Estrellas Land Holding LLC vs Valley Heart Ranch LLC et al

Case Number

22CV02689

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 05/16/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Bifurcation; Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling

(1)       For the reasons set forth herein, the motion of plaintiff Estrellas Land Holding, LLC, for summary judgment is denied.

(2)       For the reasons set forth herein, the motion of defendant and cross-complainant Valley Heart Ranch, LLC, and defendants Darrell W. Becker and Kirsten K. Becker to bifurcate this action is denied.

Background:

(1)       Facts Supporting Summary Judgment

In the separate statement supporting its motion for summary judgment against defendants Valley Heart Ranch, LLC (Valley Heart), Darrell W. Becker, and Kirsten K. Becker (collectively, Whitney Defendants), plaintiff Estrellas Land Holding, LLC (Estrellas or plaintiff) relies upon the following facts (citing to separate statement “common” fact numbers and noting asserted disputes):

On November 21, 2018, Estrellas purchased 2560 Whitney Ave, Summerland, California 93067, known as Assessor Parcel No. 005-160-073 (2560 Whitney). (Whitney Defendants’ Response Separate Statement [DSS], fact 1 [disputed on evidentiary grounds by Whitney Defendants (discussed below)].) Estrellas secured a permit to begin construction on May 8, 2018, and by July 2021, Estrellas was nearly finished with construction. (DSS, fact 2 [disputed on evidentiary grounds].)

On July 20, 2021, Valley Heart acquired the adjacent parcel, 2556/2558 Whitney Avenue, Summerland, CA 93607 (collectively, 2556 Whitney). (DSS, undisputed fact 3.) Darrell Becker and Kirsten Becker are currently living in the house at 2556 Whitney. (DSS, undisputed fact 4.)

2560 Whitney shares a common east/west boundary with the real property located at 2556 Whitney, with 2560 Whitney located downslope and to the east of 2556 Whitney. (DSS, undisputed fact 5.)

As set forth in recorded documents, as early as 1890, the 2560 Whitney and 2556 Whitney parcels were part of a townsite known as the City of Summerland, which was owned and subdivided by one H. L. Williams. (DSS, fact 6 [undisputed on this point]. By way of such Indenture, Williams did “give, grant and dedicate unto public use all those … parks, streets, squares, avenues, places, lanes, and alleys” marked on a certain map representing a survey made by A.S. Cooper, County Surveyor, filed for record on December 18, 1888, in the office of the County Recorder, in Rack 1 of Maps, Map No. 2, Santa Barbara County Records, which map expressly depicted the portions of Whitney Avenue that are relevant to this dispute. (Ibid.)

On September 25, 1890, the Board of Supervisors of Santa Barbara County, adopted Ordinance No. 125, whereby it was ordained that “Whitney Avenue …. has been accepted … for and in behalf of the public,” whereupon the County of Santa Barbara (the County) came to own the relevant portions of Whitney Avenue. (DSS, fact 7 [undisputed on this point].) Subsequently, certain parties filed a petition seeking the discontinuance and abandonment of portions of public streets and roads in Summerland including the relevant portions of Whitney Avenue. On October 7, 1940, the Board of Supervisors granted the petition and abandoned and vacated the “[p]ortion of Whitney Ave. between Olive St. and Greenwell Ave….” (DSS, fact 8 [disputed on evidentiary grounds].)

In 1958, the City of Santa Barbara (the City) abandoned Whitney Avenue after which portions of the land were conveyed to the neighboring landowners, including 2556 Whitney (a similar rectangular area was conveyed to 2560 Whitney, and is visible along the southeast edge of Estrellas’s parcel). (DSS, fact 9 [undisputed on this point].) The deed of Joseph H. Lewis and Buena V. Lewis, recorded on June 27, 1985, (the Lewis Deed) reflects the existence of “[a]n easement as an appurtenance to lands [in Block 7 and Block 8 of Summerland] for private driveway and public utilities purposes for use in common with others, in, on, over, along, and under a strip of land 60 feet in width, the center line of which is described as [the center line of abandoned Whitney Avenue between Olive Street and Greenwell Avenue]….” (DSS, fact 9 [undisputed on this point].) Around the same time, Lewis granted to Southern Counties Gas Company of California the “right to excavate for, install, maintain, remove or replace … gas pipes, mains [etc. in the same strip of former Whitney Avenue].” (DSS, fact 10 [undisputed on this point].)

The Valley Heart property was conveyed by a deed dated March 3, 1964, and recorded March 4, 1964, which reflected that “an easement for private roadway and public utility purposes for use in common with others in, on, on, over, along, and under a strip of land 60 feet in width [along the center line of] Whitney Avenue (now abandoned)….” (DSS, fact 11 [undisputed on this point].)

The Estrellas property was conveyed by a deed dated December 6, 1973, and recorded December 18, 1973, which likewise showed that the property enjoyed “[p]rivate easements over that portion of said land within Whitney Avenue … for ingress and egress in favor of the owners of the Lots in said tract….” (DSS, fact 12 [undisputed on this point].) An aerial photograph shows the respective parcels and segments of the parcels. (DSS, facts 13-17, 19 [undisputed on this point].)

The former owners of 2556 Whitney granted 2560 Whitney an easement for ingress and egress by Grant of Easement dated May 23, 2015 and recorded it with the Santa Barbara County Clerk Recorder on May 22, 2015 (the Grant of Easement) as Document 2015- 0026329. (DSS, fact 18 [undisputed on this point].) Specifically, the Grant of Easement established a “nonexclusive easement for ingress, egress, public and private utilities and incidental purposes over, under, across and through [Part 3] along with the right to install appropriate driveway and access improvements” in favor of 2560 Whitney. (Ibid.)

Utility providers are entitled to use the land within this former public way, including the rectangular area labeled “4” in the aerial photograph, for the purpose of conducting and conveying electricity, water, and gas. (DSS, fact 20 [disputed on evidentiary grounds].)

On October 22, 2020, plaintiff’s agent Beau Schmidt received verbal authorization from Elaine Poole, the prior owner of 2556 Whitney, to install the utility junction box at the location chosen by Southern California Edison Company (Edison) on the north side of the easement. (DSS, fact 21 [disputed on evidentiary grounds].) Schmidt also discussed the utility placement with the prior owner’s son, Joe Poole, who also approved its location. (Ibid.)

Approximately 21 months after the prior owner’s approval to install the utility junction box, Becker purchased 2556 Whitney on July 20, 2021. (DSS, fact 22 [undisputed on this point].) Subsequently, Becker approached plaintiff with a proposal concerning the relocation of the utility box. (Ibid.)

On February 2, 2022, Schmidt met with Becker. (DSS, fact 23 [undisputed on this point].) Estrellas and Becker entered into an agreement where plaintiff agreed to relocate the utility box 2 feet over and set up so that it could be used by both 2556 Whitney and 2560 Whitney. (Ibid.) In exchange, Becker agreed that he would pay half of the cost to relocate the utility box and that he would provide consent to the utility companies to start providing service to 2560 Whitney. (Ibid.)

Pursuant to its agreement with Becker, plaintiff moved the utility box at its own expense to the agreed upon location on February 23, 2022. (DSS, fact 24 [disputed on evidentiary grounds].) Becker spray painted the exact location where he wanted the utility box moved. (Ibid.) Plaintiff also provided the hookups necessary for 2556 Whitney to connect to the utility box as Becker had requested. (Ibid.) Once the utility box was relocated, on February 23, 2022, Estrellas requested that the utility companies servicing the 2560 Whitney property—namely, Edison and Southern California Gas Company (SoCal Gas)—connect the utilities to the 2560 Whitney property and begin running electricity and gas to the property and the residence located thereon. (DSS, fact 25 [disputed on evidentiary grounds].) At the time of Estrellas’s request for service, the residence on the 2560 Whitney property was mostly complete but could not be occupied until the utilities were connected and providing service. (Ibid.)

Edison and SoCal Gas have existing utility easements to supply both electricity and gas to 2560 Whitney. (DSS, fact 26 [undisputed on this point].)

In response, representatives from both Edison and SoCal Gas informed Estrellas that they could not activate the utility lines running to the 2560 Whitney property until all the owners of the properties through which the utility lines ran consented to their activation. (DSS, fact 27 [disputed on evidentiary grounds].) In other words, Edison and SoCal Gas would not begin running electric power and gas to 2560 Whitney until Becker and other neighbors had signed authorization forms, consenting to the installation of the utilities. (Ibid.)

All of the neighboring property owners, except Valley Heart, signed the authorizations. (DSS, fact 28 [disputed on evidentiary grounds].) When Becker, acting on behalf of Valley Heart, was presented with the authorization forms required by Edison and SoCal Gas to hook up the utilities at 2560 Whitney, Becker refused to sign the forms. (DSS, fact 29 [disputed on evidentiary grounds].) Becker demanded that Estrellas consent to (and refrain from objecting to) a proposed modification of the Valley Heart site, including a new, larger house, an Accessory Dwelling Unit (ADU), a sport court, a freestanding underground garage, enormous retaining walls, and various other improvements that would require massive grading and site modification on the 2556 Whitney property. (DSS, fact 30 [disputed on evidentiary grounds].)

According to Estrellas, the Santa Barbara County Planning & Development Department (County Planning) issued a Stop Order on June 28, 2022 and a Notice of Violation on July 5, 2022, for the construction taking place on the Estrellas property. (Plaintiff’s Separate Statement [PSS], fact 31.) According to the Whitney Defendants, on November 9, 2021, the County posted a Stop Work Order at 2560 Whitney, which was issued as a result of unpermitted grading and wall construction work as part of the Estrellas Project. (DSS, response to fact 31.) The Stop Work Order was issued with respect to 2560 Whitney’s driveway due to the fact that the driveway encroaches on Valley Heart’s property, was not built per plan, has safety issues, and interrupts historical drainage. (Ibid.)

On August 8, 2023, County Planning rescinded the Stop Work Order posted at 2560 Whitney. (DSS, fact 32 [undisputed on this point].) In the letter, County Planning referred to the Grant of Easement dated May 12, 2015, between the former owners of 2560 and 2556, which notes that the easement is a “nonexclusive easement for ingress, egress, public and private utilities and incidental purposes over, under, across and through a triangular portion of land described and depicted … along with the right to install appropriate driveway and access improvements.” (Ibid.)

On August 12, 2024 , the County approved Estrellas’s site plans (Site Plans), which among other things, included access and utility improvements across the easements. (DSS, fact 33 [disputed on evidentiary grounds].) In approving Estrellas’s Site Plans, the County issued a Minor Change (Revision) to the permit issued on May 8, 2018 (the 2018 Permit). (DSS, fact 34 [undisputed on this point].) The Revision allowed Estrellas to proceed with the work outlined in the Site Plan. (Ibid.)

The owners of 2560 Whitney have been unable to move into the property even six years after it purchased 2560 Whitney because it cannot be inhabited until the utilities are in service and it receives a certificate of occupancy. (DSS, fact 35 [disputed on evidentiary grounds].)

(2)       Procedural History

On July 13, 2022, plaintiff Estrellas filed its original complaint in this action against the Whitney Defendants, Edison, and SoCal Gas, asserting causes of action for promissory estoppel, civil extortion, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief. On September 7, Estrellas requested, and the court entered, dismissal without prejudice as to Edison and SoCal Gas.

On October 19, 2022, Estrellas filed its first amended complaint (FAC) against the Whitney Defendants only, asserting causes of action for breach of contract and declaratory relief (interference with easement). On November 18, 2022, the Whitney Defendants filed their answer to the FAC, generally denying the allegations thereof and asserting 20 affirmative defenses. The Whitney Defendants concurrently filed a cross-complaint against Estrellas asserting causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of agreement to negotiate agreement, trespass, nuisance (easement), nuisance (drainage), and declaratory relief. On January 19, 2023, Estrellas filed its answer to the cross-complaint, generally denying the allegations thereof and asserting 30 affirmative defenses.

On March 26, 2024, by order of the court on the stipulation of the parties, Estrellas filed its second amended complaint (SAC), asserting six causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) quiet title to easement by necessity; (3) equitable easement interest; (4) easement by estoppel; (5) declaratory relief (interference with easement); and (6) professional negligence. The first through fifth causes of action are asserted against the Whitney Defendants. The sixth cause of action is asserted against newly added defendants Manifest Building, dba EcoLawn SB (EcoLawn SB), and Javier Construction, Inc. (Javier Construction) (collectively, Construction Defendants). (Note: The caption of the SAC lists four causes of action; the text of the SAC identifies these six causes of action.)

On September 10, 2024, by order of the court on the stipulation of the parties, Estrellas filed its verified third amended complaint (TAC), the operative complaint. The TAC asserts the same six causes of action as in the SAC (but again listing only four in the caption).

On November 8, 2024, defendant Javier Construction filed its cross-complaint for indemnity (Javier Cross-Complaint) against the Whitney Defendants and EcoLawn SB.

 

On November 12, 2024, Javier Construction filed its answer to the TAC, denying the allegations thereof and asserting nine affirmative defenses.

On December 16, 2024, the Whitney Defendants filed their answer to the Javier Cross-Complaint, generally denying the allegations thereof and asserting eight affirmative defenses.

On February 4, 2025, EcoLawn SB filed its answer to the TAC, admitting and denying allegations therein and asserting 18 affirmative defenses.

On February 24, 2025, Estrellas filed this motion for “summary judgment” as to causes of action two and five of the TAC.

On April 24, 2025, the Whitney Defendants filed this additional motion for bifurcation of equitable claims and to allow those claims to be tried first. (The motion for bifurcation is discussed below.) On April 28, 2025, EcoLawn SB filed its notice of non-opposition to the bifurcation motion.

On May 2, 2025, the Whitney Defendants filed their opposition to the motion for summary judgment.

On May 5, 2025, Valley Heart filed its ex parte application to continue trial and to continue the hearing on this motion for summary judgment. Valley Heart noted that through a calendaring error, the opposition to the motion for summary judgment was filed 14 days prior to the hearing date rather than 20 days. Also on May 5, Estrellas filed its opposition to the motion to bifurcate.

On May 6, the court heard and denied the ex parte application to continue trial and the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. The court ruled that the opposition to the motion would not be stricken and Estrellas would be permitted to file reply papers by May 12.

On May 12, Estrellas filed its reply papers.

Analysis:

(1)       Motion for Summary Judgment

“A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(1).)

“For purposes of motions for summary judgment and summary adjudication: [¶] (1) A plaintiff … has met that party’s burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action. Once the plaintiff … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant … to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. The defendant … shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).)

            (A)       Procedural Issues

                        (i)        Scope of Motion

The scope of this motion is unclear. Plaintiff identifies this motion, both in its caption and in its notice as a “motion for summary judgment.” As Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (a)(1), quoted above, points out, “summary judgment” is appropriate for a plaintiff only where there is no defense to the “action,” thus entitling the plaintiff for judgment in the action. Instead, plaintiff seeks to adjudicate only its second and fifth causes of action; plaintiff does not seek to adjudicate its first (for breach of contract), third (equitable easement interest), or fourth (easement by estoppel) causes of action against the Whitney Defendants. The motion does not mention either the sixth cause of action or the Construction Defendants. Plaintiff is therefore not entitled to summary judgment on the face of the notice of motion.

“The language in Code of Civil Procedure section 437c subdivision (f) makes it clear that a motion for summary adjudication cannot be considered by the court unless the party bringing the motion duly gives notice that summary adjudication is being sought.” (Gonzales v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1542, 1545-1546.)

Plaintiff’s notice of motion does not directly state that it is seeking summary adjudication of the second and fifth causes of action as separate from summary judgment. Making this even more confusing, plaintiff has failed to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350:

“If made in the alternative, a motion for summary adjudication may make reference to and depend on the same evidence submitted in support of the summary judgment motion. If summary adjudication is sought, whether separately or as an alternative to the motion for summary judgment, the specific cause of action, affirmative defense, claims for damages, or issues of duty must be stated specifically in the notice of motion and be repeated, verbatim, in the separate statement of undisputed material facts.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(b).)

Plaintiff’s separate statement has three sections: facts 1 through 35 under the heading, “undisputed material facts common to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment”; facts 1 through 25 under the heading, “Issue No. 1 [¶] There are no triable issues of material fact on Estrellas’s second cause of action for easement by necessity, and Estrellas is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”; and facts 1 through 35 under the heading, “Issue No. 2 [¶] There are no triable issues of material fact on Estrellas’s fifth cause of action for declaratory relief (interference with easement), and Estrellas is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Capitalization altered; underscoring and bolding omitted.) The existence of the first section referring “facts common to plaintiff’s motion” and the citation of only to these facts in the motion suggests that plaintiff relies upon the first 35 separate statement facts in support of both summary judgment and summary adjudication. The two issues of the next two sections suggests that plaintiff alternatively seeks summary adjudication with additional facts. Nothing is repeated verbatim as required by rule 3.1350.

The failure to comply with rule 3.1350 and the absence of any reference to summary adjudication is a sufficient basis to deny the motion in its entirety.

Alternatively, assuming that the motion sufficiently seeks summary adjudication of the second and fifth causes of action, there are additional reasons why the motion must be denied, as set forth below.

                        (ii)       Objections

In opposition to the motion, the Whitney Defendants object to evidence presented in the declaration of Keith Slocum (located as exhibit 1 in volume 1 of plaintiff’s compendium of evidence and originally filed in support of another motion) in part on the basis of a lack of personal knowledge. For example, paragraph 3 of the Slocum declaration states: “On or about November 21, 2018, ELH purchased 2560 Whitney Ave, Summerland, California 93067, known as Assessor Parcel No. 005-160-073 (‘2560 Whitney’).” The first two paragraphs of the Slocum declaration are:

“I am the President of Utility Consulting Partners. I submit this declaration in support of ELH’s Ex Parte Application to Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause re: Preliminary Injunction.” (Slocum decl., ¶ 1.)

“I have personal knowledge of the facts and matters set forth in this declaration and, if called as a witness, could and would testify competently to such facts under oath.” (Slocum decl., ¶ 2.)

“Supporting and opposing affidavits or declarations shall be made by a person on personal knowledge, shall set forth admissible evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated in the affidavits or declarations.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (d).) A conclusory recital, as in paragraph 2 of the Slocum declaration, is insufficient to show affirmatively that Slocum has personal knowledge of the matters set forth in the declaration. (See Evid. Code, § 702, subd. (a); Mamou v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 686, 692, fn. 1; Snider v. Snider (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 741, 754 [“Where the facts stated do not themselves show it, such bare statement of the affiant has no redeeming value and should be ignored.”].)

Here, the statement that Slocum is president of Utility Consulting Partners is insufficient to explain how or why Slocum would have personal knowledge of such matters. There is no statement of what Utility Consulting Partners is or does. Although Slocum is referenced in the reply and response to objections as the plaintiff’s expert consultant, no facts are provided to explain how Slocum would have the personal knowledge asserted in the declaration (and no qualifications are stated to provide a foundation for an expert opinion.) Plaintiff does not otherwise give any citation to any other evidence presented in support of the motion that would provide a basis for this personal knowledge. Accordingly, the Whitney Defendants’ objections A, B, C, D, E, F, and G (to paragraphs 3, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 27 of the Slocum declaration) are sustained.

The Whitney Defendants further object in their DSS and in evidentiary objections that PSS facts 21, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, and 30 are not supported by the evidence cited.

An example is PSS fact 27: “Pursuant to its agreement with Becker, Plaintiff moved the utility box at its own expense to the agreed upon location on or about February 23, 2022. Becker spray painted the exact location where he wanted the utility box moved. Plaintiff also provided the hookups necessary for 2556 Whitney to connect to the utility box, as Becker had requested.” The evidence cited is “TAC ¶ 7.” PSS fact 27 is most of paragraph 7 of the TAC verbatim.

“The motion shall be supported by affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice shall or may be taken. The supporting papers shall include a separate statement setting forth plainly and concisely all material facts that the moving party contends are undisputed. Each of the material facts stated shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence. The failure to comply with this requirement of a separate statement may in the court’s discretion constitute a sufficient ground for denying the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(1).)

“It is generally understood … that a party cannot rely on the allegations of his own pleadings, even if verified, to make or supplement the evidentiary showing required in the summary judgment context.” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 720, fn. 1; accord, Roman v. BRE Properties, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1054 [“Citation to their own pleading is meaningless”].)

Consequently, PSS facts 21, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, and 30 are not supported. Having included these facts in the separate statement and not supported them by evidence, either the separate statement is nonconforming (and therefore the motion will be denied under section 437c, subdivision (b)(1)), or, having conceded the materiality of these separate statement facts, plaintiff has failed to meet its initial burden on summary judgments under subdivision (p)(1).

                        (iii)      Reply Separate Statement

In reply, plaintiff filed a response separate statement. Effective January 1, 2025, section 437c, subdivision (b)(4) reads (Stats. 2024, ch. 99, § 1) in relevant part:

“The reply shall not include any new evidentiary matter, additional material facts, or separate statement submitted with the reply and not presented in the moving papers or opposing papers.”

The court will disregard the reply separate statement.

                        (iv)      Requests for Judicial Notice

In support of its motion, Estrellas requests that the court take judicial notice of: (1, Plaintiff’s Exhibits, exhibit 5) the “Indenture dated as of August 8, 1890, Book 27 of Deeds, pages 615-619, Santa Barbara County Records; A.S. Cooper, County Surveyor, Subdivision Map, Map No. 2, Santa Barbara County Records filed for record on December 18, 1888, in the office of the County Recorder, in Rack 1 of Maps, Santa Barbara County Records”; (2, Plaintiff’s Exhibits, exhibit 6) the “September 25, 1890 Board of Supervisors of Santa Barbara County, Ordinance No. 125”; (3, Plaintiff’s Exhibits, exhibit 8) the “Deed of Joseph H. Lewis and Buena V. Lewis (the Lewis Deed) recorded on June 27, 1958, in Volume 1534, pages 562-564, Official Records of Santa Barbara County”; (4, Plaintiff’s Exhibits, exhibit 9) the “Grant of Easement dated September 17, 1958, recorded October 7, 1958 in Volume 1560, pages 289-290, Official Records of Santa Barbara County”; (5, Plaintiff’s Exhibits, exhibit 10) the “Deed dated March 3, 1964, and recorded March 4, 1964 in Volume 2038, pages 1008-1009, Official Records of Santa Barbara County”; (6, Plaintiff’s Exhibits, exhibit 11) the “Deed dated December 6, 1973, and recorded December 18, 1973 in Volume 2493, pages 153-154, Official Records of Santa Barbara County.”

The court will grant these requests for judicial notice. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c), (h).) Judicial notice does not extend to the proper interpretation of recorded documents. (Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.)

            (B)       Summary Adjudication

As discussed above, the court alternatively finds that plaintiff has not met its initial burden because of material facts asserted its separate statement that are not supported by evidence. The court additionally, and also alternatively, finds that Estrella has failed to meet its initial burden because of the underlying nature of the two causes of action it seemingly seeks to summarily adjudicate.

The second cause of action is to quiet title as to an easement by necessity. “It goes without saying that, where it is sought to have it decreed that real property of a person is subject to a use or easement in favor of another, the property affected must be described in the pleadings with such certainty as to enable the party against whom the claim is made to definitely know exactly what portion of his property is so claimed, and the judgment establishing the validity of the claim must be definite and certain as to the property affected.” (Leverone v. Weakley (1909) 155 Cal. 395, 398.)

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)

As identified above, the separate statement facts in support of the motion do not identify the exact location or scope of use of the easement which plaintiff claims as an easement by necessity. Summary adjudication of this cause of action as requested by Estrellas would not therefore completely dispose of this cause of action. This conclusion is consistent with the requirement in quiet title actions that the court shall “in all cases require evidence of plaintiff’s title and hear such evidence as may be offered respecting the claims of any of the defendants, other than claims the validity of which is admitted by the plaintiff in the complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 764.010.)

Alternatively, plaintiff’s own evidence, construed under the standards for summary judgment, present conflicting inferences that preclude summary adjudication.

“The circumstances for the creation of an easement by necessity in California are well known: ‘An easement by way of necessity arises by operation of law when it is established that (1) there is a strict necessity for the right-of-way, as when the claimant’s property is landlocked and (2) the dominant and servient tenements were under the same ownership at the time of the conveyance giving rise to the necessity.’ [Citations.]” (Kellogg v. Garcia (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 796, 803.) “Hence, the law ‘ “never imposes ... an easement by necessity contrary to the express intent of the parties” ’ since it is based on an inferred intent arising from the strict necessity of access for the conveyed property. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 804.)

In reply, Estrellas asserts that their facts, as they characterize them, also establish that easement rights are express. (Reply, at p. 7, fn. 1.) Under the standards for summary adjudication, this creates a triable issue of fact because an express easement, if it exists, negates the “strict necessity” element and otherwise would affect the scope and location of any easement by necessity. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c) [“summary judgment shall not be granted by the court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence if contradicted by other inferences or evidence that raise a triable issue as to any material fact”].)

Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action is for declaratory relief. For the same reasons discussed above, plaintiff has alternatively failed to meet it initial burden on summary adjudication.

In each and all of these alternatives, Estrellas has failed to establish its entitlement to summary judgment or summary adjudication. The motion will therefore be denied in its entirety.

(2)       Bifurcation Motion

The Whitney Defendants move to bifurcate trial into a phase one court trial of equitable issues (plaintiff’s second, third, and fourth causes of action in the TAC, and Valley Heart’s seventh causes of action in the cross-complaint) to be followed by a phase two jury trial of the remaining causes of action. The Whitney Defendants argue that the primary issues in this case “are equitable in nature and concern the existence, scope, and location of any access and utility easement over Defendants’ property.” (Bifurcation Motion, at p. 2.) The Whitney Defendants argue that these issues must be resolved before any claim of damages, which would likely be heard by a jury. The Whitney Defendants assert that bifurcation will streamline the proceedings and conserve the parties’ and judicial resources.

Defendant and cross-defendant EcoLawn SB expressly does not oppose the motion.

Estrellas opposes the motion. Estrellas argues that the legal and equitable issues in this action are so intertwined that bifurcation would not promote efficiency, but would instead prolong the proceedings.

As discussed by all parties in their papers, the court has considerable discretion in determining the sequencing of trial and the order of determination of equitable and legal issues.

“The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action, including a cause of action asserted in a cross-complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of causes of action or issues, preserving the right of trial by jury required by the Constitution or a statute of this state or of the United States.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1048, subd. (b).)

“It is well established that, in a case involving both legal and equitable issues, the trial court may proceed to try the equitable issues first, without a jury (or, as here, with an advisory jury), and that if the court’s determination of those issues is also dispositive of the legal issues, nothing further remains to be tried by a jury.” (Raedeke v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan Assn. (1974) 10 Cal.3d 665, 671, italics added.)

Under the circumstances here, the evidence to be presented by both sides will likely overlap the legal and equitable issues. From the perspective of trial management, the court finds it most efficient for all of the evidence to be presented in one proceeding. The court will determine how to sequence the determination of legal and equitable issues in the context of its trial orders.

The motion to bifurcate this action will therefore be denied.