Casa Blanca Beach Estate Owners’ Assn vs State of CA ex rel CA State Lands Commission et al

Case Number

23CV00947

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 02/09/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

(2) Demurrers and a Motion to Stay

Tentative Ruling

For the reasons set forth below:

1. Defendant California State Lands Commission’s Motion to Stay all Proceedings Pending Outcome of Quiet Title Action is denied.
2. Defendant County of Santa Barbara’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is overruled.
3. Defendant California Coastal Commission’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is overruled.
4. Defendants County of Santa Barbara and California Coastal Commission shall file and serve their answers to plaintiff’s first amended complaint no later than February 29, 2024.

Background:

This action commenced on March 9, 2023, by the filing of the original petition and complaint by plaintiff Casa Blanca Beach Estates Owners’ Association (“CBBEOA”) against defendant State of California ex rel. State Lands Commission (“SLC”), setting forth 13 causes of action.

More than seven months later, on October 20, 2023, CBBEOA filed the operative first amended petition and complaint (“FAC”) against defendants SLC, California Coastal Commission (“CCC”), and the County of Santa Barbara (“County”), setting forth causes of action for: (1) Breach of Contract - Damages; (2) Breach of Contract - Specific Performance; (3) Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (4) Promissory Estoppel; (5) Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment; (6) Declaratory Relief- Holdover Tenancy Rights;  (7) Declaratory Relief - Compliance with Accessway Requirement; (8) Declaratory Relief - Rights under Existing Lease and the Law; (9) Writ of Mandamus - CCP § 1085; (10) Writ of Administrative Mandamus - CCP § 1094.5; (11) Unconstitutional Taking 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (12) Unconstitutional Condition Doctrine; (13) Violation of CA Constitution; (14) Declaratory Relief - Conflicting Directives; and (15) Slander of Title.

As the complaint, including exhibits, is 109 pages long, the court provides the following abbreviated summary of allegations:

CBBEOA owns the common area property in the CBBEOA 8-home subdivision in Santa Barbara County. (FAC, ¶ 1.) CBBEOA have operated since 1996 under and in reliance on a lease issued by SLC for the operation and maintenance of a rock revetment sea wall that protects CBBEOA members homes, among other things. (Ibid.) “The Rock Revetment is located somewhat near the boundary between Casa Blanca’s property and state land, but the boundary line between the properties has never been established by agreement or adjudication. Under the terms of the Existing Lease, Casa Blanca has been, and remains, a tenant of the leased premises for $0 in annual rental in exchange for the recognized public benefit that Casa Blanca and the Rock Revetment itself have provided and continue to provide to the public. The Existing Lease does not give the SLC the authority to unilaterally terminate it, either during the initial term or the holdover period, in the absence of certain circumstances that are not present.” (Ibid.)

“Despite this, on October 31, 2022, the SLC staff falsely claimed that ‘any right of occupation held by’ Casa Blanca had been terminated. Furthermore, without engaging in meaningful negotiations with Casa Blanca, and without making a legal determination of the location of the boundary line of State land or its legal entitlement to proceed, on December 9, 2022 the SLC approved a motion that demanded that Casa Blanca accept a new lease that imposed a $648,211 one-time payment for alleged prior unauthorized occupation of the leased premises, a new annual rental of $258,300 (with annual increases), and an annual payment of $749,703 over the next ten years (with annual increases) for alleged impacts of the long-existing Rock Revetment on public trust resources. The SLC’s motion threatened that if Casa Blanca did not accept the new lease by February 8, 2023, the SLC would take steps to require that the Rock Revetment be removed. Thus, the SLC purported to terminate unilaterally the Existing Lease without cause and to replace it with a new lease requiring annual payments exceeding $1,000,000 plus a one-time payment of almost $650,000, obligating Casa Blanca to pay over $11,000,000 over the next ten years, despite the fact that Casa Blanca is entitled under the Existing Lease to pay nothing. The SLC subsequently rescinded the new lease offer when Casa Blanca declined to accept it and elected to continue under the Existing Lease.” (FAC, ¶ 2.)

“Casa Blanca also specifically seeks a declaration that Casa Blanca has fully complied with its accessway obligations under the terms of the Existing Lease as well as the underlying development permit on which this provision of the Existing Lease is based. The determination of Casa Blanca’s compliance with the accessway provisions under the Existing Lease, on which the SLC has taken final administrative action, necessarily involves the California Coastal Commission (“Coastal Commission”), whose claims regarding access formed the basis of the final administrative actions taken by the SLC, and were referenced by the SLC in taking its actions against Casa Blanca, as well as the County of Santa Barbara (“County”), whose development permit imposed the accessway requirement, and whose acceptance of the accessway is a necessary part of the accessway construction. Accordingly, these agencies have been named in this case in the causes of action relating to these claims regarding the accessway provisions under the terms of the Existing Lease.” (FAC, ¶ 4.)

On July 20, 2023, between the filing of CBBEOA’s original complaint and the FAC, SLC filed a Complaint for Quiet Title (“QTC”), in Case No. 23CV03115, against CBBEOA and several other individuals and entities that may have claims to the disputed property.

As alleged in the Quiet Title Complaint:

“The dispute at issue is the current location of the boundary between the State sovereign lands and privately owned uplands depicted on Tract No. 14,026, in the County of Santa Barbara, State of California, according to map thereof recorded in Book 156 of Maps, Pages 91-95. The State asserts the boundary of state ownership is the ordinary high-water mark, without consideration of deed boundaries or tract maps, and that the last natural location of the MHTL, as depicted in the 1964 MHTL survey and prior to the expanded construction of the revetment, is the best evidence of the boundary of state ownership. The upland property owners assert the boundary for state sovereign lands can be no further landward than the boundary between Lots 11 and Lot 12 of Tract No. 14,026 as depicted in Book 156 of Maps.” (QTC, ¶ 5.)

“Because upland owners have constructed, and added to, a rock revetment along the coastline at issue, the Commission measures the State’s current ownership using the last natural MHTL as shown on a 1964 State Lands Commission Survey. Upland homeowners dispute that jurisdictional determination. The Commission requests the Court issue a declaratory order that declares the current boundary of the State’s ownership is the MHTL as described by the 1964 State Lands Commission Survey and quiet title accordingly.” (QTC, ¶ 4.)

SLC seeks relief including a declaratory order that the current boundary between State Sovereign land and the defendants’ upland interests is the line identified as the Mean High Tide Line in the SLC’s 1964 survey, effective January 4, 2022, and continuing until such time that the rock revetment and all other artificial accretions are removed, as well as a decree quieting title in favor of the State of California that the property is designated as sovereign tidelands and submerged lands.

Relevant here is that this case and Case No. 23CV03115 were ordered related on November 20, 2023, and are now both pending before this department.

Also, there is a pending appeal in Case No. 18CV04772. That case is an action for declaratory relief and petition for writ of mandate filed by CBBEO against County and CCC in 2018.

ANALYSIS:

            Motion to Stay Proceedings

As an initial observation: “We recognize that it is very common for [attorneys] to include argument in their declarations (we know it is done all the time, and we do not want to single out the trial lawyers in this regard), but it is a sloppy practice which should stop. Even at its most benign, it is a practice that forces the trial and appellate courts, and opposing counsel, to sort out the facts that are actually supported by oath from material that is nothing more than the statement of an opinion ostensibly under oath. More fundamentally, however, it makes a mockery of the requirement that declarations be supported by statements made under penalty of perjury. The proper place for argument is in points and authorities, not declarations.” (In re Marriage of Heggie (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 28, 30, fn. 3.)

Further: An attorney is competent to recite events occurring during the course of the litigation. An attorney’s declaration of what the client’s testimony would be, based on the attorney’s discussion with the client and an investigation of the facts, is not competent. (See Donnelly v. Ayer (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 978, 984.)

In the future, counsel should refrain from including legal argument in his declaration and remain mindful of what he is claiming to possess personal knowledge of.

SLC requests that the court take judicial notice of eight documents in support of their motion. CBBEOA does not object. “ ‘Courts can take judicial notice of the existence, content and authenticity of public records and other specified documents, but do not take judicial notice of the truth of the factual matters asserted in those documents.’ ” [Citation.]” (Dominguez v. Bonta (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 389, 400.) The court will take judicial notice of the documents that are relevant to the matter before the court but will not take judicial notice of the truth of the factual matters asserted therein.

“As the court in Landis v. North American Co. (1936) 299 U.S. 248, 254, explained, ‘ “the power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” ’ ” (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 141; accord, Freiberg v. City of Mission Viejo (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489 [“ ‘Trial courts generally have the inherent power to stay proceedings in the interests of justice and to promote judicial efficiency’ ”].)” (St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company v. AmerisourceBergen Corporation (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1, 13-14.)

As the moving party, SLC bears the burden of proof that the stay should be imposed.

Here, SLC argues that the location of the boundary between State-owned public trust tidelands and upland private property is “a threshold matter that must be decided before any other dispute related to this real property can be properly adjudicated” and that the outcome of the quiet title matter has the potential to moot CBBEOA’s claims in the present case. (Motion, p. 2, ll. 6-13.)

SLC sets forth several purported facts regarding its claims in the quiet title action and then makes conclusory statements such as: “Substantively, the Quiet Title Action must be resolved before the Breach of Contract Case can be properly litigated. The current location of the boundary line between State-owned public trust tidelands and upland private property directly impacts the foundational allegations upon which all fifteen causes of action in the Breach of Contract Case rely.” (Motion, p. 5, ll. 17-21.) “CBBEOA’s entire suit, and the strength or merits of each cause of action therein depends on the current location of the boundary between State-owned public trust tidelands and upland private property. The outcome of the Quiet Title Action may eliminate or significantly alter CBBEOA’s cause of action in the Breach of Contract Case.” (Motion, p. 6, ll. 6-9.)

Likewise, the examples given by SLC, as to how resolution of the quiet title action might affect the claims made in the present action, are equally conclusory and fail to demonstrate how, even if their arguments are correct, resolution of the quiet title action would promote the interests of justice or judicial efficiency. The contrary appears to be true. The granting of the motion to stay would more likely result in duplicative discovery and increased hearings, rather than decrease or eliminate them.

Despite SLC’s claim to the contrary, and as noted above, the two cases have been ordered related and assigned to this department for all purposes. If, following a certain amount of discovery, it appears that one case, or a portion of either case, should be heard first, the court retains authority to so order. At the very least, the motion to stay this action is premature.

The motion to stay this action will be denied.

            Demurrers

“When any ground for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) “Our consideration of the facts alleged includes ‘those evidentiary facts found in recitals of exhibits attached to [the] complaint.’ [Citation.]” (Alexander v. Exxon Mobil (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1250.)

“[A] court must treat a demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, it does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.” (Travelers Indem. Co. of Connecticut v. Navigators Specialty Ins. Co. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 341, 358, citing Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

“To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)

CCC requests that the court take judicial notice of CBBEOA’s second amended complaint in Case No. 18CV04772, judgment of dismissal following CCC’s demurrer, and a letter from the clerk of the court of appeal advising that the record on appeal was filed on October 18, 2021. The court will take judicial notice of the documents that are relevant to the matter before the court but will not take judicial notice of the truth of the factual matters asserted therein.

“A demurrer shall distinctly specify the grounds upon which any of the objections to the complaint, cross-complaint, or answer are taken. Unless it does so, it may be disregarded.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.60.)

“Each ground of demurrer must be in a separate paragraph and must state whether it applies to the entire complaint, cross-complaint, or answer, or to specified causes of action or defenses.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1320(a).)

County’s Notice of Demurrer states: “Petitioner’s complaint, as against moving Respondent County of Santa Barbara, does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for declaratory relief and there is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.” (Notice, p. 2, ll. 6-9.)

CCC’s Notice of Demurrer sets forth the grounds for demurrer, as to the seventh and fourteenth causes of action as failing to state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action, being jurisdictionally deficient for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, being inappropriate for review of an administrative decision, and that there is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.

By way of its points and authorities, County challenges the seventh and fourteenth causes of action contained in the FAC. The seventh cause of action is for declaratory relief as to CBBEOA’s compliance with an accessway requirement. The fourteenth cause of action is for declaratory relief as to resolving conflicting demands imposed by defendants on CBBEOA.

“Any person interested under a written instrument, excluding a will or a trust, or under a contract, or who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another, or in respect to, in, over or upon property, or with respect to the location of the natural channel of a watercourse, may, in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an original action or cross-complaint in the superior court for a declaration of his or her rights and duties in the premises, including a determination of any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or contract. He or she may ask for a declaration of rights or duties, either alone or with other relief; and the court may make a binding declaration of these rights or duties, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed at the time. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect, and the declaration shall have the force of a final judgment. The declaration may be had before there has been any breach of the obligation in respect to which said declaration is sought.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.)

County argues that CBBOA fails to allege sufficient facts that an actual controversy between the County and CBBOA currently exists which would support a claim for declaratory relief.

Both County and CCC tend to argue the merits of their case rather than address the allegations as pled in the FAC. Because it would be improper to weigh evidence in ruling on the demurrers, the court will focus on the allegations contained in the FAC the exhibits attached thereto, and the documents of which it has taken judicial notice.

CBBEOA’s allegations regarding the basis of its claims against CCC and County are set forth in paragraph No. 4 of the FAC. That language is quoted in full above. In addition, the FAC contains numerous other allegations related to County’s and CCC’s acts or omissions that form the basis of the causes of action. The fact that County does not appear to be a party to the 1996 lease is irrelevant in ruling on County’s demurrer. There are multiple allegations pertaining to County that are not dependent on the 1996 lease. These allegations are contained in several paragraphs including Nos. 17, 20, 23, 25, 72, 112, 113, 114, 183, etc. Likewise, the allegations against CCC include allegations that CCC, SLC, and County, have made competing and inconsistent demands on CBBOA. (FAC, ¶ 63.) This is primarily the reason given for seeking declaratory relief. The allegations are sufficient to overcome demurrer.

Both County and CCC argue that the causes of action should be held in abatement pending the outcome of  Case No. 18CV04772 because the FAC raise substantially the same issues between the parties as that action, which is currently on appeal.

“The proper time to raise a plea in abatement is in the original answer or by demurrer at the time of the answer. [Citation.] It is a technical objection and must be pleaded specifically. Thus an affirmative defense or demurrer which contains a general assertion that plaintiff has not stated a cause of action does not suffice to raise a plea in abatement. [Citations.]” (Vitug v. Griffin (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 488, 493-494.)

“[T]he pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause is made a ground for demurrer. The plea is dilatory in its nature and is not favored. It may be made only when the face of the complaint shows that the causes of action and the issues in the two suits are substantially the same. [Citations.] Where, for all that appears in the complaint, the prior suit does not involve the entire cause of action presented by the complaint in the later litigation, the plea of abatement should be raised by answer rather than by demurrer. [Citations.]” (Lord v. Garland (1946) 27 Cal.2d 840, 848.)

“As a test for determining whether the causes of action are the same or different, it is the universal rule that a plea in abatement may be maintained only where the claim sued upon in the second action is such that a final judgment in the first one could be pleaded in bar as a former adjudication.” (Ibid.)

The court has thoroughly reviewed the second amended complaint filed in Case No. 18CV04772 and compared it with the allegations in the current action. While the two cases clearly have issues in common, it cannot be said that, at this time, a final judgment in the first action would bar the current action. There are additional and separate issues that are pleaded in the present case than in the first action and relating to events occurring on different dates. “ ‘Ordinarily, a general demurrer does not lie as to a portion of a cause of action and if any part of a cause of action, is properly pleaded, the demurrer will be overruled.’ ” (Elder v. Pacific Bell Telephone Co. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 841, 856, fn. 14.)

In this case, demurrer could not dispose of the entirety of either the seventh or fourteenth causes of action based on the 2018 action on appeal. The plea in abatement should be raised by answer rather than by demurrer.

CCC also argues that CBBEOA has failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. They are asking the court to improperly weigh evidence and make factual determinations. As noted above, it would be improper to do so in ruling on a demurrer. The FAC affirmatively states that CBBEOA has exhausted any necessary administrative remedies at paragraph Nos. 60-63. That is all that is required at the pleading stage.

Finally, the declaratory relief causes of action do not appear to be seeking declaratory relief related to administrative actions as argued by CCC. Rather, as pled, the FAC relates to rights and duties under the allegedly existing lease.

Reading the complaint as a whole, and its subparts in their context, the FAC contains more than sufficient allegations to overcome demurrer. The demurrers will be overruled.