Deborah Andrews v. Ford Motor Company, et al

Case Number

22CV03288

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 02/07/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Plaintiff’s Motion For Reconsideration of the Court’s January 25, 2023 Order Granting Ford Motor Company’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiff Deborah Andrews: Tionna Dolin and Daniel Law

For Defendants Ford Motor Company and Jim Vreeland Ford: Michael D. Mortenson and David M. Keithly

RULING

Defendants’ motion for reconsideration of the Court’s January 25, 2023 order, granting Ford Motor Company’s motion to compel arbitration and stay action, is denied.

Background

Plaintiff Deborah Andrews filed her complaint against Defendants Ford Motor Company (FMC) and Jim Vreeland Ford (JVF) on August 23, 2022. As alleged in the complaint, Andrews entered into a warranty contract with FMC, on or about April 22, 2020, regarding a 2020 Ford Escape. (Complaint, ¶ 10.) “Defects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves withing the applicable express warranty period, including but not limited to, electrical system defects; transmission defects; engine defects; among other defects and non-conformities.” (Complaint, ¶ 15.) Under the Song-Beverly Act, Defendant FMC had an affirmative duty to promptly offer to repurchase or replace the Subject Vehicle at the time it failed to conform the Subject Vehicle to the terms of the express warranty after a reasonable number of repair attempts.” (Complaint, ¶ 18.) “Defendant FMC has failed to either promptly replace the Subject Vehicle or to promptly make restitution in accordance with the Song-Beverly Act. (Complaint, ¶ 19.)

Andrews alleges four causes of action against FMC: (1) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (d); (2) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b); (3) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3); and (4) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. Plaintiff alleges one cause of action against JVF: negligent repair. It is unclear from the complaint, or any of the pleadings filed in this matter, what transpired that resulted in Plaintiff utilizing JVF for attempted repairs.

When Andrews purchased the subject vehicle from Paso Robles Ford, she signed a retail installment sales contract which contained an arbitration provision.

On January 25, 2023, more than one year ago, the Court granted a motion to compel arbitration as to FMC. The motion was denied as to JVF, and the action was stayed pending the outcome of arbitration between Andrews and FMC. The ruling was primarily based on the holdings of Filisilda v. FCA US LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 486 (Filisilda).

Plaintiff filed the present motion for reconsideration on December 7, 2023, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (c), and Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d).

FMC opposes the motion on the grounds that it is untimely and the Court’s January 25, 2023 order was correctly decided.

Analysis

As an initial matter: Plaintiff cites to unpublished opinions and the ruling of another trial Court. This is in violation of California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115 (a) and case law. Another trial Court’s statements or rulings . . . in an unrelated case has no bearing or precedential value to the present matter. (See Santa Ana Hospital Medical Center v. Belshe (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 819, 831.) Counsel are reminded to comply with the Rules of Court in any future filings with the Court.

“When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a Court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or Court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a).)

Attempting to side-step the time limitation of subdivision (a), Plaintiff claims to bring her motion pursuant to subdivision (c). Subdivision (c) is inapplicable to Plaintiff’s motion. That subdivision is applicable to the Court reconsidering a prior order, on its own motion, when there has been a change of law that warrants it to do so. The Court has not brought its own motion to reconsider.

In another attempt to side-step the time limitation, Plaintiff also claims the motion is brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d). That section is also inapplicable. The Court is being asked to “correct clerical mistakes” and the order is not a void order that the Court would set aside.

“The party seeking reconsideration must provide not just new evidence or different facts, but a satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce it at an earlier time.” (Glade v. Glade (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1457.) Plaintiff waited nearly a year to file her motion for reconsideration. She provides no explanation as to why she waited so long to file the motion.

The motion is untimely, and the affidavit of Plaintiff’s counsel fails to set forth any “new or different facts, circumstances, or law.” As such, the motion will be denied.

In the alternative: The cases that Plaintiff relies on, in support of her argument that Filisilda is no longer good law, are pending review. This is true of all four cases: Kielar v. Superior Court (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 614 (review granted October 25, 2023); Montemayor v. Ford Motor Company (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 958 (review granted September 20, 2023); Ochoa v. Ford Motor Company (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1324 (Ford Motor Warranty Cases) (review granted July 19, 2023); and Yeh v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 264 (review granted November 15, 2023).

“Pending review and filing of the Supreme Court’s opinion, unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court under (3), a published opinion of a Court of Appeal in the matter has no binding or precedential effect, and may be cited for potentially persuasive value only. Any citation to the Court of Appeal opinion must also note the grant of review and any subsequent action by the Supreme Court.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115 (e)(3).)

With respect to the Ford Motor Warranty Cases, the Supreme Court of California has made a ruling that: “Pending review, the opinion of the Court of Appeal, which is currently published at 89 Cal.App.5th 1324, 306 Cal.Rptr.3d 611, may be cited, not only for its persuasive value, but also for the limited purpose of establishing the existence of a conflict in authority that would in turn allow trial Courts to exercise discretion under Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 456, 20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937, to choose between sides of any such conflict. (See Standing Order Exercising Authority Under California Rules of Court, Rule 8.1115(e)(3), Upon Grant of Review or Transfer of a Matter with an Underlying Published Court of Appeal Opinion, Administrative Order 2021-04-21; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(e)(3) and corresponding Comment, par. 2.)” (Ford Motor Warranty Cases (July 19, 2023) 532 P.3d 270.)

Confusingly, Plaintiff acknowledges that her cited cases have no binding or precedential effect (Motion, p. 1, fn. 1) yet then goes on to argue: “Kielar, Ochoa, Montemayor, and Yeh are controlling, decisive authority, under which the Court should find that equitable estoppel, third-party beneficiary, and Felisilda in general do not apply.” (Motion, p. 7, ll. 17-19.) In her reply brief, Plaintiff continues to argue that these cases are controlling. To be clear, and as stated above, those cases do not currently have any binding or precedential effect because review has been granted by the California Supreme Court. The cases only have persuasive value and do not do anything to diminish the holding in Felisilda. Plaintiff has provided no binding or precedential authority that overrules, or even substantively conflicts with, Felisilda. To the extent that there does now exist a conflict of authority, the Court finds the reasoning in Felisilda to be more compelling and the Court will decline to modify, or vacate, its original ruling.

 Plaintiff’s motion will be denied.