Roxanne Coles vs Carpinteria Unified School District et al

Case Number

22CV05100

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 07/02/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; Hearing on Evidentiary Sanctions

Tentative Ruling

For Roxanne Coles [“Plaintiff”]: Mansfield Collins.

For Carpinteria Unified School District [“CUSD”]: Molly Thurmond, Cyrus Khosh-Chashm.

Issues

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

Hearing on Evidentiary Sanctions.

RULING

For the reasons set out below the Motion is GRANTED and the issue of evidentiary sanctions is MOOT.

The Motion

Filed 5/7/25; 13 pages; read and considered; summarized: Plaintiff attempts to hide the fact she made her choice when she pursued her claims through Level Five of the Grievance Procedures. The CBA provides detailed and comprehensive administrative procedures by which to challenge her termination. The arbitrator chosen by the parties in accordance with those procedures confirmed that her claims were both procedurally and substantively arbitrable under the CBA. Plaintiff pursued the administrative remedies set forth in the CBA through at least five levels, and for nearly a year. She then abandoned the process and started over again in this Court. She must be required to see the administrative process through to its conclusion, before bringing her claims before this court. Not only is she required to do so, but it would also be a waste of party and judicial resources, and prejudicially unfair to CUSD, to permit her to proceed otherwise.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the court. Notwithstanding the general rule requiring exhaustion of internal administrative remedies, a public employee who claims to have suffered employment-related discrimination need not exhaust a mandatory internal administrative remedy in addition to the FEHA’s administrative remedies before pursuing a FEHA discrimination claim in superior court. California courts have unequivocally made clear that even though an employee is not required to pursue internal grievance procedures related to FEHA discrimination claims, once the employee has commenced those procedures, they are obligated to exhaust those procedures and to bring a mandamus action to set aside any adverse findings before proceeding with a FEHA claim in a civil action. Page v. Los Angeles County Probation Dept. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1135; Miller v. City of Los Angeles (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1373.

Plaintiff in this case has named seven causes of action, two of which are based on alleged violations of the FEHA. Accordingly, as to those two causes of action, she could have, had she chosen, ignored the comprehensive administrative procedures provided in the CBA. She did not but chose instead to pursue the administrative remedies provided in the CBA, and followed those procedures through Grievance Level 5. It was only then that she abandoned the internal grievance procedures, filed a complaint with the DFEH, and received her right to sue letter. She thereafter commenced this action.

Plaintiff must be compelled to pursue her administrative remedies through exhaustion before pursuing those claims in this court. Requiring Plaintiff to exhaust her administrative remedies would both give effect to the comprehensive procedures set forth in the CBA, and – had Plaintiff followed the correct procedure – provide a more economical and less formal forum to resolve her claims, providing an opportunity for her to mitigate her damages. As it stands, and solely because of (1) Plaintiff’s abandonment of the administrative proceedings, and (2) her repetitive and persistent delays in pursuing these proceedings, her dispute has resulted in an exorbitant waste of time and financial resources – no matter what the outcome. Even if, as Plaintiff seems to argue, complete relief is not available through the administrative process, it can serve to reduce the scope of litigation – or possibly even avoid litigation altogether. In short, exhaustion of internal grievance procedures is required not because of contractual obligation but because of compelling policy considerations. An exhaustion of remedies requirement serves the function of eliminating or mitigating damages. If an organization is given the opportunity quickly to determine through the operation of its internal procedures that it has committed error, it may be able to minimize, and sometimes eliminate, any monetary injury to the plaintiff by reversing its initial decision. An individual should not be permitted to increase damages by foregoing available internal remedies.

The CBA sets forth a detailed and comprehensive grievance procedure, including five escalating levels of review. Plaintiff commenced the grievance process, and continued it through the first five steps, as set forth in the CBA. Thereafter, and without apparent cause, reason, or explanation, she abandoned the process and commenced this lawsuit.

California has made it quite clear that a discharged civil servant who elects an administrative forum for review of his or her termination must succeed in overturning that administrative decision through the judicial mandamus review procedure prior to filing a suit for damages on claims arising out of the termination. Should Plaintiff attempt to avoid application of the administrative procedures set forth in the CBA, both the Education Code (at Title 2, Div. 3, Part 25, Ch. 5) and the Government Code (at Title 2, Div. 3, Part 1, Ch. 5) also provide detailed and comprehensive administrative procedures by which to challenge termination. These statutory administrative procedures are more stringent as to timelines and requirements than those provided in the CBA. 

While one may argue which of the above procedures applies to Plaintiff’s dismissal and any challenge she raises to that dismissal, it cannot be disputed that she failed to comply with any of the required procedures for challenging her dismissal. She should not be permitted to simply ignore mandated administrative procedures, especially after initially choosing an administrative remedy, and proceeding to arbitration through that process. Plaintiff must now pursue arbitration to its conclusion before she can proceed with her claims in this Court. Dismissal of unripe, non-exhausted claims is an – indeed the only - appropriate remedy.

The Opposition

10 pages; read and considered; summarized; Plaintiff opposes CUSD’s motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (“MJOP”) on both procedural and substantive grounds. The motion, brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 438, should be denied in its entirety for the following independent reasons:

1. CUSD has waived the right to bring this MJOP by unreasonably delaying until after lengthy litigation, discovery, hearings, and extensive judicial proceedings, despite being aware of the alleged grounds for the motion since the inception of the lawsuit.

2. Plaintiff has properly pleaded multiple causes of action supported by specific allegations, including statutory claims under FEHA and Labor Code section 1102.5, and tort claims. All claims meet the legal standard to survive an MJOP, which is equivalent to a general demurrer.

3. CUSD’s assertion that Plaintiff was required to exhaust administrative remedies fails as a matter of law. Plaintiff received a DFEH right-to-sue letter, and even if administrative remedies were pursued and later settled or deemed futile, she is not barred from asserting statutory claims that reach beyond the scope of contractual arbitration under the CBA.

4. Lastly, by its own pleadings on August 22, 2022, CUSD filed a Petition to Vacate Contractual Arbitration in case number 22CV03223, and CUSD repeatedly asserts that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by ordering CUSD to arbitrate the merits of Plaintiff’s dismissal and unpaid suspension.

Plaintiff argues her claims are legally sufficient; she asserted 7 counts based upon her claim of wrongful termination: (1) Failure to Prevent Discrimination under FEHA; (2) Retaliation and Harassment under FEHA; (3) Violation of Labor Code section 1102.5[ (4) Defamation; (5) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (6) Violation of the Education Code; (7) Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy.

Plaintiff argues all these claims are sufficiently pleaded. Defendant argues Plaintiff’s claims are contractually preempted by the CBA and that she failed to exhaust remedies. However, Defendants attorney have also argued the opposite in their Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award. Thus, the record establishes a compelling argument that supports the futility of Plaintiff’s administrative remedies and confirms that Carpinteria Unified School District has admitted, both directly and by implication, that the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) does not cover Plaintiff’s statutory and tort-based claims, including her claims under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and California Labor Code section 1102.5. Sets out a timeline.  

Supported by Exhibits:

Letter dated 11/9/22 from Civil Rights Department: Attached is a copy of your complaint of discrimination filed with the Civil Rights Department (CRD) pursuant to the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Government Code section 12900 et seq. Also attached is a copy of your Notice of Case Closure and Right to Sue.

11/9/22: Notice of Filing of Discrimination Complaint CRD Matter Number: 202211-18837909 Right to Sue: Coles / CUSD.

11/9/24: Notice of Case Closure and Right to Sue; CRD Matter Number: 202211-18837909Right to Sue: Coles / CUSD.

11/9/22; In the Matter of the Complaint of Roxanne Coles Complainant, vs CUSD.

The Reply

Filed 6/23/25; 8 pages; read and considered; summarized: Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed without prejudice until she completes the administrative proceedings she commenced in 2022.

The Court’s Conclusions

Plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to support her conclusions of wrongdoing. There are no facts alleged to support a conclusion that any of the conduct which she alleges was in any manner based on, or caused by, any of the protected classes set forth in Govt. Code §12940 et seq. (FEHA), or the protected activity set forth in Labor Code section 1102.5. There is no common law cause of action against a public entity for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. (Govt. Code §815; Ross v. S.F. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1514. Plaintiff has failed to identify any statutory basis for her tort claims, as required by Govt. Code § 3 815.6. Even if the allegations in paragraph 11-18 are accepted as true, they support only a conclusion of garden-variety employment disputes, unrelated to protected class or protected activity. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations of legal wrongdoing related to the conduct are insufficient.

As to the generalized factual allegations alleged in paragraphs 19, 21 and 22, there are no dates from which to determine, much less conclude, that the alleged conduct, even if it did occur, took place within the relevant statute of limitations. It is essential that Plaintiff set forth these factual allegations, yet she has failed to do so. These deficiencies alone require dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, even if it is dismissed with leave to amend. 

CUSD’s motion is not untimely. Plaintiff commenced this action on December 21, 2022. CUSD timely answered the complaint on May 17, 2023. CUSD filed its initial Motion for Judgment on January 4, 2024.  Plaintiff failed to timely respond to that motion, and on January 24, 2024, CUSD filed a Notice of Non-Opposition. Plaintiff then filed an Opposition and requested a continuance of the motion. On February 29, 2024, the parties stipulated to stay these proceeding to enable Plaintiff to exhaust her required administrative remedies. CUSD withdrew its motion for judgment on the pleadings upon the parties’ stipulation (and this Court’s order thereon), and on the good-faith belief that Plaintiff did in fact intend to complete the administrative proceedings she had commenced in January 2022.

Plaintiff failed to make any attempt to pursue, let alone conclude, those proceedings. CUSD’s withdrawal of its motion upon its reasonable and good faith reliance on Plaintiff’s representation that she would finalize her administrative proceedings does not constitute a waiver of its right to bring this motion. In fact, the stipulation – agreed to after the motion for judgment on the pleadings was filed – constitutes Plaintiff’s acknowledgement that she needs to finalize the administrative proceedings she commenced in 2022.

There is no legal authority permitting Plaintiff to abandon her administrative claims and begin anew in Superior Court after receiving an award in the first part of the bifurcated arbitration proceedings. Where an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must be sought from the administrative body and this remedy exhausted before the courts will act. (Terris v. County of Santa Barbara (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 551, 555.) Administrative remedies include internal grievance procedures provided by a public entity. Public employees must pursue appropriate internal administrative remedies before filing a civil action against their employer. (Campbell v. Regents of Univ. of Calif. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, 321.)  

The Education Code is in accord and provides procedures by which an employee may challenge her termination. Educ. C. section 45113(c) requires the school district to adopt rules of procedure for disciplinary proceedings. Section 45113(e) provides that this section shall not be construed to prohibit a governing board of a school district, pursuant to the terms of an agreement with an employee organization, from delegating its authority to determine whether sufficient cause exists for disciplinary action against a classified employee, to an impartial third-party hearing officer. However, the governing board shall retain the authority to review the determination of such hearing officer.

In this case, the CBA specifically and comprehensively sets forth the procedures by which an employee may challenge a disciplinary action, and those procedures provide for an evidentiary hearing through arbitration before an arbitrator agreed to by the parties. CUSD adopted those procedures. Section 45113(i), in fact, specifically recognizes a school district’s right to rely on procedures set forth in a collective bargaining agreement related to disciplinary proceedings.

Plaintiff’s challenge to her termination was conducted and proceeded in accordance with the procedures adopted by CUSD, as permitted by the Education Code. Code of Civil Procedure section 1285 provides that any party to an arbitration in which an award has been made may petition the court to confirm, correct, or vacate the award.

CUSD did in fact petition this Court to vacate the arbitration award in the first part of the bifurcated arbitration, in which Plaintiff prevailed. The CBA and California law clearly enable either party to petition this Court to confirm, correct or vacate any award rendered after the second half of the bifurcated arbitration proceedings.

To the extent Plaintiff argues that a public employee whose employment is subject to a collective bargaining agreement is not required to exhaust judicial remedies before bringing a FEHA action, her argument is unavailing. Plaintiff cannot credibly argue that the comprehensive grievance provided in the CBA denies or prohibits her any right or protection that is provided by any statute, regulation, or specialized state agency procedure.

The CBA provides adequate protections – the type of protections that are missing in the procedures addressed by the legal authority that finds that exhaustion is not required. (Ortega v Contra Costa Community College Dist. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1073; Marcario v. County of Orange (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 397; Ahmadi-Kashani v. The Regents of the Univ. of Calif. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 449.)

There is no way around the provisions of the CBA and the Education Code, which provide the administrative processes which must be followed, and the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides the necessary judicial review to ensure that the procedures and remedies are in accord with those provisions and provides adequate protection of the employee’s rights. In short, the legal authority holding that a party must finalize administrative proceedings, once commenced, solidly applies to this proceeding – and the administrative proceedings commenced by Plaintiff.

Equitable estoppel does not apply to preclude CUSD from its arguments.  Plaintiff’s argument that CUSD is estopped from pursuing its exhaustion claim is without merit. In the administrative proceeding, Plaintiff argued – and the arbitrator agreed – that her claims were subject to the terms and provisions of the CBA, both procedurally and substantively.

She obtained an award in the first portion of the bifurcated arbitration.  Where a party asserts a position in one proceeding, and prevails, that party is estopped from asserting an inconsistent position in a second proceeding. (Owens v County of Los Angeles (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 107.) Having prevailed in the first portion of the bifurcated arbitration that the CBA governs her claims, both procedurally and substantively, she cannot now argue that she is not required to abide by the CBA’s terms and conditions. 

Plaintiff is correct that CUSD took the unambiguous position that Plaintiff had no right to arbitration under the CBA. CUSD lost that argument. As Plaintiff herself notes in citing People ex rel. Sneddon v. Torch Energy Services, Inc. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 181, 189 (Judicial estoppel applies when a party successfully asserts one position in a legal proceeding and then attempts to assert an inconsistent position in a later proceeding to gain advantage.) Plaintiff prevailed in the administrative arbitration; she cannot now turn around and assert an inconsistent position in this proceeding.

Plaintiff will suffer no prejudice if this matter is dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff’s FEHA claims – and one would presume her other statutory claims as well – are equitably tolled while she pursues the administrative remedies in the proceedings she commenced in early 2022. (McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88.)

Considering the policies favoring administrative resolution of employment disputes, the relative quickness and economy of such proceedings, and the availability of judicial review of those proceedings, there is no reason to permit Plaintiff to force CUSD to participate in nearly a year of evidentiary hearings under the administrative process, to abandon those proceedings, and then force CUSD to spend another three years addressing those same claims in this Court. It would be a waste of judicial and party resources, and prejudicially unfair, to permit her to proceed in this case.  

Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed without prejudice until she completes the administrative proceedings she commenced in 2022.

The issue of evidentiary sanctions was injected into this case by the Court because Plaintiff’s counsel has repeatedly avoided making the Plaintiff available for a deposition. The Court finally Ordered the date and time for the deposition to be accomplished with the expectation that it would in fact take place. Plaintiff’s counsel again avoided the event claiming a medical emergency so the Court, as a last resort, set the hearing. The Court has no intention to preclude the Plaintiff from testifying and leveling such sanctions but had the expectation that the threat would be enough to accomplish the deposition being finally taken Apparently, it was not. But with the ruling in this case the issue of evidentiary sanctions is moot.