Arnold Hernandez vs Silver Star Transportation et al

Case Number

22CV04077

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 09/25/2023 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion: Strike all Claims for Punitive Damages in Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint

Tentative Ruling

Arnold Hernandez vs. Silver Star Transportation, et al. 

Case No. 22CV04077

           

Hearing Date: September 25, 2023                                

Hearing:              Motion To Strike All Claims For Punitive Damages In Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

Attorneys:        For Plaintiff Arnold Hernandez: Anthony C. Kastenek, Philip Alexander, Harris Personal Injury Lawyers, Inc.

For Defendants Silver Star Transportation and Gleb Stenin: Rosemarie S. Lewis, Edward J. Morales, Bradford A.M. Smith,  Borton Petrini, LLP

TENTATIVE RULING:

For all reasons discussed herein, the motion of defendants Silver Star Transportation and Gleb Stenin to strike all claims for punitive damages in plaintiff’s first amended complaint is granted with leave to amend. The following matters shall be stricken from plaintiff’s first amended complaint: paragraphs 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, and prayer for relief paragraph 10. Any second amended pleading must be filed and served by plaintiff on or before October 6, 2023.

Background:

The operative first amended complaint (FAC) filed in this matter on July 11, 2023, by plaintiff Arnold Hernandez, alleges one cause of action for negligence against defendants Silver Star Transportation (Silver Star) and Gleb Stenin (Stenin) (collectively, defendants). As alleged in the FAC, on January 27, 2021, Stenin operated a vehicle owned by Silver Star and caused a collision with plaintiff’s vehicle on northbound U.S. Highway 101 in Goleta, California, causing plaintiff to be injured.

Defendants have filed a motion to strike plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages alleged in the FAC. Plaintiff opposes the motion.

Analysis:

“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) In ruling on a motion to strike, a court may “strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading” or “strike  all or part of any pleading not filed in conformity with applicable law, court rules, or an order of the court” (Code Civ. Proc., §436.) The grounds for a motion to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or from matters which the court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)

Defendants move to strike the entirety of paragraphs 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, and prayer for relief paragraph 10. To survive a motion to strike allegations of punitive damages, ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pleaded. (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) In addition, the facts and circumstances constituting the claim for punitive damages must be set forth “with sufficient particularity to apprise the opposite party of what he is called on to answer, and to enable the court to determine whether, on the facts pleaded, there is any foundation [for the claim].” (Lehto v. Underground Construction Company (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 933, 944.)

Under Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a), punitive damages are recoverable where it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with malice, oppression, or fraud. “Malice” means “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “Oppression” means “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) While the term “despicable” is not defined in Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (c), the term includes “circumstances that are ‘base,’ ‘vile,’ or ‘contemptible.’ [Citation.]” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725 (College Hospital).) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(3).)

Giving the complaint a reasonable interpretation, plaintiff alleges that the following conduct supports a claim for punitive damages: “[d]efendants … knew that the [sic] system of the truck being driven by [Stenin] was in poor condition and needed routine maintenance and repair”; before the incident, defendants “had actual knowledge that the truck’s brakes were in a dangerous condition, and it was subjecting the general motoric [sic] public to serious danger” including plaintiff; defendants “had prior knowledge of mechanical brake issues on the subject truck that caused the incident underlying this lawsuit”; Stenin’s “daily logs reflect he noted having a mechanical issue with the ‘BRAKE’ 24 hours preceding the [incident but Stenin] did nothing in terms of inspection or repair to make certain the brakes were in good working condition”; defendants “were aware of the brake issues on their truck and also failed to conduct required pre-trip inspections on the truck” the day before and on the day of the incident; “[h]ad Stenin conducted the required pre-trip inspection he would have discovered the mechanical brake issue”; [Stenin’s] conduct is in violation of 49 C.F.R. §396.13, a federal law that requires a pre-trip inspection. [Citation]”; defendants “knew that it was likely that the inadequately maintained brake system on the truck driven by [Stenin] would fail, resulting in serious injury to innocent bystanders”; despite this knowledge, defendants “failed and/or refused to maintain and/or repair the braking system on the truck driven by [Stenin]”; “the acts and, or omissions of the [defendants] were either committed by or authorized, ratified or otherwise approved by officers, directors and, or managing agents for [defendants]”. (FAC, ¶¶ 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33.)

These allegations state nothing more than a claim for ordinary negligence resting on, at most, arguably reckless or careless conduct. (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210-1211 [defendant’s carelessness, recklessness, or ignorance is insufficient to justify imposition of punitive damages].) These allegations do not state facts sufficient to support an allegation that Stenin acted with malice, oppression, or fraud as required by the statute. The remaining allegations of the FAC that plaintiff alleges relates to his punitive damages claim are conclusory and do not by themselves support a claim for punitive damages.

Moreover, apart from alleging that Stenin was the operator or permissive user of the vehicle owned by Silver Star, wholly absent from the FAC are any facts that would support the allegation that Silver Star may be held liable for punitive damages based on Stenin’s acts. Therefore, it is unclear on what basis plaintiff seeks to hold Silver Star liable for punitive damages. (See, e.g., Veh. Code, § 17151, subd. (b) [limiting owner’s liability for punitive damages imposed on permissive driver]; Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b); College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721 [discussing additional requirements on plaintiffs attempting to hold an employer liable for punitive damages based on acts of employee].)

For all reasons discussed above, the FAC fails to allege facts sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages against defendants. The Court further notes that the allegations which are the subject of the present motion are asserted under the title “Allegations Re Punitive Damages”. (See FAC at pp. 4-6.) Accordingly, it does not appear that these allegations are essential to the claims alleged in the first cause of action for negligence. (See Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1281 [“matter that is essential to a cause of action should not be struck”].) Therefore, for all reasons discussed above, the Court will grant defendants’ motion to strike, with leave to amend. Leave to amend will be limited to providing further allegations relating to a claim for punitive damages. In the event that plaintiff seeks to add any other cause of action, plaintiff will need to obtain leave of court either by stipulation or by noticed motion.