Matter of The Armando I Perez Trust Dated March 14 2017

Case Number

22PR00501

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 10/08/2025 - 08:30

Nature of Proceedings

Demurrer

Tentative Ruling

Probate Notes:

Appearances required.

The following analysis is provided for the Court at the hearing:

On March 18, 2025, Virginia Perez Garcia filed what amounts to a Petition for Instructions that asserted six causes of action and asked this court for 22 different prayers for relief.  On April 8, 2025, Patricia Perez Hogan, represented by the law firm of Bohm, Wildish & Matsen, LLP, filed a Demurrer to that petition.  On June 18, 2025, this Court heard argument on the Demurrer, and ruled on the merits, overruling the Demurrer as to most of the causes of action, explaining in great detail its rationale.

Despite that attention to detail in the ruling of the Court on the previous Demurrer, Patricia Perez Hogan, now represented by Michael Ring and Associates in what appears to be her fourth set of attorneys, brings a Demurrer attacking the Petition filed by Theodore Lee Perez, et al. on July 15, 2025, using the same arguments previously raised by her previous attorneys, and adjudicated in almost every respect in the previous Demurrer. Those arguments are addressed summarily as follows:

Standing

Standing is such a fundamental concept, that it is the first question a court must address before determining any other issues on the merits.  If a party does not have standing, none of that party’s claims can be adjudicated on the merits. (Barefoot v. Jennings (2020) 8 Cal.5th 822, 827. See also Chiatello v. City and County of San Francisco (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 472, 481; Harman v. City and County of San Francisco (1972) 7 Cal.3d 150, 159.)  Despite this fundamental concept being the first thing that should be addressed, the moving papers leave it for last. This is telling as to the merits of that claim.

The Court’s previous ruling on this issue was supported by such unassailable authority, that it should have foreclosed any further discussion on this issue:

The issue of a beneficiary’s standing was so fundamentally closed to further argument by our State’s Supreme Court in 2020, that this Court should be alarmed the claim was made here in Demurrer, and even more alarmed the case foreclosing that argument was not cited and briefed by either party. 

In Barefoot v. Jennings (2020) 8 Cal.5th 822, the California Supreme Court made it so abundantly clear that any person claiming to have been a beneficiary of a trust, at any time, under any iteration of the trust, has standing to challenge the trust under Probate Code section 17200 (Barefoot v. Jennings (2020) 8 Cal.5th 822, 828 [“So when a plaintiff claims to be a rightful beneficiary of a trust if challenged amendments are deemed invalid, she has standing to petition the probate court under section 17200.”]), that claiming otherwise rises to the level of an unmeritorious claim.

(Previously Posted Probate Notes, posted June 18, 2025.)

As a result of the above authority, the Demurrer should be overruled in total, despite a new distinction in the moving papers as to the elder abuse, statutory claims.  The authority cited above also defeats Ms. Perez-Hogan’s standing argument as to the elder abuse statutes in the Welfare & Institutions Code, because Ms. Hogan-Perez’s entire argument rests on the assumption that Ms. Hogan-Perez’s status as an adopted child of the Decedent wipes away any possible consideration that the Petitioners have an intestate interest in the estate.  This assumption ignores the allegations that Ms Perez-Hogan is the accused abuser, which calls seriously into question the legitimacy of any adult adoption proceeding during the time Decedent was alleged to lack capacity, and completely ignores the legal ramifications of such behavior that are outlined in Probate Code section 259.

Therefore, the Demurrer should be overruled as to any lack of standing grounds, because the plain language on the face of the Petition at issue, discloses allegations of beneficiary status to at least one iteration of the trust, and intestacy rights if the adult adoption is found to have been a result of elder abuse.

Statute of Limitations Argument

Ms. Perez-Hogan’s standing argument is as equally unmeritorious as the argument against standing, because Ms. Perez-Hogan conspicuously omits the fact that the same pleading being attacked here was filed in San Luis Obispo, and ignores the fact that the Notification by Trustee of Death of Settlor misleadingly identifies San Luis Obispo as the proper venue to file such a claim. 

Ms. Perez-Hogan alleges that Trustee, Shelly McConnell, sent a Notice of the Death of Trustee to all beneficiaries of the trust, and all heirs of Mr. Perez, less than a month after Mr. Perez’s death (Sept. 17, 2024).  According to Ms. Perez-Hogan, the statutory deadline to petition for any redress requested in the subject petition was January 15, 2025.

Ms. Perez-Hogan glaringly omits any mention of the fact that Petitioners filed a Petition in San Luis Obispo (case no. 25PR-0006) on January 3, 2025, that appears word for word to be the same petition as the petition being attacked by the Demurrer here.  Such an omission from the moving papers exceeds the bounds of disingenuousness, and camps firmly on the grounds of misleading the court.

Further, there is absolutely zero discussion as to how the Notification by Trustee of Death of Settlor properly stated the principal place of administration as San Luis Obispo County, but failed to indicate that the Superior Court of Santa Barbara County was where venue was proper to file any claim, due to previous administration being in that county, as well as the physical location of the Decedent before his death.

As a result, Ms. Perez-Hogan cannot now complain that she has suffered any prejudice or surprise by allowing Petitioners’ claims to proceed here, since she was on full notice of all the claims filed in the court in San Luis Obispo. (Pointe San Diego Residential Community, L.P. v. Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 265, 279 [“The criterion of relation back is whether the original complaint gave the defendant enough notice of the nature and scope of the plaintiff's claim that he shouldn't have been surprised by the amplification of the allegations of the original complaint in the amended one.”].)

Therefore, the Court should find that the Notification by Trustee of Death of Settlor, dated September 17, 2024, was insufficient to trigger the statute of limitations in Probate Code section 16061.8. The Court should also find that even if the Notification by Trustee of Death of Settlor was sufficient to trigger the statue of limitations in section 16061.8, Petitioners substantially complied with the timely filing requirements in that section when they filed their original petition in San Luis Obispo County on January 3, 2025.

This conclusion appears to be supported by a popular treatise:

An action filed in a court where venue is improper must be transferred on defendant's motion to a court with proper venue (CCP § 396b). Nonetheless, the filing date in the improper court should be considered the “commencement” date for statute of limitations purposes, not the date of transfer to the proper forum. (Although there is no known California authority, this is the federal rule; see Lafferty v. St. Riel (3rd Cir. 2007) 495 F.3d 72, 82.)

(Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Tr. Stat. of Limitations (Rutter, 2024) “Definitions and Distinctions” Ch. 1-A.)

Although the parties do not address why the case in San Luis Obispo was “dismissed” rather than transferred, it would be inequitable to improperly punish Petitioners here when there is no evidence of prejudice or surprise, and the public policy of this state is to hear claims on their merits, not to dismiss on mere technicalities. (Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 685, 715 [“The primary consideration when applying the relation back doctrine is whether the prior complaint provided the defendant with sufficient notice of the claim in the amended complaint. [Citation.] This is due to the purpose behind statutes of limitation. They are intended to provide defendants with adequate notice of claims, so they have sufficient time to prepare a defense. This purpose is met when a new claim is based on the same facts as a prior complaint. [Citation.] Along with this consideration, courts should keep in mind our state's strong policy of deciding cases on their merits.”)]

Uncertainty Argument

A cause of action is uncertain when the allegations are so bad that the opposing party cannot reasonably be expected to respond.  Stated another way, when the responding party cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against them, the pleading (or cause) is uncertain.  (Khoury v. Maly's of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616 [citing Weil & Brown, Civ. Pro. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2008) ¶7:84].)

Again here, like in her previous attorney’s arguments on the last Demurrer, Ms. Perez-Hogan claims the subject Petition is uncertain, but then immediately outlines how the prayer for relief cannot possibly be granted by specifically explaining what the claims against her are, and why she cannot be held liable to respond.  And like the last Demurrer, this Demurrer points to no facts or allegations that create ambiguity or uncertainty.

In fact, Mr. Perez-Hogan fails to even include an argument in support of uncertainty, thus can be held to have abandoned such claim.

Conclusion

The Demurrer should be overruled in total.

Appearances:

The court is open to the public for court business. The court is also conducting hearings via Zoom videoconference.

Meeting ID: 161 956 1423

Passcode: 137305