Linda Kopcrak, et al. v. Elizabeth A. Watkins., et al

Case Number

23CV00771

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 07/24/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion For Leave to Intervene by Mario Dettamanti

Tentative Ruling

For Petitioners Linda Kopcrak and Christina Carrari: Tiffany M. Carrari

For Respondent Elizabeth A. Watkins: Aaron R. Feldman

For Respondent Angelina Dettamanti: J Paul Gignac

For Proposed Intervenor Mario H. Dettamanti: Katherine Dettamanti

                  

RULING

For the following reasons, the motion of Mario Dettamanti, for leave to intervene, is denied.

Background

This action commenced on February 27, 2023, by the filing of the petition to enforce money judgment by collecting trust income and principal due judgment debtor as trust beneficiary, by Petitioners Linda Kopcrak (“Kopcrak”) and Christina Carrari (collectively “Petitioners”) against Respondents Elizabeth A. Watkins (“Watkins”), Successor Trustee of the Henry and Venice Dettamanti Family Trust dated February 6, 1986, and Angelina Dettamanti (“Angelina”), Beneficiary of the Dettamanti Family Trust dated February 6, 1998, (collectively “Respondents”). [Note: due to some common sur-names, some parties will be referred to by their given names for clarity. No disrespect is intended.)

As alleged in the petition:

Petitioners are the judgment creditors of Angelina, who is a named beneficiary of the Henry and Venice Dettamanti Family Trust dated February 6, 1986 (“Dettamanti Trust”). (Pet., ¶¶ 1-2.) Watkins is the successor trustee of the Trust. (Pet., ¶ 3.)

On November 9, 2021, Petitioners recovered a money judgment against Angelina in the sum of $711,924.35, plus applicable legal interest dating from November 25, 2018, in favor of Petitioners, as successor co-trustees of The George Miguel Carrari Trust, in Case No. 18PR00182. (Pet., ¶ 9.) No part of the judgment has been paid. (Pet., ¶ 10.)

On January 24, 2022, Petitioners recovered a money judgment against Angelina in the sum of $358,000, plus applicable legal interest dating from November 25, 2018, in favor of Petitioners, as successor co-trustees of the Carrari Family Trust dated February 28, 2002 (“Carrari Trust”), in Case No. 18PR00334. (Pet., ¶ 11.) The Court signed the trust judgment on February 3, 2022, and notice of entry of judgment was served on Angelina February 11, 2022. (Ibid.)

On April 21, 2022, following a hearing on Kopcrak’s motion for attorney fees, in Case No. 18PR00334, the Judgment was amended to reflect that Kopcrak was to recover total fees and costs of $595,075.99. (Pet., ¶ 12.) As amended, the money judgment against Angelina, in Case No. 18PR00334, is $953,075.99, plus interest from November 25, 2018. (Pet., ¶ 13.) No part of the judgment has been paid. (Pet., ¶ 14.)

By the terms of the Dettamanti Trust, Benjamin Henry Dettamanti (“Benjamin”) was a designated beneficiary as to 50% of the trust estate. Benjamin predeceased his two children, Angelina and Mario Dettamanti (“Mario”), on August 20, 2021. (Pet., ¶ 16.) As a result, following the death of Venice Dettamanti on July 25, 2022, Angelina became entitled to half of the principal and any undistributed income held in Benjamin’s sub-share. (Ibid.)

Petitioners seek to recover the judgments from Angelina’s 25 percent interest in the Dettamanti Trust assets.

On March 29, 2023, this Court granted the petition and executed an order to that effect. Notice of entry of order was filed on April 10, 2023. Angelina filed a notice of appeal on June 5, 2023, but she defaulted, and the appeal was dismissed.

This matter is related to Case No. 23PR00280. That matter was filed on May 30, 2023.

Mario now seeks leave to intervene in this case, arguing that the motion is timely, he is entitled to intervene as a matter of right, and, alternatively, the Court should grant him permissive intervention because he has a direct interest in this action and his intervention would not enlarge the issues in the litigation.

Petitioners oppose the motion as an attempt to relitigate matters that were decided on the merits more than a year ago, in an action where Mario lacks standing.

Analysis

“(1) The Court shall, upon timely application, permit a nonparty to intervene in the action or proceeding if either of the following conditions is satisfied:

“(A) A provision of law confers an unconditional right to intervene.

“(B) The person seeking intervention claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action and that person is so situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede that person’s ability to protect that interest, unless that person’s interest is adequately represented by one or more of the existing parties.

“(2) The Court may, upon timely application, permit a nonparty to intervene in the action or proceeding if the person has an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 387, subd. (d); italics added.)

“In addition to the statutory limitation on the time of intervention, it is the general rule that a right to intervene should be asserted within a Reasonable time and that the intervener must not be guilty of an Unreasonable delay after knowledge of the suit. [¶] The main purpose of intervention is to obviate delay and multiplicity of actions. [Citation.] It is also the general rule that an intervention will not be allowed when it would retard the principal suit, or require a reopening of the case for further evidence, or delay the trial of the action, or change the position of the original parties. [Citation.]” (Sanders v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 661, 668-669.)

Although not a party to this action, Mario was served with the petition on March 6, 2023. (Carrari Dec., ¶ 2 & Exh. A.) As Petitioners filed an objection to the probate matter and notices of related cases, on July 3, 2023, Mario has been aware of this action, as well as the specifics of the Order to enforce money judgment, for more than one year.

Mario argues that his motion to intervene is timely. He correctly cites to Crestwood Behavioral Health, Inc. v. Lacy (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 560, 574 (Crestwood), for the proposition that: “ ‘Timeliness is determined by the totality of the circumstances facing would-be intervenors, with a focus on three primary factors: ‘ “(1) the stage of the proceeding at which an applicant seeks to intervene; (2) the prejudice to other parties; and (3) the reason for the delay.” ’ ” [Citation.]” However, after citing the case, Mario primarily argues that the final order in this case was erroneously entered and that the Court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order. Mario presents little argument that addresses the factors mentioned in Crestwood. A final ruling on the petition has been entered, Petitioners would be prejudiced by reopening this case and relitigating it, and Mario’s stated reasons for delay in seeking to intervene are not persuasive.

The Court finds that Mario failed to timely seek intervention. If he were permitted to intervene now, more than a year after the Order granting the petition, his intervention “would retard the principal suit, or require a reopening of the case for further evidence, or delay the trial of the action, or change the position of the original parties.” The motion will be denied as untimely.

Alternatively, the Court will deny the motion on the following grounds:

Mario further argues that his right to intervene is mandatory pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1250.230, which provides: “Any person who claims a legal or equitable interest in the property described in the complaint may appear in the proceeding. Whether or not such person is named as a defendant in the complaint, he shall appear as a defendant.”

“Not every interest in the outcome of litigation gives to its possessor the right to intervene in the lawsuit. “ ‘The interest . . . must be direct and not consequential, and it must be an interest which is proper to be determined in the action in which the intervention is sought.’ ” [Citation.]” (Continental Vinyl Products Corp. v. Mead Corp. (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 543, 549.) “A person has a direct interest justifying intervention in litigation where the judgment in the action of itself adds to or detracts from his legal rights without reference to rights and duties not involved in the litigation.” (Ibid.)

Mario’s argument that he has a legal or equitable interest in this enforcement action is conclusory and lacks merit. Mario is mentioned in the petition for enforcement of judgment as a trust beneficiary. However, the petition seeks nothing from Mario. The action is to enforce civil judgments by collecting trust income and assets of Angelina, which is separate from any interest that Mario possesses. Mario’s interest in Trust assets is not an issue in the case.

The Order in this case, that Mario takes issue with, does nothing to affect any of his interests or assets. Specifically, the Order on the petition to enforce judgment provides:

1. Elizabeth A. Watkins (“Watkins”), Successor Trustee of the Henry and Venice Dettamanti Family Trust dated February 6, 1986, and all sub-trusts thereunder (the “Dettamanti Trust”), shall withhold from Angelina Dettamanti and pay to Petitioner, up to 25% of the Dettamanti Trust Assets, whether distributable in cash or in kind, including but not limited to 25% of the proceeds from Watkins’ February 6, 2023 sale of the Dettamanti Trust property commonly known as 1001 North A Street, Lompoc, CA (Assessor’s Parcel Number: 087-354-020) in Santa Barbara County, to which Angelina Dettamanti would otherwise be entitled, to the extent that Petitioner’s Total Judgments, together with interest thereon at the legal rate from and after November 25, 2018, are satisfied in full;
2. Angelina Dettamanti’s entire 25% interest in all Dettamanti Trust assets (including but not limited to those listed at Paragraph l7 and Exhibit H of the Petition to Enforce Judgment shall be applied by Watkins to the satisfaction of Petitioner’s Total Judgments by the following methods, as appropriate: 1) The sale (liquidation) of Angelina Dettamanti’s interest in Dettamanti Trust Assets and subsequent transfer of all proceeds to Petitioner, 2) The transfer of Angelina Dettamanti’s interest in Dettamanti Trust Assets to Petitioner, and 3) Petitioner’s collection of Dettamanti Trust income otherwise payable to Angelina Dettamanti.”

The enforcement action, and resulting final Order, does not affect any of Mario’s interests or rights under the Dettamanti Trust, or anything else. The petition itself seeks only assets that were designated for Angelina. This action is simply to enforce judgments against Angelina. It is in no way directed to enforcement or administration of the Trust itself. As inferred above, Mario has no interest in this action whatsoever. To the extent that Mario argues that the Order of attorney fees will reduce his interest in the Dettamanti Trust distributions, even if assumed correct, that is a matter to be heard in the related probate case which is ongoing.

The motion for leave to intervene will be denied.