Fernando Castro-Ramirez vs General Motors LLC

Case Number

22CV04207

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 02/16/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion to Compel

Tentative Ruling

For all reasons discussed herein, the court continues the hearing on the motion of plaintiff for an order compelling further responses and production of documents responsive to set one request for production of documents to March 15, 2024, or another date to be determined at the hearing on this matter. On or before March 1, 2024, the parties shall submit a joint report, or individual status reports, in accordance with this ruling.

Background:

Plaintiff Fernando Castro-Ramirez filed a complaint in this matter on October 26, 2022, alleging five causes of action against defendant General Motors, LLC (GM): (1) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (d); (2) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b); (3) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3); (4) breach of express written warranty (Civ. Code, §§ 1791.2, subd. (a), & 1794); and (5) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability (Civ. Code, §§ 1791.1 & 1794). As alleged in the complaint:

On June 20, 2022, plaintiff purchased a 2022 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 (the vehicle) manufactured and distributed by defendant General Motors, LLC (GM). (Compl., ¶ 6.) Plaintiff purchased the vehicle from “a person or entity in the business of manufacturing, distributing, or selling consumer goods at retail.” (Compl., ¶ 9.) In connection with the purchase, plaintiff received an express written warranty in which GM undertook to preserve or maintain the utility or performance of the vehicle or to provide compensation if there is a failure in utility or performance for a specified period of time. (Compl., ¶ 10.) The warranty provided that in the event a defect developed during the warranty period, plaintiff could deliver the vehicle for repair to GM’s representative. (Ibid.)

After plaintiff took possession of the vehicle and during the warranty period, the vehicle developed defects which impair its use, safety, and value, and which violate express and implied warranties. (Compl., ¶¶ 11, 13, 16.) The defects include a defective engine, audio system, transmission system, and ignition system. (Compl., ¶ 12.)

Plaintiff provided GM and its representatives with sufficient opportunity to service or repair the vehicle. (Compl., ¶ 14.) GM and its representatives were unable or failed to service or repair the vehicle within a reasonable number of attempts. (Compl., ¶ 15.)

GM filed an answer to plaintiff’s complaint on December 8, 2022, generally denying its allegations and asserting twenty-six affirmative defenses.  

Plaintiff has filed a motion for an order compelling GM to provide further responses to plaintiff’s set one requests for production of documents nos.16, 19, 20, 21, 32 and 42 (the RFP), and to further produce documents. Plaintiff contends that GM has asserted unmeritorious “boilerplate” objections to the RFP, has failed to provide adequate code-compliant responses to the RFP, and has failed to produce responsive documents which plaintiff asserts are directly relevant to plaintiff’s claims under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civil Code § 1791, et seq.) (the Act).

In support of the motion, plaintiff submits the declaration of his counsel, Corinna Jiang, who declares that the RFP were served on GM by electronic mail on September 8, 2023. (Jiang Decl., ¶ 11 & Exh. 5.) GM served responses to the RFP on October 9, 2023, but did not produce documents or provide a signed verification with those responses. (Id. at ¶ 12; Exh. 6.) On November 9, 2023, GM provided signed verifications and an initial document production. (Id. at ¶ 13.)

On September 8, September 14, October 20, November 1, and November 15, 2023, the parties engaged in efforts to meet and confer regarding the production of electronically stored information (ESI), a purported failure by GM to produce documents responsive to the RFP, and what plaintiff contends constitute deficient responses and boilerplate objections to the RFP. (Jiang Decl., ¶¶ 14-18 & Exhs. 7-11.) Plaintiff contends that GM continues to refuse to provide code-compliant responses and a full and complete document production. (Id. at ¶ 19.)

Counsel’s declaration also includes background information relating to plaintiff’s purchase of the vehicle, information appearing in repair records for the vehicle, technical service bulletins issued by GM, and a description of documents produced by GM on November 9, 2023.

GM opposes the motion. In its opposition, GM contends that plaintiff failed to meet and confer with GM in good faith, that its objections to the RFP are well founded, that GM has produced documents responsive to the RFP, that plaintiff improperly seeks the production of documents that relate to other vehicles not at issue in this litigation, and that plaintiff prematurely filed the present motion before GM could supplement its document production.

In support of its opposition, GM submits the declaration of its counsel, Ryan Kay, who does not dispute that GM served responses to the RFP on October 9, 2023, and verifications to the responses on November 9, 2023. (Kay Decl., ¶ 4.) Counsel further declares that GM’s investigation is not yet complete and that plaintiff continues to seek documents unrelated to the vehicle and which constitute privileged material. (Ibid.) GM produced documents which are identified in the opposition and referred plaintiff to responsive documents in its responses to the RFP. (Ibid.) Plaintiff refused to narrow the scope of the RFP. (Id. at ¶ 5.)

Counsel further asserts that in correspondence dated November 1, 2023, GM explained that it would stand by its objections, provided plaintiff with additional responsive information and, directed plaintiff to specific documents responsive to the RFP where appropriate. (Kay Decl., ¶ 6.) GM also offered to produce additional information, including specific documents, subject to a protective order and offered to use the court’s informal discovery process to resolve the discovery dispute to avoid court intervention. (Ibid.) In response, plaintiff rehashed the same arguments and demanded a response despite GM’s objections to the RFP. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Before GM could supplement its document production, plaintiff filed the present motion leaving GM no choice but to oppose it. (Id. at ¶ 8.)

GM also contends that the records sought in the RFP contain confidential, proprietary, and commercially sensitive information. (Kay Decl., ¶¶ 11-12.) To support these contentions, GM submits the declaration of Huizhen Lu, who is presently employed by GM as a Senior Manager/Senior Technical Consultant of Engineering Analysis. (Id. at Exh. A [Lu Decl.], ¶ 3.)

Lu provides a general description of engineering and business information which GM possesses and undertakes extensive measures to protect. (Lu Decl., ¶¶ 8-10.) Lu further states that engineering and other information that GM anticipates may be produced in this matter include information relating to the vehicle’s design specifications, evaluations, performance analysis relative to specifications, material selection, cost, and quality. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Lu asserts that the information described in his declaration which may be produced in this matter is not generally available to the public and that GM undertakes considerable effort to keep the information confidential. (Ibid.)

Lu further declares that the categories of documents described in the RFP may include and cover current projects, design or engineering specifications, test reports, meeting minutes, procedures including policy and decision-making processes and product investigation, and warranty and evaluation materials. (Lu Decl., ¶¶ 14-38.) Disclosure of these documents and the information contained therein will cause GM to suffer economic and competitive harm and would place GM at a competitive disadvantage should the information be disclosed or become available to competitors of GM. (Ibid.)

Analysis:

A party responding to requests for production of document must respond, separately, to each request by “(1) [a] statement that the party will comply with the particular demand . . . [a] representation that the party lacks the ability to comply with the demand . . . (3) [a]n objection to the particular demand[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.210, subd. (a).) “A statement that the party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed will comply with the particular demand shall state that the production, inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, and related activity demanded, will be allowed either in whole or in part, and that all documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession, custody, or control of that party and to which no objection is being made will be included in the production.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.220.)

“A representation of inability to comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling shall affirm that a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand. This statement shall also specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party. The statement shall set forth the name and address of any natural person or organization known or believed by that party to have possession, custody, or control of that item or category of item.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.230.)

“If the responding party objects to the demand[,] the response shall do both of the following: (1) [i]dentify with particularity any document, tangible thing, land, or electronically stored information falling within any category of item in the demand to which an objection is being made[,] (2) [s]et forth clearly the extent of, and the specific ground for, the objection. If an objection is based on a claim of privilege, the particular privilege invoked shall be stated. If an objection is based on a claim that the information sought is protected work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010), that claim shall be expressly asserted.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.240, subd. (b).) “If an objection is based on a claim of privilege or a claim that the information sought is protected work product, the response shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim, including, if necessary, a privilege log.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.240, subd. (c)(1).)

“On receipt of a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that any of the following apply: [¶] [a] statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete[;] [¶] [¶] [a]n objection in the response is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a)(1), (3).) The motion must set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand and be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Code of Civil Procedure section 2016.040. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1) & (2).)

Plaintiff’s efforts to informally resolve the issues presented in the motion:

GM contends that plaintiff’s efforts to meet and confer regarding GM’s responses to the RFP and the production of documents by GM were not made in good faith because plaintiff did not provide any meaningful substantive reasoning or analysis to support plaintiff’s assertions that the RFP are valid, that the objections asserted by GM are invalid, or that GM must produce documents that, according to GM, have nothing to do with issues raised in the present action. Therefore, GM argues, the motion should be denied.

A party moving to compel further responses to discovery must submit a declaration stating facts “showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040.) The court has discretion to determine “whether an attempt at informal resolution is adequate[.]” (Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431 (Obregon).) While an inadequate effort at informal resolution of the dispute does not necessarily justify a denial of discovery, a failure to meet and confer in good faith constitutes a misuse of the discovery process. “[T]he court shall impose a monetary sanction ordering that any party or attorney who fails to confer as required pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct.” (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2023.010, subd. (i), 2023.020; Obregon, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 433-434.)

The court has reviewed the Jiang declaration and the correspondence offered by plaintiff in support of the motion. (See Jiang Decl., Exhs. 9-11.) The court finds that plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence demonstrating a reasonable and good faith attempt to informally resolve the issues presented in the motion. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040.) Furthermore, available information demonstrates that the parties reached an impasse during the meet and confer process such that further efforts by plaintiff were not likely to be productive. (See Jiang Decl., ¶ 19 & Exh. 10 at pp. 5-6 [GM Nov. 1, 2023, letter asserting justification for objections to the RFP]; Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1293-1294.)

Good cause justifying the discovery sought by plaintiff:

“In the more specific context of a request to produce documents, a party who seeks to compel production must show ‘good cause’ for the request [citation]—but where … there is no privilege issue or claim of attorney work product, that burden is met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance.” (Glenfed Development Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117.)

RFP No. 32:

RFP No. 32 requests that GM produce documents on which it relied to support its contention that GM was under no obligation to replace or repurchase the vehicle. (Sep. Stmt. at p. 36.) The documents sought in RFP No. 32 directly relate to the vehicle and are relevant to the damages alleged by plaintiffs and liability issues regarding any warranties applicable to the vehicle. (See Civ. Code, § 1790, et seq.)

In addition, factors to be considered by a jury in determining whether to award a civil penalty under the Act include: (1) whether the manufacturer knew the vehicle had not been repaired within a reasonable period or after a reasonable number of attempts; and (2) whether the manufacturer had a written policy on the requirement to repair or replace. (Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 174, 185-186.) Accordingly, to the extent RFP No. 32 relates to GM’s policies and procedures under the Act with respect to any requirement that GM to replace or repurchase the vehicle and whether such policies exist and their substance, the documents sought in RFP No. 32 are relevant to a determination of whether any failure by GM to repurchase the vehicle was willful.

For all reasons discussed above, and to the extent RFP No. 32 seeks documents concerning GM’s knowledge that the vehicle had not been repaired or whether GM had a written policy regarding repair or replacement of the vehicle, including GM’s internal policies for investigating or handling reported problems such as those alleged in the present action, it appears that good cause exists for the request described in RFP No. 32.

RFP No. 42:

RFP No. 42 seeks the production of documents evidencing the “organizational charts of people within [GM’s] customer service call center or prelitigation department.” (Sep. Stmt. at p. 38.) Plaintiff contends that the organizational charts will identify employees involved in or who had oversight of the decision to deny plaintiff’s request that GM repurchase the vehicle.

RFP No. 42 is not by its terms limited to persons who were involved in handling or making decisions regarding plaintiff’s repurchase request. Plaintiff also fails to sufficiently explain why a chart identifying every person within GM’s customer service or prelitigation departments will necessarily disclose the identity of persons who were involved in any request by plaintiff with respect to the vehicle. For these reasons, RFP No. 42 is potentially unlimited in scope. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to meet his burden to demonstrate good cause for the request described in RFP No. 42.

RFP Nos. 16, 19, 20, and 21:

RFP Nos. 16, 19, 20, and 21 each seek the production of documents concerning an “engine defect” in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the vehicle (the similar vehicles), including any internal analysis or investigation performed by GM with respect to the engine defect in similar vehicles, consumer complaints or claims relating to the engine defect in similar vehicles, failure rates in similar vehicles resulting from the engine defect, and any fixes for the engine defect in similar vehicles. (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 3, 11, 20, 28.)

The term “engine defect” is defined in the RFP as one that results in a lack of power when accelerating, a failure to accelerate at highway speeds, reduced power, long crank before starting, abnormal noise, replacement of the nitrogen oxide catalytic converter with a filter, replacement of gaskets, replacement of the exhaust rear pipe, illumination of diagnostic codes, performance of “Technical Service Bulletin … 22-NA-168”; and “any other concern identified in the repair history for the subject [vehicle].” (Sep. Stmt. at p. 2.)

Plaintiff contends that the documents described in RFP Nos. 16, 19, 20, and 21 will show that GM was aware of the engine defect in the vehicle and its cause, that GM lacked any fix for the engine defect and nonetheless refused to repurchase the vehicle, and the nature and scope of the engine defect which will in turn assist plaintiff’s expert to assess the impact of the engine defect on the vehicle. (Sep. Stmt. at p. 4.)

Plaintiff further contends that the documents described in RFP Nos. 16, 19, 20, and 21 support a claim for civil penalty liability by showing that although GM was aware of the engine defect which plaintiff contends was “prevalent” and could not be repaired, GM willfully failed to abide by its obligations under the Act. (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 4-5, 12-13, 20-21, 29-30.)

GM contends that plaintiff’s claims in the present action relate to an alleged breach of warranties involving the vehicle only and whether the vehicle conformed to applicable warranties or was repaired. Because plaintiff does not allege a products liability claim relating to the existence of an engine defect in similar vehicles, GM argues, the documents described in RFP Nos. 16, 19, 20, and 21 are not relevant to plaintiff’s claims in the present action.

GM further contends that it has produced documents responsive to RFP Nos. 16, 19, 20, and 21, and that it has agreed to produce substantially similar customer complaints regarding similar vehicles purchased in California. GM further asserts that RFP Nos. 16, 19, 20, and 21 require GM to produce materials which constitute or implicate trade secrets. (See Resp. Sep. Stmt. at PDF pp. 3-8, 9, 10-11.)

In the complaint, plaintiff alleges that GM is liable for an alleged breach of implied and express warranties under Civil Code sections 1791.1, 1791.2, subdivision (a), 1793.2, subdivisions (a)(3), (b) and (d), and 1794. (Note: Undesignated statutory references shall be to the Civil Code unless otherwise indicated.) “A plaintiff pursuing an action under the Act has the burden to prove that (1) the vehicle had a nonconformity covered by the express warranty that substantially impaired the use, value or safety of the vehicle (the nonconformity element); (2) the vehicle was presented to an authorized representative of the manufacturer of the vehicle for repair (the presentation element); and (3) the manufacturer or his representative did not repair the nonconformity after a reasonable number of repair attempts (the failure to repair element).” (Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1101 (Oregel).)

The Act “requires the manufacturer of consumer goods sold in this state for which the manufacturer has made an express warranty to maintain sufficient service and repair facilities to carry out the terms of those warranties. [Citation.] Service or repairs of nonconforming goods must be commenced within a ‘reasonable time,’ within 30 days unless the buyer agrees in writing to the contrary. [Citation.]” (Schreidel v. American Honda Motor Co. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1249.) If a manufacturer or its representative in California fails to service or repair a new motor vehicle to conform to applicable express warranties after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer must replace the vehicle or pay restitution. (Ibid.; see also Cummins, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 478, 489-490.)

“The [Act] provides for both express and implied warranties, and while under a manufacturer’s express warranty the buyer must allow for a reasonable number of repair attempts within 30 days before seeking rescission [citations] that is not the case for the implied warranty of merchantability’s bulwark against fundamental defects.” (Brand v. Hyundai Motor America (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1545.)

“[A]n implied warranty of merchantability accompanies every retail sale of consumer goods in the state.” (Music Acceptance Corp. v. Lofing (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 610, 619.) It guarantees that “ ‘ “consumer goods meet each of the following: [¶] (1) Pass without objection in the trade under the contract description. [¶] (2) Are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used. [¶] (3) Are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled. [¶] (4) Conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label.” [Citations.]’ …. ‘The core test of merchantability is fitness for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Isip v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 19, 26.)

To prove a breach of warranty claim such as those alleged in the complaint, a plaintiff is not necessarily required to offer evidence of defects in similar vehicles to prove each element of the claim. (See, e.g., Oregel, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1101-1102, 1105 [describing evidence relating solely to vehicle at issue that would support a jury’s conclusion that defect was warrantied or whether failure to honor statutory obligations was willful]; Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 149 (Donlen) [“the plaintiff is not obligated to identify or prove the cause of the car’s defect. Rather, he is required only to prove the car did not conform to the express warranty”].) However, to the extent its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice and other considerations, evidence concerning the existence of defects in similar vehicles is not necessarily irrelevant to the claims alleged by plaintiff in this action, as GM contends. (See Evid. Code, § 352.)

Donlen is instructive regarding the issues raised by GM in opposition to the motion. In Donlen, the court examined whether sufficient evidence supported a jury’s verdict that a manufacturer did not bring plaintiff’s vehicle in conformity with the warranty before the warranty expired and whether the court erred by admitting evidence of “ ‘other similar vehicles’ ”. (Donlen, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at pp. 152-153.) The evidenced reviewed by the court in Donlen demonstrated that the subject vehicle was defective before it was purchased by the plaintiff. The evidence reviewed by the court included special service messages, technical service bulletins, and recall notices issued by the manufacturer as well as evidence showing that the vehicle’s transmission “was known as problematic among industry personnel….” (Id. at p. 153.) Concluding that there existed substantial evidence to support of the verdict, the court noted that “[t]he jury could conclude from this evidence that [the manufacturer]… indeed may not have been able to bring [the vehicle] into conformity with the warranty at any time.” (Id. at p. 154.)

The Donlen court also considered the manufacturer’s assertions in that case that the trial court abused its discretion by denying motions in limine to exclude evidence of other vehicles which the manufacturer argued was prejudicial. (Donlen, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 154.) The court concluded that the “ ‘other vehicle’ testimony was not unduly prejudicial. It did not concern simply other vehicles. It was limited to the transmission model … installed in plaintiff’s truck and other vehicles. [Plaintiff’s expert witness] described what [the manufacturer] itself had done to notify dealers and technicians about problems with this transmission model. Thus, everything about which he testified that applied to other vehicles applied equally to plaintiff’s vehicle. Such evidence certainly was probative and not unduly prejudicial.” (Ibid.)

Notwithstanding that the holding in Donlen did not address a discovery dispute, for all reasons discussed above, GM’s contention that the requests described in RFP Nos. 16, 19, 20, and 21 are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and therefore irrelevant to plaintiff’s claims, is without merit. In addition, apart from conclusory and speculative assertions regarding trade secrets, GM has failed to demonstrate how or why the categories of documents described in RFP Nos. 16, 19, 20, or 21 necessarily require GM to disclose information that is confidential, proprietary, or otherwise privileged. Moreover, court records reflect that on November 20, 2023, the court issued an order approving a stipulation and protective order (the protective order) agreed to by the parties.

For reasons discussed above, the court does not generally find that the requests in RFP Nos. 16, 19, 20, and 21 are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and therefore wholly irrelevant to plaintiff’s claims in the present action. (See Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 591 [nothing that the statutory term “subject matter” is broader than the issues and not limited to admissible evidence].) However, the subject matters described in RFP Nos. 16, 19, 20, and 21, are potentially unlimited including with respect to geographic area and time, among other things. (See, e.g., Civ. Code, § 1793.2, subd. (a) [limiting the Act’s requirements to consumer goods sold in California].)

For example, based on the definition of the term “engine defect” as used in the RFP, it is unclear whether plaintiff seeks discovery concerning defects in the same design as the engine installed in the vehicle, or whether plaintiff seeks discovery of defects in all engines installed in similar vehicles notwithstanding whether the same engine type or designed was installed in the similar vehicles described in the RFP. The RFP are also potentially unlimited with respect to time and geographic location. These examples are not intended to be exhaustive and the court declines to issue an advisory opinion regarding the manner in which each of the requests in RFP Nos. 16, 19, 20, and 21 may be crafted to avoid potential subject matter or scope issues described above.

Under the circumstances present here and for all reasons discussed above, the court will continue the hearing on the motion. The court will order the parties to further meet and confer, fully and in good faith, regarding RFP Nos. 16, 19, 20, 21, and GM’s responses thereto in consideration of the court’s findings herein. The court will also order the parties to include in their discussions the scope of RFP No. 32, and GM’s responses thereto, in light of the court’s concerns as further discussed above. It should be noted that the court’s discussion of whether good cause exists for the requests described in RFP Nos. 16, 19, 20, 21, and 32 is not intended to be exhaustive or comprehensive, but is intended to provide guidance as to the direction the court intends to proceed at this stage of the parties’ discovery dispute.

The court expects the parties to fully meet and confer, in good faith, as to the subject matter and scope of the requests set forth in RFP Nos. 16, 19, 20, 21, and 32 and each objection and response asserted thereto by GM. The parties’ discussions should include, at a minimum and without limitation, whether the scope of RFP Nos. 16, 19, 20, 21, and 32 should be narrowed, whether a further protective order is necessary to address any legitimate trade secrets or other confidential information that may be implicated in responding to RFP Nos. 16, 19, 20, 21, and 32 and whether a privilege log is necessary.

The court will also order the parties to submit a joint status report regarding what, if any, issues remain regarding RFP Nos. 16, 19, 20, 21, and 32, and any responses or objections thereto. Although the court prefers that the parties submit a joint status report, the parties may, if necessary, file separate individual status reports setting forth any issues that remain to be determined.

Furthermore, to the extent the parties are unable to resolve the present dispute, at the continued hearing the court will, if necessary, address the present objections and responses provided by GM in response to RFP Nos. 16, 19, 20, 21, and 32. To the extent GM serves supplemental responses to RFP Nos. 16, 19, 20, 21, or 32 prior to the continued hearing, and to the extent the motion may be withdrawn based on any such supplemental responses, this ruling is without prejudice to a future procedurally and substantively appropriate motion addressing the supplemental responses.