COASTAL RANCHES CONSERVANCY V. CALIFORNIA DEPT. OF STATE PARKS AND RECREATION, ET AL
COASTAL RANCHES CONSERVANCY V. CALIFORNIA DEPT. OF STATE PARKS AND RECREATION, ET AL
Case Number
22CV02818
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Wed, 03/06/2024 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Demurrer by Caltrans to Third Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
Tentative Ruling
Daniel Cooper of Sycamore Law, Inc. and Michelle Black of Carstens, Black & Minteer, LLP for Petitioner Coastal Ranches Conservancy
Erin Holbrook / G. Michael Harrington / Lucille Y. Baca / Justin P. Wynne of California Dept. of Transp. Legal Division for Caltrans
RULING
For the reasons more fully articulated below, the demurrer will be sustained, without leave to amend.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Coastal Ranches Conservancy (CRC) filed its original verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief on July 22, 2022, and its First Amended Petition on September 13, 2022. Both the initial petition and First Amended Petition (FAP) named only the California Department of State Parks and Recreation (State Parks) as the Respondent. There are multiple claims maintained against State Parks in these petitions, which complain of its failure to implement habitat restorations required by a condition of project approval in a 1992 Coastal Development Permit for a project to rehabilitate Gaviota State Beach, and related to a 1998 Mitigated Negative Declaration (MND) under CEQA, related to a project to improve water supply to Gaviota State Beach and rest stops near Gaviota Creek operated by the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans). The latter project included diversions from Las Cruces Spring, which is a source of year-round cold water to Hot Springs Creek. The MND noted that the project could cause adverse impacts to surface water resources and related potential impacts to plant and wildlife, without the project operation standards it described. To prevent those impacts, the MND provided:
“To ensure that coincidence of peak use periods does not adversely impact biological resources in the Hot Springs and Las Canovas Creeks, during the period of July 1 through September 30, the Caltrans well will be utilized at full capacity any time the spring source drops below 30 gpm. Based on the foregoing, potential impacts to surface water resources and related potential impacts to plants and wildlife can be avoided through the project operation standards described and no significant adverse impacts to these resources will occur.”
The earlier petitions essentially complain, among other things, about State Parks’ failure to comply with the requirements of a Mitigated Negative Declaration under CEQA, for a project to improve water supply to Gaviota State Beach and rest stops near Gaviota Creek operated by Caltrans. The original petition alleged causes of action against State Parks for (1) waste and unreasonable use of water, (2) violation of public trust duties, and (3) failure to comply with the negative declaration as required by CEQA. The FAP continued to allege those causes of action, but divided the CEQA claims into separate claims based upon its (a) failure to comply with the negative declaration for the Gaviota Beach State Park Rehabilitation Project (3rd cause of action) and (b) failure to comply with the negative declaration for the Water Supply Project (5th cause of action), and added a cause of action for failure to comply with the Coastal Development Permit for Gaviota Beach State Park Rehabilitation Project, as required by the Coastal Act.
CRC filed a Second Amended Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (SAP) on June 21, 2023. Functionally, it was identical to the FAP, except it added allegations with respect to Caltrans, and added a cause of action stated solely against Caltrans. The added allegations included noting Caltrans’ ownership of a well that State Parks’ environmental documents require it to use during periods of low flow in Las Cruces Spring, and the subsequent entry into a Well Contract with State Parks in which Caltrans agreed to operate and maintain the well and supply well water to the State Parks treatment facility in exchange for State Parks upgrading of the Las Cruces water treatment plant to Caltrans’ specifications, quoting a provision from the contract that the existing Caltrans water source be maintained in place for use in times of low yield from the State Parks well and treatment facility, and noting that the MND issued by State Parks relied on the Caltrans well.
The SAP’s added cause of action was entitled “Against Respondent California Department of Transportation Pursuant to Interagency Agreement #05-SB-101-46.1/48 For Failing to Maintain State Parks’ Access to the Caltrans Well.” It alleged that State Parks’ compliance with its CEQA obligations relied upon Caltrans’ maintenance and provision of water from its well, but that Caltrans had failed to maintain or make the well available to State Parks during times of low flow, as required by the contract, and Caltrans had therefore failed to comply with the contract. Consequently, State Parks was prevented from complying with its CEQA obligations, to the detriment of sensitive species, and in violation of Caltrans’ public trust duties. No other provisions of the contract were alleged in the SAP, nor was it attached to the SAP. The SAP sought issuance of a writ of mandate compelling Caltrans to comply with the Well Contract.
Caltrans demurred to the FAP on grounds that CRC had not adequately pled the Well Contract, and failed to plead facts sufficient to establish a legally cognizable third-party right to enforce the Well Contract. After hearing on November 29, 2023, the Court sustained the demurrer, with leave to amend. The Court found that the Well Contract was not adequately alleged, in that it was not attached to the SAP, and there were no allegations with respect to the material allegations of the complaint other than the single sentence “The existing Caltrans water source shall be maintained in place for use in times of low yield from the State Parks well and treatment facility,” which never mentioned State Parks’ mitigation obligations, or tethered Caltrans’ obligations under the contract to those mitigation obligations in any way. The Court further found that the SAP failed to allege sufficient facts to establish either the beneficial interest standing or public interest standing of CRC to seek to compel Caltrans’ compliance with the Well Contract.
CRC filed its Third Amended Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (TAP) on December 11, 2023. The TAP swelled from the 170 paragraphs of general allegations contained in the SAP (215 paragraphs overall), to the 249 paragraphs of general allegations contained in the TAP (323 paragraphs overall). It restated the cause of action for failing to maintain State Parks’ access to the well and alleged a new cause of action against Caltrans for violation of public trust duties.
The TAP attached as an exhibit a copy of a document entitled “Interagency Agreement Gaviota State Park and Gaviota Roadside Rests Water Systems Improvement Project,” with a notation in its upper corner which designates it as “Interagency Agreement # 05-SB-101-46.1/48.5.” The Interagency Agreement was entered into by and between Caltrans and State Parks. The Interagency Agreement’s recitals articulated that the parties had a mutual interest in the provision of potable water to state-owned facilities in the Gaviota Pass area, including the public park, campground, residences, and a hot spring owned and operated by State Parks, and the roadside rest area for highway users owned and operated by Caltrans. State Parks planned to increase the capacity of water treatment facilities and to construct a new water line to transport water taken from the facility to its existing recreational facilities in Gaviota State Park. Caltrans had an existing well and waterline located within the median of the SR 101 right-of-way and was authorized to develop the property or to permit it to be developed by others. The agreement recited further that the parties desired to work cooperatively in the joint planning of a new waterline to provide water to the roadside rest stop and to the state park and campground facility, and to define their responsibilities in planning, designing, constructing, operating, and maintaining the water line, by entering into the agreement. The agreement then articulated 10 paragraphs setting forth terms for construction, maintenance, and operation of the new water line, as well as a defense and indemnity provision, a provision that the agreement may be amended only by written agreement, and a statement that all commitments were conditional on the passage of an annual fiscal year budget. At ¶ 5, Interagency Agreement provided that Caltrans and State Parks would share the water provided by the pipeline on the following basis: (a) At all flows from the treatment facility in excess of twenty gallons per minute (20 GPM), Caltrans shall be allotted ten gallons per minute or 14,000 gallons per day. (b) When total flows form the treatment facility fall below 20 GPM, the water shall be shared equally between State Parks and Caltrans. (c) The existing Caltrans water source shall be retained in place for use in times of low yield from the State Parks well and treatment facility. (This is the agreement CRC has referred to as the “Well Contract,” although the construction, maintenance, and operation of the water line is the subject of the agreement.)
The allegations added to the TAP include allegations with respect to six individual members and board members of CRC, which details the personal interest of each in Gaviota Creek and the protection and restoration of its watershed. (¶¶ 15-60.) It alleges Caltrans’ ownership, operation, and maintenance of Highway 101, including the portion in the Gaviota Creek watershed, which is biologically productive and contains deep holding pools where steelhead can find refuge during hot and dry summer months, Caltrans’ construction of twelve small check dams in the 1050s that partially or completely block the passage of steelhead, its operation of two rest stops on Gaviota Creek, the provision by State Parks of water to the two rest stops, and Caltrans’ control of the well used by State Parks to supply its facilities during periods of low flow in Las Cruces Spring. (¶¶ 66-72.) It makes general allegations of public interest standing by CRC and its members (¶ 77, 83.) It adds general legal arguments regarding use of mandamus to procure enforcement of a public duty. (¶¶ 89-91.) In its discussion of the Gaviota Creek watershed, it again adds allegations that a significant portion of Gaviota Creek is controlled by Caltrans, where it is adjacent to Highway 101, and realleges Caltrans’ construction of fish passage barriers. (¶¶ 161-162.) In its discussion of steelhead, the TAP alleges that Caltrans identified 14 fish passage barriers on Gaviota Creek as a statewide priority for removal (¶ 173), and alleges that Caltrans has started planning on a Gaviota Creek Improvement Project to remove and/or replace the barriers, and otherwise remediate the barriers (§ 176), but the estimated completion date of the project has been pushed from 2027 to 2031. (¶ 177.) Finally, within the discussion of CEQA and impact mitigation, the TAP adds an allegation which quotes the MND for State Parks’ Water Supply Project. (¶ 229.)
The new seventh cause of action against Caltrans for violation of its public trust duties alleges that the state holds tidal and navigable waters in trust for public uses, including navigation, commerce, fishing, recreation, and habitat conservation, that Southern California Steelhead are a public trust resource, that Caltrans has a public trust duty to consider the effect of their use of public trust resources, and that Caltrans is responsible for the protection of public trust resources and Gaviota Creek. It then alleges that State Parks has a duty to consider the impact on public trust resources resulting from the diversion at Las Cruces Spring and, where feasible to eliminate those impacts. It then simply alleges that Caltrans’ failure to comply with the Well Contract impacts public trust resources, and the harms to the public trust from that non-compliance continue.
As against Caltrans, the TAP continues to seek only issuance of a writ of mandate ordering that Caltrans “comply with Interagency Agreement #05-SB-101-46.1/48 by maintaining its Gaviota Pass well and otherwise making water available during times of low yield from the State Parks facility.” (Prayer @ ¶ 4.)
As against State Parks, CRC seeks (1) issuance of a writ compelling State Parks to comply with CEQA and the mitigation provisions set forth in the MND, (2) issuance of a writ compelling State Parks to comply with the Coastal Act and the mitigation provisions set forth in its Coastal Development Permit, (3) issuance of a writ compelling State Parks to comply with its public trust duties by stopping diversions from the Las Cruces Spring until there has been sufficient analysis regarding the impact to public trust resources from the spring diversion and, where feasible, mitigation of such impacts; and (4) fees and costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.
While the TAP is denominated as including equitable claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, it does not seek any specific declarations or injunctions, and prays only for “other injunctive and/or declaratory relief, as appropriate.”
Demurrer
Caltrans has demurred to the TAP, on multiple grounds, seeking to have the demurrer sustained without leave to amend. First, Caltrans contends that the TAP fails to support any cause of action against it based upon the Well Contract, because material allegations of the TAP are contrary to those of the Well Contract, and the terms of the Well Contract are not connected in any way to State Parks’ mitigation commitments. Second, Caltrans contends that the TAP fails to plead facts sufficient to establish either beneficial interest standing or public interest standing by CRC to enforce the Well Contract solely between State Parks and Caltrans. Caltrans further demurs, contending that the sixth cause of action fails to plead a viable cause of action, and CRC failed to plead sufficient facts to sustain its seventh cause of action.
CRC has opposed the demurrer on all grounds.
ANALYSIS
The Court will sustain the demurrer, without leave to amend.
I. Standards on demurrer.
The Court’s task in ruling on a demurrer is to determine whether the complaint states a cause of action. (People ex rel. Lungren v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 300.) A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded (Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967), no matter how unlikely or improbable they may be (Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604), or how unlikely it will be that Plaintiff will be able to prove the claim (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 213-214). The Court also assumes the truth of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the properly pleaded facts. (Reynolds v. Bement (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1075, 1083.) The assumption of truth does not apply, however, to contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law or fact. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters, and therefore lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Id.)
Once again, CRC submitted a declaration of one of its members, Doug Campbell, in support of its opposition to demurrer. Just as was the case with the previous demurrer, this is patently improper. The Court has disregarded the declaration.
II. Availability of and standing to pursue mandamus as a remedy.
A. General standards and requirements for traditional mandamus.
A traditional writ of mandate will issue to compel the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085), where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086.) Such writ will issue against a county, city or other public body or against a public officer. (County of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 643, 653.) A writ of mandate under Section 1085 is a vehicle to compel a public entity to perform a legal duty, typically one that is ministerial. (Citizens for Amending Proposition L v. City of Pomona (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1159, 1173.)
A ministerial act is an act that a public officer is required to perform in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority and without regard to his own judgment or opinion concerning such act’s propriety or impropriety, when a given state of facts exists. (Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School District (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 916.) Where a statute or ordinance clearly defines the specific duties or course of conduct that a governing body must take, that course of conduct becomes mandatory and eliminates any element of discretion. (Bullis Charter School v. Los Altos School District (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1022, 1035.) Mandate will not lie to control a public agency’s discretion, i.e., to force the exercise of discretion in a particular manner. (Weiss v. City of Los Angeles (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 194, 204.)
B. Principles of beneficial interest and public interest standing
To establish associational standing, a Petitioner must demonstrate that its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right. (Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Commission (1999) 21 Cal.4th 352, 361.) As a general rule, to have standing to seek a writ of mandate, a party must be “beneficially interested.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086.) “The requirement that a Petitioner be ‘beneficially interested’ has been generally interpreted to mean that one may obtain the writ only if the person has some special interest to be served or some particular right to be preserved or protected over and above the interest held in common with the public at large. [Citations.] As Professor Davis states the rule: ‘One who is in fact adversely affected by governmental action should have standing to challenge that action if it is judicially reviewable. (Davis, 3 Administrative Law Treatise (1958) p. 291.)” (Carsten v. Psychology Examining Com. (1980) 26 Cal.3d 793, 796-797.) The beneficial interest must be direct and substantial. (Save the Plastic Bag Coalition v. City of Manhattan Beach (2011) 52 Cal.4th 155, 165.) The standard is equivalent to the federal “injury in fact” test, which requires a party to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it has suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. (Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Commission, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 362.) The Petitioner’s interest in the outcome of the proceedings must be substantial, and a writ will not issue to enforce a technical, abstract, or moot right. (Braude v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 83, 87.) The Petitioner must show that his legal rights are injuriously affected by the action being challenged. (Ibid.)
Nevertheless, where the question is one of public right, and the object of mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, a Petitioner need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, since it is sufficient that he is interested as a citizen in having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced. (Save the Plastic Bag Coalition v. City of Manhattan Beach, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 166.) This “public right/public duty” exception to the requirement of beneficial interest for a writ of mandate promotes the policy of guaranteeing citizens the opportunity to ensure that no governmental body impairs or defeats the purpose of legislation establishing a public right. (Ibid.) This variety of standing is referred to as public interest standing (Ibid), or citizen standing. (Citizens for Amending Proposition L v. City of Pomona, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 1174.)
The interest of a citizen may be considered sufficient when the public duty is sharp and the public need weighty. (Waste Management of Alameda County, Inc. v. County of Alameda (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1236, disapproved on other grounds by Save the Plastic Bag Coalition v. City of Manhattan Beach, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 169-170.) The Courts balance the applicant’s need for relief (i.e., his beneficial interest) against the public need for enforcement of the official duty. When the duty is sharp and the public need weighty, the Courts will grant a mandamus at the behest of an applicant who shows no greater personal interest than that of a citizen who wants the law enforced. (Citizens for Amending Proposition L v. City of Pomona, supra.) Determining whether the public interest exception to the beneficial interest requirement is warranted thus involves a judicial balancing of interests, and the balancing is done on a sliding scale, i.e., when the public need is less pointed, the Courts hold Petitioner to a sharper showing of personal need. (Ibid.) The trial Court may also find public interest standing outweighed by competing considerations of a more urgent nature, and a Petitioner is not entitled to pursue a mandamus petition under the public interest exception as a matter of right. (Ibid.)
A trial Court only considers the public interest exception if the Petitioner fails to demonstrate a beneficial interest. (See Citizens for Amending Proposition L v. City of Pomona, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 1175.) If a petition reveals that a Petitioner either lacks the right or standing to sue, it is vulnerable to a general demurrer on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action. (Carsten v. Psychology Examining Com, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 796.)
III. Propriety of mandamus to enforce Caltrans’ alleged contractual obligations.
- Allegations and party arguments.
The TAP alleges two causes of action against Caltrans. The sixth cause of action alleges that Caltrans’ failure to comply with the Well Contract impacts Gaviota Creek and the Steelhead that depend on it and has prevented State Parks form complying with its CEQA obligations. (TAP @ ¶¶ 308-315, generally.). The seventh cause of action alleges that Caltrans has a public trust duty to consider the effect of their use of public trust resources, is responsible for protection of public trust resources in Gaviota Creek, that State Parks has a duty to consider the impact on public trust resources resulting from the diversion at Las Cruces spring and, where feasible, eliminate those impacts, and that Caltrans’ failure to comply with the Well Contract impacts public trust resources. (TAP @ ¶¶ 318-323, generally.) The only relief sought by CRC against Caltrans in this proceeding, is a writ of mandate compelling Caltrans’ compliance with the Well Contract. (TAP Prayer @ ¶ 4 [“Coastal Ranches Conservancy prays that this Court order Caltrans to comply with Interagency Agreement #05-SB-101-46.1/48 by maintaining its Gaviota Pass well and otherwise making water available during times of low yield from the State Parks facility.”].)
Caltrans demurrer, within its discussion of CRC’s lack of beneficial interest standing to enforce a contract to which it is not a party, argues further that writ relief is not appropriate to enforce a public entity’s contractual obligations, but rather is properly directed to enforcing an official duty of a public officer or entity, citing Wenzler v. Municipal Court (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 128, 132, and 300 DeHaro Street Investors v. Department of Housing & Community Development (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 12430, 1254-1255. It asserts this is true because public entities are under no special duty to carry out the terms of contracts or to refrain from breaching them, and thus are not properly subject to mandamus for such breaches, citing Wenzler, supra. (Demurrer @ p. 8, lines 9-18.)
In its discussion of CRC’s lack of public interest standing, Caltrans further asserts that the TAP fails to allege facts to support the enforcement of a public duty owed by Caltrans as to or under the contract CRC is seeking to enforce, contending that the type of legal, ministerial duty necessary for public interest standing in a writ case is one that is required to be performed in a prescribed manner under the mandate of legal authority, without the exercise of discretion or judgment, citing County of San Diego v. State of California (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 5880, 593. It notes that the TAP fails to allege any statute or legal enactment that imposes a nondiscretionary mandate on Caltrans as to the contract, and instead conflates a contractual duty with a non-existent public duty. It then reiterates the argument it previously made in discussing beneficial interest standing, that public officials are under no special or public duty to comply with contractual provisions, which are properly dealt with between the contracting parties under contract law, again citing Wenzler, supra.
In opposition to the demurrer, and within its argument that it possesses public interest standing to compel Caltrans’ compliance with the Well Contract (Opposition @ pp. 18:5-18), CRC first notes that the public interest exception functions to promote the policy of guaranteeing citizens the opportunity to ensure that no governmental body impairs or defeats the purpose of the legislation establishing a public right (citing Save the Plastic Bag, supra), but contends further that the use of the public interest standing exception is not limited to matters where a governmental body has impaired the purpose of legislation establishing a public right, but may be used in a writ action to enforce any public duty, including contractual and public trust duties. It cites to Green v. Obledo (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126, and its discussion of the use of the public interest exception citing Board of Social Welfare v. County of Los Angeles (1945) 27 Cal.2d 98, 101, which explains that the use of the public interest exception is appropriate “when a power or duty is imposed by law upon a public board or officer, and in order to execute such power or perform such duty, it becomes necessary to obtain a writ of mandamus, it or he may apply for the same.”
CRC then proceeds to contend (Opposition @ p. 19:5-17) that mandamus against public agencies is available where there is a clear, present ministerial duty by the Respondent, to perform a specific act in a manner prescribed by law whenever a given state of facts exists, without regard to any personal judgment as to the propriety of the act, and concludes that the Well Contract sets out a ministerial duty by requiring that “[t]he existing Caltrans water source shall be maintained in place for use in times of low yield form the State Parks well and treatment facility.”
CRC’s opposition contains a separate section discussing the propriety of a writ of mandamus to enforce the Well Contract and Caltrans’ alleged public trust duties (Opposition at 20:9—21:2), in which it briefly again addresses the issue. It noted that the Wenzler Court provided two reasons that mandamus is not an appropriate remedy for enforcing a contractual obligation against a public entity, including (1) because contracts are enforceable by ordinary civil actions, and mandamus is not available where there is an adequate remedy at law, and (2) because the duty a writ of mandamus enforces is not the contractual duty of the entity, but the official duty of the Respondent officer or board. It then argues that Caltrans’ contractual and official duties are the same here, in that its contractual duty under the Well Contract directly corresponds to its official duty under the Public Trust doctrine to preserve public trust resources. CRC then cites Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1349, and National Audubon Society v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal.3d 419, which authorize the use of mandamus to enforce public duties, including public trust duties, concluding that the TAP properly alleges Caltrans’ violation of its duty to protect public trust resources in the Gaviota Creek watershed by failing to comply with the terms of the Well Contract.
In its reply (Reply @ 8:8—9:13), Caltrans asserts that CRC failed to cite any case where public interest standing has granted a claimant non-party enforcement rights to a contract. CRC admitted that a writ is only appropriate where the agency has a ministerial duty to perform a specific act in a manner prescribed by law whenever a given state of facts exists. Caltrans argues that a public entity’s contractual obligation is not a ministerial duty, and has specifically been held not to be a public duty, citing Wenzler, supra, and The H.N. & Frances C. Berger Foundation v. Perez (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 37, 48-49 [no mandatory duty in discretionary contractual agreement]; and California Teachers Association v. Governing Board (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 393, 399 [mandamus inappropriate to compel act not required by law]. Because performance of the Well Contract—an agreement to install and share a pipeline, which defines the parties rights and obligations—is not an act required by law as a matter of public right, Caltrans concludes it provides no basis for public interest standing, further contending that the cases cited by CRC illustrated that public interest standing must be based on legislation establishing a public right.
Caltrans’ reply also separately responded to CRC’s separate argument regarding the propriety of a writ of mandate to enforce the Well Contract (Reply @ 9:15—10:10), in which it noted that the allegations of the TAP and arguments in the opposition did not cure the defect in the SAP, when the Court stated that none of CRC’s cited cases supported the proposition that public interest standing allowed for nonparty enforcement of a public entity contract. While CRC attempted to distinguish Wenzler, its reasoning and express holding that mandamus is not an appropriate remedy for enforcing a contractual obligation against a public entity, remains and applies. While CRC attempts to avoid the rule by contending that Caltrans’ public trust duties and contractual duties were the same, that statement is contrary to law under Wenzler, which distinguished official public duties subject to mandamus, and public entity contractual duties not subject to mandamus. Further, neither a public right nor a public duty is at issue as to Caltrans, and the Well Contract does not involve a public right or public duty under law. CRC’s reliance on Center for Biological Diversity and Audubon to support their argument that the public trust doctrine applies to Caltrans’ contractual obligations is unavailing, because both cases involved a statute or ordinance that clearly defined and imposed specific public duties.
- Analysis and resolution.
Based on the allegations of the TAP, the documents incorporated therein, the arguments and authorities presented by the parties, and the considerable research conducted by the Court, it has concluded that mandate is legally unavailable to compel Caltrans’ compliance with the Interagency Agreement, for a variety of reasons.
First, as noted above, the law does not impose upon public agencies or their officers any special duty to carry out the terms of their contracts, or to refrain from breaches of contracts. Nothing in the law distinguishes them from other entities or individuals by requiring them, alone, to always observe their contractual obligations. Indeed, it is generally understood that except under the very limited circumstances under which an equitable action for specific performance of a contract can be stated, parties may freely breach contracts, so long as they are willing to respond in damages. The above-cited law makes very clear that there is nothing about public agencies as contracting parties that places them in any position where their contractual performance may always be compelled. The fact that CRC is not a contracting party does not alter this conclusion in any way, particularly since there is nothing in the Interagency Agreement to construct, maintain, and operate a water line, to indicate that the public as a whole, or any interested member thereof, could possibly constitute an express third-party beneficiary of the contract.
This conclusion is further affirmed by the authority providing that mandamus is not appropriate where the act which a Plaintiff seeks to compel is not an act required by law. (The H.N. & Frances C. Berger Foundation v. Perez (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 36, 46, citing California Teachers Association v. Governing Board (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 393, 399.) The TAP does not allege, nor has CRC cited, any facts or authority which would have the legal effect of elevating Caltrans’ contractual obligations under the Interagency Agreement to an act required by law, as opposed to a mere contractual obligation.
Second, even if this were not true and a contractual obligation could be enforced through issuance of a writ of mandate, the term of the contract with which the TAP seeks Caltrans’ compliance is does not clearly define its specific duties or course of conduct related to the well, so as to permit the contractual obligations to constitute a “ministerial act” subject to a writ of mandate. To be ministerial, an act is one that a public officer is required to perform in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority and without regard to his own judgment or opinion concerning such act’s propriety or impropriety, when a given state of facts exists. (Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School District (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 916.) Further, mandate does not lie to control a public agency’s discretion, i.e., to force its exercise of discretion in a particular manner. (Weiss v. City of Los Angeles (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 194, 204.)
A common example of a truly ministerial duty, subject to enforcement through issuance of a writ of mandate, exists where a statute or ordinance requires a public agency to issue a particular type of permit, where certain articulated requirements are met. If an application is presented which meets all those requirements—i.e., presents the required the “given state of facts”—the agency then has no discretion to do anything other than issue the permit, i.e., it has a ministerial duty to issue the permit. If it fails or refuses to do so, the applicant may seek a writ of mandate to compel the agency to specifically do what the law requires it to do, i.e., issue the permit.
The sole provision of the Interagency Agreement with which CRC seeks to compel compliance is: “The existing Caltrans water source shall be maintained in place for use in times of low yield from the State Parks well and treatment facility.” What exactly does that mean? By what standard can it be determined that the yield from the State Parks well and treatment facility is sufficiently “low” that it triggers the specific Caltrans obligation with which CRC seeks to compel Caltrans’ compliance? The agreement specifies how water from the treatment facility would be allocated depending upon whether the flows exceeded 20 GPM or not but does not define 20 GPM as any sort of “low yield” threshold, nor does it set forth any indication of what would constitute a “low yield” under the contract. Any determination of whether flows were “low” would require the exercise of judgment or discretion.
Consequently, no “given state of facts” is articulated in the contract that would compel Caltrans to act, nor is there any clearly articulated prescribed manner of performance which could be compelled without regard to judgment or discretion. Even if a contract could be enforced through issuance of a writ of mandate, the terms of the Interagency Agreement which CRC seeks to enforce cannot be enforced without forcing Caltrans to exercise its discretion in a particular manner—which is something which mandate cannot be used to accomplish.
Third, none of this is altered by CRC’s attempted reliance on case law related to public interest standing, either generally or in matters which properly fall within the public trust doctrine. Public interest standing merely permits interested members of the public to petition for issuance of writs of mandates against public agencies in order to procure the enforcement of a public duty, when the person is interested as a citizen in having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced. Not only is it highly questionable that any public right or public duty exists with respect to Caltrans’ contractual obligation to “retain in place for use in times of low yield” its existing water source, but public interest standing, even when appropriately recognized and applied, does not grant the Petitioner any special dispensation to compel a public agency to perform acts which are not otherwise properly subject to mandate. Public interest standing merely permits interested members of the public to petition for issuance of writs of mandate against public agencies, where issuance of a writ of mandate against the public agency would otherwise be proper; it does not make mandate an appropriate remedy, where mandate would not otherwise be permissible.
Indeed, the Court in Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1349—relied on by CRC for its contention that it has public interest standing to compel Caltrans’ compliance with the Interagency Agreement—makes clear that in actions for breach of the public trust brought against appropriate responsible public agencies, neither members of the public nor the Court may assume the task of administering the trust. (Center for Biological Diversity, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 1368.) Imposing mandate upon Caltrans to comply with a contract the provisions of which would not otherwise be subject to mandate, would constitute the impermissible “administration” of the public trust by CRC and the Courts.
For all the foregoing reasons, the Court will sustain the demurrer