Coastal Ranches Conservancy v. California Department Of Parks And Recreation
Coastal Ranches Conservancy v. California Department Of Parks And Recreation
Case Number
22CV02818
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Wed, 08/13/2025 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Petitioner’s Motion For Attorneys’ Fees And Costs
Tentative Ruling
For Petitioner Coastal Ranches Conservancy: Daniel Cooper, Kristina Hambley,
Sycamore Law, Inc.; Michelle Black, Carstens, Black & Minteer, LLP
For Respondent California Department of Parks and Recreation: Rob Bonta, Jessica E. Tucker-Mohl, Sophie A. Wenzlau, Nathaniel Hyman, Attorney General of California
RULING
(1) For all reasons discussed herein, the motion of Petitioner for attorneys’ fees and costs is denied in part as to Petitioner’s request for an award of costs against Respondent, without prejudice, and continued in part to October 1, 2025, as to Petitioner’s request for an award of attorney’s fees against Respondent.
(2) On or before August 27, 2025, Petitioner shall file and serve a supplemental brief addressing, in full, each of the matters described herein, in accordance with this ruling. On or before September 10, 2025, Respondent shall file and serve its response to the supplemental brief of Petitioner, in accordance with this ruling.
Background
This case is consolidated for all purposes with case number 24CV02742, with this action designated as the lead case. The first amended petition (FAP) filed on September 13, 2022, by Petitioner Coastal Ranches Conservancy (Coastal Ranches) is the operative pleading. (See Mar. 27, 2024, Minute Order [striking fourth amended petition and deeming FAP as operative pleading].) The FAP arises from an alleged failure by Respondent California Department of Parks and Recreation (State Parks) to comply with the requirements of two mitigated negative declarations for two projects. As alleged in the FAP:
State Parks is the lead agency for purposes of environmental review of a project for constructing new water treatment facilities and new water lines to connect the Las Cruces/Hot Springs and main campground and day-use areas of Gaviota State Park (the Park) and the Caltrans rest area at Gaviota Pass under Public Resources Code section 21000 et seq. (the California Environmental Quality Act or CEQA), and for the purposes of environmental review for the rehabilitation of the Park which resulted in construction of a new campground, parking area, and facility buildings.
In 1979, State Parks developed a plan (the rehabilitation project) to rehabilitate the Park with new campsites, a new day-use parking area, and newly constructed restrooms and concession buildings. Engineering, funding, and litigation issues with Chevron delayed the rehabilitation project until 1990. On December 12, 1991, the Coastal Commission approved a permit for the rehabilitation project and in 1992, State Parks adopted a mitigated negative declaration (the 1992 MND) for that project.
With respect to the rehabilitation project, the area of the Park is designated as an Environmentally Sensitive Habitat area and contains diverse wildlife and vegetation, a coastal salt marsh, lagoon and stream corridor. The 1992 MND issued by State Parks for the rehabilitation project stated that project would not have a significant effect on the environment because mitigation measures had been added which included (a) a coastal salt marsh restoration project with respect to the existing salt marsh, which was in a degraded condition and which would involve the eradication of exotic species, excavation to lower elevations and recontouring, revegetation using salvaged native plans and nursery stock, and monitoring the results and replanting if necessary; and (b) a riparian woodland restoration project in order to provide a significant buffer along the Gaviota Creek, which would involve various grading activities, removal of exotic plant species, the planting of various native riparian woodland species, and monitoring for three years to assess reestablishment of the riparian woodland and to remove any exotics that may have recolonized.
Though State Parks completed implementation of the rehabilitation project, it neither commenced nor completed either the coastal salt marsh restoration project or the riparian woodland restoration project described above.
In 1998, State Parks adopted a mitigated negative declaration (the 1998 MND) for a water supply project (the water supply project) that would serve the Park and a rest stop owned by the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans). The 1998 MND found that the water supply project could cause adverse impacts to surface water resources, plants, and wildlife. To prevent these adverse impacts, the 1998 MND provides that State Parks would utilize a Caltrans well at full capacity from July 1 through September 30, at any time the water source for the water supply project dropped below 30 gallons per minute. In January 2022, Coastal Ranches was informed that State Parks was not suspending use of the water source from July 1 through September 30 and had failed to remove water pipes as required by the conditional use permit issued for the water supply project.
The FAP alleges five causes of action against State Parks: (1) waste and unreasonable use of water; (2) violations of public trust duties; (3) failure to comply with the negative declaration for the rehabilitation project as required by CEQA; (4) failure to comply with the Coastal Development Permit for the rehabilitation project as required by Public Resources Code section 30000 et seq. (the California Coastal Act of 1976 or Coastal Act); and, (5) failure to comply with the negative declaration for the water supply project as required by CEQA.
For reasons more fully discussed and resolved in the Court’s ruling issued on August 7, 2024, the CEQA causes of action were dismissed from case number 22CV02818 on May 17, 2024, and refiled as case number 24CV02742 on May 27, 2024. In the August 7, 2024, ruling, State Parks’ motion to dismiss the CEQA claims from case number 22CV02818 was granted, State Parks’ motion to strike the entirety of the petition filed in case number 24CV02742 was denied, and Coastal Ranches’ motion to consolidate case numbers 24CV02742 and 22CV02818 was granted.
As the result of the events described above, the operative causes of action in this case are the first, second, and fourth causes of action alleged in the FAP and described above, as consolidated with the petition filed in case number 24CV02742, which includes causes of action for (1) violation of CEQA based upon the failure to comply with the 1992 MND for the rehabilitation project; and (2) violation of CEQA for failing to comply with the 1998 MND for the water supply project.
State Parks has filed verified answers to each of the relevant petitions.
On May 8, 2025, based on a stipulated judgment of the parties filed on the same date, the Court entered an order finding that the parties to this action have reached a settlement which resolves all disputes, ordering that the parties shall perform all obligations set forth in a “Settlement Agreement” attached to the stipulated judgment as exhibit A, and ordering that the Court will retain jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement Agreement, among other things.
On June 5, 2025, Coastal Ranches filed a motion for an award of attorney’s fees and costs against State Parks.
In support of the motion, Coastal Ranches submits a declaration of its counsel, Daniel Cooper (Cooper), who is a partner at Sycamore Law, Inc., (Sycamore). (Cooper Decl., ¶ 2.) Cooper states that Sycamore was founded in 2020 and represents non-profit clients. (Cooper Decl., ¶ 3.) In addition, Cooper provides a list of cases in which Cooper has acted as co-counsel and which demonstrate Cooper’s experience with state and federal environmental law enforcement actions, administrative proceedings, and related litigation. (Cooper Decl., ¶ 3(a)-(vv).) Cooper asserts that his practice relies on fee awards obtained in successful cases to assist with funding subsequent public interest litigation. (Cooper Decl., ¶ 4.)
To substantiate the attorney’s fees requested in the motion, Cooper attaches to his declaration a complete set of all “time slips” for this litigation which ostensibly includes all hours “contemporaneously recorded on a computerized billing system known as Bill4Time.” (Cooper Decl., ¶ 5 & Exh. A.) Cooper explains that, even where matters are handled on a contingency basis, “we finalize a bill each month to assure that our timekeeping is accurate...:” and that “[b]efore a time slip is finalized, we review it to ensure that the time charged is appropriate.” (Cooper Decl., ¶ 5.)
Cooper also provides a chart set forth in the declaration, which summarizes the number of hours worked by each attorney and staff member of Sycamore during the pendency of this case through entry of judgment, and each timekeeper’s hourly rate, which Cooper asserts is “accurate”. (Cooper Decl., ¶¶ 5-6.)
According to information appearing in the chart described above, Cooper expended in this action 509.70 hours at the hourly rate of $1,035, Jesse Swanhuyser expended 6 hours at the hourly rate of $825, Kristina Hambley expended 383 hours at the hourly rate of $480, Hannah Mathieson expended 4.7 hours at the hourly rate of $455, Jessica Hollinger expended 11.6 hours at the hourly rate of $535, and Mackenzie Paskerian expended 123 hours at the hourly rate of $325. (Cooper Decl., ¶ 6.) Based on the complete set of time slips attached to the Cooper declaration, Cooper states that the hours expended by these individuals total 1038, and the attorney’s fees total $764,592. (Cooper Decl., ¶ 8.)
Cooper further asserts that the attorney’s fees requested in the motion include time expended by Sycamore attorneys and staff to, among other things, research, draft, and amend the petition; draft a motion for leave to amend, a motion to compel, a partial summary judgment motion, an opposition to a motion to strike, and an opposition to a motion for judgment on the pleadings; conduct discovery and engage in settlement discussions; and prepare for trial. (Cooper Decl., ¶¶ 10, 11(ii)-(jj), & 12-16.) Cooper also provides a description of what Cooper describes as the “complicated” prelitigation and procedural history of this action, commencing with Coastal Ranches communicating concerns in September 2019 about State Parks’ water diversion” (Cooper Decl., ¶ 11(a)-(ll).)
Cooper explains that his firm records time actually expended without rounding. (Cooper Decl., ¶ 9.) Cooper has carefully reviewed the time slips for each of the attorneys, paralegals, and summer legal interns at Sycamore to ensure that all tasks and hours are accurate, reasonable, of the type normally billed to clients, and not duplicative. (Ibid.) Cooper believes that the time and hourly rates reflected in the time slips attached to the Cooper declaration were all reasonably spent and necessary to the prosecution of this case. (Ibid.)
Information appearing in the Cooper declaration also shows that the parties entered into the Settlement Agreement on May 8, 2025. (Cooper Decl., ¶ 11(ll) & Exh. F [Settlement Agreement].) According to Cooper, the Settlement Agreement requires State Parks to temporarily reduce water diversions from Las Cruces, remove abandoned pipelines near the Gaviota Water Treatment Plant, conduct CEQA-compliant environmental review of the water supply project, and restore the affected estuary at the Park. (Ibid.) Coastal Ranches also agreed to raise funds to support the “Updated Restoration Project” outlined in the Settlement Agreement. (Ibid.) Cooper contends that the obligations accepted by State Parks pursuant to the Settlement Agreement reflect the environmental protections set forth in the 1992 MND and 1998 MND, and that Coastal Ranches would have accepted these settlement terms at the inception of this case in 2022. (Ibid.)
Cooper also provides information showing the educational background and relevant litigation experience of Sycamore attorneys Jesse Swanhuyser, Kristina Hambley, Hannah Mathieson, and Jessica Hollinger, and paralegal Mackenzie Paskerian. (Cooper Decl., ¶¶ 17-31.)
Cooper asserts that Coastal Ranches also seeks to recover costs incurred in the course of this litigation, which include expenses relating to filings, deposition transcripts, lodging and travel, printing, Court reporting, trial demonstratives, and reports provided by Derek Booth, Mark Allen, and Lisa Stratton, who are individuals designated as experts by Coastal Ranches during the course of the litigation. (Cooper Decl., ¶¶ 35-51 & Exhs. B [expense report], C [invoices from Derek Booth, PhD, PG, PE], D [invoices from Normandeau Associates Environmental Consultants], & E [invoices & time reports from Fat Pencil Studio].)
Coastal Ranches also submits declarations of Sycamore attorneys Kristina Hambley (Hambley) and Hannah Mathieson (Mathieson). In these declarations, Hambley and Mathieson each describe their educational background, knowledge of, and experience with environmental law enforcement actions and other related matters, and the services performed and hours expended by each of these attorneys in this litigation. (Hambley Decl., ¶¶ 4-11 & Exh. A [Hambley timeslips]; Mathieson Decl., ¶¶ 4-14 & Exh. A [Mathieson timeslips].)
Coastal Ranches also submits a declaration of Michelle Black (Black), who is a partner at Carstens, Black & Minteer, LLP (CBM LLP), co-counsel for Coastal Ranches in this action. (Black Decl., ¶ 2.) Black states that CBM LLP is a small, public interest, for profit law firm that practices exclusively in the areas of environmental, land use, historic preservation, and municipal law, with a significant amount of the firm’s practice involving administrative processes and litigation under CEQA and the California Coastal Act. (Black Decl., ¶ 3.) CBM LLP primarily represents public interest environmental and community groups and, occasionally, government. (Ibid.)
Black asserts that CBM LLP’s practice in litigating public interest cases is largely based on contingency fee arrangements because nonprofit, public interest groups such as Coastal Ranches are often unable to pay market rates for legal services due to their limited fundraising capabilities and the high cost of litigation. (Black Decl., ¶ 4.) CBM LLP generally accepts cases based upon a reduced rate negotiated with the clients, sometimes with a cap on fees, and sometimes on a fully contingent basis, except for payment of costs. (Ibid.) In addition, CBM LLP frequently defers payment of fees for several years with no guarantee that any of the fees incurred or costs advanced would ever be recovered. (Black Decl., ¶ 5.) Black states that, during the litigation of this case, CBM LLP had to decline paid representation in order to dedicate sufficient time to its successful resolution. (Ibid.)
Black submits a copy of what Black describes as a complete set of all contemporaneously recorded “time slips” for this litigation which were recorded on a computerized billing system known as “Timeslips” and which show the number of hours Black expended during the administrative process and pendency of the case. (Black Decl., ¶¶ 6-8 & Exh. A [time slips].) Black explains that, even where matters are being handled on a contingency basis, CBM LLP finalizes a bill each month to assure accurate timekeeping, and that before a “timeslip” is finalized, it is reviewed to ensure that the time charged is appropriate. (Black Decl., ¶ 6.) According to information appearing in the Black declaration, and the attached “time slips”, Black expended 79.1 hours at the hourly rate of $830, for a total of $65,653 in attorney’s fees. (Black Decl., ¶¶ 7-8.)
Black also states that CBM LLP records time actually expended without rounding, and that Black has “carefully reviewed the timeslips to ensure that all tasks and hours are accurate, reasonable, of the type normally billed to clients, and not duplicative.” (Black Decl., ¶ 9.) The hours expended by Black include time to research and draft the petition, to draft the motion for leave to amend, and to draft portions of the opposition of Coastal Ranches to the motion to strike and motion for judgment on the pleadings, among other things. (Black Decl., ¶ 10.)
Black also describes her educational background and experience with environmental, land use, historic preservation, and municipal law with CBM LLP, and provides a list of reported cases in which CBM LLP was involved. (Black Decl., ¶¶ 11-12(a)-(gg).)
In addition, Coastal Ranches submits a declaration of Philip L. Gregory (Gregory), who is self-employed with the Gregory Law Group. (Gregory Decl., ¶ 2.) Gregory provides a description of Gregory’s work as co-counsel and of counsel in various litigation and representative cases, and of Gregory’s educational background and litigation experience. (Gregory Decl., ¶¶ 2-5 & Exh. 1 [resume].)
Gregory’s practice litigating public interest cases is also largely based on contingency or pro bono arrangements based on the frequent inability of nonprofit, public interest groups to pay market rates for legal services. (Gregory Decl., ¶ 6.)
Gregory submits a copy of his “Statement for Services” as counsel in this case through May 31, 2025. (Gregory Decl., ¶ 7 & Exh. 2.) Gregory states that the hours reflected in this statement were contemporaneously recorded, and that the statement was developed on a weekly basis using Gregory’s notes and calendar entries to ensure accuracy. (Gregory Decl., ¶ 11.) Before the Statement for Services was finalized, Gregory reviewed each entry to ensure the time charged is appropriate and avoided duplication of efforts with co-counsel. (Ibid.)
According to information appearing in the Statement for Services and the Gregory declaration, Gregory expended 111 hours in this litigation at the hourly rate of $1,035, for a total of $114,885 in attorney’s fees. (Gregory Decl., ¶¶ 12-13.)
Gregory states that his primary role in this litigation was to prepare this matter for trial, with the intent that Gregory serve as co-trial counsel and assist in various pre-trial matters such as motion practice, pre-trial conferences, witness preparation, exhibit preparation, and settlement. (Gregory Decl., ¶ 7.) Gregory began working on this matter in August 2024 to prepare for oral argument on State Parks’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, and attended the hearing on that motion. (Gregory Decl., ¶ 8.) Gregory also describes his subsequent work in this action which includes drafting Coastal Ranches’ summary judgment motion, conducting expert discovery, and preparing for trial. (Gregory Decl., ¶¶ 8-9.) Beginning in February 2025, Gregory began working with co-counsel to finalize the Settlement Agreement. (Gregory Decl., ¶ 10.)
The motion is opposed by State Parks, who submits a declaration of its counsel, Sophie Wenzlau (Wenzlau) in support of that opposition. Wenzlau submits a table of attorney’s fees and costs which are contested by State Parks, and which were drawn from the billing entries attached to the Cooper, Black, and Gregory declarations described above. (Wenzlau Decl., ¶ 2 & Exh. A.) Wenzlau also sets forth the reasons why State Parks contends that certain attorney’s fees and costs requested in the motion in regard to experts, discovery, and appearances at hearings are not awardable or should be reduced or denied. (Wenzlau Decl., ¶ 4(a)-(h).)
Wenzlau further asserts that the terms of the final Settlement Agreement “are very different from Coastal Ranches’ 2022 settlement offers. With regard to the restoration project, for example, Coastal Ranches’ November 2022 settlement offer simply sought implementation of the 1991 project. It did not include, for example, a proposal that a new project be designed to reflect current environmental conditions, that Coastal Ranches would raise up to $3 million of the proposed project costs, or that project implementation would be contingent on environmental review.” (Wenzlau Decl., ¶ 4(i).) Attached to the Wenzlau declaration is a copy of Coastal Ranches’ November 2022 settlement letter. (Ibid. & Exh. I.)
The above summary is not intended to be exhaustive, and the Court considers all admissible and relevant evidence and information to determine the motion.
Analysis
For all reasons discussed herein, the present motion will be denied in part and continued in part. (Note: Undesignated statutory references herein shall be to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.)
In the motion, Coastal Ranches seeks to recover attorney’s fees and costs incurred in this action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, which provides: “Upon motion, a Court may award attorneys’ fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one public entity against another public entity, are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any. With respect to actions involving public entities, this section applies to allowances against, but not in favor of, public entities, and no claim shall be required to be filed therefor, unless one or more successful parties and one or more opposing parties are public entities, in which case no claim shall be required to be filed therefor under Part 3 (commencing with Section 900) of Division 3.6 of Title 1 of the Government Code.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5.)
The Settlement Agreement entered into by the parties includes the following provision: “The Parties agree that within 30 days of the Effective Date, Coastal Ranches may move the Court under Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5 for a determination of attorneys’ fees and costs associated with the Action (the ‘Fees Motion’). For purposes of this paragraph 10 alone, the parties agree that Coastal Ranches is the ‘successful party’ for determination of attorneys’ fees in this Action, consistent with how that term is used in Code Civ. Pro., § 1021.5. For purposes of the Fees Motion, notwithstanding the framework of Code Civ. Pro., § 1021.5 and applicable case law, no multiplier shall be available in the context of the Fees Motion. The Fees Motion will be presented to the Court consistent with ordinary motion practice, including an opposition brief by Parks and a reply brief by Coastal Ranches, and oral argument if requested by the Court, and will be resolved through an order issued by the Court (“Fees Order”) that the Parties agree shall not be appealed by any Party. Notwithstanding any other applicable rule of Court, Coastal Ranches, as prevailing party for purposes of this paragraph, shall serve Notice of Entry of the Fees Order within five business days of Court issuance.” (Cooper Decl., Exh. F at ¶ 10; Wenzlau Decl., Exh. B [same].)
In its opposition to the motion, State Parks states that it “does not dispute Coastal Ranches’ status as the prevailing party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, as stipulated in the parties’ Settlement Agreement. However, [State] Parks contests the reasonableness of the fee requested in Coastal Ranches’ Fees Motion, and seeks fee reductions 1) to exclude the unsuccessful work attempting to join Caltrans to the litigation, 2) because Coastal Ranches did not meet its burden to show that all of its hours expended were reasonable and necessary, and 3) to conform with reasonable rates in Santa Barbara.” (Opp. at p. 5, ll. 13-17.) State Parks also requests that the Court “tax those costs that are either not allowable or not reasonably necessary, and thus ineligible.” (Id. at ll. 18-19.)
As to the attorney’s fees requested in the motion, State Parks does not appear to dispute that “the requirements for a private attorney general action have been satisfied.” (Benson v. Kwikset Corp. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1278 (Benson).) For these and all further reasons discussed above, the present record is sufficient to show that Coastal Ranches is, for purposes of section 1021.5, a successful party entitled to an award of attorney’s fees.
The motion of Coastal Ranches also includes a request for an award of costs. “The right to recover costs is purely a creature of statute, and the applicable statute defines the defines the extent of a party’s right to recover costs. Thus, absent statutory authorization, parties engaged in civil litigation must bear their own expenses in a lawsuit. [Citations.] [S]ection 1033.5 precludes recovery of the fees and expenses sought by plaintiff ‘except when expressly authorized by law.’ [Citation.]” (Benson, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1279.)
In addition, and relevant under the circumstances present here, “California case law has long recognized ‘the usual and ordinary meaning of the words “attorney's fees,” both in legal and in general usage, is the consideration that a litigant actually pays or becomes liable to pay in exchange for legal representation.’ [Citations.] The definition of attorney fees must be contrasted with the definition of ‘costs,’ which has been construed to mean “ ‘those fees and charges which are required by law to be paid to the Courts, or some of their officers’ or an amount which is expressly fixed by law as recoverable as costs. [Citations.]’ [Citations.] ‘The “costs” of a civil action ... usually exclud[e] attorney fees.’ [Citations.]” (Benson, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1279-1280.)
Though provision of the Settlement Agreement set forth above, which the parties do not appear to dispute is relevant for present purposes, expressly provides that Coastal Ranches is the successful party for purposes of an award of attorney’s fees and authorizes Coastal Ranches to move the Court under section 1021.5 for a determination of attorney’s fees costs, the Settlement Agreement is otherwise silent as to Coastal Ranches’ entitlement to an award of costs under section 1021.5.
Coastal Ranches also offers no reasoned argument showing why the costs described in the motion and supporting declarations constitute “reasonable costs or fees imposed for the preparation of the record of proceedings in conformance with any law or rule of Court.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 21167.6, subd. (b)(1); see also Wagner Farms, Inc. v. Modesto Irrigation Dist. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 765, 772-773 [discussion of “rules of law applicable to an award of costs” in mandamus cases].)
“Section 1021.5 authorizes recovery of attorney fees by the prevailing party. Since the statute does not mention costs, we conclude the Legislature intended Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, the general costs statute, to apply. Section 1033.5 precludes recovery of expert witness fees and the other expenses sought by plaintiff ‘except when expressly authorized by law.’ [Citations.]” (Benson, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1283.) For all reasons discussed above, Coastal Ranches has failed to show why it is entitled to an award of costs under section 1021.5.
In addition, the present record reflects that, to the extent Coastal Ranches requests an award of costs in the motion, section 1021.5 is not the operative statute. Instead, the general costs statutes set forth in sections 1032 and 1033.5 govern Coastal Ranches’ request for an award of costs.
Section 1032 provides that “a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (b).) The term “prevailing party” is defined under subdivision (a)(4) of section 1032. For all reasons discussed herein, Coastal Ranches has failed to show, with reasoned argument, why it is a “prevailing party” for purposes of section 1032, subdivision (a)(4), or why the Court should exercise its discretion to allow the costs requested in the motion.
By way of example, Coastal Ranches states in the motion that “there has been no financial recovery in the instant case....” (Motion at p. 12, ll. 16-17.) For this reason, the record reflects that Coastal Ranches is not a party with a net monetary recovery. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).) In addition, to the extent that neither Coastal Ranches nor State Parks obtained any relief, it would appear that State Parks is the prevailing party for purposes of section 1032, subdivision (a)(4).
Section 1032 authorizes the Court to determine the “prevailing party” in circumstances where a party “recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified....” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).) The parties here appear to dispute whether Coastal Ranches recovered something other than monetary relief and achieved its objectives in this litigation. Further, the general and conclusory arguments advanced in the motion, which appear to be directed to the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees requested by Coastal Ranches and not the costs claimed in the motion, are also insufficient to show why the Court should exercise its discretion to allow costs under the circumstances present here. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4) [also noting that the Court “may apportion costs between the parties....”].)
Even if the Court were to assume without deciding that Coastal Ranches is a prevailing party entitled to an award of costs under sections 1032 and 1033.5 (and the Court presently makes no findings in this regard), the Court has no record showing that Coastal Ranches served and filed a procedurally appropriate verified memorandum of costs as required under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(a)(1). Coastal Ranches also provides no information or evidence to show that the parties, either in the Settlement Agreement or by their conduct, “stipulated to an alternative procedure for awarding costs, dispensing with the usual formalities of a complete cost memo and a motion to tax costs.” (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 70; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (c).)
The Court further notes that under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(b)(1), a party may contest costs claimed in a memorandum of costs by filing a notice of motion to strike or tax those costs. “If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that were not reasonable or necessary. On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs. [Citations.] Whether a cost item was reasonably necessary to the litigation presents a question of fact for the trial Court and its decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774.)
For all reasons discussed above, by failing to file a verified memorandum of costs, by requiring State Parks to oppose costs claimed in what is effectively an attorney’s fees motion within its opposition, and by effectively failing to allow State Parks a complete opportunity to contest any costs in a noticed motion supported by a full memorandum (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113(d)), Coastal Ranches has effectively and improperly shifted the burden to State Parks and deprived State Parks of a complete opportunity to present its arguments. For these reasons, there also exist due process concerns.
In addition, Section 1033.5 sets forth the items which are and are not allowable as costs. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(1)-(16) & (b).) There exists some question as to whether costs identified in the motion are allowable under section 1033.5.
For example, the present motion appears to include a request for an award of costs incurred in connection with reports of expert witnesses, and for travel and lodging fees. (See, e.g., Cooper Decl., Exh. B at pdf p. 51 [expenses for “travel/lodging”] & Exhs. C-E.) Absent reasoned argument showing why the fees of expert witnesses were ordered by the Court or that the requested travel expenses were incurred to attend depositions, it appears these costs may not be allowable under section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(3)(C) and (8). Coastal Ranches also appears to claim costs for postage charges which are expressly not allowable under section 1033.5, subdivision (b)(3). (See, e.g., Cooper Decl., Exh. B at pdf pp. 51-53 [containing charges for “Mailing/Postage”.)
Moreover, to the extent any costs claimed in the motion are not expressly disallowed under subdivision (b) of section 1033.5, Coastal Ranches presents no reasoned argument showing why these costs are “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation...” or “reasonable in amount.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(2) & (4); Landwatch San Luis Obispo County v. Cambria Community Services District (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 638, 645.) “Whether such costs [are] reasonably necessary is a question of fact for the trial Court….” (Green v. County of Riverside (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1374.) Absent reasoned argument showing why costs not expressly disallowed are reasonably necessary or reasonable in amount, the Court is unable to make the findings required to determine whether to award these costs.
The examples provided above are intended to be illustrative but not exhaustive. For all reasons discussed above, to the extent Coastal Ranches requests an award of costs in the present motion, that request is procedurally and substantively inappropriate. Therefore, the Court will deny the motion, in part as to any request for an award of costs.
Notwithstanding the issues further discussed above, the Court’s denial of the present motion as to Coastal Ranches’ request for an award of costs is without prejudice to the filing and service of an appropriate and timely memorandum of costs by Coastal Ranches, and to the filing and service by State Parks of a procedurally appropriate noticed motion to strike or tax any costs claimed in any memorandum of costs that may be filed and served by Coastal Ranches in the future. Nothing herein shall be construed to prevent Coastal Ranches from including in any memorandum of costs those costs which Coastal Ranches claims are allowable under section 1033.5, or to prevent State Parks from raising in any motion to strike or tax those costs grounds which could have been but were not raised here.
Though Coastal Ranches is, for all reasons noted above, entitled to attorney’s fees as a successful party under section 1021.5, the Court will continue the motion, in part as to Coastal Ranches’ request for an award of attorney’s fees to permit further supplemental briefing necessary for the Court to determine the reasonableness of the fees requested in the motion.
“Determination of the amount of an attorney fees award under section 1021.5 begins with the calculation of a lodestar figure. [Citation.] The lodestar figure equals the hours expended by the attorney multiplied by that attorney’s reasonable hourly rate. [Citation.] ‘It is not necessary to provide detailed billing timesheets to support an award of attorney fees under the lodestar method. [Citations.] Declarations of counsel setting forth the reasonable hourly rate, the number of hours worked and the tasks performed are sufficient.’ [Citation.] The party seeking attorney fees has ‘the burden of showing that the fees incurred were “allowable,” were “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation,” and were “reasonable in amount.” ’ [Citation.]” (Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Julian Union Elementary School Dist. (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 970, 994; see also Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1133 [“an attorney fee award should ordinarily include compensation for all the hours reasonably spent, including those relating solely to the fee....”], original italics.)
As further detailed above, Cooper, Black, and Gregory each assert that they contemporaneously recorded the hours they expended in this litigation to represent Coastal Ranches, either through the use of computerized billing systems or through weekly notes and calendar entries. Cooper and Black have each provided copies of their respective firm’s billing records to show the hours and attorney’s fees expended by Sycamore and CBM LLP. Gregory submits the Statement of Services developed on a weekly basis based on his notes and calendar entries, to show the hours and fees expended by Gregory.
The billing records submitted in support of the present motion indicate or suggest that Sycamore expended time for matters other than the legal representation of Coastal Ranches. For example, the “Summary Report” attached to the Cooper declaration as exhibit A includes numerous entries which suggest or indicate that the hours expended by Sycamore relate to matters described as “Reimbursement for Normandeau Associates invoice #75417”, “Upham Hotel”, “United Airlines” or “United Airlines Airfare”, “NationWide Legal filing fee”, “CA File Filing Fee”, “USPS”, “Superior Court Fee”, “CA file”, “Transportation – Negib Zoghlami”, “Transportation - SF Taxicab”, various additional taxi fees, “Federal Express”, “Staples”, deposition invoices, “Jesse’s Getaway Cafe”, meals during depositions, and fuel, among others. (Cooper Decl., Exh. A at pdf pp. 28 & 30-36.) The time expended on these matters is billed in 1-hour increments. (Ibid.) It is unclear to the Court whether the time expended on these matters is included in the hours for which Coastal Ranches seeks compensation.
In addition, though the present record reflects that Sycamore attorneys Hambley, Mathieson, Jesse Swanhuyser, and Jessica Hollinger expended time to perform legal services in this action, Coastal Ranches does not include with the motion declarations of Jesse Swanhuyser or Jessica Hollinger describing the services performed by these attorneys. Coastal Ranches also advances no explanation or justification for the absence of these declarations. Considering that the billing records submitted by Sycamore appear to reflect time expended on matters other than the legal representation of Coastal Ranches, these declarations appear necessary.
“A trial Court may not rubber stamp a request for attorney fees, but must determine the number of hours reasonably expended.” (Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 271, original italics (Donahue).) For all reasons further discussed above, it appears to the Court that the attorney’s fees requested in the motion includes amounts that Coastal Ranches paid or became liable to pay in exchange for matters other than legal representation, and not for attorney’s fees. (See Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 280 [discussion of “reasonable attorney’s fees” subject to compensation].) The inclusion of these items, and the absence of what appear to be necessary declarations, impedes the Court’s ability to determine whether the fees requested in the motion are reasonable, or reflect time expended on matters which are not subject to compensation. (Donahue, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 271-272 [also noting the absence of declarations in the record].)
It also appears to the Court that there exists duplication of effort between Sycamore, CBM LLP, and Gregory. By way of example, the billing records of Sycamore include entries showing that Cooper expended at least 6 hours to draft and edit the petition. (Cooper Dec., Exh. A at pdf. p. 28.) The billing records of CBM LLC also show that Black also expended at least 3 hours to draft and review the petition. (Black Decl., Exh. A at pdf p. 11.) On August 1, 2024, Gregory expended 3.60 hours to review the petitions and answer. (Gregory Decl., Exh. 2 at pdf p. 16.)
Counsel’s billing records further reflect or suggest that Black expended at least 1.4 hours to draft opposition to a motion to strike and motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Black Decl., Exh. A at pdf p. 17.) In addition, Hambley expended over 16 hours draft opposition to ostensibly the same motion to strike and motion for judgment on the pleadings, and Cooper expended over 10 hours to ostensibly prepare edits to these oppositions. (Hambley Decl., Exh. A at pdf p. 20; Cooper Decl., Exh. A at pdf pp. 32-33.) The billing records submitted by Gregory also include 1.6 hours to “prepare for and review” Cooper’s oral argument re “Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.” (Gregory Decl., Exh. 2 at pdf p. 16.)
Further, though Gregory asserts that his primary role was to prepare this matter for trial and to serve as co-trial counsel, information appearing in counsel’s billing records reflects that Hambley ostensibly also expended a significant amount of time to prepare the matter for trial. (See, e.g., Hambley Decl., Exh. A at pdf pp. 24-26 [entries reflecting time expended to “Prep logistics for SB trial”, draft and edit witness trial outlines and trial brief, and to call experts re trial testimony, among other things]; Gregory Decl., Exh. 2 at pdf pp. 12-13 [same re witness lists & outlines, exhibits list, stipulation to admissibility/authenticity, and trial deliverables].) The record further reflects numerous calls, correspondence, and meetings between co-counsel for Coastal Ranches. (Hambley Decl., Exh. A at pdf pp. 18 & 23-25 [calls and meetings with Black, Gregory & Cooper]; see also Cooper Decl., Exh. A at pdf pp. 29 [calls and emails with Black], 37 [email to Black]; Gregory Decl., Exh. 2 at pdf pp. 13-16 [entries for co-counsel conferences]; Black Decl., Exh. A at pdf pp. 11 & 13 [telephone calls with Cooper], 12 [telephone calls and emails with Cooper], 14 [conferences and telephone calls with Cooper].) These billing entries suggest or indicate that there exists duplicative efforts between Coastal Ranches’ co-counsel.
The above examples are intended to be illustrative but not exhaustive. The Court notes that entries reflecting what appears to be an ostensible duplication of effort appear throughout counsel’s billing records.
“Reasonable compensation does not include compensation for ‘ “padding” in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts....’ [Citation.]” (Donahue, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 271.) Apart from general references to the reasonableness of the hours expended by co-counsel, wholly absent from the motion and the supporting declarations is any explanation of Coastal Ranches’ decision to retain three law firms to concurrently represent it in this proceeding, or for any apparent duplication of work by co-counsel that appears to have occurred in this matter. (Id. at p. 272 [also noting that “simultaneous representation by multiple law firms posed substantial risks of task padding, over-conferencing, attorney stacking (multiple attendance by attorneys at the same Court functions), and excessive research....”]; see also Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1326 [describing circumstances sufficient to “support[] the trial Court’s conclusion the matter was overstaffed....”].)
As Coastal Ranches is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees under section 1021.5 for all reasons discussed above, and considering that State Parks was effectively denied the opportunity to present a full opposition to Coastal Ranches’ request for an award of attorney’s fees for all reasons more fully discussed above, the Court will continue the hearing on the motion to permit Coastal Ranches to submit further supplemental briefing, with supporting declarations, addressing the matters discussed herein as to Coastal Ranches’ request for an award of attorney’s fees.
The Court expects that any supplemental brief and supporting declarations submitted by Coastal Ranches will fully and completely address the issues discussed herein, including in regard to entries in billing records which appear to reflect time expended for matters other than the legal representation of Coastal Ranches such as the items described herein any other items not identified in this ruling which appear in the billing records. In addition, to the extent the billing records reflect any duplication of effort between Sycamore, CBM LLC, and Gregory, including with respect to the matters discussed above and any other matters no included in this ruling which reflect duplication of effort due to counsel’s simultaneous representation of Coastal Ranches, the Court also expects that Coastal Ranches will provide in its supplemental brief and supporting declarations, a sufficient explanation justifying each instance of simultaneous representation or duplication of effort, including why any related billing records do not reflect inefficiencies or are reasonable.
In addition, the Court will permit State Parks to submit a response to the supplemental brief to be provided by Coastal Ranches. Nothing herein shall be construed to prevent State Parks from raising in that response any point or argument that could have been but was not raised in State Parks’ present opposition to the motion.
The parties may not submit any further papers in support of or in opposition to the present motion apart from the supplemental briefing described in this ruling.