Estate of James David Westerfield

Case Number

22PR00493

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Tue, 09/03/2024 - 09:00

Nature of Proceedings

Petition for Final Distribution

Tentative Ruling

Probate Notes:

Appearances required of Petitioner and Natalie Westerfield.  Remote appearances allowed. 

After review of the supplement and declaration filed on August 29, 2024, the following is noted for the court at the hearing:

Grossly Unreasonable Assignment.  The proposed distribution does not comply with the intestate distribution scheme in the Probate Code.  When a decedent’s estate does not pass by a testamentary instrument, this Court is bound by law to order that property passes to the decedent’s heirs as prescribed in Division 6, part 2 of the Probate Code (§§6401, et seq.). (Prob. Code, § 6400.) 

While it is true that heirs may assign their interest to another, those assignments do not escape scrutiny.  This Court has wide discretion to “inquire into the circumstances surrounding the execution of, and the consideration for, the transfer, agreement, request, or instructions, and the amount of any fees, charges, or consideration paid or agreed to be paid by the beneficiary.” (Prob. Code, § 11604(b).)  During that inquiry, this Court “may refuse to order distribution, or may order distribution on any terms that the court deems just and equitable, if the court finds either of the following:

(1) The fees, charges, or consideration paid or agreed to be paid by a beneficiary are grossly unreasonable.

(2) The transfer, agreement, request, or instructions were obtained by duress, fraud, or undue influence.”

(Prob. Code, § 11604(c).) 

IN THIS CASE, assignment of Decedent’s daughter to Petitioner (her brother) is grossly unreasonable on its face, because she purports to assign all her 50% interest in real property to the Petitioner for a fraction of the value of that property.  Decedent’s daughter alleges that this assignment is in consideration of “over $500,000 worth of service to my father” provided for by the petitioner at the end of the Decedent’s life.  (Westfield Decl. at ¶3.)  There are several problems with this allegation.

First, there were no documents attached to the declaration in support of the dollar value placed on the care given to the Decedent by the petitioner. Second, even if a dollar value could be supported by evidence, the claim Petitioner would have for the value would be a creditor’s claim on the estate, which was not filed or approved of by the Court. (Prob. Code 9252, § [creditor’s claims by personal representative must be approved by the court before paid.].)  Third, the remaining estate after that creditor’s claim was paid would still have to be distributed via intestate succession, as discussed above.

It goes without saying that any heir may do with their own property whatever they wish, as a matter of law. But this court may not ignore statutory commands that govern distribution of a decedent’s estate so as to be the conduit for transfer of one heir’s property to another. 

Thus, the Court should find the assignment of Natalie Westerfield grossly unreasonable as a matter of law, and order the estate be distributed according to the law of intestacy, 50% of the entire estate to Petitioner and 50% of the entire estate to Natalie Westerfield.