Jason Leggitt vs Virandra Singh et al

Case Number

22CV02789

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 03/11/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

CMC; Motion re Anti-Slapp Motion

Tentative Ruling

Jason Leggitt v. Viranda Singh, et al.                                

Case No. 22CV02789      

Hearing Date: March 11, 2024                                                

HEARING:              Anti-SLAPP Motion of Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Jason Leggitt

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Jason Leggitt: Adam T. Carralejo

                                    For Defendants and Cross-Complainants Viranda Singh, Rehanna Singh, and The V. Singh Family Living Trust, UTD, 11/29/2004: Robert L. Scott                       

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff and cross-defendant Jason Leggitt’s anti-SLAPP motion is granted as to the sixth cause of action contained in the Singh’s cross-complaint for interference with prospective advantage, and that cause of action is stricken.

Background:

This action commenced on July 20, 2022, by the filing of the complaint by plaintiff Jason Leggitt (“Leggitt”) against defendants Viranda Singh and Rehana Singh. (Collectively “the Singhs.”) The complaint alleges causes of action for trespass to land and trespass.

As alleged in the complaint:

Leggitt and the Singhs own adjacent parcels of property, on De la Vina Street in Santa Barbara, between which is an alleyway that is designated in the deed to Leggitt’s property. Since the Singhs purchased their parcel in 2006, the parties have disagreed over the use of the alleyway and the Singhs have regularly exceeded the scope of use as an alleyway by placing personal items in it. Leggitt has made several attempts to resolve the issue without success. The Singhs demanded that Leggitt provide an official land survey.

Leggitt contracted with a survey company that determined the property line is located approximately midway between the two building structures with an alleyway easement along a five-foot-wide section of Leggitt’s parcel. Leggitt sent notice to the Singhs and asked them to remove the personal property trespassing on Leggitt’s property. The Singhs did not remove their personal items from Leggitt’s property and has placed more permanent storage containers encroaching on Leggitt’s property.

On August 26, 2022, while self-represented, the Singhs filed an answer to the complaint setting forth their version of the dispute with Leggitt.

On October 18, 2023, the Singhs filed a substitution of attorney and are no longer self-represented.

On December 21, 2023, the parties filed a stipulation to allow the Singhs to file a cross-complaint and allow Leggitt to amend his complaint.

On January 2, 2024, the Singhs filed their cross-complaint against Leggitt setting forth causes of action for: (1) Quiet Title Adverse Possession; (2) Quiet Title Prescriptive Easement; (3) Quiet Title Equitable Easement; (4) Quiet Title Implied Easement; (5) Declaratory Relief; and (6) Interference with Prospective Advantage. [Note: The sixth cause of action is incorrectly set forth as “Damages” in the caption of the cross-complaint.]

The Singhs are seeking quiet fee simple title to portions of property, easements, and improvements extending into disputed areas of the subject properties, as well as easements and rights to occupation and use of portions of the properties and improvements thereon.

Leggitt moves to strike this sixth cause of action for interference with prospective advantage based on the Anti-SLAPP statutes. Leggitt argues that the sixth cause of action is protected by the litigation privilege because the conduct giving rise to the cause of action was made before a judicial proceeding. Leggitt also seeks attorney fees and costs incurred in bring the motion.

The Singhs oppose the motion.

Analysis:

1.         Standards for Special Motions to Strike

Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 provides, in relevant parts:

(a) The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances. The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process. To this end, this section shall be construed broadly.

(b)(1) A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.

(2) In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.

(3) If the court determines that the plaintiff has established a probability that he or she will prevail on the claim, neither that determination nor the fact of that determination shall be admissible in evidence at any later stage of the case, or in any subsequent action, and no burden of proof or degree of proof otherwise applicable shall be affected by that determination in any later stage of the case or in any subsequent proceeding.

* * *

(e) As used in this section, “act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue” includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law . . . . [Emphasis added.]

“Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps. First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by [Code of Civil Procedure] section 425.16. [Citation.] If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success. We have described this second step as a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure.’ [Citation, fn.] The court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law. [Citation.] ‘[C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.’ [Citation.]” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384–385.)

2.         First Prong

“A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim. [Citations.] Critically, ‘the defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.’ [Citations.] ‘[T]he mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.’ [Citations.] Instead, the focus is on determining what ‘the defendant’s activity [is] that gives rise to his or her asserted liability—and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.’ [Citation.] ‘The only means specified in section 425.16 by which a moving defendant can satisfy the [“arising from”] requirement is to demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct by which plaintiff claims to have been injured falls within one of the four categories described in subdivision (e)....’ [Citation.] In short, in ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, courts should consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1062–1063.)

As alleged in the Singh’s sixth cause of action:

“126. Because of the proximity of their real properties there existed a noncontractual economic relationship between Cross-Complainants and Cross-Defendant LEGGITT that involved probable future economic damage to Cross-Complainant. Prior to July 20, 2022, Cross-Complainant and Cross-Defendant LEGGITT had discussions that devolved into disputes. Although Cross-Complainant made good faith efforts to accommodate his demands, cross-defendant LEGGITT attempted to deprive Cross-Complainant SINGHS of their rights in their properties and EASEMENTS that had developed and matured over a period in excess of 100 years. Included in the disputes was the demand that Cross-Complainants tear down half of their long-standing GARAGE and other improvements and surrender the use of half of their ten-foot driveway/sideyard.” (Italics Added.)

“127. Cross-Defendant knew the worth of making properties ready for market and/or rentals, and that a lawsuit would cause expensive delays. He nonetheless refused to relent in his efforts to coerce Cross-Complainants to surrender their rights and give up earned OCCUPANCIES, USES and EASEMENTS relative to the respective properties. Cross-Defendant LEGGITT knew of the existence of the economic hardships described above.” (Italics Added.)

“128. Cross-Defendant LEGGITT intentionally acted to disrupt the above-described

potential economic relationships, causing confusion and financial barriers so that Cross-Complainants would no longer be capable of marketing or otherwise renting their properties with the intent to harm Cross-Complainants financially and to induce them not to seek revenues from their rightful property interests.”

“129. Cross-Defendant LEGGIT’S actions alleged above constituted an unfair trade practice in violation of Business and Professions Code Section 17200 in that the properties are side-by-side and compete with one another for clients, customers and tenants in the same marketplace.”

“130. Cross-Complainants’ property was unable to be brought to a condition to be

safely and competitively made available for market rentals or owing to activities precipitated with the building department as a result of Cross-Defendant LEGGITT’S conduct.”

“131. The acts of Cross-Defendant LEGGITT were a proximate cause of actual damages suffered by Cross-Complainants. As a proximate result of LEGGIT’S conduct Cross-Complainants have suffered damages in the following amounts:

“VRBO $20,947.26

“Air BnB $61,264.96

“Subtotal $82,212.22

“Personal Rental +. $18,000.00

“Three Bedroom Home Garage Conversion garage conversion would’ve been One

Bedroom $33,000 annually = $59,400 1/3rd the price approx.

Total $159,612.22”

Leggitt argues that the only specific conduct the Singhs alleged he engaged in that constitutes “interference” is a result of this litigation. Specifically, the language included in paragraph 127 that alleges as follows: “Cross-Defendant knew the worth of making properties ready for market and/or rentals, and that a lawsuit would cause expensive delays.”

Leggitt further argues that the language in paragraph 126 that states : “Included in the disputes was the demand that Cross-Complainants tear down half of their long-standing GARAGE and other improvements and surrender the use of half of their ten-foot driveway/sideyard,” is protected because the demand was first made during the September 8, 2023, Mandatory Settlement Conference and is therefore covered under the litigation privilege.

A.        Litigation privilege

Under Civil Code section 47(b), a publication or broadcast made in a judicial proceeding is privileged.

The litigation privilege codified in Civil Code section 47, applies to any publication required or permitted by law in the course of a judicial proceeding to achieve the objects of the litigation, even though the publication is made outside the courtroom and no function of the court or its officers is involved. (Albertson v. Raboff (1956) 46 Cal.2d 375, 381.) The usual formulation is that the privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action. (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 213-214.)

The principal purpose of the litigation privilege is to afford litigants and witnesses the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions. (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 213.) To achieve this purpose, courts have given the litigation privilege a broad interpretation. (Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1241.) Other purposes underlying the litigation privilege include the promotion of the effectiveness of judicial proceedings by encouraging open channels of communication and the presentation of evidence in judicial proceedings; assurance of the utmost freedom of communication between citizens and public authorities whose responsibility is to investigate and remedy wrongdoing; promotion of the effectiveness of judicial proceedings by encouraging attorneys to zealously protect their clients’ interests; and enhancement of the finality of judgments by avoiding “an unending roundelay of litigation.” (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 213-214.)

The privilege is a matter of substantive law and, when applicable, is absolute, because it applies regardless of the communicator’s motives, morals, ethics, or intent. (Id. at pp. 216, 220.)

The litigation privilege has been held applicable to all torts except malicious prosecution; malicious prosecution actions are permitted because the policy of encouraging free access to the courts is outweighed by the policy of affording redress for individual wrongs when the requirements of favorable termination, lack of probable cause, and malice are satisfied. (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 215-216, citing Albertson v. Raboff, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 382.) The privilege has been held to immunize defendants from tort liability based on theories of abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional inducement of breach of contract, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, negligent misrepresentation, invasion of privacy, negligence, and fraud (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d  at p. 215), as well as suits to enjoin tortious conduct, and suits alleging interference with contract and related claims, including unfair competition. (Rubin v. Green (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1187, 1201-1203 [plaintiff may not plead around the privilege barrier by relabeling the nature of the action].).

With respect to the language in paragraph 127, the Singhs indicate that the financial interference is the “expensive delays” associated with Leggitt filing a lawsuit against them. The filing of the original complaint is clearly protected under the litigation privilege. Leggitt has therefore satisfied the first prong with respect to paragraph 127 by establishing that the claim arises from protected activity.

With respect to the language in paragraph 126, Leggitt argues that the demand that the Singhs “tear down half of the long-standing GARAGE and other improvements and surrender the use of half their ten-foot driveway/sideyard,” was first made during the September 8, 2023 settlement conference and is also protected by the litigation privilege. In support, Leggitt provides the declaration of his attorney stating: “I made this demand on behalf of my client at the first Mandatory Settlement Conference in this case, which occurred September 8, 2023.” (Carralejo Dec., ¶ 3.) Leggitt has satisfied the first prong with respect to paragraph 128 by establishing that the claim arises from protected activity.

 

3.         Second Prong

“If the court determines that relief is sought based on allegations arising from activity protected by the statute, the second step is reached. There, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated. The court, without resolving evidentiary conflicts, must determine whether the plaintiff’s showing, if accepted by the trier of fact, would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. If not, the claim is stricken. Allegations of protected activity supporting the stricken claim are eliminated from the complaint, unless they also support a distinct claim on which the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing.” (Baral v. Schnitt, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396.)

The litigation privilege is relevant to the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis in that it may present a substantive defense which plaintiff must overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing. (JSJ Limited Partnership v. Mehrban (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1512, 1522.) A plaintiff cannot establish a probability of prevailing if the litigation privilege precludes the defendant’s liability on the claim. (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 323.)

“ ‘To demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits, the plaintiff must show that the complaint is legally sufficient and must present a prima facie showing of facts that, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor. [Citations.] The plaintiff’s showing of facts must consist of evidence that would be admissible at trial. . . . [Citations.]” (JSJ Limited Partnership v. Mehrban, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1521.)

At this second stage, “a plaintiff seeking to demonstrate the merit of the claim ‘may not rely solely on its complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon competent admissible evidence.’ ” (Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 940.)

           

The Singhs opposition sets forth legal authority pertaining to anti-SLAPP motions in general, as well as authority regarding violation of the Unfair Business Practices Act. However, there is no application of any of the authorities to the present motion. The Singhs do not provide any evidence that the sixth cause of action arises from anything other than protected activity. In fact, the Singhs provide no evidence in opposition whatsoever, and they do not even dispute, in the opposition itself, that the sixth cause of action is brought as the result of Leggitt filing his original complaint against them. The Singhs have failed to show that the claim is legally sufficient, factually substantiated, or that they have any probability of prevailing.

Because the sixth cause of action for interference with prospective advantage is based upon protected activity, and the Singhs have not met their burden of showing otherwise, or that they have any probability of prevailing on the claim, the motion to strike will be granted as to the sixth cause of action.

4. Attorney Fees and Costs

With exceptions not present here, “a prevailing defendant [or cross-defendant] on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (c)(1).) The court will address attorney fees separately by noticed motion to be filed by Leggitt.