Estate of Claudia Pizarro

Case Number

22PR00602

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Thu, 09/25/2025 - 09:00

Nature of Proceedings

CMC; Motion: Compel Compliance and Further Responses to Demands for Production

Tentative Ruling

This matter will be heard concurrently with 23CV04759.

HEARING:

Petitioner’s Motion To Compel (1) Compliance With Agreement to Produce; (2) Further Responses To Demands For Production Of Documents And Tangible Things To Debra Bandy, Set One; (3) Sanctions

ATTORNEYS:

For Petitioner Carolina Pizarro: Stephen E. Penner, J.A.A. Purves, Law Offices of Stephen E. Penner, PC For Interested Party Debra Bandy: Yasha Bronshteyn, Ashley Blaser, Ginzburg & Bronshteyn, APC

TENTATIVE RULING:

(1) The motion of petitioner Carolina Pizarro to compel compliance with agreement to produce and further responses of third party Debra Bandy to petitioner’s set one demand for production of documents and tangible things, is granted in part and denied without prejudice as to any motion for a protective order that may be filed by third party Debra Bandy in accordance with this ruling.

(2) On or before October 24, 2025, third party Debra Bandy shall serve verified, code compliant, further responses to petitioner’s set one demand for production of documents and tangible things nos. 1 through 19, without the objections overruled herein except as to those based on privilege or protected work product, and produce responsive documents previously withheld on the basis of any overruled objection and, if necessary, a privilege log.

(3) On October 31, 2025, at 10 a.m., third party Debra Bandy shall make available for inspection at 2187 Lillie Avenue, Summerland, California, any responsive tangible things described in petitioner’s set one demand nos. 1 through 19, including those tangible things which have been withheld on the basis of any overruled objection. The parties may agree in writing to a different date and time for the inspection ordered herein.

(4) To the extent third party Debra Bandy files an appropriate noticed motion for a protective order as to petitioner’s set one demand for production of documents and tangible things, that motion must be filed and served on or before October 10, 2025, or not later than two weeks prior to any date for the inspection ordered herein that may be otherwise agreed to in writing by the parties.

(5) The court awards sanctions in favor of petitioner Carolina Pizzaro and against third party Debra Bandy and her counsel, in the amount of $3,500, payable to third party’s counsel. Payment of sanctions is due by third party Debra Bandy on or before October 25, 2025.

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Background:

On December 7, 2022, petitioner Carolina Pizarro filed a petition for letters of administration and authorization to administer under the Independent Administration of Estates Act the estate of decedent Claudia Pizarro (decedent). The petition was set for hearing on February 2, 2023. (This petition is referred to herein as the “Administration Petition.”)

On February 2, 2023, the court granted the Administration Petition and ordered that Letters of Administration be issued upon taking the oath as required by law. (Minute Order, filed Feb. 2, 2023.)

On February 9, 2023, the court issued Letters of Administration appointing petitioner as administrator of the decedent’s estate.

On February 28, 2023, third parties Debra Bandy (Debra) and Timothy J. Bandy (Timothy) (collectively, respondents) each filed requests for notice of all matters for which special notice may be requested in this proceeding. (Note: The court refers to the third parties, individually, by their first names to avoid confusion due to common surnames. No disrespect is intended.)

On May 12, 2023, Debra, who asserts that she is the sole and exclusive owner of the Property, filed a motion to expunge a notice of pending action or lis pendens (the motion to expunge) as to real property located at 2187 Lillie Avenue, Summerland (the Property), recorded by petitioner on December 13, 2022. The motion was originally set for hearing on July 6, 2023, and continued to July 13 by stipulation of the parties and order of the court. That motion was opposed by petitioner.

On July 12, 2025, after the court posted its tentative ruling to grant the motion to expunge, and prior to the hearing date on that motion, petitioner filed a second petition in this matter pursuant to Probate Code section 850 (850 Petition) to, among other things, determine ownership interest in the Property, which petitioner announced at the hearing of the motion to expunge. The court took the matter under submission and permitted the parties to file further briefing.

On September 14, 2023, the court granted the motion to expunge.

On October 16, 2023, respondents filed their objection to the 850 Petition.

On November 7, 2023, Pizarro Building + Design, Inc., filed a notice of related case identifying this case as related to Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 23CV04759 entitled Pizarro Building + Design, Inc. v. Timothy Bandy, et al.

On November 15, 2023, the court ordered that matter related to this case.

On March 27, 2025, petitioner filed a motion for an order compelling Debra to comply with an agreement to produce documents in response to petitioner’s set one “Demands for Production of Documents and Tangible Things to Debra Bandy” (the Demand), nos. 1 through 19, and awarding attorney’s fees and costs incurred by petitioner in the amount of $13,400. The present motion is supported by a declaration of petitioner’s counsel, J.A.A. Purves, who states that petitioner served Debra with the Demand on September 6, 2024. (Purves Decl., ¶ 16 & Exh. I.) After petitioner granted extensions of time for Debra to respond, Debra served a response to the Demand on October 28, 2024, which did not include responsive documents. (Purves Decl., ¶ 19 & Exh. J.) On January 2, 2025, Debra’s counsel emailed a link to documents responsive to the Demand in electronic form. (Purves Decl., ¶ 21.)

On January 7 and February 11, 2025, Purves met and conferred with Debra’s counsel requesting that the parties agree to a date for the turnover and pickup of decedent’s personal property, and to an extension of petitioner’s deadline to file a motion to compel. (Purves Decl., ¶¶ 22-23 & Exhs. L-M.)

On March 12, 2025, Purves received an email from Debra’s counsel stating: “ ‘I will point out that you are seeking electronics, computer, sports collectibles that our client has simply never been in possession of and is not in possession of. To the extent you are seeking decedent’s “electronic data”, given that most sophisticated business people back up all of their data, files, emails, and financials to the cloud. As administrator you client should have Letters to access cloud data.’ ” (Purves Decl., ¶ 24 & Exh. N.) Attached to that email was a supplemental response of Debra to the Demand, which Purves asserts did not include a supplemental document production or any dates for the pick up or delivery of decedent’s personal property. (Purves Decl., ¶ 25 & Exh. O [supplemental responses].)

The motion is opposed by Debra. In support of that opposition, Debra submits a declaration of her counsel, Yasha Bronshteyn, who states that before the present motion was filed, Debra “(a) produced materials responsive to requests where items existed; (b) gathered additional documents and personal effects for [p]etitioner to pick up; and (c) repeatedly engaged with [p]etitioner’s counsel to coordinate pickup logistics.” (Bronshteyn Decl., ¶ 5 & Exh. A.) Though petitioner’s counsel sent follow-up inquiries about the size of the vehicle to bring, petitioner did not finalize a pickup date. (Ibid.)

Bronshteyn further states that the Property contains property and sensitive items of a non-party to this litigation, and that Bronshteyn proposed a supervised site inspection on reasonable notice for the purpose of avoiding disputes and protecting third-party property. (Bronshteyn Decl., ¶ 6 & Exh. B.) According to Bronshteyn, petitioner’s counsel refused these safeguards and continued to insist on unfettered access. (Ibid.)

The opposition of Debra to the motion is also supported by a declaration of attorney Ashley Blaser, who states that on March 27, 2025, Blaser sent petitioner’s counsel an email agreeing to a two-week extension of time to file the present motion with the intent to “keep the meet and confer process moving without forcing rushed motion practice.” (Blaser Decl., ¶¶ 5-6, 7 & Exh. C.) In that email, Blaser stated that Blaser needed to confer with Bronshteyn and respondents regarding the requested walk-through site access. (Blaser Decl., ¶ 7.) The next day, petitioner filed the motion. (Blaser Decl., ¶ 9.)

Analysis:

As further discussed herein, information and evidence appearing in the present record shows or suggests that there exist, or may exist, documents or tangible things responsive to the Demand which have been withheld by Debra. In addition, the failure of Debra to provide code compliant responses to Demand nos. 1 through 19, or to assert meritorious objections to the Demand, prevents the court and petitioner from determining or evaluating whether all documents or tangible things responsive to the Demand have been produced or made available for inspection, or whether there exists any justification or appropriate basis for withholding any document or tangible thing, among other things. Therefore, and for all reasons discussed below, the court will grant the motion, in part and in accordance with this ruling.

As a threshold matter, Debra contends that petitioner failed to adequately meet and confer in good faith before filing the motion. A motion for an order compelling a further response to a demand for inspection or production of documents must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration which “state[s] facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016.040; 2030.300, subd. (b)(1); 2031.310, subd. (b)(2); 2033.290, subd. (b)(1).) “This rule is designed ‘to encourage the parties to work out their differences informally so as to avoid the necessity for a formal order....’ [Citation.]” (Townsend v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1435.)

The record of correspondence offered by the parties demonstrates that petitioner engaged in efforts to informally resolve the present dispute in regard to petitioner’s request to take possession of decedent’s property, for documentation of Debra’s claims regarding an alleged business and landlord/tenant relationship with decedent, and purported delays in permitting petitioner to take possession of decedent’s property. (See, e.g., Purves Decl., Exh. M.) The record also reflects that in response to these efforts, Debra’s counsel referred to petitioner’s requests as a “fishing expedition”, suggested that petitioner access decedent’s “cloud data”, and requested limitations before agreeing to produce all documents or an inspection. (Purves Decl., Exh. N; Bronshteyn Decl., Exh. B.)

For all reasons discussed above, the record of correspondence between the parties is sufficient to show that the parties reached an impasse in their efforts to meet and confer to resolve the present dispute, such that additional efforts by petitioner were unlikely to produce a different result. (Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1293-1294.) For these reasons, the court finds that petitioner has, for present purposes, demonstrated a reasonable and good faith attempt to informally resolve the issues presented by the motion.

A motion to compel further responses to demand for inspection or copying must also “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Code Civ. Proc. §2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) “[U]nless there is a legitimate privilege issue or claim of attorney work product, [the] burden [of showing good cause] is met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance.” (TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)

Noted above, the Demands at issue include Demand nos. 1 through 19. Demand nos. 1 through 4 and 19 seek the production of all documents or tangible things constituting the personal effects of decedent in Debra’s possession, custody, or control, including those tangible things that were located at the Property, from various dates in October and November of 2022. (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 2, 5, 8, 11 & 55.)

Demand nos. 5 through 8 seek the production of documents constituting the “business records”, bills, invoices, receipts for payment, financial statements, of decedent which are in Debra’s possession, custody, or control including those documents stored at the Property. (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 13, 16-17 & 19-20.)

Demand nos. 9 through 14 seek the production of electronic devices, laptops, and desktop computers belonging to or purchased by decedent in cash or with decedent’s credit or debit card or Amazon account. (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 25, 28, 31, 34, 37 & 40.)

Demand nos. 15 and 16 seek the production of decedent’s personal banking cards, and the business banking cards belonging to Pizarro Building & Design, Inc. (PBD). (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 43 & 46.) Demand nos. 17 and 18 seek the production of devices in Debra’s possession, custody, or control that store any digital or electronic records belonging to any business entity owned by decedent including PBD. (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 49 & 52.)

The parties do not, and cannot reasonably, dispute that the court appointed and authorized petitioner to administer decedent’s estate with full authority under Probate Code section 10400 et seq. (the Independent Administration of Estates Act). (Prob. Code, § 10402 [defining “full authority”]; see Letters of Administration, filed Feb. 2, 2023.) Subject to conditions and limitations, and the provisions of Probate Code section 9600, “a personal representative who has been granted authority to administer the estate under this part has the powers described in Article 2 (commencing with Section 10510), Article 3 (commencing with Section 10530), and Article 4 (commencing with Section 10550).” (Prob. Code, § 10502, subd. (a).) These include “the power to manage and control property of the estate....” (Prob. Code, § 10531, subd. (a).)

Considering the subject of these proceedings, and that Debra offers no reasoned factual or legal argument to show why good cause does not exist for the production of the documents and tangible things described in the Demand and above, the court finds that, for all reasons discussed above, there exists sufficient good cause for the requests stated in the Demand.

“Once good cause is shown, the burden shifts to the responding party to justify its objections. (Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221; Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) The supplemental responses of Debra to Demand nos. 1 through 19 include objections made on the grounds that “the request calls for premature disclosure of expert witness opinion evidence and/or testimony” (Demand nos. 1 and 4 through 19), that “to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on [Debra]” (ibid.), and that that the demands are “calculated to annoy and harass [Debra]” (Demand nos. 1-19). (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 17-18, 20-21, 23-24, 26, 29, 32, 35, 38, 41, 44, 47, 50, 53 & 56.)

Absent from Debra’s opposition, including the response to petitioner’s separate statement submitted by Debra in support of the opposition, is any sufficient reasoned factual or legal argument showing why the objections to Demand nos. 1 through 19 described above are meritorious or justified.

For example, Debra fails to explain why any of the demands at issue improperly require Debra to disclose expert witness opinion evidence or testimony. As to Debra’s objections that any particular Demand imposes an undue burden or expense, or is calculated to annoy or harass Debra, Debra advances no reasoned argument or evidence showing “the quantum of work required” to respond to any specific Demand, or why that Demand creates “an unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.” (West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417; see also Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 549 (Williams) [“the party opposing discovery has an obligation to supply the basis for this determination”].)

Debra also fails to offer any factual or legal argument showing why any specific request stated in the Demand is outside the the subject matter of this proceeding, the scope of permissible discovery, or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (See Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 542-549.)

“Discovery may be obtained ... of the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any document, electronically stored information, tangible thing, or land or other property.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) For all reasons discussed above, absent reasoned argument showing why the objections asserted in the supplemental responses of Debra to Demand nos. 1 through 19 are justified, the court will overrule Debra’s objections to the requests stated these demands, except as to those objections which are based on a claim of privilege or protected work product.

As to each of the substantive supplemental responses of Debra to Demand nos. 1 through 19, Debra states: “Responding Party did not remove any of [decedent’s] belongings from the ... Property prior to or after her death. Responding Party did not have, and we have never had, any personal property belonging to [decedent], including, without limitation, her financial records and papers or her laptop computer. Moreover, on or about November 6, 2022, in the presence of police offices [sic] numerous documents and papers belonging to [decedent] were taken by [decedent’s] family members from [the] Property. Proper arrangements through law enforcement need to be made to enter the premises and inventory remaining Tangible Things in dispute to the extent there are ‘Tangible Things’ [or ‘Documents’]”. (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 3, 6, 9, 12, 14- 15, 17-18, 20-21, 24, 27, 29-30, 35-36, 38-39, 41-42, 47-48, 50-51 & 56-57.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.210 requires that Debra respond to each Demand with a statement of compliance, a representation that Debra lacks the ability to comply, or an objection to the demand. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.210, subd. (a)(1)-(3).) A statement of compliance must “state that the production, inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, and related activity demanded, will be allowed either in whole or in part, and that all documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession, custody, or control of that party and to which no objection is being made will be included in the production.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.220.)

In addition, any “representation of inability to comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling shall affirm that a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand. This statement shall also specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party. The statement shall set forth the name and address of any natural person or organization known or believed by that party to have possession, custody, or control of that item or category of item.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.230.)

Further, and notwithstanding that the court will overrule the objections asserted in the supplemental responses of Debra, Debra must also identify “with particularity” any document or tangible thing “falling within any category of item in the demand to which an objection is being made.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.240, subds. (a) & (b)(1).) The responses must also “[s]et forth clearly the extent of, and the specific ground for, the objection. If an objection is based on a claim of privilege, the particular privilege invoked shall be stated. If an objection is based on a claim that the information sought is protected work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010), that claim shall be expressly asserted.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.240, subd. (b)(2).) To the extent any objection is based on a claim of privilege or protected work product, “the response shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim, including, if necessary, a privilege log.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.240, subd. (c)(1).)

The supplemental responses of Debra described above fail to comply with code requirements. For example, the responses do not include an unequivocal statement of compliance. To the extent Debra asserts a representation of Debra’s inability to comply with a particular demand, Debra fails to state whether a diligent search or reasonable inquiry has been made, or, if appropriate, the name and address of any person believed to have possession, custody, or control of any particular item. The court further notes that Debra’s supplemental responses also do not identify any documents or tangible things falling within any category to which the objections are made.

The examples provided above are intended to be illustrative but necessarily exhaustive in regard to the deficiencies appearing in the supplemental responses of Debra to the Demand. As the supplemental responses of Debra are, for all reasons discussed above, deficient, it is also unclear whether or on what basis Debra has withheld from production or inspection any documents or tangible things described in Demand nos. 1 through 19.

For example, in a letter dated April 10, 2025, Debra’s counsel stated that Debra “cannot agree to produce “all documents / inspection responsive to the Requests as originally drafted.” (Bronshteyn Decl., Exh. B.) As to the electronic data of decedent described in the Demands, Debra’s counsel further stated that petitioner should have access to cloud data. (Purves Decl., Exh. N.) These statements give rise to an inference that additional responsive materials may exist.

As further detailed above, Debra also states in her supplemental responses that arrangements through law enforcement must be made to inventory remaining documents or things in dispute. There is no evidence or information appearing in the supplemental responses, or Debra’s opposition to the motion, showing why the presence of law enforcement is necessary to inventory any remaining documents or tangible things sought in the Demand. The court also has no record showing that Debra filed an appropriate motion for a protective order with respect to any such remaining documents or things. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.020, subd. (a).)

Considering the information, evidence, and issues further described above, and Debra’s failure to provide code compliant responses to each of the Demands at issue, neither the court nor petitioner is presently able to determine whether Debra has produced all documents or made available all tangible things requested in Demand nos. 1 through 19, or whether there exists a meritorious reason for withholding any document or tangible thing. For these and all reasons discussed above, the court will grant the motion, in part.

The court will order Debra to serve verified, code compliant, further responses to Demand nos. 1 through 19, without the objections overruled herein except as to those objections based on a claim of privilege or protected work product, and to produce any documents described in the Demand which Debra has withheld from production based on any overruled objection. To the extent Debra’s verified further responses include objections based on any claim of privilege or protected work product, or Debra has withheld any documents based on these claims, Debra must also provide a sufficient and code compliant privilege log as to these documents.

In addition, the court will order Debra to make available for an inspection at the Property, on a date certain, all tangible things described in Demand nos. 1 through 19 previously withheld by Debra based on any overruled objection, unless the parties agree in writing to a different date. To the extent Debra has withheld from an inspection any tangible thing based on a claim of privilege or work product, Debra must produce a sufficient and code compliant privilege log as to these tangible things.

Nothing herein shall be construed to prevent or preclude Debra from filing and serving an appropriate motion for a protective order in regard to any particular Demand, or item or category of items requested in any Demand. Any motion for a protective order made by Debra must be filed sufficiently prior to the date set for the inspection ordered herein, be procedurally appropriate, and be sufficient to show why the court should place any limits or conditions on the production of any document or the inspection of any tangible thing.

Sanctions:

In their respective moving and opposing papers, petitioner and Debra each request an award of sanctions against the other. The sanctions requested by petitioner total $13,400, and are based on the time expended or expected to be expended by petitioner’s counsel to resolve disputed discovery issues and Bandy’s noncompliance with the demands at issue, and estimated hours petitioner’s counsel expects to expend to resolve the motion, among other things. (Purves Decl., ¶¶ 32-35.) The sanctions requested by Debra total $3,745, representing 7 hours of time expended by Debra’s counsel at the hourly rate of $650. (Bronshteyn Decl., ¶¶ 6, 7 & 10.)

Subject to exceptions which do not appear to apply here, “the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (h).)

Under the totality of the circumstances present here, the court finds that the motion was substantially justified, and that Debra was not substantially justified in opposing the motion. The court is also not persuaded that the imposition of sanctions against Debra or her counsel would be unjust. Therefore, and for all reasons discussed above, the court will grant petitioner’s request for an award of sanctions, in part.

The principles which govern an award of discovery sanctions include “the principle of reasonableness...” which “means a trial court has discretion to reduce the amount of fees and costs requested as a discovery sanction in order to reach a reasonable award.” (Cornerstone Realty Advisors, LLC v. Summit Healthcare Reit, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 771, 777, 791.)

It appears to the court that the amount of attorney fees claimed by petitioner is excessive under the circumstances here. The amount of the sanctions needs to reflect the reasonable expenses incurred by petitioner. While the court agrees that some of the time expended by petitioner’s counsel was necessitated by the conduct of Debra in responding to Demand nos. 1 through 19, information appearing in the Purves declaration shows that the sanctions requested by petitioner includes over 35 hours expended by two different attorneys. (Purves Decl., ¶¶ 33-34.)

Absent from the Purves declaration is information sufficient to show the nature of the efforts expended by each attorney in connection with the present motion, which prevents the court from determining whether the fees requested by petitioner are reasonable, appropriately awardable, or reflect inefficient or duplicative efforts by counsel. (Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 271; see also Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1326 [describing circumstances sufficient to “support[] the trial court’s conclusion the matter was overstaffed....”].) Further, the issues presented in the motion are not complex.

Under the circumstances present here including the court’s experience with addressing attorney fee issues, the court finds that 10 hours of Purves’ time at the reasonable hourly rate of $350, for a total of $3,500, constitutes the reasonable amount of attorney fees incurred as a result of the filing of the present motion and reasonable efforts expended by counsel for petitioner, for which monetary sanctions are appropriately awardable.