Fernando Castro-Ramirez v. General Motors, LLC
Fernando Castro-Ramirez v. General Motors, LLC
Case Number
22CV04207
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Fri, 03/22/2024 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Plaintiff’s Motion To Compel Further Responses And Documents To Requests For Production Of Documents, Set One
Tentative Ruling
Fernando Castro-Ramirez v. General Motors, LLC
Case No. 22CV04207
Hearing Date: March 22, 2024
ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiff Fernando Castro-Ramirez: Nancy Zhang, Corinna Jiang, Consumer Law Experts, PC
For Defendant General Motors, LLC: Mary Arens McBride, Ryan Kay, Erskine Law Group, PC
TENTATIVE RULING:
(1) For all reasons discussed herein, the motion of plaintiff to compel further responses and documents to plaintiff’s request for production of documents, set one, is denied without prejudice.
(2) Plaintiff’s counsel, Corinna Jiang, and defendant’s counsel, Ryan Kay, are ordered to appear on April 19, 2024, at 10:00 a.m. in this Department, and show cause why monetary sanctions not to exceed $1,500 should not be imposed against them for violating the court’s Minute Order dated February 16, 2024, as discussed herein. Counsel for the parties shall each file and serve their respective written responses to the court’s order to show cause on or before April 5, 2024.
Background:
Plaintiff Fernando Castro-Ramirez filed a complaint in this matter on October 26, 2022, alleging five causes of action against defendant General Motors, LLC (GM): (1) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (d); (2) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b); (3) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3); (4) breach of express written warranty (Civ. Code, §§ 1791.2, subd. (a), & 1794); and (5) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability (Civ. Code, §§ 1791.1 & 1794). As alleged in the complaint:
On June 20, 2022, plaintiff purchased a 2022 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 (the vehicle) manufactured and distributed by defendant General Motors, LLC (GM). (Compl., ¶ 6.) Plaintiff purchased the vehicle from “a person or entity in the business of manufacturing, distributing, or selling consumer goods at retail.” (Id. at ¶ 9.) In connection with the purchase, plaintiff received an express written warranty in which GM undertook to preserve or maintain the utility or performance of the vehicle or to provide compensation if there is a failure in utility or performance for a specified period of time. (Id. at ¶ 10.) The warranty provided that in the event a defect developed during the warranty period, plaintiff could deliver the vehicle for repair to GM’s representative. (Ibid.)
After plaintiff took possession of the vehicle and during the warranty period, the vehicle developed defects which impair its use, safety, and value, and which violate express and implied warranties. (Compl., ¶¶ 11, 13, 16.) The defects include a defective engine, audio system, transmission system, and ignition system. (Id. at ¶ 12.)
Plaintiff provided GM and its representatives with sufficient opportunity to service or repair the vehicle. (Compl., ¶ 14.) GM and its representatives were unable or failed to service or repair the vehicle within a reasonable number of attempts. (Id. at ¶ 15.)
GM filed an answer to plaintiff’s complaint on December 8, 2022, generally denying its allegations and asserting twenty-six affirmative defenses.
On November 28, 2023, plaintiff filed a motion for an order compelling GM to provide further responses to plaintiff’s set one requests for production of documents nos.16, 19, 20, 21, 32 and 42 (the RFP), and to further produce documents (the motion to compel). GM opposed the motion.
On February 16, 2024, the court issued its Minute Order (the Minute Order) continuing the hearing on the motion to compel to March 15, 2024. As more fully discussed in the Minute Order, the court found that plaintiff failed to meet his burden to demonstrate good cause for the request described in RFP No. 42.
For reasons fully discussed in the Minute Order, the court further found that, to the extent the request described in RFP No. 32 demands that GM produce documents concerning GM’s knowledge that the vehicle had not been repaired or whether GM had a written policy or procedure applicable to the repair or replacement of the vehicle, good cause exists for the request described in RFP No. 32.
Though the court did not generally find the requests described in RFP Nos. 16, 19, 20, and 21 were necessarily irrelevant or not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence as GM contends, the court found that the subject matter described in these RFP was potentially unlimited. Under the circumstances present here, as further discussed in the Minute Order, the court ordered the parties to further meet and confer, fully and in good faith, regarding the subject matter and scope of RFP Nos. 16, 19, 20, 21, and GM’s responses and objections thereto. The court also ordered the parties to include in their discussions the potentially unlimited scope of RFP No. 32, and GM’s responses and objections thereto. (See Minute Order.)
In addition, the court ordered plaintiff and GM to submit a joint status report or, if necessary, individual status reports regarding any issues remaining for the court’s determination with respect to the requests described in RFP Nos. 16, 19, 20, 21, and 32. The parties were required to submit a joint status report or individual status reports on or before March 1, 2024.
Court records reflect that on February 27, 2024, plaintiff filed and served notice of the Minute Order. (See Feb. 27, 2024, Notice of Ruling.)
Court records further reflect that on March 8, 2024, one week after the deadline stated in the Minute Order, plaintiff late-filed an individual status report (the status report). In the status report, plaintiff asserts that on February 20, 2024, he attempted to meet and confer with GM by email, and requested GM’s availability for a telephonic meet and confer to discuss the outstanding discovery issues. (Pl. Mar. 8, 2024, Status Report at p. 1, ll. 2-4.) Plaintiff contends that GM did not respond to those efforts. (Id. at l. 5.)
Plaintiff further asserts that on February 27, 2024, he provided notice to GM of the Minute Order. (Pl. Mar. 8, 2024, Status Report at p. 1, ll. 5-8.) Plaintiff contends that GM did not respond to any of plaintiff’s correspondence. (Id. at l. 8.)
Plaintiff also states that because GM produced certain documents after plaintiff filed the motion to compel, the request described in RFP No. 32 is no longer at issue. (Pl. Mar. 8, 2024, Status Report at p. 3, ll. 20-21.) Plaintiff contends that RFP Nos. 16, 19 through 21, and 42 are still at issue and requests that the court order GM to “produce its internal investigation and analysis” of the engine defect at issue, including with respect to other vehicles of the same year, make and model with the same engine type or design, and produce its organizational charts for GM’s customer service call center or prelitigation department. (Id. at pp. 3, ll. 22-26.)
Court records reflect that GM did not file an individual status report as ordered by the court.
Analysis:
As further discussed above, the parties appear to have resolved their dispute with respect to RFP No. 32. Therefore, the motion is moot and will be denied on this ground with respect to RFP No. 32.
As explained by the court in the Minute Order, the request described in RFP No. 42 is not appropriately limited to persons who participated in the handling or resolution of plaintiff’s repurchase request. Plaintiff has also failed to sufficiently explain why a chart identifying every person within GM’s customer service or prelitigation departments, without limitation including as to geographic location, will necessarily disclose the identity of persons who were involved in any request made by plaintiff with respect to the vehicle. For these reasons, RFP No. 42 is potentially unlimited in subject matter and scope. Therefore, and for all reasons discussed herein and in the Minute Order, as plaintiff has failed to meet his burden to demonstrate good cause for the production by GM of organizational charts of persons within GM’s customer service call center or prelitigation department, the court will deny the motion with respect to the request described in RFP No. 42.
As noted in the Minute Order, the subject matter described in RFP Nos. 16, 19, 20, and 21 is potentially unlimited including with respect to geographic area and time, among other things. (See, e.g., Civ. Code, § 1793.2, subd. (a).) For example, based on the definition of the term “engine defect” as used in the RFP, it is unclear whether plaintiff seeks discovery concerning defects in the same engine design or type as that installed in the vehicle, or whether plaintiff seeks discovery of defects in all engines installed in similar vehicles notwithstanding whether the same engine type or designed was installed in those similar vehicles. The RFP are also potentially unlimited with respect to time and geographic location.
The examples offered by the court in the Minute Order and herein are not intended to be exhaustive, and the court declines to issue an advisory opinion regarding the manner in which the requests in RFP Nos. 16, 19, 20, and 21 may be crafted to avoid the potential subject matter or scope issues described here and in the Minute Order.
In the status report, plaintiff asserts that he is willing to narrow the definition of “engine defect” to the same engine type or design in other vehicles of the same year, make and model suffering from the same defect or symptoms. (Pl. Mar. 8, 2024, Status Report at p. 3, ll. 6-8.) Though plaintiff’s proposed narrowing addresses in part the concerns raised in the Minute Order, it does not address the potentially unlimited scope or subject matter described in these RFP in other respects. For the same reasons discussed in the Minute Order, the court declines to issue an advisory opinion as to the manner in which the requests described in RFP Nos. 16, 19, 20, and 21 may be further narrowed to avoid the problems addressed herein and in the Minute Order.
For all reasons discussed above and in the Minute Order, plaintiff has failed to meet his burden to show good cause for the requests described in RFP Nos. 16, 19, 20, and 21. Therefore, the court will deny the motion with respect to RFP Nos. 16, 19, 20, and 21, without prejudice to a future procedurally appropriate motion to compel to the extent plaintiff further and appropriately narrows these requests in any future demand.
Plaintiff submits evidentiary objections to portions of the Ryan Kay declaration and to the entirety of the declaration of Huizhen Lu submitted in support of the opposition to the motion filed by GM. Plaintiff’s objections fail to identify which specific statements among multiple statements, including entire paragraphs from the Kay declaration and the entirety of the Lu declaration, constitute objectionable material. Plaintiff’s failure to specifically identify the objectionable matters forces the court to speculate as to whether plaintiff objects to the cited material in whole or in part. For these reasons, the court will overrule plaintiff’s objections to the Kay and Lu declarations.
Order to show cause:
“A judicial officer shall have the power to impose reasonable money sanctions, not to exceed fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500), notwithstanding any other provision of law, payable to the court, for any violation of a lawful court order by a person, done without good cause or substantial justification. This power shall not apply to advocacy of counsel before the court. For the purposes of this section, the term ‘person’ includes a witness, a party, a party’s attorney, or both.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 177.5.)
Available information indicates that GM failed to timely and fully meet and confer in good faith in accordance with the Minute Order with regard to RFP Nos. 16 and 19 through 21, as ordered by the court and in accordance with the Minute Order. In addition, plaintiff and GM each failed to timely file a joint or individual status report in compliance with the Minute Order. For all reasons discussed above, the court finds that plaintiff and GM have violated the Minute Order.
Neither plaintiff nor GM has offered any information demonstrating good cause or substantial justification for their violation of the Minute Order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 177.5; see also Seykora v. Superior Court (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1075, 1081 [“section 177.5 does not even require a willful violation, but merely one committed ‘without good cause of substantial justification,’ that is, without a valid excuse”].) Therefore, the court will order counsel for plaintiff, Corinna Jiang, and counsel for GM, Ryan Kay, to appear and show cause why monetary sanctions not to exceed $1,500 should not be imposed against each of them for violating the Minute Order. The hearing on this order to show cause shall be set for April 19, 2024, at 10:00 a.m. in this Department. Counsel for the parties shall each file and serve their written responses to the court’s order herein on or before April 5, 2024.