Gustavo Castellanos vs County of Santa Barbara et al

Case Number

22CV03081

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Thu, 05/22/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion: Set Aside

Tentative Ruling

The motion to set aside dismissal is denied.

Background:

This action commenced on August 9, 2022, by the filing of the judicial council form complaint by plaintiff Gustavo Castellanos (“Castellanos”) against defendants County of Santa Barbara (“County”), City of Santa Barbara (“City”), and Leonardo Garcia (“Garcia”) for negligence as the result of personal injuries sustained by Castellano due to a February 8, 2022, motor vehicle accident that was allegedly caused by Garcia.

At the time of the motor vehicle accident, Castellanos was in the course and scope of his employment with Cox Communications. Garcia was driving a County vehicle.

On November 21, 2022, lien claimant Broadspire Insurance Services, Inc. (“Broadspire”) filed a Notice of Lien for Reimbursement pursuant to Labor Code sections 3852, et seq. The proof of service indicates that Castellanos was served, through counsel, by electronic service.

On January 4, 2023, City was dismissed without prejudice.

On January 5, 2023, County filed its answer to the complaint with a general denial and 10 affirmative defenses. On January 11, 2023, Garcia filed his answer to the complaint with a general denial and nine affirmative defenses.

On January 5, 2024, Broadspire filed an Amended Notice of Lien for Reimbursement. The proof of service shows that Castellanos was served but that County was not served.

On May 3, 2024, Broadspire filed a case management statement apprising the court of the status of the ongoing workers’ compensation matter. The proof of service indicates that Castellanos was served but County was not served.

On July 3, 2024, Castellanos filed a Notice of Settlement of Entire Case. The proof of service indicates that County was served but Broadspire was not served.

On July 18, 2024, Broadspire filed a Motion to Impress Workers’ Compensation Lien Against the Settlement Entered into by Castellanos and County. The proof of service indicates that both Castellanos and County were served with the motion.

On September 16, 2024, Castellanos dismissed the entire case with prejudice.

On February 27, 2025, Broadspire filed to present motion, to set aside the dismissal, arguing that it “timely availed itself to this Court and sought to impress its lien,” and that “the dismissal was entered in error by the court clerk as plaintiff had no standing to dismiss the entire action which included lien claimant’s lien.” (Motion, p. 4, ll. 3-5.)

On May 12, 2025, County filed an “objection” to the motion, arguing that Broadspire lacks standing to bring the motion, that a dismissal with prejudice should be final, and that any remaining dispute is between Castellanos and Broadspire, not County or Garcia. (Opp., p. 2, ll. 21-24.)

Castellanos filed a joinder in County’s objection on May 13, 2025.

Analysis:

Broadspire brings its motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b), and argues that it is the court’s error, in entering the dismissal, that requires setting the dismissal aside.

Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b), provides in part:

“The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. . . .”

Broadspire acknowledges that what it seeks is not relief based on mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect of a party or legal counsel. Broadspire argues that the code section should be applied to the court clerk due to the “liberal construction of the statute.” (Motion, p. 6, ll. 1-3.)

There is no dispute that Broadspire has a lien against Castellanos’ recovery.

In the context of workers’ compensation, when there is a lawsuit against a third party to recover for losses:

“In the event of a suit against such third party:

. . .

“(b) If the action is prosecuted by the employee alone, the court shall first order paid from any judgment for damages recovered the reasonable litigation expenses incurred in preparation and prosecution of such action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee which shall be based solely upon the services rendered by the employee’s attorney in effecting recovery both for the benefit of the employee and the employer. After the payment of such expenses and attorney’s fee the court shall, on application of the employer, allow as a first lien against the amount of such judgment for damages, the amount of the employer’s expenditure for compensation together with any amounts to which he may be entitled as special damages under Section 3852.” (Lab. Code, § 3856, subd. (b).)

Broadspire’s entire argument rests on its contention that the action was wrongly dismissed. The question is whether Broadspire is correct in its assertion that Castellanos’ dismissal of the case was prohibited by the notice of lien and filing of the motion to impress Workers’ Compensation lien against the settlement.

A plaintiff may dismiss an action: “With or without prejudice, upon written request of the plaintiff to the clerk, filed with papers in the case, or by oral or written request to the court at any time before the actual commencement of trial, upon payment of the costs, if any.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 581, subd. (b)(1).)

“A plaintiff may dismiss his or her complaint, or any cause of action asserted in it, in its entirety, or as to any defendant or defendants, with or without prejudice prior to the actual commencement of trial.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 581, subd. (c).)

Here, Broadspire is not a party to the action. No complaint in intervention was filed. Broadspire’s simply filed a notice of its lien on the proceeds of any settlement received by Castellanos.

“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this chapter, an employee may settle and release any claim he may have against a third party without the consent of the employer. Such settlement or release shall be subject to the employer’s right to proceed to recover compensation he has paid in accordance with Section 3852.” (Lab. Code, § 3859, subd. (b).)

“[T]he plaintiff in a lawsuit has an absolute right to dismiss. [Citation.] Neither the clerk nor the trial court has any discretion in the matter. [Citation.] Numerous cases note that voluntary dismissal of a lawsuit terminates the trial court’s jurisdiction over the matter. [Citations.]” (O’Dell v. Freightliner Corp. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 645, 659.)

The remedy for Broadspire is not to set aside the dismissal. Broadspire has provided no authority that the entry of the dismissal was improper. The dismissal was properly entered by the clerk of the court. As such, the motion must be denied.

Broadspire is not without a remedy. However, that remedy must be sought in a separate action. This is especially true since Castellanos did not, according to Broadspire as well as the proof of service attached to the notice of settlement of entire case, notify Broadspire of the settlement as required by Labor Code section 3858. See, for example, American Home Assurance Co. v. Hagadorn (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1898; Abdala v. Aziz (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 369.