Linda Kopcrak, et al. v. Elizabeth A. Watkins., et al

Case Number

23CV00771

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 09/04/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion To Vacate Void Judgment Pursuant To Code of Civil Procedure section 473, Subdivision (d)

Tentative Ruling

For Petitioners Linda Kopcrak and Christina Carrari: Tiffany M. Carrari

For Respondent Angelina Dettamanti: Self Represented

For Respondent Elizabeth A. Watkins: Aaron R. Feldman, Feldman Law Group

RULING

For all reasons discussed herein, the motion of respondent Angelina Dettamanti to vacate void judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d), is denied.

Background

On February 27, 2023, petitioner Linda Kopcrak (Kopcrak), individually and as co-Trustee of the George Miguel Carrari Trust dated November 28, 1979 and the Carrari Family Trust dated February 28, 2002 (the Carrari Trusts), and petitioner Christina Carrari, as co-Trustee of the Carrari Trusts (collectively Petitioners), filed a verified “Petition To Enforce Money Judgment By Collecting Trust Income And Principal Due Judgment Debtor As Trust Beneficiary” (the petition) against respondents Elizabeth A. Watkins (Watkins), as successor Trustee of the Henry and Venice Dettamanti Family Trust dated February 6, 1986 (the Dettamanti Trust), and Angelina Dettamanti (Angelina), as a beneficiary of the Dettamanti Trust (collectively Respondents). (Note: due to common sur-names, the Court will, as necessary, refer to the parties by their first names to avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended.) As alleged in the petition:

On November 9, 2021, an amended judgment following a default in the amount of $711,924.35, exclusive of interest (Judgment 1), was entered and filed in case number 18PR00182 against Angelina, who is a named beneficiary of the Dettamanti Trust, and in favor of Petitioners as co-Trustees of the Carrari Trusts. (Pet., ¶ 9 & Exh. A.) Notice of entry of Judgment 1 was served on Angelina on the same day. (Id. at ¶ 9 & Exh. B.) No part of Judgment 1 has been paid. (Id. at ¶ 10.)

On February 3, 2022, a judgment following a default hearing in the amount of $358,000, exclusive of interest (Judgment 2), was entered in case number 18PR00334 against Angelina and in favor of Petitioners, as successor co-Trustees of the Carrari Trusts. (Pet., ¶ 11 & Exh. C.) Judgment 2 was filed in case number 18PR00334 on February 10, 2024, and notice of entry of Judgment 2 was served on Angelina on February 11, 2022. (Ibid. & Exhs. C & D.)

On May 26, 2022, following a hearing on a motion by Kopcrak for attorney fees and costs, the Court entered an order (the fee order) in case number 18PR00334 which amended Judgment 2 to include that Kopcrak shall recover an award of attorney fees and costs in the total amount of $595,075.99. (Pet., ¶ 12 & Exh. E; see also Exh. F [notice of entry of fee order].) As amended by the fee order, Judgment 2 includes a monetary judgment against Angelina totaling $953,075.99, exclusive of interest. (Id. at ¶ 13.) No part of Judgment 2 has been paid. (Id. at ¶ 14.)

Under the terms of the Dettamanti Trust, Benjamin Henry Dettamanti (Benjamin) was a designated beneficiary as to 50 percent of the estate of the Dettamanti Trust. (Pet., ¶ 16.) Benjamin predeceased his two children, one of whom is Angelina and the other Mario Dettamanti (Mario), on August 20, 2021. (Ibid.) As a result, following the death of Venice Dettamanti, who is the settlor and primary beneficiary of the entire estate of the Dettamanti Trust, on July 25, 2022, Angelina became entitled to half of the principal and any undistributed income held in Benjamin’s sub-share which, under the terms of the Dettamanti Trust, shall be immediately distributed to Angelina and Mario thereby entitling Angelina to a distribution of 25 percent of the assets of the Dettamanti Trust. (Ibid.) In the petition, Petitioners request an order directing Watkins to withhold from Angelina and pay to Petitioners up to 25 percent of the Dettamanti Trust assets and applying Angelina’s 25 interest in the Dettamanti Trust assets to satisfy Judgment 1 and Judgment 2 (collectively, the Judgments), among other things. (Id. at prayer ¶¶ 1 & 2.)

Court records reflect that on March 1, 2023, Petitioners filed an ex parte application for an order temporarily restraining Watkins from making any distribution of income or principal from the Dettamanti Trust to Angelina, and for an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be granted enjoining Watkins from performing the above-described act during the pendency of this action.

On March 2, 2023, the Court entered an order (the OSC) directing Watkins and Angelina to appear and show cause why Watkins should not be enjoined during the pendency of this action from making distributions of income or principal from the Dettamanti Trust to Angelina until such time that the Court enters an order on the Petition.

On March 17, 2023, Angelina filed her opposition to the Petition.

On March 29, 2023, following a hearing on the OSC, the Court entered an order granting the preliminary injunction requested by Petitioners in their March 1, 2023, ex parte application described above. (See Mar. 29, 2023, Order Granting Preliminary Injunction.)

On April 3, 2023, Watkins filed her response to the Petition.

On April 7, 2023, following a hearing, the Court entered its order (the Order) granting the petition, directing Watkins to withhold from Angelina and pay to Petitioners up to 25 percent of the Dettamanti Trust assets including 25 percent of the proceeds from a sale of certain property of the Dettamanti Trust, to the extent that the Judgments together with interest are satisfied in full. (Apr. 7, 2023, Order, ¶ 1.) The Order also directed Watkins to apply Angelina’s entire 25 percent interest in all Dettamanti Trust assets to the satisfaction of the Judgments by the methods further set forth in the Order. (Id. at ¶ 2.) Notice of the Order was provided to Watkins and Angelina on April 10, 2023. (See Petitioner’s Apr. 10, 2023, Notice of Entry of Order.)

On June 5, 2023, Angelina filed a notice of appeal of the Order.

On June 7, 2024, Mario filed a notice identifying case number 22PR00622 entitled Matter of the Dettamanti Family Trust (the 2022 Dettamanti Trust matter) as related to the present action. Angelina filed an opposition to the notice filed by Mario on June 13, 2024.

On June 24, 2024, Mario filed a motion for leave to intervene in this matter, which was opposed by Petitioners and Watkins.

On July 3, 2023, Petitioners filed a notice identifying case number 23PR00280 entitled In re The Henry and Venice Dettamanti Family Trust u/a February 6, 1986 (the 2023 Dettamanti Trust matter) as related to the present action. On July 10, 2023, the Court entered an order relating the present action to the 2023 Dettamanti Trust matter.

Court records reflect that the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of California, County of Santa Barbara, issued a notice of default on July 14, 2023, in reference to the appeal filed by Angelina on June 5, 2023.

The Court denied the motion of Mario for leave to intervene on July 24, 2024.

On July 25, 2024, Angelina filed the present motion for an order vacating the “[j]udgment entered on April 12, 2023” and dismissing this action with prejudice on grounds further discussed below. (Motion at p. 1, l. 26 – p. 2, l. 1.) The present motion of Angelina is opposed by Petitioners.

Analysis

Though there exist procedural deficiencies in the present motion, which also appears to be an end-run around the default by Angelina on appeal, the Court has nonetheless considered the points raised by Angelina and will, for reasons more fully discussed below, deny the motion.

A motion is an application for an order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1003.) Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, subdivision (a)(1) through (13), sets forth motions which require written notice, which include “[a]ny … proceeding under this code in which notice is required, and no other time or method is prescribed by law or by court or judge.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (13).) Based on its caption, Angelina brings the present motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d), which provides that, “on motion of either party after notice to the other party”, the court may “set aside any void judgment or order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (d).) Therefore, the present motion requires written notice. (Note: Undesignated code references herein shall be to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.)

“A notice of motion must state in the opening paragraph the nature of the order being sought and the grounds for issuance of the order.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1110(a); see also Code Civ. Proc., § 1010 [a notice of a motion must state “the grounds upon which it will be made”].) “The purpose of the notice requirements ‘is to cause the moving party to “sufficiently define the issues for the information and attention of the adverse party and the court.” ’ [Citations.]” (Kinda v. Carpenter (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1277 (Kinda).) Therefore, “[a]s a general rule, the trial court may consider only the grounds stated in the notice of motion.” (Luri v. Greenwald (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1125 (Luri).)

The present motion includes a brief introductory paragraph in which Angelina states that she moves the Court to “VACATE its Judgment entered on April 12, 2023, as it’s based on a void case, as the attached Points and Authorities will prove such.” (Motion at p. 1, l. 27 – p. 2, l. 1.) Angelina goes on to state that the Court must “VACATE its April, 2023 Judgment and DISMISS CASE WITH PREJUDICE, as judgment merging is not a cause of action.” (Motion at p. 2, ll. 2-4.) The Court has no record of a “judgment” having been entered in this matter on April 12, 2023. Furthermore, in the memorandum in support of the motion, Angelina asserts additional and different grounds than those stated in the introductory paragraph which are more fully discussed below. For these reasons, there exists an insufficient notice of the present motion sufficiently defining the issues for the Court and Petitioners. In addition, to the extent the grounds offered in the supporting memorandum are not stated in the introductory paragraph, the Court is generally not required to consider these grounds.

Notwithstanding the procedural deficiencies noted above, Petitioners have submitted an opposition to the present motion responding to each ground asserted by Angelina in the memorandum including those grounds which are not stated in the purported notice of the motion. The content of Petitioners’ opposition to the motion indicates to the Court that Petitioners understand the issues. (See Kinda, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1277-1278 [purpose of notice requirements may be met if omitted grounds were raised “without objection”]; Luri, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1125 [“[a]n omission in the notice may be overlooked if the supporting papers make clear the grounds for the relief sought”].) Therefore, the Court will consider the grounds for relief asserted in the memorandum. However, Angelina is reminded of her obligation to comply with procedural requirements when filing motions with the Court.

In their opposition, Petitioners state their understanding that the April 12, 2023, judgment referenced in the motion is an erroneous reference to the Order. In her reply to the opposition, Angelina does not dispute that she seeks to vacate the Order. Therefore, for present purposes, it is also the Court’s understanding that the motion is directed to the Order which Angelina contends is void and must be set aside pursuant to subdivision (d) of section 473. The Court also notes for present purposes that, to the extent it is not void, the Order is final and preclusive under principles of res judicata. (Franklin & Franklin v. 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1174; Rochin v. Pat Johnson Manufacturing Co. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1239.)

“The question of whether a judgment is void is typically framed as a question of whether the court rendering the judgment lacked jurisdiction.” (Grados v. Shiau (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 1042, 1050; see also Plaza Hollister Ltd. Partnership v. County of San Benito (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1, 20 [“[t]he granting of relief, which a court under no circumstances has any authority to grant, has been considered an aspect of fundamental jurisdiction”].) “Essentially, jurisdictional errors are of two types. ‘Lack of jurisdiction in its most fundamental or strict sense means an entire absence of power to hear or determine the case, an absence of authority over the subject matter or the parties. [Citation.] When a court lacks jurisdiction in a fundamental sense, an ensuing judgment is void, and ‘thus vulnerable to direct or collateral attack at any time.’ [Citation.]” (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 660 (American Contractors).)

“However, ‘in its ordinary usage the phrase “lack of jurisdiction” is not limited to these fundamental situations.’ [Citation.] It may also ‘be applied to a case where, though the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties in the fundamental sense, it has no “jurisdiction” (or power) to act except in a particular manner, or to give certain kinds of relief, or to act without the occurrence of certain procedural prerequisites.’ [Citation.] ‘[W]hen a statute authorizes [a] prescribed procedure, and the court acts contrary to the authority thus conferred, it has exceeded its jurisdiction.’ [Citation.] When a court has fundamental jurisdiction, but acts in excess of its jurisdiction, its act or judgment is merely voidable.” (American Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 661.) A voidable act or judgment is “valid until it is set aside, and a party may be precluded from setting it aside by ‘principles of estoppel, disfavor of collateral attack or res judicata.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

In the motion, Angelina offers four separately enumerated arguments in support of the motion which are entitled “Argument I” (motion at pp. 2-4), “Argument II” (motion at pp. 4-5), “Argument III” (motion at pp. 6-7), and “Argument IV” (motion at p. 7-9). The Court will address each in the order in which they are presented.

Argument I:

With respect to Argument I, Angelina states that section 9.4 of the Dettamanti Trust provides that “[i]f any creditor of any Beneficiary other than a Trustor, who is entitled to any distribution from a Trust established under this instrument, shall attempt by any means to object to the satisfaction of his claim against such Beneficiary’s interest in distribution, then, notwithstanding any other provision herein, the distribution set aside for such Beneficiary shall, in the Trustee’s discretion, either be added to principal or set aside in a special account until the release of the writ of attachment of garnishment or other process.” (Motion at p. 3, ll. 6-11.) Angelina contends or effectively contends that to the extent the Order permits Petitioners to satisfy the Judgments against Angelina’s beneficiary interest in the Dettamanti Trust, that interest is not subject to any voluntary or involuntary transfers under section 9.4. Rather, Angelina argues, section 9.4 requires that the Trustee either keep Angelina’s share in a special account or add it to principal.

Based on Angelina’s interpretation of section 9.4 of the Dettamanti Trust as further described above, Angelina also contends that under subdivision (c) of section 709.010, which provides that nothing in that section “affects the limitations on the enforcement of a money judgment against the judgment debtor’s interest in a trust under Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 15300) of Part 2 of Division 9 of the Probate Code” (Code Civ. Proc., § 709.010, subd. (c)), the restraint or limitation set forth in Probate Code section 15300 applies here. Under Probate Code section 15300, “if the trust instrument provides that a beneficiary’s interest in income is not subject to voluntary or involuntary transfer, the beneficiary’s interest in income under the trust may not be transferred and is not subject to enforcement of a money judgment until paid to the beneficiary.” (Prob. Code, § 15300.) Angelina contends that, because section 9.4 of the Dettamanti Trust restricts transfers of her beneficiary interest as further detailed above, her beneficiary interest was exempt from the claims asserted by Petitioners in this action. Therefore, Angelina argues, the Order is void on its face for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The information and arguments presented by Angelina under Argument 1 do not arise from any apparent invalidities on the face of the record of these proceedings. For example, Angelina appears to concede that the Court had personal jurisdiction over the parties to this action. (Opp. at p. 5, ll. 17-19; Greener v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1028, 1034-1035 (Greener) [general discussion of personal jurisdiction]; Braugh v. Dow (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 76, 88 (Braugh) [discussion of service of process as an “issue of fundamental jurisdiction”].) Instead, Angelina relies on extrinsic evidence (here, section 9.4 which purportedly appears within the Dettamanti Trust) to support her arguments. Therefore, Angelina has not established that the Order is void on its face. (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1441; Braugh, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 86 [the relevant inquiry does not turn on evidence].)

Regarding Angelina’s contention that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction based on section 9.4 of the Dettamanti Trust, a court’s subject matter jurisdiction “is conferred by constitutional or statutory law” and refers to the “power of the court over a cause of action or to act in a particular way.” (Guardianship of Ariana K. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 690, 701 (Ariana K.); Greener, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1035.) A “lack” of subject matter jurisdiction “means the entire absence of power to hear or determine a case; i.e., an absence of authority over the subject matter.” (Ariana K., supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 701.) To determine whether an order or judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction in a “fundamental” sense, courts “look first to the language of the statute.” (Schrage v. Schrage (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 126, 140 (Schrage); American Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 661.)

Section 709.010, which Angelina expressly and by inference concedes governs this action, provides that a “judgment debtor’s interest as a beneficiary of a trust is subject to enforcement of a money judgment only upon petition under this section by a judgment creditor to a court having jurisdiction over administration of the trust as prescribed in Part 5 (commencing with Section 17000) of Division 9 of the Probate Code. The judgment debtor’s interest in the trust may be applied to the satisfaction of the money judgment by such means as the court, in its discretion, determines are proper, including but not limited to imposition of a lien on or sale of the judgment debtor’s interest, collection of trust income, and liquidation and transfer of trust property by the trustee.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 709.010, subd. (b).) As Petitioners sought an order authorizing enforcement of the Judgments from Angelina’s beneficiary interest in the Dettamanti Trust, which the Court granted in the Order, the Court had subject matter jurisdiction under the provisions of section 709.010, and the relief granted under the Order is authorized by this statute. In addition, Angelina does not contend that, and offers no reasoned argument showing why, the Court did not have jurisdiction over the administration of the Dettamanti Trust. (See also Prob. Code, §§ 17000; 17001; 17003, subd. (b); 17004 [authorizing the Court to exercise its jurisdiction in this action].)

In addition, and ignoring the questionable admissibility of the information offered by Angelina with respect to the terms of the Dettamanti Trust on which Angelina relies, under the express terms of section 9.4 as cited by Angelina and described above, this section appears to apply only to the extent Petitioners were entitled to any distribution and “attempted … to object” to the satisfaction of their claims against Angelina’s beneficiary interest in the Dettamanti Trust. There is no information or evidence demonstrating that Petitioners attempted to object in this action to the satisfaction of their claims against Angelina’s beneficiary interest. Therefore, the provisions of section 709.010, Probate Code section 15300, and the Dettamanti Trust cited by Angelina, do not prohibit the relief granted under the Order.

For all reasons discussed above, the contentions offered by Angelina under Argument 1 fail to establish that the Court lacked fundamental authority over a party to this action, jurisdiction over the subject matter or questions presented in the petition, or the power to hear or resolve the legal dispute raised in the petition. (Dial 800 v. Fesbinder (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 32, 42 [general discussion of subject matter jurisdiction]; (Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 798, 808 [same]; Braugh, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 88 [discussion of service of process as an “issue of fundamental jurisdiction”].) For these reasons, Angelina has failed to meet her burden to establish that the Order is void. (Corns v. Miller (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 195, 200 [the moving party bears the burden to proving each fact essential to the relief requested in a motion].)

Although Angelina has failed to show that the Court lacked fundamental jurisdiction to issue the Order, “the Constitution, a statute, or relevant case law may constrain the court to act only in a particular manner, or subject to certain limitations. [Citation.] When a trial court has fundamental jurisdiction but fails to act in the manner prescribed, it is said to have acted ‘ “in excess of its jurisdiction.” ’ [Citation.] Because an ordinary act in excess of jurisdiction does not negate a court’s fundamental jurisdiction to hear the matter altogether, such a ruling is treated as valid until set aside. [Citation.] A party may be precluded from seeking to set aside such a ruling because of waiver, estoppel, or the passage of time. [Citation.]” (Braugh, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 87-88.)

To the extent Angelina contends that the Court acted in excess of its jurisdiction because it was not authorized to give, or constrained from awarding, the relief prescribed in the Order, even if Angelina could show that the Court failed to act in a manner prescribed by applicable statutes (and Angelina has not done so here), this would not negate the Court’s fundamental jurisdiction to hear the petition. (Braugh, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 87; Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, Third Dist. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 288-290 [general discussion].) Rather, the Order would be merely voidable. (Schrage, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 139.) However, under subdivision (d) of section 473, “[o]nly void judgments and orders may be set aside …; voidable judgments and orders may not.” (People v. North River Insurance Co. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 226, 234; see also Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, 495-496 [a trial court is without statutory authority to set aside an order that is not void].) As Angelina has failed, for all reasons discussed above, to demonstrate that the Order is void, she is not entitled to relief under section 473, subdivision (d). (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1009.)

Argument II:

As to Argument II, Angelina contends that Petitioners failed to provide any evidence that any distribution was due and payable to Angelina from her beneficiary share, which Angelina argues is a prerequisite or “qualifying condition” under Probate Code section 15303, subdivision (b), for bringing the petition under section 709.010. For this reason, Angelina contends that the Court lacked jurisdiction to enter the Order.

To support the assertions of Argument II, Angelina states that in the 2023 Dettamanti Trust matter, Watkins filed a petition for instructions and approval of a final distribution plan which, according to Angelina, shows that a distribution to Angelina was neither due nor payable. Angelina further asserts that pursuant to a trust account report submitted in the 2023 Dettamanti Trust matter in February 2024, no distribution have been given to Angelina by Watkins, that Watkins proposed zero distributions to Angelina after the Order was entered, and that the preliminary injunction issued in this action has prevented any distributions to Angelina. For these reasons, Angelina contends that the prerequisite condition that distributions must be due or payable do not exist such that the Order is void on its face.

The same reasoning and analysis applies. Based on the conclusory information and arguments offered under Argument II, Angelina has failed to demonstrate that the Order is void on its face or that the Court lacked fundamental jurisdiction to hear this action. In addition, Angelina appears to conflate the question of whether or not the Order is void for lack of fundamental jurisdiction with other matters. For example, court records reflect, and Angelina requests that the Court take judicial notice of the fact, that the Dettamanti Trust matter was filed on May 30, 2023, after the Order was entered. (See July 3, 2023, Notice of Related Case.) Angelina fails to explain why events occurring in the 2023 Dettamanti Trust matter, after the Order was entered, establishes that the Court lacked fundamental jurisdiction in this action.

Further, the statutory language cited by Angelina does not appear in Probate Code section 15303, but in Probate Code section 15301, subdivision (b), which provides that “[a]fter an amount of principal has become due and payable to the beneficiary under the trust instrument, upon petition to the court under Section 709.010 of the Code of Civil Procedure by a judgment creditor, the court may make an order directing the trustee to satisfy the money judgment out of that principal amount.” (Prob. Code, § 15301, subd. (b).) Petitioners allege in the petition facts demonstrating that Angelina, at the time of filing, was entitled to an immediate distribution of 25 percent of the assets of the Dettamanti Trust. (Pet., ¶ 16.) As noted in the Order, Angelina filed an opposition to the Petition, and the Court heard oral argument of the parties, including Angelina, before entering the Order.

In addition, under Probate Code section 15306.5, and subject to limitations which do not apply here, “upon a judgment creditor’s petition under Section 709.010 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court may make an order directing the trustee to satisfy all or part of the judgment out of the payments to which the beneficiary is entitled under the trust instrument or that the trustee, in the exercise of the trustee’s discretion, has determined or determines in the future to pay to the beneficiary.” (Prob. Code, § 15306.5, subd. (a).) The order “may not require that the trustee pay in satisfaction of the judgment an amount exceeding 25 percent of the payment that otherwise would be made to, or for the benefit of, the beneficiary.” (Prob. Code, § 15306.5, subd. (b).) Further, and also subject to conditions not applicable here, “the aggregate of all orders for satisfaction of money judgments against the beneficiary’s interest in the trust may not exceed 25 percent of the payment that otherwise would be made to, or for the benefit of, the beneficiary.” (Prob. Code, § 15306.5, subd. (f).)

Here, the Order expressly provides that Watkins shall withhold from Angelina and pay to Petitioners up to 25 percent of the assets of the Dettamanti Trust, and that Angelina’s entire 25 percent interest in all trust assets will be applied to satisfy the Judgments by the methods described in the Order. (Order, ¶¶ 1 & 2.) As the relief granted in the Order is authorized under the provisions of the Probate Code described above, Angelina has failed to establish that the Court acted in excess of its jurisdiction. Even if Angelina was successful in establishing that the Order was voidable (and the Court does not find that the Order is voidable), Angelina is precluded from obtaining relief under section 473, subdivision (d).

Argument III:

The contentions asserted under Argument III of the motion are effectively the same or similar to the arguments further discussed above with respect to the provisions of section 9.4 of the Dettamanti Trust, which Angelina contends constitutes a “spendthrift clause”, and with respect to whether Petitioners have established that a due and payable distribution existed. The same reasoning and analysis applies to Argument III. For all reasons discussed above, Angelina has failed to demonstrate that the Order is void for lack of jurisdiction.

Argument IV:

As to Argument IV of the motion, Angelina contends that under the “primary rights” theory, the Judgments constitute a final disposition of the rights and duties of the parties. For this reason, Angelina argues, the Judgments cannot give rise to any valid cause of action under the petition filed in this action. On this additional ground, Angelina contends, this action is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Angelina appears to conflate the primary rights and duties giving rise to the Judgements with the nature of the relief sought in this action. Here, the award or relief sought in the petition did not arise from any invasion by Angelina of the same indivisible primary rights, or breach by Angelina of the same primary duty, as those which gave rise to the Judgments. Rather, in the present action, Petitioners sought to satisfy the Judgments, or the remedy Petitioners obtained ostensibly based on a violation of different primary rights or duties by Angelina, from Angelina’s interest in the Dettamanti Trust. (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 904.) Accordingly, Angelina has failed to explain why the primary rights theory barred the present action or why the Order is void, or voidable, on this ground.

Under Argument IV, Angelina asserts additional arguments which appear to relate to the 2023 Dettamanti Trust matter. (See Motion at p. 9 [referring to distributions not made by Watkins and other matters regarding trust property].) These assertions have no demonstrated relevance to the issues presented in the motion. There is also no information or evidence to suggest why Angelina cannot raise these matters in a procedurally appropriate manner in the 2023 Dettamanti Trust matter, where they may be relevant.

Request for judicial notice of the 2023 Dettamanti Trust matter:

Angelina requests that the Court take judicial notice of the 2023 Dettamanti Trust matter. As the Court has ordered the present action related to the 2023 Dettamanti Trust matter, it is not necessary for the Court to take judicial notice of the filing of that action to determine the present motion. Furthermore, judicial notice of the 2023 Dettamanti Trust matter would not extend to the truth of any factual assertions made in that matter. (Williams v. Wraxall (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 120, 130.) For these reasons, the Court will deny Angelina’s request.

Surreply of Petitioners:

On September 3, 2024, the day before the hearing, Petitioners filed a surreply in response to Angelina’s reply filed on August 28, 2024. The surreply is not authorized and will be disregarded by the Court.