Coastal Ranches Conservancy v. California Department of Parks and Recreation
Coastal Ranches Conservancy v. California Department of Parks and Recreation
Case Number
22CV02818
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Wed, 10/01/2025 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
1) Petitioner’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs; 2) Motion To Strike or Tax Costs
Tentative Ruling
For Petitioner Coastal Ranches Conservancy: Daniel Cooper, Kristina Hambley, Sycamore Law, Inc.; Michelle Black, Carstens, Black & Minteer, LLP
For Respondent California Department of Parks and Recreation: Rob Bonta, Jessica E. Tucker-Mohl, Sophie A. Wenzlau, Nathaniel Hyman, Attorney General of California
RULING
(1) For all reasons discussed herein, the continued motion of petitioner for an award of attorneys’ fees is granted, in part. The court awards attorney’s fees in favor of petitioner Coastal Ranches Conservancy and against respondent California Department of Parks and Recreation, in the amount of $716,074. Except as herein granted, the motion is otherwise denied.
(2) For all reasons discussed herein, the motion of respondent to strike or tax costs is continued to November 19, 2025.
Background
This case is consolidated for all purposes with case number 24CV02742, with this action designated as the lead case.
The first amended petition (FAP) filed on September 13, 2022, by petitioner Coastal Ranches Conservancy (Coastal Ranches) is the operative pleading. (See Mar. 27, 2024, Minute Order [striking fourth amended petition and deeming FAP as operative pleading].) The FAP arises from an alleged failure by respondent California Department of Parks and Recreation (State Parks) to comply with the requirements of two mitigated negative declarations. As alleged in the FAP:
State Parks is the lead agency for purposes of environmental review of a project to construct new water treatment facilities and water lines to connect the Las Cruces/Hot Springs and main campground and day-use areas of Gaviota State Park (the Park) and the Caltrans rest area at Gaviota Pass under Public Resources Code section 21000 et seq. (the California Environmental Quality Act or CEQA), and of the rehabilitation of the Park which resulted in construction of a new campground, parking area, and facility buildings.
In 1979, State Parks developed a plan (the rehabilitation project) to rehabilitate the Park with new campsites, a new day-use parking area, and newly constructed restrooms and concession buildings. The rehabilitation project was delayed until 1990. On December 12, 1991, the Coastal Commission approved a permit for the rehabilitation project and in 1992, State Parks adopted a mitigated negative declaration (the 1992 MND) for that project.
In regard to the rehabilitation project, the area of the Park is designated as an Environmentally Sensitive Habitat area and contains diverse wildlife and vegetation, a coastal salt marsh, lagoon and stream corridor. The 1992 MND stated that the rehabilitation project would not have a significant effect on the environment because mitigation measures had been added which included (a) a restoration project with respect to the existing coastal salt marsh; and (b) a riparian woodland restoration project to provide a buffer along the Gaviota Creek. Though State Parks completed implementation of the rehabilitation project, it neither commenced nor completed the coastal salt marsh restoration project or the riparian woodland restoration project described above.
In 1998, State Parks adopted a mitigated negative declaration (the 1998 MND) for a water supply project (the water supply project) that would serve the Park and a rest stop owned by the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans). The 1998 MND found that the water supply project could cause adverse impacts to surface water resources, plants, and wildlife. To prevent these adverse impacts, the 1998 MND provides that State Parks would utilize a Caltrans well at full capacity from July 1 through September 30, at any time the water source for the water supply project dropped below 30 gallons per minute.
In January 2022, Coastal Ranches was informed that State Parks was not suspending its use of the water source from July 1 through September 30, and had failed to remove water pipes as required by the conditional use permit issued for the water supply project.
The FAP alleges five causes of action against State Parks: (1) waste and unreasonable use of water; (2) violations of public trust duties; (3) failure to comply with the negative declaration for the rehabilitation project as required by CEQA; (4) failure to comply with the Coastal Development Permit for the rehabilitation project as required by Public Resources Code section 30000 et seq. (the California Coastal Act of 1976 or Coastal Act); and, (5) failure to comply with the negative declaration for the water supply project as required by CEQA.
For reasons more fully discussed and resolved in a court ruling issued on August 7, 2024, the CEQA causes of action were dismissed from case number 22CV02818 on May 17, 2024, and refiled as case number 24CV02742 on May 27, 2024. The court’s August 7, 2024, ruling granted State Parks’ motion to dismiss the CEQA claims from case number 22CV02818, denied State Parks’ motion to strike the entirety of the petition filed in case number 24CV02742, and granted Coastal Ranches’ motion to consolidate case numbers 24CV02742 and 22CV02818.
As the result of the events described above, the operative causes of action in this case are the first, second, and fourth causes of action alleged in the FAP, which is consolidated with the petition filed in case number 24CV02742 and which alleges causes of action for (1) violation of CEQA based upon the failure to comply with the 1992 MND for the rehabilitation project; and (2) violation of CEQA for failing to comply with the 1998 MND for the water supply project.
State Parks has filed verified answers to each of the relevant petitions.
On May 8, 2025, based on a stipulated judgment of the parties filed on that same date, the court entered an order finding that the parties to this action have reached a settlement which resolves all disputes. The court’s May 8, 2025, order requires the parties to perform all obligations set forth in the “Settlement Agreement” attached to the stipulated judgment, and orders that the court will retain jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement Agreement, among other things.
On June 5, 2025, Coastal Ranches filed a motion for an award of attorney’s fees and costs (the fee motion) against State Parks.
In support of the fee motion, Coastal Ranches submits a declaration of its counsel, Daniel Cooper (Cooper), who is a partner at Sycamore Law, Inc., (Sycamore). (Cooper Decl., ¶ 2.) Cooper states that Sycamore was founded in 2020 and represents non-profit clients. (Cooper Decl., ¶ 3.) Cooper provides a list of cases demonstrating Cooper’s experience with state and federal environmental law enforcement actions, administrative proceedings, and related litigation. (Cooper Decl., ¶ 3(a)-(vv).) Cooper states that his practice relies on fee awards to assist with funding subsequent public interest litigation. (Cooper Decl., ¶ 4.)
Attached to the Cooper declaration is what Cooper describes as a complete set of all “timeslips” setting forth all hours expended in this litigation which were “contemporaneously recorded on a computerized billing system known as Bill4Time.” (Cooper Decl., ¶ 5 & Exh. A.) Cooper states that Sycamore finalizes a bill each month to ensure accurate timekeeping, and which is reviewed to “to ensure that the time charged is appropriate.” (Cooper Decl., ¶ 5.)
The Cooper declaration also includes a chart summarizing the number of hours worked by each attorney or staff member of Sycamore during the pendency of this case, and each individual’s hourly rate. (Cooper Decl., ¶¶ 5-6.) Information appearing in this chart, which is based on information appearing in the timeslips attached to the Cooper declaration, shows that Cooper expended 509.70 hours at the hourly rate of $1,035; that attorney Jesse Swanhuyser (Swanhuyser) expended 6 hours at the hourly rate of $825; that attorney Kristina Hambley (Hambley) expended 383 hours at the hourly rate of $480; that attorney Hannah Mathieson (Mathieson) expended 4.7 hours at the hourly rate of $455; that attorney Jessica Hollinger (Hollinger) expended 11.6 hours at the hourly rate of $535; and that paralegal Mackenzie Paskerian (Paskerian) expended 123 hours at the hourly rate of $325. (Cooper Decl., ¶ 6.) These hours total 1038, and the fees incurred total $764,592. (Cooper Decl., ¶ 8.)
The fees requested in the fee motion include hours expended by the attorneys and staff members described above to, among other things, research, draft, and amend the petition; draft motions for leave to amend, to compel discovery, and for summary judgment; draft oppositions to a motion to strike and motion for judgment on the pleadings; conduct discovery and engage in settlement discussions; and prepare for trial. (Cooper Decl., ¶¶ 10, 11(ii)-(jj), & 12-16.) Cooper also describes the prelitigation and procedural history of this action, commencing with Coastal Ranches communicating in September 2019, concerns about State Parks’ purported water diversion. (Cooper Decl., ¶ 11(a)-(ll).)
Cooper states that Sycamore does not round recorded time. (Cooper Decl., ¶ 9.) Cooper has carefully reviewed the timeslips described above to ensure that all tasks and hours are accurate, reasonable, not duplicative, and of the type normally billed to Sycamore’s clients. (Ibid.) Cooper asserts that the time and hourly rates reflected in the timeslips were reasonably spent and necessary to the prosecution of this case. (Ibid.)
Information and evidence appearing in the Cooper declaration shows that the parties entered into the Settlement Agreement on May 8, 2025. (Cooper Decl., ¶ 11(ll); see also Exh. F [Settlement Agreement].) According to Cooper, the Settlement Agreement requires State Parks to temporarily reduce water diversions from Las Cruces, to remove abandoned pipelines near the Gaviota Water Treatment Plant, to conduct CEQA-compliant environmental review of the water supply project, and to restore the affected estuary at the Park. (Ibid.) Coastal Ranches has also agreed to raise funds to support an “Updated Restoration Project” further described in the Settlement Agreement. (Cooper Decl., ¶ 11(ll).)
Cooper contends that the obligations accepted by State Parks pursuant to the Settlement Agreement reflect the environmental protections set forth in the 1992 MND and 1998 MND, and that Coastal Ranches would have accepted these settlement terms upon the filing of this case. (Cooper Decl., ¶ 11(ll).)
Cooper also provides a description of the educational background and relevant litigation experience of Swanhuyser, Hambley, Mathieson, and Hollinger, and Paskerian. (Cooper Decl., ¶¶ 17-31.)
Cooper states that Coastal Ranches also seeks to recover costs incurred in this litigation, which include expenses incurred for filings, deposition transcripts, lodging and travel, printing, court reporting, trial demonstratives, and reports provided by Coastal Ranches’ designated experts Derek Booth, Mark Allen, and Lisa Stratton. (Cooper Decl., ¶¶ 35-51 & Exhs. B [expense report], C [invoices from Derek Booth, PhD, PG, PE], D [invoices from Normandeau Associates Environmental Consultants], & E [invoices & time reports from Fat Pencil Studio].)
The fee motion is also supported by the declarations of Hambley and Mathieson, who each describe their educational background, knowledge of, and experience with environmental law enforcement actions and other related matters, and the services performed and hours expended in this litigation. (Hambley Decl., ¶¶ 4-11 & Exh. A [Hambley timeslips]; Mathieson Decl., ¶¶ 4-14 & Exh. A [Mathieson timeslips].)
Attorney Michelle Black (Black), who is a partner at Carstens, Black & Minteer, LLP (CBM LLP), also submits a declaration in support of the fee motion stating that CBM LLP is a small, public interest, for profit law firm that practices exclusively in the areas of environmental, land use, historic preservation, and municipal law, with a significant amount of the firm’s practice involving administrative processes and litigation under CEQA and the California Coastal Act. (Black Decl., ¶¶ 2-3.) CBM LLP primarily represents public interest environmental and community groups and, occasionally, government. (Ibid.)
Black states that CBM LLP’s practice is largely based on contingency fee arrangements because nonprofit, public interest groups such as Coastal Ranches are often unable to pay market rates for legal services due to their limited fundraising capabilities and the high cost of litigation. (Black Decl., ¶ 4.) With the exception of costs, CBM LLP generally accepts cases based upon a negotiated reduced rate, sometimes with a cap on fees or on a fully contingent basis. (Ibid.) CBM LLP frequently defers payment of fees for several years with no guarantee of recovery. (Black Decl., ¶ 5.) Black states that CBM LLP declined paid representation during this litigation in order to dedicate sufficient time to its successful resolution. (Ibid.)
Black submits a copy of contemporaneously recorded “timeslips” for this litigation which were recorded on a computerized billing system known as “Timeslips”, and which show the number of hours Black expended during the administrative process and pendency of this case. (Black Decl., ¶¶ 6-8 & Exh. A [Black timeslips].) According to Black, CBM LLP finalizes a bill each month to assure accurate timekeeping, and that before a “timeslip” is finalized, it is reviewed to ensure that the time charged is appropriate. (Black Decl., ¶ 6.)
Information appearing in the Black declaration and the timeslips attached to the Black declaration show that Black expended 79.1 hours in this litigation, at the hourly rate of $830, for a total of $65,653 in attorney’s fees. (Black Decl., ¶¶ 7-8.)
Black also states that CBM LLP does not round time, and that Black has “carefully reviewed the timeslips to ensure that all tasks and hours are accurate, reasonable, of the type normally billed to clients, and not duplicative.” (Black Decl., ¶ 9.) The hours expended by Black include time to research and draft the petition, to draft the motion for leave to amend, and to draft portions of the opposition of Coastal Ranches to the motion to strike and motion for judgment on the pleadings, among other things. (Black Decl., ¶ 10.)
Black also provides a description of Black’s educational background and experience with environmental, land use, historic preservation, and municipal law with CBM LLP, and a list of reported cases in which CBM LLP was involved. (Black Decl., ¶¶ 11-12(a)-(gg).)
The fee motion is further supported by a declaration of Philip L. Gregory (Gregory), who is self-employed with the Gregory Law Group. (Gregory Decl., ¶ 2.) Gregory describes his work in various representative cases, and Gregory’s educational background and litigation experience. (Gregory Decl., ¶¶ 2-5 & Exh. 1 [Gregory resume].) Gregory states that his practice litigating public interest cases is also largely based on contingency or pro bono arrangements due to the frequent inability of public interest groups to pay market rates. (Gregory Decl., ¶ 6.)
Gregory submits a copy of a “Statement for Services” through May 31, 2025. (Gregory Decl., ¶ 7 & Exh. 2.) Gregory asserts that the hours reflected in the Statement for Services were contemporaneously recorded, and that the statement was developed on a weekly basis using Gregory’s notes and calendar entries to ensure accuracy. (Gregory Decl., ¶ 11.) Before the Statement for Services was finalized, Gregory reviewed each entry to ensure the time charged was appropriate and did not duplicate the efforts of Gregory’s co-counsel. (Ibid.)
Information appearing in the Statement for Services and the Gregory declaration reflect that Gregory expended 111 hours in this litigation at the hourly rate of $1,035, for a total of $114,885 in attorney’s fees. (Gregory Decl., ¶¶ 12-13.)
Gregory asserts that his primary role in this litigation was to prepare the matter for trial, to serve as co-trial counsel, and to assist in pre-trial matters including motion practice, pre-trial conferences, witness and exhibit preparation, and settlement. (Gregory Decl., ¶ 7.) Gregory began working on this matter in August 2024 to prepare for oral argument on State Parks’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and attend the hearing on that motion. (Gregory Decl., ¶ 8.) Gregory describes his subsequent work in this action which includes drafting Coastal Ranches’ summary judgment motion, conducting expert discovery, and preparing for trial. (Gregory Decl., ¶¶ 8-9.) Beginning in February 2025, Gregory began working with co-counsel to finalize the Settlement Agreement. (Gregory Decl., ¶ 10.)
State Parks opposes the fee motion. That opposition is supported by a declaration of State Parks’ counsel Sophie Wenzlau (Wenzlau). Wenzlau includes in her declaration a table of attorney’s fees and costs which are contested by State Parks, and which is based on the billing entries attached to the Cooper, Black, and Gregory declarations described above. (Wenzlau Decl., ¶ 2 & Exh. A.) Wenzlau also sets forth the reasons why State Parks contends that certain attorney’s fees and costs requested in the fee motion in regard to experts, discovery, and appearances at hearings should not be awarded, or should be reduced or denied. (Wenzlau Decl., ¶ 4(a)-(h).)
Wenzlau asserts that the terms of the Settlement Agreement “are very different from Coastal Ranches’ 2022 settlement offers. With regard to the restoration project, for example, Coastal Ranches’ November 2022 settlement offer simply sought implementation of the 1991 project. It did not include, for example, a proposal that a new project be designed to reflect current environmental conditions, that Coastal Ranches would raise up to $3 million of the proposed project costs, or that project implementation would be contingent on environmental review.” (Wenzlau Decl., ¶ 4(i).) To support these statements, Wenzlau submits a copy of Coastal Ranches’ November 2022 settlement letter. (Ibid. & Exh. I.)
On August 13, 2025, the court entered an order (the Order) adopting its tentative ruling denying the fee motion, in part, as to the request of Coastal Ranches for an award of costs, without prejudice to the filing and service of an appropriate memorandum of costs by Coastal Ranches, and of a procedurally appropriate noticed motion to strike or tax any costs claimed in any memorandum of costs filed by Coastal Ranches. As to Coastal Ranches’ request for an award of attorney’s fees, the court continued the hearing on the fee motion to October 1, 2025, and ordered Coastal Ranches to, on or before August 27, 2025, file and serve a supplemental brief addressing in full each of the matters described in the Order. The court further ordered State Parks to serve and file its response to the supplemental brief of Coastal Ranches on or before September 10, 2025.
On August 27, Coastal Ranches submitted a supplemental brief in support of the fee motion, which is supported by a supplemental Cooper declaration. In that declaration, Cooper states that he served as lead and trial counsel in this action and as the point of contact with Coastal Ranches. (Supp. Cooper Decl., ¶ 17.) In this role, Cooper coordinated litigation and settlement discussions, developed the litigation team and litigation strategy in coordination with Cooper’s co-counsel, and assigned tasks. (Ibid.)
Cooper further states that Swanhuyser is a partner at Sycamore, and that Hambley and Mathieson are employed as associates with Sycamore. (Supp. Cooper Decl., ¶ 18.) Though Hollinger has left Sycamore, all of Hollinger’s work on this case was under Cooper’s direct supervision. (Supp. Cooper Decl., ¶ 18.) Cooper asserts that Paskerian is a summer law school intern who assisted with depositions under Cooper’s direct supervision. (Ibid.)
Cooper explains that, at each phase of the litigation, the initial legal research and drafting were usually assigned to Hambley who is a junior associate, and that Cooper and Hambley would “work together on the outline of the arguments and the appropriate legal research.” (Supp. Cooper Decl., ¶ 19.) Once Hambley completed a draft, Cooper would provide edits. (Ibid.) At this stage, Cooper would coordinate a conference call with co-counsel to discuss the timeline for the pleading at issue and the allocation of tasks to complete that document. (Supp. Cooper Decl., ¶ 20.)
Black joined this litigation for the purpose of providing specialized expertise on CEQA and writs of mandamus. (Supp. Cooper Decl., ¶ 21.) After a pleading was drafted by Hambley and reviewed and edited by Cooper, that pleading was typically provided to Black to address CEQA aspects. (Ibid.)
After initial efforts to settle had failed and State Parks began motion practice, Cooper concluded that this case would likely proceed to trial. (Supp. Cooper Decl., ¶ 22.) Because Sycamore’s partners have limited trial experience. Gregory joined the team in August 2024 to provide guidance in preparing and trying the case. (Ibid.) After Black finished providing edits to draft documents, Gregory would review the drafts and also provide comments. (Ibid.) Cooper and Hambley would then finalize and file the document. (Supp. Cooper Decl., ¶ 23.)
To demonstrate the existence of coordinated efforts and a division of labor between counsel and the necessity for overlap in work due to the factual and legal issues presented, Cooper provides examples of the manner in which Coastal Ranches’ oppositions to the motions to strike, and discovery, were prepared. (Supp. Cooper Decl., ¶¶ 26-34.)
Cooper also asserts that, due to the complexity of this case and the range of legal issues involved including as to claims made under CEQA, among other things, multiple attorneys were needed to prepare the case for trial. (Supp. Cooper Decl., ¶ 35.) Cooper states that trial preparation was carried out by Hambley and Gregory, whose involvement was, according to Cooper, essential to trial strategy and execution. (Ibid.) Cooper describes the division of labor between Hambley and Gregory in preparing the case for trial, and asserts that this division was necessary due to the volume of documents and witnesses involved, and the need to ensure that the legal theories were consistent with the record and the testimony of experts. (Ibid.)
Cooper further explains that his role in this litigation included editing and drafting motions, declarations, and settlement documents; communicating with opposing counsel; coordinating with co-counsel; conducting and defending depositions; mooting for oral arguments; negotiating settlement terms, and drafting the fee motion and the supplemental briefing. (Supp. Cooper Decl., ¶37.)
Cooper states that Swanhuyser’s time was expended to defend Coastal Ranches’ designated expert at a deposition. (Supp. Cooper Decl., ¶ 38.)
Cooper further states that the hours expended by Hambley include drafting and editing amended petitions, case management statements, requests for production, discovery letters, motions to compel, exhibit lists, motion to consolidate, various oppositions and replies to motions filed by State Parks, expert reports, stipulations, witness outlines and lists, document logs, a consent decree, the Settlement Agreement, the fee motion and reply; legal research; preparing for depositions; participating in settlement negotiations; and communicating with opposing counsel. (Supp. Cooper Decl., ¶ 39.)
The hours expended by Mathieson include time to organize documents for disclosure to State Parks, to draft a table of contents and table of authorities for Coastal Ranches’ motion for summary judgment, and to draft the fee motion and supporting declarations. (Supp. Cooper Decl., ¶ 40.)
The hours billed by Hollinger also include time spent to edit documents, draft interrogatories, and create exhibits. (Supp. Cooper Decl., ¶ 41.)
Paskerian was a summer legal intern who Cooper asserts “played an essential role in helping Sycamore ... prepare for and conduct depositions.” (Supp. Cooper Decl., ¶ 42.) Paskerian drafted requests for production, communicated and assisted Coastal Ranches’ experts in preparing for depositions and expert reports, provided editing feedback and support, and assisted in various discovery tasks. (Ibid.)
Cooper also provides a description of the roles of expert witnesses Mark Allen, Dr. Derek Booth, and Dr. Lisa Stratton, each of whom were who was retained by Coastal Ranches. (Supp. Cooper Decl., ¶¶ 5-15.) The supplemental brief of Coastal Ranches is also supported by declarations of Mark Allen and Dr. Derek Booth, for whom Coastal Ranches seeks to recover costs. (Supp. Cooper Decl., ¶ 15.)
The supplemental brief is also supported by a supplemental Black declaration, in which Black states that she contributed to CEQA-specific research and briefing. (Supp. Black Decl., ¶¶ 2 & 4.) Black further states that she was brought into this case to evaluate the existence and strength of potential CEQA claims once Sycamore determined that the use of the spring had not been curtailed in summer months. (Supp. Black Decl., ¶ 6.)
Black explains that, after a brief was drafted by Hambley and reviewed by Cooper, Black would address remaining CEQA issues including whether obligations of the mitigated negative declarations were key aspects of the project description; whether these declarations were enforceable mitigation measures; the applicable CEQA statute of limitations for each claim raised; and whether the use of the spring constituted a continuing violation under CEQA. (Supp. Black Decl., ¶ 6.) According to Black, the Coastal Act issues raised in this litigation also included whether State Parks complied with applicable permits. (Ibid.)
Black also provides a description of her role in preparing the petition, and the oppositions to State Parks’ motions to strike and for judgment on the pleadings. (Supp. Black Decl., ¶¶ 11-13.)
Hambley also submits a supplemental declaration stating that Hambley’s role in this litigation was primarily to conduct initial research and write preliminary drafts for the majority of briefs in this matter for review by senior attorneys Cooper, Black, and Gregory. (Supp. Hambley Decl., ¶ 9.) Hambley would then incorporate requested edits and changes, and prepare the documents for filing. (Ibid.) Hambley also drafted the majority of the discovery requests in this matter, handled correspondence with opposing counsel, and contributed to drafting pre-trial documents, preparing witnesses, and coordinating trial preparation activities. (Ibid.)
Hambley asserts that the briefs filed in this matter typically originated at Sycamore and were based on an existing templates or briefings in Sycamore’s files, with Black contributing CEQA-specific research and briefing at Hambley’s or Cooper’s request. (Supp. Hambley Decl., ¶ 11.)
The supplemental Mathieson declaration states, among other things, that the majority of the 23.8 hours expended by Mathieson relate to the fee motion. (Supp. Mathieson Decl., ¶ 7.)
In the supplemental Gregory declaration submitted in support of the supplemental brief of Coastal Ranches states that Gregory and Hambley worked on finalizing the trial exhibit list, pre-trial briefing, and fact and expert witness outlines, and that Gregory coordinated preparing demonstratives and other trial exhibits. (Gregory Decl., ¶ 10.) Gregory asserts that this division of labor was necessary due to the short timeframe to re-start trial preparation, the volume of documents and demonstratives to be considered for trial exhibits, and the number of witnesses involved. (Ibid.)
On September 12, 2025, State Parks submitted its response to the supplemental briefing of Coastal Ranches, which is supported by a supplemental declaration of Wenzlau. Wenzlau contends that the terms of the Settlement Agreement are more favorable to State Parks than Coastal Ranches. (Wenzlau Decl., ¶ 4.)
The above is not intended to be an exhaustive summary of information and evidence appearing in the supplemental declarations submitted in support of and in opposition to the supplemental brief of Coastal Ranches.
The memorandum of costs and motion to strike or tax costs:
On August 27, 2025, Coastal Ranches filed a memorandum of costs claiming costs in the total amount of $49,082.74.
On September 12, 2025, State Parks filed a motion for an order (the cost motion) striking all costs claimed in the memorandum of costs filed by Coastal Ranches or, alternatively, taxing specific costs as not allowable, necessary or reasonable under Code of Civil Procedure sections 1032 and 1033.5.
Court records reflect that the cost motion was originally set for hearing on November 19, 2025. On September 18, 2025, State Parks filed a stipulation which is executed by counsel for the parties, and in which the parties agreed, subject to the court’s approval, that the fee motion and cost motion should each be considered at the October 1, 2025, hearing on the fee motion, to facilitate the expeditious adjudication of this case and because counsel for State Parks may need to begin maternity leave in November 2025, among other things. (See Stip., ¶¶ 8-10.)
On September 18, 2025, the court entered an order upon the parties’ stipulation described above, advancing the hearing on the cost motion to October 1, and ordering Coastal Ranches to file its opposition to that motion on or before September 19, 2025.
On September 22, 2025, Coastal Ranches late-filed its opposition to the cost motion.
Analysis
(1) The Fee Motion
In its supplemental brief, Coastal Ranches refers to an “amended” order purportedly entered by the court on August 14, 2025. The court’s records of this proceeding do not reflect the entry of an “amended” order on that date. Therefore, the court understands any references to an “amended” order to refer to the Order.
As also discussed in the Order, the fee motion is made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, which authorizes the court to award attorney’s fees “to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one public entity against another public entity, are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5.)
In the Settlement Agreement, the parties agreed that, for the purpose of determining an award of attorney’s fees as that term is used in Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, Coastal Ranches is the “successful party”. (Cooper Decl., Exh. F at ¶ 10; Wenzlau Decl., Exh. B [same].) State Parks does not dispute that Coastal Ranches is the successful party for purposes of a fee award under section 1021.5, and does not appear to dispute that “the requirements for a private attorney general action have been satisfied.” (Benson v. Kwikset Corp. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1278.) Instead, State Parks contests the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees requested in the fee motion, arguing, among other things, that the fees requested by Coastal Ranches include hours expended for duplicative, inefficient, unreasonable, and unnecessary work. (Opp. at p. 5, ll. 13-17; Wenzlau Decl., Exh. A [table of contested fees].)
For all reasons discussed above, the present record is sufficient to show that Coastal Ranches is, for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, the successful party entitled to an award of attorney’s fees.
“[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. ‘California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.’ [Citation.] The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work. [Citations.] The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. [Citation.] Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)
“[T]he predicate of any attorney fee award, whether based on a percentage-of-the-benefit or a lodestar calculation, is the necessity and usefulness of the conduct for which compensation is sought.” (Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 846, italics omitted.) The court generally begins its analysis by reviewing the attorney’s time records which, if verified, are “entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous[.]” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396 (Horsford); see also Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 562-563 [if fee request is supported by sufficient declarations and documentation, a challenge to the fee request requires similar proof].)
Further, “[t]he value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court has its own expertise. [Citation.] The trial court may make its own determination of the value of the services contrary to, or without the necessity for, expert testimony. [Citation.] The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623-624.)
“The magnitude of what constitutes a reasonable award of attorney fees is ... a matter committed to the discretion of the trial court.” (Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Assn. v. Hazelbaker (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 252, 263.) The court must exercise its discretion so as to fully compensate the attorney for the services provided to the client, which may also include fees incurred to pursue a claim for attorney’s fees. (Horsford, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 395-396; Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 580.) Further, “[t]he court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market in setting a reasonable hourly rate.” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009.)
Noted above, Cooper asserts that Black provided specialized expertise on CEQA and with writs of mandamus. Black also describes her role in this litigation as “largely focused on attempts to resolve CEQA concerns.” (Black Decl., ¶ 7.) Black did not participate in trial preparation. (Black Decl., ¶ 14.)
The court has reviewed the timeslips for Black, which include sufficiently detailed descriptions of the services rendered to Coastal Ranches by Black with respect to the CEQA aspects of this proceeding. There is no information to suggest or indicate that the timeslips are erroneous. Based on the court’s review of the record as to the hours expended by Black and considering Black’s role and the nature of this litigation, the court finds that the 79.1 hours expended by Black is reasonable for this category of litigation.
To support its contention that the hourly rate charged by Black is not reasonable, State Parks asserts that two years ago, Black was awarded an hourly rate of $525 in an unrelated case, and that Coastal Ranches has offered no justification for declining to retain local counsel. (Opp. at p. 16.)
State Parks fails to sufficiently explain why the Santa Barbara are is not part of the “community” encompassing the Los Angeles area, or the larger southern California region, for purposes of determining relevant market rates for this type of litigation. Further, considering the specialized knowledge required for CEQA aspects of this litigation, Black’s relevant area of expertise, that out-of-town counsel frequently appear in this court to litigate specialized CEQA matters, and its own familiarity with the local legal market, the court finds the hourly rate charged by Black to be reasonable for the Los Angeles area, including as to hourly rates prevailing in the local community for similar work. (Environmental Protection Information Center v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 217, 248-249 [general discussion]; In re Tobacco Cases I (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 570, 587-588 [trial court may rely on its own experience and knowledge, when provided with pertinent facts, to determine reasonable value of attorney’s services].)
For all reasons discussed discussed above, the court also finds the hourly rate charged by Black to be reasonable under the totality of the circumstances present here, considering the nature of this litigation and the experience of Black with the type of work demanded.
As also further discussed above, information appearing in the supplemental Cooper declaration is sufficient to show that Gregory joined Coastal Ranches’ litigation team to provide “high level” advice on strategy. (Supp. Cooper Decl., ¶ 22.) In this role, Gregory also assisted with settlement matters. (Supp. Gregory Decl., ¶ 3.)
The same reasoning and analysis apply as to the hours expended by Gregory in connection with Coastal Ranches’ trial and settlement strategy. For the same or similar reasons discussed above, the court finds that 111 hours were reasonably expended by Gregory at the reasonable hourly rate of $1,035.
Information and evidence appearing in the present record indicates or suggests that the greater part of the underlying work to conduct discovery, prepare motions and oppositions, and to otherwise litigate and settle this action was performed by Hambley under Cooper’s supervision. (See, e.g., Cooper Decl., ¶ 13; Supp. Hambley Decl., ¶¶ 9-11.) The court has reviewed the timeslips attached to the Hambley moving, reply, and supplemental declarations, which also include sufficiently detailed descriptions of the work performed by Hambley throughout this litigation.
Though entries appearing in the timeslips submitted in support of the fee motion reveal some duplication of effort between Hambley, Black, and Gregory, the present record is sufficient to show that shared tasks were allocated and performed in accordance with each attorney’s experience and expertise. Considering this allocation of tasks as described in the declarations of Hambley, Black, and Gregory, it appears to the court that some duplication of effort by Black, Gregory, and Hambley may have been unavoidable if not necessary to ensure efficiency. (See, e.g., Supp. Hambley Decl., ¶ 10; Supp. Black Decl., ¶ 3; Supp. Gregory Decl., ¶¶ 12 & 15.)
For all reasons discussed above, the court finds that 415.4 hours of Hambley’s time was reasonably expended in this case, including in connection with the fee motion. (Hambley Reply Decl., ¶ 5 [setting forth the hours expended by Hambley to prepare fee motion].) As to Hambley’s hourly rate of $480, the same reasoning and analysis apply. Based on the court’s familiarity with the legal market and Hambley’s skill and experience, the court finds that an hourly rate of $480 for Hambley’s time is appropriate for the Santa Barbara area.
Coastal Ranches appears to request in the supplemental brief additional fees incurred for Hambley to prepare the supplemental brief. (See Supp. Hambley Decl., Exh. A at pp. 45-46.) “[T]he burden is on the party seeking attorney fees to prove that the fees it seeks are reasonable.” (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 98.) The information presented in Coastal Ranches’ supplemental brief could and should have been presented in the fee motion. For this reason, the court finds that the hours to prepare the supplemental brief included in Coastal Ranches’ request were not reasonably expended by Hambley. Though the hours reasonably expended do not include Hambley’s time to prepare the supplemental brief, the court notes that the hours described above include time expended by Hambley to prepare the fee motion, as set forth in Coastal Ranches’ reply.
The court has also reviewed the timeslips for Cooper, Mathieson, Swanhuyser, and Hollinger, and the declarations submitted in support of the fee motion. As further discussed below, the present record shows or suggests that there exists significant duplication of tasks and efforts by Cooper, Mathieson, and Hollinger. In addition, the supplemental brief fails to sufficiently explain why this ostensible duplication of effort was necessary or justified.
The available information and evidence shows that Swanhuyser expended 6 hours on November 5, 2024, at the hourly rate of $825, to “defend State Park’s deposition of designated expert Derek Booth[.]” (Cooper Decl., ¶ 6 & Exh. A at pdf p. 38; Supp. Cooper Decl., ¶ 44.) The court finds that Swanhuyser’s time for this deposition was reasonably expended, and that Swanhuyser’s hourly rate is reasonable for this type of work and category of litigation, including with respect to the Santa Barbara area.
The timeslips for Mathieson show that Mathieson expended 19.1 hours in connection with the present fee motion and the supporting declarations, and as to the remaining hours expended by Mathieson, to research and draft a “Sanchez MIL”. (Cooper Decl., ¶ 6 & Exh. A; Hambley Reply Decl., ¶ 5 & Exh. A; Supp. Mathieson Decl., Exh. A at p. 23-24.) Mathieson’s hourly rate is $455. (Cooper Decl., ¶ 6; Supp. Cooper Decl., ¶ 44.)
Noted above, Coastal Ranches requests reimbursement for 32.4 hours expended by Hambley in connection with the fee motion which the court finds to be reasonable. (Hambley Reply Decl., ¶ 5 & Exh. A; Supp. Hambley Decl., Exh. A at p. 45.) Wholly absent from the supplemental brief is any explanation showing why Mathieson also necessarily expended time to prepare the fee motion, or why Hambley expended more time to prepare or edit the fee motion than Mathieson ostensibly expended. For these reasons, it is unclear, and there exists some question as to, which attorney effectively or substantively prepared that motion.
The record further reflects that Cooper expended an additional 14.25 hours to edit the fee motion and to communicate with Hambley regarding that motion. (Hambley Reply Decl., ¶ 5 & Exh. A.) Also absent from the supplemental brief is any sufficient reasoned argument showing why it was necessary or reasonable for both Hambley and Cooper to expend 50 hours, collectively, to edit or communicate about the fee motion which available information and evidence indicates was also prepared by Mathieson. For these reasons, there exists an ostensible duplication of work in preparing the fee motion.
The hours expended by Cooper in this litigation also include time spent to edit additional court filings apart from the fee motion, to communicate and coordinate with co-counsel, to develop the litigation team and its strategy, to assign tasks consistent with each attorney’s skills and experience, and “mooting” for oral arguments, among other things. (Cooper Decl., ¶ 11; Supp. Cooper Decl., ¶ 17.) Cooper’s hourly rate is $1,035. (Cooper Decl., ¶ 6.)
In addition to the duplication of effort expended by Cooper in connection with the fee motion as further discussed above, Cooper expended approximately, if not more than, 15 hours to draft, edit, review edits, and review the petitions which were ostensibly also drafted by Black. (Supp. Cooper Decl., Exh. A at p. 1; Supp. Black Decl., Exh. A at pdf pp. 13-14.) Considering the information offered to show Black’s experience in litigating similar matters, Coastal Ranches has failed to sufficient explain the necessity for this ostensibly duplication in effort to prepare the petitions filed in this action.
Cooper also expended approximately 10 hours to prepare edits to Coastal Ranches’ opposition to the motions to strike and for judgment on the pleadings which were ostensibly prepared by Hambley. (Supp. Cooper Decl., Exh. A at pp. 11-12; Supp. Hambley Decl., Exh. A at pp. 31-32.) In addition, on November 6, 2024, Cooper expended 8 hours to “pre” and “debrief” the “Booth Depo” which was attended by Swanhuyser as further discussed above. (Supp. Cooper Decl., Exh. A at p. 17.) Cooper also includes time to prepare the supplemental brief which, for reasons further discussed above, was not reasonably expended. (Supp. Cooper Decl., Exh. A at p. 23.)
The available information and evidence also shows that Paskerian expended 123 hours as a summer legal intern at the hourly rate of $325, to assist with preparing for and conducting depositions, to draft discovery, and to communicate with experts, among other things. (Cooper Decl., ¶ 6.) Though Coastal Ranches does not provide any timeslips describing the specific tasks performed by Paskerian, the court notes that the timeslips submitted by Coastal Ranches show that Cooper, Hambley, and Hollinger also expended hours to prepare for depositions, to draft or edit discovery, and to communicate with experts. (See, e.g., Supp. Cooper Decl., Exh. A at pp. 2 & 7 [hours expended by Cooper to draft discovery and edit “Rogs” and “RFPs”]; pp. 3-5 & 7 [Cooper time for communications with experts]; pp. 24-25 [hours expended by Hollinger to draft interrogatories]; pp. 27 & 30-31 [hours expended by Hambley to prepare for depositions and draft letter re deposition logistics].)
In addition to time expended to edit or draft discovery prepared by others, Hollinger expended time to perform tasks typically performed by non-attorney staff for which Sycamore charged an attorney rate, and to also prepare edits to the FAP. (See, e.g., Supp. Cooper Decl., Exh. A at p. 24 [including hours to “email” First Legal regarding service, to “send to First Legal for filing”, and to edit the FAP]; see Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 250 [general discussion re reductions for non-attorney tasks].) Considering the hours expended by other counsel to prepare or edit petitions and discovery in this matter, the hour expended by Hollinger also appear to reflect duplicative efforts.
The examples provided above are intended to be illustrative but not exhaustive of the ostensible and what appears to be significant duplication of effort expended by Sycamore’s attorneys as reflected throughout the timeslips submitted in support of the fee motion, and for which Coastal Ranches has not provided sufficient, if any, justification.
“Reasonable compensation does not include compensation for ‘ “padding” in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts....’ [Citation.]” (Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 271; see also Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1326 [describing circumstances sufficient to show the matter at issue was “overstaffed....”].) For all reasons discussed above, there exist what appears to be a significant duplication of effort by Cooper, Mathieson, Hollinger, and Paskerian. This duplication of effort also suggests that there exist inefficiencies by Sycamore in litigating this matter, and that this matter was overstaffed.
Though the court finds, for all reasons further discussed above, that the hourly rates charged by Sycamore for the hours expended in this litigation by Cooper, Mathieson, Hollinger, and Paskerian are reasonable based on the nature of this litigation and other factors described above, the court finds, based on its thorough review of the record including the timeslips discussed above and the arguments advanced by State Parks, that 304.4 hours of Cooper’s time, 4.7 hours of Mathieson’s time, 7.4 hours of Hollinger’s time, and 30.9 hours of Paskerian’s time was reasonably expended for non-duplicative tasks performed by these attorneys and for which fees are appropriately awardable.
State Parks further contends that fees incurred to join Caltrans as a party to this litigation and to prepare the motion of Coastal Ranches for partial summary judgment should not be awarded because Coastal Ranches was not successful in these efforts, which according to State Parks, failed to advance the case towards resolution or narrow the issues.
“ ‘Compensation is ordinarily warranted,’ even for unsuccessful litigation forays, ‘unless the unsuccessful forays address discrete unrelated claims, are pursued in bad faith, or are pursued incompetently, i.e., are such that a reasonably competent lawyer would not have pursued them....’ [Citation.]” (Simers v. Los Angeles Times Communications LLC (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 940, 947.) For these reasons, even if there exists evidence showing that Coastal Ranches expended time to litigate matters that were not successful, this is not, alone, a sufficient ground to deny the fees requested in the motion. Considering the matters at issue in this proceeding as alleged in the FAP, including with respect to the water supply project described above, and notwithstanding whether Coastal Ranches was successful in its efforts to join Caltrans or obtain summary adjudication or judgment, State Parks fails to explain why these efforts address wholly unrelated claims.
There is also no evidence or information to suggest, or which would permit the court to conclude, that Coastal Ranches seeks to recover attorney’s fees for matters which it pursued in bad faith, or that its counsel was incompetent in pursuing these matters. By way of example, the court has no record showing that State Parks filed a motion to recover expenses incurred by State Parks as a result of any bad faith or frivolous actions or tactics undertaken by Coastal Ranches in this matter. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 128.5.)
Furthermore, “ ‘[a]pportionment is not required when the claims for relief are so intertwined that it would be impracticable, if not impossible, to separate the attorney's time into compensable and noncompensable units.’ [Citation.] Attorney fees also ‘need not be apportioned between distinct causes of action where plaintiff's various claims involve a common core of facts or are based on related legal theories.’ [Citation.]” (Douglas E. Barnhart, Inc. v. CMC Fabricators, Inc. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 230, 250.)
Considering the allegations of the FAP described above, including as to the 1998 MND, State Parks’ use of a Caltrans well, and the water supply project, the present record is sufficient to show that Coastal Ranches may recover attorney’s fees incurred in litigating factual or legal issues common to these issues which include the question of whether State Parks failed to keep water diversions low, among other things. To the extent there exist common factual and legal issues as to these matters, State Parks has also failed to show why Coastal Ranches is required to apportion attorney’s fees between any purportedly distinct issues, claims, or causes of action.
The court has also considered the remaining arguments advanced by State Parks in its opposition to the fee motion and does not find these arguments persuasive apart from the matters further discussed above.
For all reasons discussed above, the court will grant the fee motion, in part, and award to Coastal Ranches attorney’s fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, in the amount of $716,074 which includes: (1) 79.1 hours expended by Black at the hourly rate of $830, in the total amount of $65,653; (2) 111 hours expended by Gregory at the hourly rate of $1,035, in the total amount of $114,885; (3) 415.4 hours reasonably expended by Hambley at the hourly rate of $480, in the total amount of $199,392; (4) 304.4 hours reasonably expended by Cooper at the hourly rate of $1,035, in the total amount of $315,054; (5) 6 hours expended by Swanhuyser at the hourly rate of $825, in the total amount of $4,950; (6) 4.7 hours reasonably expended by Mathieson at the hourly rate of $455, in the total amount of $2,138.50; (7) 7.4 hours reasonably expended by Hollinger at the hourly rate of $535, in the total amount of $3,959; and (8) 30.9 hours reasonably expended by Paskerian at the hourly rate of $325, in the total amount of $10,042.50.
(2) The Cost Motion
As a threshold matter, in a footnote appearing in the cost motion, State Parks contends that it was not served properly with the memorandum of costs because an email transmitting the supplemental brief of Coastal Ranches further discussed above did not mention that the memorandum was included among the attachments. (Cost Motion at p. 7, fn. 3.) As State Parks has substantively contested Coastal Ranches entitlement to the costs claimed in the memorandum of costs on the merits, any defect in the service of the memorandum has effectively been waived by State Parks. (Kunzler v. Karde (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 683, 688.)
Though the court will consider the cost motion notwithstanding State Parks’ contentions regarding service of the cost memorandum as further discussed above, the court will continue the hearing on the cost motion to the date originally set upon the filing of that motion by State Parks.