of $16,633.25. (FAC, ¶¶ 18-19.)

Handy filed his answer to the original complaint on October 23, 2023, asserting a general denial and nine affirmative defenses.

Cross obtained a default judgment against Four P’s, which was entered on December 20, 2023.

Following a court trial on October 14, 2024, which Handy did not attend, the court rendered judgment in favor of Cross in the amount of $908,493.00. Cross was instructed to seek attorneys’ fees and litigation-related expenses by means of the present post-trial motion for attorneys’ fees and expenses.

The motion was served on Handy, at two separate addresses, via mail and by email. Handy has not filed opposition or any other response to the motion.

Analysis

Cross seeks $105,203.00 in contractual attorneys’ fees and $8,156.79 in expenses as the prevailing party.

The contract, under which this action was brought, includes the following paragraph: “In the event any payment under this Note is not paid when due, and an agreement for resolution has been attempted but cannot be agreed upon by both parties, Jeff L. Handy/Four P’s Group LLC agrees to pay, if appropriate, reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred to recover the note payment by the note holder, the Jean Michele Cross Revocable Trust.” (Gignac Decl., Exh. B.)

“In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs.” (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (a).)

“[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. ‘California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.’ [citation] The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work. [citation] The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. [citation] Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. [citation].” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)

“[T]rial courts must carefully review attorney documentation of hours expended” in assessing reasonable and necessary attorney fees. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4h 1122, 1132.)

“[T]he [party] . . . seeking fees and costs ‘bear[s] the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.’ [Citation.]’” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320.) “To that end, the court may require [a] Defendant . . . to produce records sufficient to provide ‘a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expended. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

“California case law permits fee awards in the absence of detailed time sheets. . . .” (Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 255.) The court may award fees based on time estimates for attorneys who do not keep time records. (Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1006–1007.) It properly awards fees based on an attorney's declaration. (Weber v. Langholtz (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1587.)

While not producing the actual time sheets, counsel for Cross submitted a declaration that he billed Cross at the discounted rate of $600 per hour for himself and $395 per hour for an associate attorney. The total hours claimed are 194.6, but that $10,552.50 was for legal services solely related to the claims against Four P’s. By way of the declaration, Cross has provided prima facie evidence that the fees are reasonable, and the services performed were necessary.

As the motion is unopposed, Handy does not contest the reasonableness of the requested fees. Based on the court’s experience with other similar cases, and attorney fees charged by similarly qualified attorneys, the requested fees represent a reasonable amount. The attorney fees will be awarded in favor of Cross and against Handy.

As noted above, Cross also seeks recovery of $8,156.79 paid to Tyler Young for expert witness fees. Counsel for Cross attaches an invoice, from Young, in that amount. (Gignac Decl., ¶¶ 15-16 & Exh. D.) The motion for recovery of the $8,156.79 expert witness fee will be granted.