Coastal Ranches Conservancy v. California Department of Parks and Recreation

Case Number

22CV02818

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 11/19/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion To Strike or Tax Costs

Tentative Ruling

For Petitioner Coastal Ranches Conservancy: Daniel Cooper, Kristina Hambley, Sycamore Law, Inc.; Michelle Black, Carstens, Black & Minteer, LLP

For Respondent California Department of Parks and Recreation: Rob Bonta, Jessica E. Tucker-Mohl, Sophie A. Wenzlau, Nathaniel Hyman, Attorney General of California         

          

RULING

For all reasons stated herein, the motion of Respondent California Department of Parks and Recreation to strike or tax costs is granted in part and denied in part. The Court disallows the amount of $7,921.16 claimed under item 4 of the memorandum of costs filed by Petitioner on August 27, 2025, and the amount of $8,661.64 claimed under item 15 of that memorandum of costs. The Court confirms an award of costs in the amount of $32,499.94 in favor of Petitioner Coastal Ranches Conservancy.

Background

This case is consolidated for all purposes with case number 24CV02742, with this action designated as the lead case.

The first amended petition (FAP) filed on September 13, 2022, by Petitioner Coastal Ranches Conservancy (Coastal Ranches) is the operative pleading. (See Mar. 27, 2024, Minute Order [striking fourth amended petition and deeming FAP as operative pleading].) The FAP arises from an alleged failure by Respondent California Department of Parks and Recreation (State Parks) to comply with the requirements of two mitigated negative declarations. As alleged in the FAP:

State Parks is the lead agency for purposes of environmental review of a project to construct new water treatment facilities and water lines to connect the Las Cruces/Hot Springs and main campground and day-use areas of Gaviota State Park (the Park) and the Caltrans rest area at Gaviota Pass under Public Resources Code section 21000 et seq. (the California Environmental Quality Act or CEQA), and of the rehabilitation of the Park which resulted in construction of a new campground, parking area, and facility buildings.

In 1979, State Parks developed a plan (the rehabilitation project) to rehabilitate the Park with new campsites, a new day-use parking area, and newly constructed restrooms and concession buildings. The rehabilitation project was delayed until 1990. On December 12, 1991, the Coastal Commission approved a permit for the rehabilitation project and in 1992, State Parks adopted a mitigated negative declaration (the 1992 MND) for that project.

In regard to the rehabilitation project, the area of the Park is designated as an Environmentally Sensitive Habitat area and contains diverse wildlife and vegetation, a coastal salt marsh, lagoon and stream corridor. The 1992 MND stated that the rehabilitation project would not have a significant effect on the environment because mitigation measures had been added which included (a) a restoration project with respect to the existing coastal salt marsh; and (b) a riparian woodland restoration project to provide a buffer along the Gaviota Creek. Though State Parks completed implementation of the rehabilitation project, it neither commenced nor completed the coastal salt marsh restoration project or the riparian woodland restoration project described above.

In 1998, State Parks adopted a mitigated negative declaration (the 1998 MND) for a water supply project (the water supply project) that would serve the Park and a rest stop owned by the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans). The 1998 MND found that the water supply project could cause adverse impacts to surface water resources, plants, and wildlife. To prevent these adverse impacts, the 1998 MND provides that State Parks would utilize a Caltrans well at full capacity from July 1 through September 30, at any time the water source for the water supply project dropped below 30 gallons per minute.

In January 2022, Coastal Ranches was informed that State Parks was not suspending its use of the water source from July 1 through September 30, and had failed to remove water pipes as required by the conditional use permit issued for the water supply project.

The FAP alleges five causes of action against State Parks: (1) waste and unreasonable use of water; (2) violations of public trust duties; (3) failure to comply with the negative declaration for the rehabilitation project as required by CEQA; (4) failure to comply with the Coastal Development Permit for the rehabilitation project as required by Public Resources Code section 30000 et seq. (the California Coastal Act of 1976 or Coastal Act); and, (5) failure to comply with the negative declaration for the water supply project as required by CEQA.

For reasons more fully discussed and resolved in a Court ruling issued on August 7, 2024, the CEQA causes of action were dismissed from case number 22CV02818 on May 17, 2024, and refiled as case number 24CV02742 on May 27, 2024. The Court’s August 7, 2024, ruling granted State Parks’ motion to dismiss the CEQA claims from case number 22CV02818, denied State Parks’ motion to strike the entirety of the petition filed in case number 24CV02742, and granted Coastal Ranches’ motion to consolidate case numbers 24CV02742 and 22CV02818.

As the result of the events described above, the operative causes of action in this case are the first, second, and fourth causes of action alleged in the FAP, which is consolidated with the petition filed in case number 24CV02742 and which alleges causes of action for (1) violation of CEQA based upon the failure to comply with the 1992 MND for the rehabilitation project; and (2) violation of CEQA for failing to comply with the 1998 MND for the water supply project.

 

State Parks has filed verified answers to each of the relevant petitions.

On May 8, 2025, upon the filing of a stipulated judgment on that same date, the Court entered an order finding that the parties to this action have reached a settlement which resolves all disputes.

On June 5, 2025, Coastal Ranches filed a motion for an award of attorney’s fees and costs (the fee motion) against State Parks. The fee motion was supported by a declaration of Coastal Ranches’ counsel, Daniel Cooper (Cooper), which showed that the parties to this action entered into a Settlement Agreement on May 8, 2025. (Cooper Decl. [Fee Motion], ¶ 11(ll) & Exh. F [Settlement Agreement].)

State Parks opposed the fee motion.

On August 13, 2025, the Court entered an order (the August Order) adopting its tentative ruling denying the fee motion, in part as to the request of Coastal Ranches for an award of costs. The Court’s denial of the motion as to Coastal Ranches’ request for a cost award was without prejudice to the filing and service of an appropriate memorandum of costs by Coastal Ranches, or a procedurally appropriate noticed motion to strike or tax costs that may be filed by State Parks. As to Coastal Ranches’ request for an award of attorney’s fees, the Court continued the hearing on the fee motion to October 1, and ordered Coastal Ranches to, on or before August 27, 2025, file and serve a supplemental brief addressing matters more fully described in the August Order. Further, the Court ordered State Parks to serve and file any response to the supplemental brief on or before September 10.

On August 27, Coastal Ranches filed its supplemental brief in support of the fee motion, and separately filed a memorandum of costs (the cost memorandum) claiming costs totaling $49,082.74.

On September 12, State Parks filed its response to the supplemental brief of Coastal Ranches, and separately filed a motion for an order (the cost motion) striking all costs claimed in the cost memorandum or, alternatively, taxing those costs which State Parks contends are not allowable, necessary, or reasonable under Code of Civil Procedure sections 1032 and 1033.5. The cost motion was originally set for hearing on November 19, 2025.

On September 18, State Parks filed a stipulation executed by counsel for the parties, in which the parties agreed, subject to the Court’s approval, that the cost motion should be considered at the October 1, 2025, hearing on the fee motion. (See Sept. 18 Stip., ¶¶ 8-10.) On that same date, the Court entered an order advancing the hearing on the cost motion to October 1 and ordering Coastal Ranches to file its opposition to that motion on or before September 19.

On September 22, Coastal Ranches late-filed its opposition to the cost motion.

On October 1, 2025, after a hearing, the Court entered its minute order (the October Order) adopting its tentative ruling granting the fee motion, in part, and awarding attorney’s fees in favor of Coastal Ranches and against State Parks, in the amount of $716,074. The Court continued the cost motion to November 19, the date originally set for hearing that motion.

Analysis

As a threshold matter, in its opposition to the cost motion, Coastal Ranches renews arguments previously raised in the fee motion in regard to whether, pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the parties agreed to forgo the usual procedure for determining costs, and to resolve costs by a single motion for an award of both fees and costs. The Court fully addressed this contention in its August Order.

Briefly, as noted in the August Order, the Settlement Agreement, a copy of which is attached to the Cooper declaration submitted in support of Coastal Ranches’ present opposition to the cost motion, includes the following provision: “The Parties agree that within 30 days ..., Coastal Ranches may move the Court under Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5 for a determination of attorneys’ fees and costs associated with the Action....” (Cooper Decl. [Opp. Cost Motion], Exh. A at p. 9, ¶ 10.) Apart from this provision, the Settlement Agreement is otherwise silent as to whether Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 permits the recovery of costs.

“The right to recover costs is purely a creature of statute, and the applicable statute defines the defines the extent of a party’s right to recover costs. Thus, absent statutory authorization, parties engaged in civil litigation must bear their own expenses in a lawsuit. [Citations.]” (Benson v. Kwikset Corp. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1279.) “[Code of Civil Procedure] [s]ection 1021.5 authorizes recovery of attorney fees by the prevailing party. Since the statute does not mention costs, we conclude the Legislature intended Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, the general costs statute, to apply.” (Id. at p. 1283.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 sets forth items allowable as costs under section 1032. Section 1032 provides that “a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (b).) “A prevailing party who claims costs must serve and file a memorandum of costs....” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(a)(1) & (b)(1) [authorizing motion to strike or tax costs claimed in a memorandum of costs].)

“Section 1032’s definition of ‘prevailing party’ does not control, however, when another statute provides for different means of allocating costs. ... When parties settle a case, they are free to allocate costs in any manner they see fit, although they must do so in language specifically addressing such allocation.” (DeSaulles v. Community Hospital of Monterey Peninsula (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1140, 1147-1148.)

Considering that the Settlement Agreement mentions the filing of a motion by Coastal Ranches under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 only, that section 1021.5 does not mention the recovery of costs or a procedure for allocating costs, that the general costs statute applies under the circumstances present here, and that the Settlement Agreement does not specifically mention or address the general costs statute, Coastal Ranches fails to explain why the parties, either in the Settlement Agreement or by their conduct, “stipulated to an alternative procedure for awarding costs, dispensing with the usual formalities of a complete cost memo and a motion to tax costs.” (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 70 (Gorman); see also Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (c).)

Even if the Court were to construe the Settlement Agreement as describing an “alternate procedure” under which Coastal Ranches may claim prevailing party costs apart from those described in Code of Civil Procedure sections 1032 or 1034, this would not change the Court’s reasoning or analysis set forth herein.

Noted above, Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 does not reference or define a prevailing party for purposes of a cost award. Section 1032 defines a “prevailing party” to include “the party with a net monetary recovery, a Defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a Defendant where neither Plaintiff nor Defendant obtains any relief, and a Defendant as against those Plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that Defendant.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).) “If any party recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified, the ‘prevailing party’ shall be as determined by the Court, and under those circumstances, the Court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not and, if allowed, may apportion costs between the parties on the same or adverse sides pursuant to rules adopted under Section 1034.” (Ibid.)

Coastal Ranches appears to dispute whether, under the circumstances present here, the Court has discretion to determine whether Coastal Ranches is a prevailing party. For example, Coastal Ranches contends that State Parks’ request for an order striking all of the costs claimed in the cost memorandum is improper, and that Coastal Ranches may recover costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. (See Opp. at p. 5, ll. 3-12.)

To interpret the Settlement Agreement, the Court applies “the general rules of contract interpretation. [Citation.] ‘The goal of contractual interpretation is to determine and give effect to the mutual intention of the parties. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Thus, ‘ “a Court’s paramount consideration ... is the parties’ objective intent when they entered into [the contract].” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘A contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful.’ [Citation.] ‘ “If a contract is capable of two constructions Courts are bound to give such an interpretation as will make it lawful, operative, definite, reasonable, and capable of being carried into effect....: [Citations.]’ [Citation.] In addition, ‘[a]n interpretation which gives effect is preferred to one which makes void.’ [Citation]” (Khavarian Enterprises, Inc. v. Commline, Inc. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 310, 318 (Khavarian).)

As further discussed above and in the August Order, though the Settlement Agreement provides that Coastal Ranches is the “successful party” for purposes of an award of attorneys’ fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 (see Cooper Decl. [Opp. Cost Motion], Exh. A at p. 9, ¶ 10), it contains no provision in which the parties agree that Coastal Ranches is the prevailing party for purposes of an award of costs. Instead, the Settlement Agreement states only that Coastal Ranches may move the Court for an award of costs. (Ibid.)

By agreeing that only Coastal Ranches may file a motion for a determination of costs, “[t]he language of the [S]ettlement [A]greement could mean only that the parties agreed that the prevailing party, if there was one, was [Coastal Ranches].” (Khavarian, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at pp. 318-319.) Furthermore, to the extent the Settlement Agreement provides that Coastal Ranches may move the Court for an award of costs, that agreement “must also be interpreted as acknowledging that the parties were agreeing to submit to a procedure by which the Court would exercise its discretion to determine whether [Coastal Ranches] was a prevailing party....” (Ibid.)

For all reasons discussed above, the Settlement Agreement reflects an agreement by the parties “to supersede resort to the default definitions of ‘prevailing party’ contained in the first clause of Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (a)(4)...” and to instead “define their status as described in the remainder of section 1032, subdivision (a)(4)....” (Khavarian, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 319.) For these reasons, the Court may, under the circumstances present here, exercise its discretion to determine whether Coastal Ranches is the prevailing party.

Under the second sentence or “prong” of Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (a)(4), which, as further discussed above, applies here, “ ‘the trial Court in its discretion determines the prevailing party, comparing the relief sought with that obtained, along with the parties’ litigation objectives as disclosed by their pleadings, briefs, and other such sources.’ [Citation.] Thus, the trial Court determines whether the party succeeded at a practical level by realizing its litigation objectives [citation] and the action yielded the primary relief sought in the case [citation].” (Friends of Spring Street v. Nevada City (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1104 (Spring Street).)

To determine the prevailing party, the Court addresses first the relief sought by Coastal Ranches in this action, and then considers any relief actually obtained pursuant to the Settlement Agreement. (Cisneros v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 381, 428.)

The operative causes of action alleged in the FAP are the first cause of action for waste and unreasonable use of water, the second cause of action for violations of public trust duties, and fourth cause of action for failure to comply with the Coastal Act. In addition, the operative petition filed in case number 24CV02742 alleges a violation of CEQA arising from the purported failure by State Parks to comply with the 1992 MND for the rehabilitation project; and a violation of CEQA arising from a purported failure by State Parks to comply with the 1998 MND for the water supply project.

In the FAP, Coastal Ranches requests, among other things, injunctive or declaratory relief, and that the Court order State Parks: to stop diversions from the Las Cruces Spring until there has been sufficient analysis regarding the impact from the spring diversion; to, where feasible, mitigate impacts arising from diversions from the Las Cruces Spring; to comply with CEQA and the negative declarations, or to implement the projects described in the negative declarations; and to comply with the Coastal Act and State Parks’ Coastal Development Permit. (FAP at p. 30, Prayer for Relief ¶¶ 1-4.)

The petition filed in consolidated case number 24CV02742 requests an order requiring State Parks to comply with CEQA, the 1992 MND, and the 1998 MND. (May 17, 2024, Pet. [case no. 24CV02742] at pp. 29-30, Prayer for Relief, ¶¶ 1-3.)

State Parks asserts that the Settlement Agreement differs substantially from the relief sought in the FAP for the following reasons: the Settlement Agreement contemplates that Coastal Ranches will raise at least $500,000 and up to $3 million to support the design and implementation of a new restoration project based on current environmental conditions, which precede State Parks’ environmental review milestones; State Parks lacks legal authority to commit to implementing any new project, including the proposed new restoration project, prior to the completion of environmental review and approval; the Settlement Agreement does not pre-commit State Parks to approving or implementing a new restoration project and instead sets forth milestones intended to assure that State Parks will plan for and consider the project in good faith; though Coastal Ranches sought to stop State Parks from diverting water from the Las Cruces Spring pending environmental review, the Settlement Agreement allows continued diversions subject to a temporary ceiling; and State Parks’ obligations related to the diversion are also contingent upon environmental review. (Cost Motion at pp. 11-13.) For these reasons, State Parks argues, the outcome of this litigation is “mixed” such that each party should be required to bear its own costs. (Cost Motion at p. 12.)

In its opposition to the cost motion, Coastal Ranches asserts that the CEQA causes of action were raised because State Parks failed to complete restoration projects required by the 1992 MND and to reduce diversions from the Las Cruces Spring during summer months. (Opp. at p. 12.) As to claims related to the 1992 MND, Coastal Ranches asserts that the FAP sought State Parks’ compliance with CEQA and to ensure that restoration work would be implemented. (Ibid.)

Coastal Ranches asserts that the Settlement Agreement sets forth a framework for the implementation by State Parks of two initiatives: (1) reduced water diversions at Las Cruces Spring that provide environmental benefits which are equivalent to the mitigation measures required by the 1998 MND; and (2) a riparian and wetland restoration project with environmental benefit equivalent to the 1992 MND. (Opp at p. 6.) Coastal Ranches contends that, as a direct result of the settlement, the restoration projects will commence after updated environmental review, resulting in progress toward CEQA compliance by State Parks. (Opp. at pp. 12-13.)

Coastal Ranches further contends that the Settlement Agreement is functionally equivalent to the 1998 MND because it restores cold water flows to the Gaviota Creek system by requiring reductions beginning in July 2025. (Opp. at p. 13.) Coastal Ranches states that it negotiated a specific flow limit in consultation with its experts, which, according to Coastal Ranches, secures meaningful flows for endangered steelhead while accounting for operational feasibility. (Ibid.) According to Coastal Ranches, the Settlement Agreement achieved the core relief sought in this litigation, including “environmental review, long-overdue restoration work, and reduced diversions from Las Cruces Spring—all of which [State] Parks would not have undertaken absent this action.” (Opp. at p. 5, ll. 12-19.) For these and all further reasons described above, Coastal Ranches argues, it is the prevailing party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 notwithstanding whether the Settlement Agreement mirrors the 1992 MND or the 1998 MND.

The Court has considered the points advanced by State Parks and Coastal Ranches as further described above, and the terms of the Settlement Agreement which show or suggest that Coastal Ranches succeeded in securing a commitment by State Parks to, among other things, implement updated or new restoration and water diversion projects, subject to any required CEQA review and pursuant to a schedule of milestones attached as exhibit B to the Settlement Agreement. (See, e.g., Cooper Decl. [Opp. Cost Motion], Exh. A at ¶¶ 5.2, 5.3, 6, 7 & Exh. B.) The available evidence and information also suggests that the filing of this action by Coastal Ranches may have served as a “catalyst” to change or modify the conduct of State Parks as alleged in the FAP. (Molski v. Arciero Wine Group (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 786, 790.)

For all reasons discussed above, and notwithstanding that the Settlement Agreement requires Coastal Ranches to engage in efforts to raise funds to support the financing of an updated or new restoration project by State Parks (see Cooper Decl. [Opp. Cost Motion], Exh. A at ¶¶ 8-9), the present record is sufficient to show that, on balance, Coastal Ranches realized its primary objectives in this litigation. (Spring Street, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 1105; see also Great Western Bank v. Converse Consultants, Inc. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 609, 614-615 [payment of money as part of a settlement was not “a meaningful distinction[]” in determining the prevailing party].) For these reasons, the Court finds that Coastal Ranches is, for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (b)(4), the prevailing party.

“[Code of Civil Procedure] [s]ection 1032 is the fundamental authority for awarding costs in civil actions. It establishes the general rule that ‘[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.’ [Citation.]” (Scott Co. of California v. Blount, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1103, 1108.) Unless otherwise provided by statute, “the Court has no discretion to deny costs to the prevailing party.” (Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 128-129. )

Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivisions (a) and (b), set forth items which are categorically allowable as costs, if incurred, and items which are not allowable. (Segal v. ASICS America Corp. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 651, 667 (Segal).) Costs which are not mentioned in section 1033.5 and claimed under subdivision (c)(4), are allowable in the Court’s discretion. (Ibid.) “Costs are allowable . . . whether or not paid[]”, and must be “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation” and “reasonable in amount.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(1)-(3); see also Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 856 (Benach) [verified memorandum is prima facie evidence that costs were necessarily incurred].)

“If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that were [sic] not reasonable or necessary. On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs.” (Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774; see also Benach, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 855 [the trial Court’s first determination is whether the statute expressly allows item and if it appears proper on its face].)

The cost memorandum claims the following costs: filing and motion fees in the amount of $1,777.98 (item 1); deposition costs in the amount of $20,854.19 (item 4); witness fees in the amount of $550 (item 8); models, enlargements, and photocopies of exhibits in the amount of $16,485 (item 13); and “other” costs which total $9,415.57 (item 15). (Cost Memo. at p. 1.) These costs total $49,082.74 (Ibid.)

Item 8 witness fees:

The cost motion asserts that State Parks “specifically” objects to costs claimed under items 1, 4, 13 and 15 of the cost memorandum, only. (Cost Motion at p. 13, ll. 12-14.) State Parks advances no reasoned argument showing why costs for witness fees claimed in item 8 are disallowed, unreasonable, nor not necessary to the conduct of this litigation. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the Court will allow the witness fees claimed in item 8 of the cost memorandum, in the amount of $550.

Item 1 filing and motion fees:

Costs for filing and motion fees are expressly allowable under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(1). For these reasons, the costs claimed in item 1 of the cost memorandum appear proper on their face. For all reasons discussed above, it is the burden of State Parks to show why costs for filing and motion fees claimed by Coastal Ranches were not reasonable or necessary, or to otherwise properly object to these costs.

The cost motion asserts that the 50 entries for Court filings appearing in an expense report attached to the Cooper declaration submitted in support of Coastal Ranches’ opposition to the cost motion do not identify the specific filings to which each entry relates. (Cooper Decl. [Opp. Cost Motion], ¶ 28 & Exh. B.) For these reasons, State Parks contends, it is difficult to evaluate whether the filings were necessary to the conduct of this litigation, or whether the amounts incurred are reasonable.

In response, Coastal Ranches contends that the costs claimed in item 1 of the cost memorandum were incurred in connection with all filings in this action as reflected in this Court’s docket.

The Court’s records own records reflect that Coastal Ranches incurred $1,775 in Court costs and filing fees in this action. In addition, it can be inferred from information appearing in the expense report attached to the Cooper declaration, that the minor discrepancy between the amount reflected in the Court’s records and the amount claimed in item 1 of the cost memorandum ostensibly arises from fees incurred by Coastal Ranches to electronically file documents through an electronic filing service provider. (See, e.g., Cooper Decl. [Opp. Cost Motion], Exh. B at pdf pp. 65 [showing filing fees in the amount of $5.25 per transaction].)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 expressly states that “[f]ees for the electronic filing or service of documents through an electronic filing service provider if a Court requires or orders electronic filing or service of documents.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(14).) Even if this Court did not require or order electronic filing or service of documents in this action, the costs claimed in item 1 would “fall within the ‘discretionary category,’ subdivision (c)—that is, they are allowable if in the Court’s discretion they were ‘reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation.’” (Sanford v. Rasnick (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1132.)

Absent reasoned argument by State Parks showing why any costs to electronically file documents should be disallowed, the present record is sufficient to show, expressly and by inference, that the costs claimed in item 1 of the cost memorandum, which do not appear unreasonably on their face, are expressly allowable and necessary to the conduct of this litigation. (Benach, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 858.)

For all reasons discussed above, the Court finds that the filing and motion fees claimed in item 1 of the cost memorandum are expressly allowable, reasonable in amount, and reasonably necessary to the conduct of this litigation. Therefore, the Court will deny the cost motion as to this item, and allow filing and motion fees in the amount of $1,777.98.

Item 4 deposition costs:

Costs incurred for the taking and transcribing of necessary depositions are also expressly allowable under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (3)(A)-(C).) For all reasons discussed above, as the deposition costs claimed under item 4 of the cost memorandum appear proper on their face, State Parks bears the burden to show why these costs are not allowable, reasonable, or necessary.

State Parks does not appear to dispute that travel expenses to attend, and costs to take or transcribe, necessary depositions are allowable. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(3)(A) & (C).) State Parks asserts that Coastal Ranches has included in item 4, the amount of $254.24 for meal expenses, which State Parks contends are disallowed under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5. State Parks further contends that it is unclear whether the amount of $7,666.92 in deposition costs included in item 4 was incurred in connection with hotel or other expenses which, according to State Parks, should be disallowed.

The expense report attached to the Cooper declaration and described above indicates or suggests that item 4 of the cost memorandum includes, or appears to include, hotel expenses incurred to take the “Glick”, “Flora”, and “Bellman” depositions, among others, and additional meal expenses incurred while attending depositions. (Cooper Decl. [Opp. Cost Motion], Exh. B at pdf pp. 67-68.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 does not expressly allow costs for meals when taking necessary depositions. Hotel expenses to attend out-of-town depositions may be allowed in the Court’s discretion. (Chaaban v. Wet Seal, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 49, 59-60.) For these reasons, State Parks has met its burden as to a portion of the deposition costs ostensibly included in item 4. The burden now shifts to Coastal Ranches to show why any costs incurred for hotels or meals while attending depositions are allowable, and reasonably necessary to the conduct of this litigation.

Coastal Ranches appears to assert in its opposition that meal expenses included in item 4 should be deducted from any award of costs. For example, Coastal Ranches asserts that an award of deposition costs totaling $20,599.77, instead of the amount claimed in the cost memorandum as described above, is appropriate. (See Opp. at p. 15, ll. 13-16.) For these reasons, the Court understands the opposition to concede that meal expenses in the amount of $254.24 should be deducted from the costs claimed in item 4.

Coastal Ranches also does not appear to dispute that item 4 of the cost memorandum includes expenses incurred for hotel lodging for its counsel while attending depositions in this action. (See Cooper Decl. [Opp. Cost Motion], ¶ 28; Opp. at p. 15, ll. 10-13 [stating that item 4 includes “accommodations for attorneys during depositions”].)

Though the Court may, for reasons further discussed above, exercise its discretion to allow hotel expenses for out-of-town depositions, wholly absent from the opposition of Coastal Ranches is any reasoned factual or legal argument showing why hotel expenses were reasonably necessary to the conduct of this litigation. For example, though Coastal Ranches presents evidence showing that it served deposition notices and attended depositions, Coastal Ranches fails to present any evidence or information showing the location of these depositions in relation to the location of its counsel’s office, or why it was reasonably necessary to the conduct of this litigation to incur expenses for hotel lodging in order to attend any particular deposition, rather than merely beneficial. (See, e.g., Cooper Decl. [Opp. Cost Motion], ¶¶ 22(z)-(ff) & 28 [discussing depositions].)  

In addition, though Coastal Ranches appears to assert that the amount of $7,666.92 contested by State Parks includes other deposition related costs apart from hotel or meal expenses, also absent from the opposition is any information or evidence sufficient to permit the Court to determine the amount or nature of these other deposition costs, or whether they are allowable or reasonably necessary expenses.

For example, Coastal Ranches fails to explain what portion of the amount put in issue by State Parks reflects Court reporter charges, costs incurred for deposition transcripts, or costs to photocopy deposition exhibits. Coastal Ranches also fails to explain, with reasoned argument, why the Court should exercise its discretion to allow costs incurred to photocopy deposition exhibits. (See Segal, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 666-667 [general discussion of Court’s discretion to award costs in preparing exhibits].)

Apart from the general and conclusory arguments described above, Coastal Ranches has failed to show why the Court should exercise its discretion to allow costs incurred for hotel lodging to attend any depositions, to photocopy deposition exhibits, or other deposition related expenses which have been properly placed in issue by State Parks, and which total $7,666.92. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the Court will grant the cost motion as to item 4, in the amount of $7,921.16 in purported deposition costs put in issue by the cost motion. For these same reasons, the Court will allow recovery of deposition costs in the amount of $12,933.03.

Item 13 models, enlargements, and photocopies of exhibits:

“Models, the enlargements of exhibits and photocopies of exhibits, and the electronic presentation of exhibits, including costs of rental equipment and electronic formatting, may be allowed if they were reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact.” (a)(13).) The cost motion asserts that, because no trial occurred in this case, the costs claimed under item 13 of the cost memorandum were not reasonably necessary to the litigation, and are not reasonable in amount. For these reasons, State Parks argues, the Court should exercise its discretion to disallow these costs.

Coastal Ranches contends that the preparation of trial demonstratives was integral to an effective trial presentation had this matter proceeded to trial. For these reasons, Coastal Ranches argues, the Court should exercise its discretion to award the costs claimed in item 13.

The parties do not appear to dispute that item 13 of the cost memorandum includes charges appearing in invoices from Fat Pencil Studios, copies of which are attached to the Cooper declaration, for its work in generating trial demonstratives and witness outlines in preparation for trial. (Cost Motion at pp. 15-16; Cooper Decl. [Opp. Cost Motion], ¶¶ 30, 65-67 & Exh. E.)

Undisputed information and evidence appearing in the Cooper declaration shows that the parties to this action agreed to a “settlement framework” on January 29, 2025, and as a result of that agreement, requested that the trial be continued to May 12, 2025, which the Court granted. (Cooper Decl. [Opp. Cost Motion], ¶ 24.) The parties did not reach a settlement until May 5, one week prior to the continued trial date. (Cooper Decl. [Opp. Cost Motion], ¶ 25(b).)

Cooper states that the services provided by Fat Pencil Studios, who “specializes in the creation of trial graphics and demonstrative outlines”, were used by Coastal Ranches to “generate outlines and trial graphics to support testimony provided by Coastal Ranches’ three experts and fact witness, Doug Campbell.” (Cooper Decl. [Opp. Cost Motion], ¶¶ 53-54.) Cooper further states that Coastal Ranches utilized these services “until the day the case settled, approximately one week before the start of trial....” (Cooper Decl. [Opp. Cost Motion], ¶¶ 54-55 & Exh. E.)

The fact that models or exhibits are not used at a trial, by itself, “does not necessarily indicate that [a party] could have safely proceeded to trial without them.” (Moss v. Underwriters’ Report (1938) 12 Cal.2d 266, 276.) Notwithstanding whether any models, exhibits, or other materials prepared by Fat Pencil Studios were not presented to a trier of fact as a result of the parties’ settlement shortly before trial, State Parks offers no information or argument showing why the trial demonstratives or outlines prepared by Fat Pencil Studios were “not reasonably necessary to prepare for trial....” (Doe v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 675, 695 [party challenging costs failed to present evidence demonstrating that deposition was not reasonably necessary to prepare for trial].) Rather, the relevant inquiry here is whether these costs were necessary to the conduct of the litigation. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(3)(A); Ceranski v. Muensch (1943) 60 Cal.App.2d 751, 755.)

Under the totality of the circumstances present here, the present record is sufficient to show that Coastal Ranches was “justified in preparing the case as though it were going to trial, and the fortuity of a pretrial settlement with [State Parks] should not defeat [Coastal Ranches’] right to recover these cost items in settlement.” (Regan Roofing Co. v. Superior Court (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1685, 1710.) The Court has reviewed the invoices from Fat Pencil Studios attached to the Cooper declaration, which consist of five invoices totaling $16,485, the amount claimed in item 13. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the Court will deny the cost motion as to item 13 of the cost memorandum, and will allow recovery of these costs, in the total amount of $16,485.

Item 15 “other” costs:

As to the “other” costs claimed under item 15, which total $9,415.57, the cost memorandum does not, on its face, include any evidence or information sufficient to permit the Court to determine whether these “other” costs are expressly allowable under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, were reasonably necessary to the conduct of this litigation, or are reasonable in amount.

The opposition to the cost motion expressly states that Coastal Ranches “agrees to strike ... $3,677.75 in claimed costs related to uncategorized service expenses identified by [State] Parks.” (Opp. at p. 17, ll. 2-5; see also Cooper Decl. [Opp. Cost Motion], ¶ 36.) Absent further explanation by Coastal Ranches, it is unclear to the Court whether the amount Coastal Ranches agrees to strike from the cost memorandum is included in the item 15 “other” costs. For these reasons, it is the Court’s understanding that this amount of costs Coastal Ranches agrees to strike is included in item 15 of the cost memorandum. Therefore, and for these reasons, the Court will grant the cost motion as to the amount of $3,677.75 ostensibly included in the “other” costs claimed in item 15, and will disallow recovery of this amount as to this item.

As to the remaining amount of $5,737.82 ostensibly included in item 15, information appearing in the opposition of Coastal Ranches suggests or indicates that this amount includes travel and lodging costs incurred by Coastal Ranches for its counsel to attend Court hearings “in person” and site visits. (See Opp. at p. 16.)

Coastal Ranches contends that site visits to the water treatment facility and Gaviota State Park “were essential to Coastal Ranches’ ability to understand and evaluate the scope of the proposed mitigation projects and [State] Parks’ performance under the 1992 and 1998 Mitigated Negative Declarations.” (Cooper Decl. [Opp. Cost Motion], ¶ 22(w).) Coastal Ranches further contends that locations of the site visits were “the focal point of the underlying dispute[]” and that “[f]irsthand observation of these sites enabled counsel and expert consultants to prepare more effectively for depositions, trial ..., and the preparation of demonstrative evidence.” (Opp. at p. 16, ll. 17-20.) Coastal Ranches also asserts that its counsel’s in person attendance at case management conferences and hearings was part of its “litigation strategy....” (Id. at ll. 20-22.) For these reasons, Coastal Ranches argues, the Court should exercise its discretion to award the remaining costs included in item 15 of the cost memorandum.

Though the Court agrees that attorney fees incurred by Coastal Ranches for its counsel to attend a site inspection were reasonably necessary to the conduct of this litigation, the Court has awarded Coastal Ranches reasonable attorneys fees incurred in this litigation pursuant to the October Order. As to travel or other expenses incurred to attend site inspections, Coastal Ranches provides no reasoned argument showing the nature or amount of these costs.

Available evidence and information indicates that Coastal Ranches ostensibly incurred costs in connection with a site inspection on December 16, 19, 21, and 22 of 2024, which include: the amount of $192.01 for a “car”; the amount of $296.40 for a “hotel”; and the amounts of $25.08 and $63.25 for undisclosed matters. (Cooper Decl. [Opp. Cost Motion], Exh. B at pdf p. 69 [entries dated December 16, December 19, December 21, and December 22].) It also appears from the available information and evidence that Coastal Ranches incurred costs related to a site visit on March 6 and 10, 2025, in the following amounts: $265.52 for a flight; and separate amounts of $26, $35, $56.38, and $54.90 for undisclosed matters. (Cooper Decl. [Opp. Cost Motion], Exh. B at pdf p. 70.)

Noted above, Coastal Ranches provides no information explaining the nature or need for each of the undisclosed matters or items described above. For these reasons, the Court will grant the cost motion as to these items. As to the remaining costs for a car, hotel, and flight incurred in connection with site inspections as further described above, these costs total $753.93, and will be allowed as reasonable in amount and reasonably necessary to the conduct of this litigation.

As to the remaining “other” costs ostensibly included in item 15 and purportedly incurred in connection with counsel’s in person attendance at conferences and hearings held in this matter, the evidence, information, and arguments advanced by Coastal Ranches are insufficient to show why these costs were reasonably necessary to the conduct of this litigation. Instead, costs incurred for counsel’s in person attendance at Court hearings and conferences appear to be merely convenient or beneficial to the preparation of this litigation by Coastal Ranches. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the Court will grant the motion as to the remaining amount of “other” costs claimed under item 15 and described above.

Coastal Ranches’ request for expert witness fees:

Information appearing in the Cooper declaration and opposition to the cost motion suggests that Coastal Ranches also requests that the Court allow Coastal Ranches to recover expert fees in the amount of $32,750. (Cooper Decl. [Opp. Cost Motion], ¶¶ 3 & 38-52.) These costs are not included in the cost memorandum. Coastal Ranches states that it “intentionally omitted expert costs from its memorandum of costs as those costs are not available under Section 1032 and 1033.5.” (Opp. at p. 17, ll. 6-9.)

“Usually, the omission of an item from a cost memo may be regarded as a waiver of the prevailing party’s claim to that item.” (Gorman, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 70.) Moreover, State Parks has raised an objection to the expert witness fees claimed in the opposition, on the grounds that these fees were not included in the cost memorandum. (Ibid.; see also Cost Motion at p. 18.) For these reasons, there exist sufficient grounds to deny any request for expert witness fees.

Notwithstanding Coastal Ranches’ failure to include expert witness fees in the cost memorandum, to which State Parks has raised an appropriate objection, it is the Court’s understanding that Coastal Ranches contends it is entitled to recover expert witness fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 998, because the terms of the Settlement Agreement were more favorable to Coastal Ranches.

“[N]ot every offer qualifies as a valid 998 offer. To be valid under section 998, the offer (1) must be ‘sufficiently’ ‘certain,’ ‘specific,’ or ‘definite’ in its terms and conditions [citations], (2) must be unconditional [citations], and (3) must be made in ‘good faith,’ which means ‘the offer is ‘ “realistically reasonable under the circumstances” ’ ” because (a) the offer was ‘within the “range of reasonably possible results” at trial, considering all of the information the offeror knew or reasonably should have known,’ and (b) the offeror knew ‘the offeree had sufficient information ... to assess whether the “offer [was] a reasonable one” ’ [Citation.]” (Gorobets v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 913, 925-926, original italics.) Coastal Ranches bears the burden to show it made an offer that “was sufficiently certain and unconditional ... to qualify as a valid 998 offer.” (Id. at pp. 926-927.)

Coastal Ranches’ opposition to the cost motion fails to advance any reasoned legal or factual argument showing that Coastal Ranches made a sufficiently certain, unconditional, and valid offer under Code of Civil Procedure section 998, the terms of any such statutory offer, or why the terms of any statutory offer were certain, specific, or definite. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the Court will deny Coastal Ranches request for an award of expert witness fees.

Service of the cost memorandum on State Parks:

To the extent State Parks contends that it was not properly served with the cost memorandum, the Court addressed this argument in the October Order. As noted in that order, because State Parks has substantively contested Coastal Ranches’ claimed entitlement to costs on the merits, any defect in the service of the cost memorandum has effectively been waived by State Parks. (Kunzler v. Karde (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 683, 688.)