Christian Anthony Carino v. Art & Elements, Inc., et al

Case Number

23CV01958

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 04/24/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motions to Compel (3)

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiff Christian Anthony Carino: Eric Berg, Berg Law Group                

For Defendants Art & Elements, Inc. and Jose Luis Esparza: Christian Bosuel, Bosuel Law Office                

For Defendant Hugo R. Garcia: Self Represented                 

For Defendant Hudson Insurance Company: Clark H. Cameron, Kenneth S. Humphrey, Humphrey, Berger & Associates

RULING

(1) For all reasons discussed herein, the motion of Plaintiff to compel further responses to set one form interrogatories and for monetary sanctions against Defendant Art & Elements, Inc., is granted, in part, as to Plaintiff’s form interrogatory numbers 14.1, 14.2, and 16.8, and denied as to form interrogatory number 16.7.

(2) For all reasons discussed herein, the motion of Plaintiff to compel further responses to set one special interrogatories and for monetary sanctions against Defendant Art & Elements, Inc., is granted, in part, as to Plaintiff’s special interrogatory number 7, and denied as to special interrogatory number 5.

(3) For all reasons discussed herein, the motion of Plaintiff to compel further responses to set one requests for production of documents and for monetary sanctions against Defendant Art & Elements, Inc., is granted, in part, as to Plaintiff’s request for production of documents number 16, and denied as to request for production of documents number 4.

(4) On or before May 15, 2024, Defendant Art & Elements, Inc., shall serve verified code-compliant further responses to Plaintiff’s form interrogatory numbers 14.1, 14.2, and 16.8, Plaintiff’s special interrogatory number 7, and Plaintiff’s request for production of documents number 16, without objections overruled herein except those based on privilege.

(5) The Court awards sanctions in favor of Plaintiff against Defendant Art & Elements, Inc., in the total amount of $1,725, payable to Plaintiff. Payment of sanctions is due by May 24, 2024.

Background

On May 5, 2023, Plaintiff Christian Anthony Carino filed in this matter a complaint against Defendants Art & Elements, Inc. (AEI), Hugo R. Garcia (Garcia), Jose Luis Esparza (Esparza), and Hudson Insurance Company (Hu dson) (collectively, Defendants), alleging seven causes of action: (1) breach of contract (against AEI only); (2) negligence (against AEI only); (3) fraud - intentional misrepresentation (against AEI, Garcia, and Esparza); (4) fraud - negligent misrepresentation (against AEI, Garcia, and Esparza); (5) unjust enrichment (against AEI and Garcia); (6) common counts – money had and received (against AEI and Garcia); and (7) breach of licensing bond (against Hudson only). As alleged in the complaint:

Plaintiff owns and resides at 226 Ortega Ridge Road in Santa Barbara, California (the property). Devin Park (Park), who is not a party to this action, has been responsible for the daily maintenance and upkeep of the property and has held himself out as the manager of the property and Plaintiff’s agent since June 2019. On June 10, July 7, and July 31, 2022, Park entered into three contracts (collectively, the contracts) with Defendants for, respectively, the preparation of the terrain for improvements (the first contract), masonry work (the second contract), and the purchase of I-beams (the third contract). Plaintiff has paid the full amount required under the first contract.

During a meeting between Plaintiff, Park, Garcia, and Esparza on June 11, 2022, and before Defendants had broken ground at the property, Plaintiff inquired whether any construction permits were required to perform the work detailed in the first and second contracts. In response, Garcia and Esparza expressly stated to Plaintiff that no permits were required and assured Plaintiff that all work would be completed per Santa Barbara County Building Department specifications.

On June 20, 2022, Defendants commenced construction work at the property. During subsequent meetings in August 2022, after construction work had commenced, Garcia and Esparza again told Plaintiff that no construction permits were necessary.

On October 24, 2022, after Defendants had completed some of the work called for in the first and second contracts, the County of Santa Barbara issued a Notice of Violation and Stop Work Order citing Plaintiff for unpermitted construction work at the property which did not comply with building codes and regulations. Plaintiff must retain a new contractor at additional cost to correct and remedy the work of Defendants.

In addition, on multiple dates between the execution of the third contract and March 29, 2023, Defendants informed Plaintiff and Park that I-beams had been purchased. The I-beams were delivered to the property on March 29, 2023. The sales order indicated that the I-beams had been ordered the day prior. The I-beams were not the type bargained for under the third contract and are structurally deficient for their purpose.

On June 8, 2023, Esparza filed an answer to the complaint admitting all of its allegations with exceptions.

On June 9, 2023, Garcia and AEI filed an answer to the complaint generally denying its allegations.

On June 14, 2023, Hudson filed its answer to the complaint generally denying its allegations and asserting nineteen affirmative defenses. On the same date, Hudson filed a cross-complaint for declaratory relief against Plaintiff and AEI. Plaintiff filed his answer to the cross-complaint of Hudson on July 14, 2023, generally denying its allegations and asserting five affirmative defenses. The Court has no record of AEI having filed an answer to the cross-complaint of Hudson.

On November 29, 2023, AEI and Garcia filed an amended answer to the complaint generally denying its allegations and asserting thirty-seven affirmative defenses.

On March 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed three motions: (1) for an order compelling AEI to serve further responses to form interrogatories, set one, nos. 14.1, 14.2, 16.7, and 16.8, and for monetary sanctions (the FI Motion); (2) for an order compelling AEI to serve further responses to special interrogatories, set one, nos. 5 and 7, and for monetary sanctions (the SI Motion); and (3) for an order compelling AEI to serve further responses to requests for production of documents, set one, nos. 4 and 16 and for monetary sanctions (the RFP Motion) (collectively, the motions).

In support of each of the motions, Plaintiff submits declarations of his counsel, Eric Berg (Berg), which set forth substantially similar if not identical information relating to the present dispute. For ease of reference, the Court will refer collectively, where appropriate, to the Berg declarations and exhibits thereto.

Berg declares that on November 20, 2023, Plaintiff served AEI with set one form interrogatories (the FI), set one special interrogatories (the SI), and set one requests for production of documents (the RFP) (collectively, the discovery requests). (Berg Decls., ¶ 3 & Exhs. A.) AEI served its responses to the discovery requests on February 6, 2024. (Berg Decls., ¶ 4 & Exhs. B.)

After Berg determined that the responses of AEI to the discovery requests were evasive and the objections without merit, Berg transmitted a meet and confer letter to counsel for AEI on February 7, 2024, addressing FI Nos. 14.1, 14.2, 16.7, and 16.8, SI Nos. 5 and 7, and RFP Nos. 4 and 16. (Berg Decls., ¶ 5 & Exhs. C.) On February 26, 2024, counsel for AEI responded to Berg’s February 7, 2024, letter, stating that AEI would not provide supplemental responses to the discovery requests at issue in the motions. (Berg Decls., ¶ 5 & Exhs. D.) Regarding RFP Nos. 4 and 16, Berg further declares that AEI has failed to provide documents responses to these requests. (Berg Decl. [RFP Motion], ¶ 5.)

AEI opposes each of the motions. In support of its oppositions, AEI submits the declaration of its counsel, Christian Bosuel (Bosuel), who does not dispute that the discovery requests were served by Plaintiff on November 20, 2023. (Bosuel Decls., ¶ 2.)

Bosuel declares that on March 4, 2024, AEI served supplemental responses to the SI and RFP. (Bosuel Decl. FI Motion, ¶ 8; SI Motion ¶ 8 & Exh. 1; RFP Motion, ¶ 8 & Exhs. 1 & 2.) Bosuel further asserts that Plaintiff failed to meet and confer with AEI after receiving the supplemental responses. (Bosuel Decl. [SI Motion], ¶ 10.) AEI seeks reimbursement of attorney’s fees incurred as a result of Plaintiff’s filing of the motions without justification. (See Bosuel Decls., FI Motion at ¶ 11, SI Motion at ¶ 12; RFP Motion at ¶ 11.)

Analysis

(1) The FI Motion and the SI Motion

A party responding to interrogatories must respond separately to each interrogatory by either “[a]n answer containing the information sought to be discovered”, “[a]n exercise of the party’s option to produce writings”, or “[a]n objection to the particular interrogatory. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.210, subd. (a)(1)-(3).) Each response to interrogatories “shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits.” (Code Civ. Proc. §2030.220, subd. (a).) If an interrogatory cannot be answered completely, it must be answered to the extent possible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subd. (b); Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 [“a party may not provide deftly worded conclusionary answers designed to evade a series of explicit questions”].)

If the responding party objects to an interrogatory in whole or in part, the specific grounds for the objection, including those based on a claim of privilege, must be set forth clearly in the response. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.240, subd. (b).) “If only a part of an interrogatory is objectionable, the remainder of the interrogatory shall be answered.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.240, subd. (a).)

If the responding party does not have sufficient personal knowledge to enable a full response, the party “shall so state” but must “make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to other natural persons or organizations, except where the information is equally available to the propounding party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subd. (b).)

In addition, “[i]f the answer to an interrogatory would necessitate the preparation or the making of a compilation, abstract, audit, or summary of or from the documents of the party to whom the interrogatory is directed, and if the burden or expense of preparing or making it would be substantially the same for the party propounding the interrogatory as for the responding party, it is a sufficient answer to that interrogatory to refer to this section and to specify the writings from which the answer may be derived or ascertained. This specification shall be in sufficient detail to permit the propounding party to locate and to identify, as readily as the responding party can, the documents from which the answer may be ascertained.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.230.)

On receipt of responses to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling further responses if the propounding party deems that the responses are “evasive or incomplete,” or if the objections are “without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc., §2030.300, subd. (a)(1) & (3).)

The FI:

Available evidence and information demonstrates that AEI did not serve supplemental responses to FI Nos. 14.1 and 14.2, which request AEI to state whether it contends that any “PERSON” violated or was cited or charged with the violation of any statute, ordinance, or regulation, and whether the violation was a proximate cause of the “INCIDENT”. (Sep. Stmt. at p. 2.) In its answers to FI Nos. 14.1 and 14.2, AEI does not assert objections and states that Plaintiff “violated building regulations” (FI No. 14.1), and that Plaintiff “was charged with several violations due to modifying the entire property without requesting the corresponding permits” (FI No. 14.2). (Sep. Stmt. at p. 2, ll. 12 & 27; p. 3, l. 1.)

As AEI has answered FI Nos. 14.1 and 14.2 by stating that Plaintiff violated or was cited or charged with the violation of building regulations and other unspecified violations, AEI must also, in its response to FI No. 14.1, identify the statute, ordinance, or regulation that AEI contends Plaintiff violated. In addition, AEI must answer subparts (a) through (d) of FI No. 14.2. As AEI has failed to include all requested information in its answers to FI Nos. 14.1 and 14.2, the responses of AEI to these interrogatories are incomplete.

In its opposition to the FI Motion, AEI contends that it did not receive copies of notices sent by the County of Santa Barbara regarding violations by third parties. For this reason, AEI contends that it lacks the means to ascertain the specific regulations breached by Plaintiff and that a further response would require “guesswork” by AEI. (Opp. at p. 4, ll. 6-8.) AEI further contends that Plaintiff as the owner of the property has access to all of the information sought in FI Nos. 14.1 and 14.2, but has not produced any documents in response to AEI’s discovery requests rendering it impossible for AEI to furnish answers to FI Nos. 14.1 and 14.2.

Plaintiff does not appear to contend, and the parties do not appear to dispute, that AEI’s answers to FI Nos. 14.1 and 14.2 are incomplete as to the identity of the person who violated or was charged or cited with the violation of a statute, ordinance, or regulation. Therefore, the only matters at issue relate to the completeness of the information provided by AEI regarding the identity of the statute, ordinance, or regulation that Plaintiff purportedly violated, whether the violation was a proximate cause of the “INCIDENT”, and the additional matters addressed in subparts (a) through (d) of FI No. 14.2.

Based on information available to the Court at this time, including information offered by AEI in its opposition which does not appear in AEI’s responses, it is ambiguous and uncertain whether the responses of AEI to FI Nos. 14.1 and 14.2 are as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to AEI permits. It is also unclear, to the extent that AEI does not have sufficient personal knowledge to respond fully to FI Nos. 14.1 and 14.2, whether AEI has made a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.220, subdivision (c). 

Because it is unclear whether AEI’s responses are sufficient and code-compliant for reasons noted above, the Court will grant the FI Motion, in part, and order AEI to provide verified further responses to FI Nos. 14.1 and 14.2. AEI’s further responses to FI Nos. 14.1 and 14.2 must include declarations that the responses are as complete as information reasonably available to AEI permits. The Court notes that it is a sufficient further response for AEI to state that, as to each omitted field of information identified in the responses, the responses are as complete as information reasonably available to AEI permits. To the extent the information that is omitted from AEI’s responses is reasonably available from sources searched by or available to AEI, AEI must also provide the missing or omitted information in each of the verified further responses to FI Nos. 14.1 and 14.2. The further responses to FI Nos. 14.1 and 14.2 must be verified by a person with sufficient personal knowledge of the manner in which any responsive information was collected.

As further discussed above, AEI also did not provide supplemental responses to FI Nos. 16.7 and 16.8. FI No. 16.7 asks AEI to state whether it contends that any property damage claimed by Plaintiff in discovery proceedings was not caused by the “INCIDENT”. (Sep. Stmt. at p. 3.) AEI has asserted objections to FI No. 16.7 based on relevance and privilege, and on the grounds that FI No. 16.7 is “unintelligible, compound, vague, ambiguous and overly broad.” (Sep. Stmt. at p. 3, l. 18-p. 4, l. 13.)

Plaintiff contends that because FI No. 16.7 is approved by the Judicial Council, it is not unintelligible, compound, vague, ambiguous, or overly broad. Plaintiff further asserts that the complaint alleges property damage in the form of improperly installed and illegal work by AEI, and that he is entitled to know if AEI contends that the property damage was not caused by its conduct and if so, the identity of facts, documents, and witnesses on which AEI relies to support that contention. (See Sep. Stmt. at p. 4, ll. 13-20.)

There exist procedural problems that prevent the Court from determining whether AEI’s objections and Plaintiff’s stated reasons for compelling a further response to FI No. 16.7 are meritorious. FI No. 16.7 also includes the capitalized word “INCIDENT”. Plaintiff has not included with the separate statement the text of the definition of the term “INCIDENT” with respect to FI No. 16.7.

Though Plaintiff vaguely references “conduct” by AEI in reference to FI No. 16.7, considering the objections asserted by AEI and the lack of information offered in the separate statement with respect to the definition of the term “INCIDENT”, the Court is unable to understand in full the request stated in FI No. 16.7, or to determine whether any of the objections to this interrogatory are justified or a further response is necessary. Moreover, Plaintiff’s failure to include the text of the definition of “INCIDENT”, which the Court requires to understand FI No. 16.7, constitutes a violation of California Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(c)(4). For these reasons, the Court will deny the FI Motion with respect to FI No. 16.7.

FI No. 16.8 asks AEI to state whether any costs of repair claimed by Plaintiff in “discovery proceedings thus far” are unreasonable. (Sep. Stmt. at p. 4, ll. 22-28 & p. 5, ll. 1-4.) AEI asserts objections to FI No. 16.8 and does not provide a substantive answer. (Id. at p. 5.) It is AEI’s burden to justify its objections to FI No. 16.8. (Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.)

In its opposition to the FI Motion, AEI contends that Plaintiff has not asserted any property damage or costs of repair during the discovery proceedings in this matter. AEI further argues that because Plaintiff altered the nature of FI No. 16.8 during the meet and confer process by stating that Plaintiff seeks information regarding damages claimed in the complaint rather than in discovery proceedings, FI No. 16.8 is ambiguous.

Assuming the truth of AEI’s contention that Plaintiff has not asserted property damage or costs of repair in the discovery proceedings, this fact does not make the request stated in FI No. 16.8 irrelevant, ambiguous, compound, vague, or overly broad. As further discussed above, it is sufficient for AEI to state that, as to each omitted field of information identified in the responses, the responses are as complete as information reasonably available to AEI permits. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220 [requiring answer to be as complete as reasonably available information permits].) For this reason, the Court will overrule the objections of AEI to FI No. 16.8 with the exception of those based on privilege. Furthermore, for all reasons discussed above, the Court will grant the FI motion, in part, and require AEI to provide a further verified response to FI No. 16.8.

The SI:

Available information demonstrates that AEI served a supplemental response to SI No. 5 but did not serve a supplemental response to SI No. 7. (See Bosuel Decl. SI Motion, Exh. 1.) Plaintiff states that he is withdrawing SI No. 5 from the SI Motion because the supplemental response of AEI to this interrogatory was sufficient. Therefore, as to SI No. 5, the Court will deny the SI Motion as moot. (Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 408-409.)

Available information demonstrates that AEI did not serve a supplemental response to SI No. 7. (Bosuel Decl. SI Motion, Exh. 1.) SI No. 7 asks AEI to identify all facts relating to AEI’s contention that the work performed at the property complied with the County of Santa Barbara building codes and regulations. (Sep. Stmt. at p. 6, ll. 20-22.) AEI does not assert any objections to SI No. 7. (Id. at ll. 23-25.) In its substantive response to SI No. 7, AEI states that “[e]verything we build complied with Santa Barbara County’s building codes and regulations.” (Ibid.)

The answer of AEI to SI No. 7 constitutes a contention and a conclusion. AEI must, to the extent information reasonably available to AEI permits, identify facts to support AEI’s contention that its work complied with stated building codes and regulations. Moreover, it is unclear whether AEI has made a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain facts responsive to SI No. 7 to the extent AEI does not have personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully. Therefore, for all reasons further discussed above, the Court will grant the SI Motion in part, and will require AEI to provide a further verified response to SI No. 7.

(2) The RFP Motion

Available information demonstrates that AEI served a supplemental response to RFP No. 4. (Bosuel Decl. RFP Motion at Exh. 2, p. 13.) Though Plaintiff has included in the separate statement the text of the supplemental response of AEI to RFP No. 4, Plaintiff offers no facts demonstrating a reasonable and good faith attempt to informally resolve any issues with respect to the supplemental response of AEI to RFP No. 4. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016.040 & 2031.310, subd. (b)(2) [requiring motion to be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration].) Therefore, the Court will deny the RFP Motion as moot with respect to RFP No. 4. Any disputes regarding the supplemental response to RFP No. 4, served by AEI on March 4, 2024, may be raised in a procedurally appropriate future motion provided the parties fully meet and confer in good faith.

Available information further demonstrates that AEI did not serve a supplemental response to RFP No. 16, which demands that AEI produce all documents relating to any workers compensation insurance covering employees of AEI who performed work at the property. (Sep. Stmt. at p. 8, ll. 5-7.)

A motion to compel further responses to a demand for production of documents must “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b).) In circumstances where there exist no issues of privilege or claims of attorney work product, the burden to demonstrate good cause is “met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance.” (Glenfed Development Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117; accord, Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.)

Plaintiff contends that good cause exists for the discovery sought in RFP No. 16 because Plaintiff has alleged in his complaint that AEI failed to obtain and maintain workers’ compensation insurance as required by law. (Sep. Stmt. at p. 8, ll. 13-15; Motion at p. 5, ll. 12-13.) In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that AEI employed workers to perform work at the property who were not covered by workers’ compensation insurance. (Compl., ¶¶ 43, 57, 127.) As Plaintiff has explained how the discovery sought in RFP No. 16 will tend to prove a fact that is of consequence in this action, the Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated sufficient good cause for the discovery sought in RFP No. 16. (Digital Music News LLC v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216, 224, disapproved on another ground in Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 557, fn. 8.)

AEI objects to RFP No. 16 on the grounds that the demand “is argumentative because it requires an improper adoption of an assumption” and because the documents sought are “irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence.” (Sep. Stmt. at p. 8, ll. 8-12.) As there exists good cause for the demand stated in RFP No. 16, the Court will overrule the objection of AEI based on relevance.

With respect to AEI’s objection that RFP No. 16 requires the adoption of an assumption, AEI contends that Plaintiff was informed that no employees worked at the property in the response and supplemental response of AEI to SI No. 5 and in the party’s meet and confer communications. Because no employees of AEI worked at the subject property, AEI argues, the production of documents in response to RFP No. 16 is not possible.

Assuming without deciding for present purposes that no “employees” of AEI worked at the property for purposes of workers’ compensation as AEI contends, this information is not included in the response of AEI to RFP No. 16. In addition, this purported fact does not render the demand stated in RFP No. 16 argumentative or improper. For example, to the extent AEI cannot comply with the demand stated in RFP No. 16 for the reasons stated by AEI, AEI must respond with “a representation” of its lack of ability to comply. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.210, subd. (a)(2).) Moreover, AEI must “affirm that a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.230.) These examples are intended to be illustrative but not exhaustive with regard to the deficiencies in the response of AEI to RFP No. 16.

For all reasons further discussed above, the objections of AEI to RFP No. 16 on the grounds that the demand is “argumentative” is without merit. Therefore, and for all reasons discussed above, the Court will overrule AEI’s objections to RFP No. 16 except those based on privilege. The Court will further grant the RFP Motion, in part, and require AEI to provide a further code-compliant verified response to RFP No. 16, without objections overruled herein.

(3) Sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Efforts To Informally Resolve The Issues Presented

In each of its oppositions to the motions, AEI appears to contend that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently meet and confer with AEI regarding its responses to the discovery requests. The Court has reviewed the record of correspondence offered by the parties with respect to the present discovery dispute. The record demonstrates that Plaintiff initiated an effort to informally resolve the purported issues with the responses of AEI to the FI, SI, and RFP at issue in the present motion. (Berg Decls., Exh. C.) Available information further demonstrates that AEI unequivocally stated that it would not supplement certain responses and that it might supplement certain responses at a later time. (Ibid) Accordingly, available information demonstrates that the parties reached an impasse such that additional efforts by Plaintiff to informally resolve the issues were unlikely to bear fruit. (See Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1293-1294.) For these reasons, the Court does not find that Plaintiff’s efforts to informally resolve the issues presented in the motions were insufficient.

(4) Sanctions

Plaintiff and AEI each request that an award sanctions against the other as reimbursement for attorney’s fees incurred by each party to, respectively, bring and oppose the motions. The Court “shall” impose a monetary sanction against any party who “unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response” to interrogatories or an inspection demand, “unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (d); 2031.310, subd. (h).) In addition, the Court may award sanctions in favor of the moving party even though the requested discovery was provided after the motion was filed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1348(a).)

Under the circumstances present here, and considering Plaintiff’s partial success in making the motions, the Court finds that an award of sanctions in favor of Plaintiff and against AEI is warranted. However, “[t]he principle of reasonableness means a trial Court has discretion to reduce the amount of fees and costs requested as a discovery sanction in order to reach a reasonable award.” (Cornerstone Realty Advisors, LLC v. Summit Healthcare Reit, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 771, 791.)

The Court find that the amount of attorney fees claimed by Plaintiff is excessive under the circumstances here. The amount of the sanctions needs to reflect the reasonable expenses incurred as a result of the misuse of the discovery process. While the Court agrees that some of the time spent by counsel for Plaintiff was necessitated by the conduct of AEI and that AEI was in part unsuccessful in opposing the motions, Plaintiff also unsuccessfully argued points that were not supported in a procedurally appropriate manner.

Under all of the circumstances here, including the Court’s experience in addressing attorney fee issues, the Court finds that 3 hours of time for attorney Eric Berg at his reasonable hourly rate of $575, for a grand total of $1,725, constitutes the reasonable amount of attorney fees incurred by Plaintiff as a result of the filing of the motions and the misuse of the discovery process for which monetary sanctions are appropriately awardable.