Diana Cibrian vs American Honda Motor Co Inc

Case Number

23CV01268

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 05/06/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion: Compel

Tentative Ruling

Diana Cibrian v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.     

Case No. 23CV01268         

Hearing Date: May 6, 2024                                        

HEARING:              Motion of Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff Diana Cibrian: Tionna Grace Carvalho, Daniel Law, Strategic Legal Practices

                                    For Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc.: Spencer P.

                                                Hugret, Jeanette C. Suarez, Joshua Hartmann, Gordon

                                                Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP

                                   

TENTATIVE RULING:

The motion of Honda Motor Co., Inc.  to compel arbitration and stay action is denied.

Background:

This action commenced on March 27, 2023, by the filing of the complaint by plaintiff Diana Cibrian against defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (“Honda”), alleging violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act related to a warranty contract, entered into on April 1, 2017, between plaintiff’ and Honda on a 2017 Honda Ridgeline vehicle. Plaintiff alleges several defects and non-conformities that Honda, and its authorized repair facility, failed to repair within a reasonable time to conform to the applicable warranties.

Honda answered the complaint on April 27, 2023, asserting a general denial and 25 affirmative defenses including the fifteenth affirmative defense of arbitration agreement.

Honda now moves to compel arbitration and stay this action pursuant to an arbitration provision in the vehicle lease agreement. Plaintiff opposes the motion.

Analysis:

“[T]he Legislature has expressed a ‘strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive means of dispute resolution.’ [Citations.] Consequently, courts will ‘indulge every intendment to give effect to such proceedings.’ [Citations.]” (Mancharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 9.)

The preliminary question that must be addressed is the existence of an arbitration agreement.

“The burden of persuasion is always on the moving party to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement with the opposing party by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164.)

By way of declaration, Honda claims that the arbitration agreement is contained in a Retail Installment Sale Contract. (Suarez Dec., ¶ 2 & Exh. A) However, the only arbitration language that is included in exhibit A is: “Agreement to Arbitrate: By signing below, you agree that, pursuant to the Arbitration Provision on the reverse side of the contract, you or we may elect to resolve any dispute by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action. See the Arbitration Provision for additional information concerning the agreement to arbitrate.” That section is signed by plaintiff. The language does not indicate who, besides plaintiff, is agreeing to arbitration. The reverse side of the contract, purporting to contain the arbitration details, is not included in the moving papers.

By way of its reply, Honda admits that it “inadvertently provided a copy of a later

Retail Installment Contract for Plaintiff’s vehicle.” (Reply, p. 2, ll. 14-16.) Honda then purports to attach a copy of the Lease Agreement that actually contains the arbitration agreement, signed by plaintiff, as Exhibit C to the declaration of Joshua Hartmann in reply to plaintiff’s opposition. (Hartmann Dec., ¶ 5 & Exh. C.)

Exhibit C to the Hartmann declaration is the exact same Retail Installment Sale Contract submitted with the moving papers. It does not contain an agreement to arbitrate with Honda. The court has scoured the rest of Honda’s moving papers, and reply papers, and Honda has not provided a copy of any arbitration agreement with Honda as a party to the agreement or naming Honda as a third-party beneficiary of the agreement.

“[T]he moving party must establish with admissible evidence a valid arbitration agreement between the parties. The burden of proving the agreement by a preponderance of the evidence remains with the moving party. [Citation.]” (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 165-166, italics added.)

Although Honda sets forth language, by way of its motion, that it claims constitutes the arbitration agreement, it has not produced any admissible evidence of the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. Further, even if the language in the moving papers was contained in a properly admissible document, it does not show that “American Honda Motor Co., Inc.,” as opposed to another Honda entity, such as “Santa Barbara Honda,” which is the seller-creditor listed in the retail installment sale contract, is the “Honda” referred to in the arbitration agreement.

Honda has failed to meet its initial burden of establishing the existence of an arbitration agreement. As such, the motion must be denied.