Marcus E. v. David Ellinwood, et al
Marcus E. v. David Ellinwood, et al
Case Number
22CV05139
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Wed, 05/22/2024 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
1. Motion of Defendant David Ellinwood for Summary Judgment 2. Motion of Defendant County of Santa Barbara for Summary Judgment
Tentative Ruling
For Plaintiff Marcus E.: Self-represented
For Defendant David Ellinwood: Robert M. Sanger, Stephen K. Dunkle, Miguel A. Avila, Sanger Dunkle Law, P.C.
For Defendant County of Santa Barbara: Sean A. Andrade, Andrade Gonzalez LLP
RULING
For the reasons set forth herein, the motions of Defendants David Ellinwood and County of Santa Barbara, for summary judgment, are granted. The MSC set for 6/7/24 and the Trial Date of 6/26/24 are ordered off Calendar. County to provide an order consistent with this decision. County to give notice.
Background
On December 29, 2022, Plaintiff Marcus E. (“Plaintiff”) filed his complaint in this action, against David Ellinwood (“Ellinwood”) and County of Santa Barbara (“County”) asserting claims of childhood sexual abuse and public entity liability. The complaint contains causes of action for: (1) Sexual Battery; (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (3) Public Entity Liability. The first two causes of action are alleged as to Ellinwood and the third cause of action is alleged as to County.
On April 4, 2023, Defendant County of Santa Barbara filed its answer to the complaint generally denying the allegations thereof and asserting 25 affirmative defenses.
On April 11, 2023, Defendant David Ellinwood filed his answer to the complaint generally denying the allegations thereof and asserting 12 affirmative defenses.
Following a series of discovery motions, requests for admission, propounded by Ellinwood on Plaintiff, were deemed admitted on February 28, 2024. Requests for admission, propounded by County on Ellinwood, were deemed admitted on March 6, 2024.
Ellinwood and County now each move for summary judgment on the grounds that there are no triable issues of material fact.
Plaintiff has filed no oppositions or other responsive documents to the motions.
Analysis
A Defendant’s motion for summary judgment asks the Court to determine that the entire action has no merit, and to terminate the action without the necessity of a trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a).) The procedure enables the Court to look behind the pleadings to determine whether the party against whom the motion is directed has evidence to back up the claims. “The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In determining if the papers show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact, the Court shall consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except the evidence to which objections have been made and sustained by the Court, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence, except summary judgment shall not be granted by the Court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence if contradicted by other inferences or evidence that raise a triable issue as to any material fact.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
“A motion for summary judgment must be decided on admissible evidence in the form of affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions and matters of which judicial notice may be taken.” (Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1119-1120.)
“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. … Further, although not expressly, [section 437c] impliedly provide[s] for a burden of production to make a prima facie showing. A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of the party in question. [Citation.] No more is called for.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850–851, fn. omitted.)
“A Defendant … has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. Once the Defendant … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the Plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
“[M]ere self-representation is not a ground for exceptionally lenient treatment. Except when a particular rule provides otherwise, the rules of civil procedure must apply equally to parties represented by counsel and those who forgo attorney representation. [Citation.] . . . A doctrine generally requiring or permitting exceptional treatment of parties who represent themselves would lead to a quagmire in the trial Courts, and would be unfair to the other parties to litigation.” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.)
Deemed Admissions
“As a general rule an admission is conclusive in the action as to the party making it. [Citations.] Absent leave of Court to amend or withdraw the admission, no contradictory evidence may be introduced.” (Murillo v. Superior Court (206) 143 Cal.App.4th 730, 736.)
David Ellinwood Motion for Summary Judgment
Ellinwood’s separate statement of undisputed material facts (“UMF”) in support of his motion for summary judgment are all based on facts which were deemed admitted as the result of Plaintiff’s failure to provide code-compliant responses to discovery.
Of the facts presented, the first UMF is sufficient to grant summary judgment on the first cause of action for sexual battery. That UMF states: “David Ellinwood did not sexually batter Plaintiff.” (UMF No. 1.)
Of the facts presented, the twentieth UMF is sufficient to grant summary judgment on the second cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. That UMF states: “David Ellinwood did not intentionally inflict emotional distress on Plaintiff.” (UMF No. 20.)
As Plaintiff has, in effect, admitted these facts, there are no triable issues of material fact as to either cause of action asserted against Ellinwood. The motion for summary judgment will be granted.
County of Santa Barbara
County’s UMFs in support of its motion for summary judgment are also all based on facts which were deemed admitted as the result of Plaintiff’s failure to provide code-compliant responses to discovery.
Of the facts presented, the third UMF is sufficient to grant summary judgment on the third cause of action for public entity liability. That UMF states: “The Plaintiff admitted that the County: (a) Was ‘not liable to YOU pursuant to the Third Cause of Action in YOUR Complaint in the matter of Marcus E. v. David Ellinwood, Case No. 22CV05139’; and (b) That ‘YOU have no evidence that the COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA is liable to YOU pursuant to the Third Cause of Action in YOUR Complaint in the matter of Marcus E. v. David Ellinwood, Case No. 22CV05139.’ “ (UMF No. 3.)
Again, Plaintiff has, in effect, admitted these facts and there are no triable issues of material fact as to County for public entity liability. The motion for summary judgment will be granted.