Victor Hugo Castillo Trejo vs Jellison Clearwater Properties LLC

Case Number

23CV00768

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 12/08/2023 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

CMC; Demurrer

Tentative Ruling

The demurrer to plaintiff’s first amended complaint is overruled. Defendant Jellison Clearwater Properties, LLC shall file and serve an Answer to the first amended complaint no later than December 29, 2023.

Background:

Plaintiff Victor Hugo Castillo Trejo (“Trejo”) filed his original complaint on February 24, 2023, against defendants Jellison Clearwater Properties, LLC (“JCP”), James Bradford Jellison, and Teresa M. Jellison. On June 5, 2023, plaintiff filed the operative first amended complaint (“FAC”) setting forth causes of action for negligence and premises liability.

As alleged in the FAC:

On May 30, 2022, Trejo was lawfully on the property located at 6505 Camino Carreta, in the City of Carpinteria, California 95204. (FAC, ¶¶ 5, 11. “Defendants requested that Plaintiff perform this dangerous activity of trimming avocado trees/landscaping on avocado trees, outside the scope of any employment relationship and Plaintiff’s regular job duties.” (FAC, ¶ 13.)

Defendants “breached [their duty of care in the management of their property] when by the acts of their agents and employees they negligently, carelessly and recklessly constructed, inspected, maintained, contracted, subcontracted, supervised, controlled, engineered, and designed the SUBJECT PREMISES and supplied Plaintiff with defective, unreasonably dangerous equipment and/or tools, which led to Plaintiff’s injuries. Furthermore, Defendants requested that Plaintiff perform a dangerous activity of trimming avocado trees on the SUBJECT PREMISES outside the scope of any of Plaintiff’s regular duties and failed to provide any proper safeguards and employed and instructed Plaintiff to use a dangerous method of trimming avocado trees.” (FAC, ¶ 18.) “[Defendants] negligently and carelessly created, assisted, developed and/or approved the dangerous condition which caused the Subject Incident to occur and further supplied Plaintiff with defective, unreasonably dangerous equipment and/or tools, unknown to Plaintiff.” (FAC, ¶ 19.)

“[Defendants] regularly inspected the SUBJECT PREMISES and that they were aware of the dangerous nature of the SUBJECT PREMISES. Further, Defendants, and each of them, had actual or constructive knowledge of the unsafe conditions, as aforesaid, and knew that individuals were accessing the SUBJECT PREMISES. Defendants failed to warn Plaintiff of the dangerous conditions, including providing Plaintiff with defective tools and/or equipment, such as a defective ladder.” (FAC, ¶ 20.) “Defendants instructed Plaintiff to perform duties that required licensed workers under California codes, statutes, or regulations, including but not limited to Business and Professions Code §§ 7008, 7027.5 and Cal. Code of Regulations Tit. 16, § 832.27. Such code sections, statutes, and/or regulations are designed to protect people from harm, such as Plaintiff, and as a result of such violations of California codes, statutes, and/or regulations, Plaintiff was seriously harmed. The type of harm suffered was the type of harm that the statutes, codes, or regulations were intended to prevent and that such acts, omissions, and failures of Defendants were negligence per se.” (FAC, ¶ 22.)

“[A]t the time of the subject incident, the SUBJECT PREMISES was in a dangerous condition as it posed a serious risk of injury to foreseeable users, including Plaintiff. The dangerous nature of the SUBJECT PREMISES was known to the Defendants or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been known to the Defendants, inclusive and each of them.” (FAC, ¶ 32.)

Defendant filed the present demurrer on September 14, 2023, on the grounds that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute an action because Trejo’s claims are barred by the workers compensation exclusivity rule pursuant to Labor Code section 3600 et seq.

On November 14, 2023, Trejo dismissed James Bradford Jellison and Teresa M. Jellison. The action now proceeds solely against JPC.

Trejo opposes the demurrer arguing that the complaint alleges sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action.

Analysis:

A demurrer alleging that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and/or that the pleading is uncertain is permitted under Code of Civil Procedure sections 430.10 subds. (e) and (f).

“[A] court must treat a demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, it does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.” (Travelers Indem. Co. of Connecticut v. Navigators Specialty Ins. Co. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 341, 358, citing Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

“To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) “A demurrer is simply not the appropriate procedure for determining the truth of disputed facts.” (Ramsden v. Western Union (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 873, 879.)

“What is important is that the complaint as a whole contains sufficient facts to apprise the defendant of the basis upon which the plaintiff is seeking relief.” (Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6.)

The question of plaintiff’s’ ability to prove their case is of no concern in ruling on a demurrer. (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 213-214 [superseded by statute on other grounds].)

JPC has provided exhibits which it argues show that the action is barred by the Worker’s Compensation Exclusive Remedy Rule. There is no request for judicial notice of any worker’s compensation action. “ ‘It is an elementary rule that the sole function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the challenged pleading.  It cannot, properly, be addressed to or based upon evidence or other extrinsic matters.’ ” [Citation.] And as noted in National Auto Ins. Co. v. Winter (1943) 58 Cal.App.2d 11, 16–17, 136 P.2d 22: “ ‘Matters of defense not apparent in the pleading are not available upon demurrer. (21 Cal.Jur. 116.) On the hearing of a demurrer, therefore, the court is bound by the facts as alleged in the pleading attacked by demurrer, and it is not entitled to consider facts presented to it through the medium of an affidavit.’ ” (Childs v. State of California (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 155, 163.)

In opposition, Trejo argues that there is no workers compensation claim as against JPC and that Trejo has asserted a worker’s compensation claim against Clearwater Engineering Inc., rather than JPC. In reply JPC does not address this argument. It simply reasserts the argument made in its moving papers.

Labor Code section 3852 provides, in pertinent part: “The claim of an employee, including, but not limited to, any peace officer or firefighter, for compensation does not affect his or her claim or right of action for all damages proximately resulting from the injury or death against any person other than the employer.”

Under the circumstances presented to the court, at the pleading stage it would not be proper to determine whether a worker’s compensation claim, against a third- party entity, bars Trejo’s action against JPC. As such, the demurrer must be overruled.